ORDER S. P. Bhargava, J. This revision application is filed by the plaintiffs who had instituted a suit for declaration and possession valued at Rs, 5,200 in the Court of Civil Judge Class I, Sehore. The suit was registered as Civil Suit No. 22-A of 1962 and was decided on 20-9-1963. The suit was decreed with costs. The applicants feeling aggrieved by the said decree filed a regular civil appeal which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 280 of 1963 in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Sehore, on 20-10-1963. The said appeal continued to be pending in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Sehore, till 19-7-1966 on which date it was ordered to be presented to the proper Court for the reason that the Additional District Judge, Sehore, had no jurisdiction to hear appeals valued over Rs. 5,000 and therefore it should have been filed before the District Judge, Bhopal. On 20-7-1966 the appeal so returned was filed before the District Judge, Bhopal, accompanied by an application for condonation of delay under sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. The application for condonation was supported by an affidavit of the first applicant. The learned District Judge, Bhopal, by his order dated 17-12-1966, held that the applicants were not entitled to have the delay condoned. He therefore dismissed their application for condonation of delay. Feeling aggrieved against the said order, the applicants have filed this revision. The contention advanced on behalf of the applicants is that the appeal as presented before the Additional District Judge, Sehore, did not suffer from any defect of presentation as the Court of Additional District Judge, Sehore, did not form a separate Court but was attached to the District Court, Bhopal, and formed part of it and therefore the presentation of the appeal before the said Additional District Judge should be held to be a presentation to the District Court itself for purposes of limitation. The learned counsel placed reliance on the view taken by this Court in Sukhul v. Nanhoo 1918 N L J 4 : A I R 1917 Nag. 162, AIR 1928 199 (Nagpur) , AIR 1937 80 (Nagpur) , Gulabchand Kanhayalal v. Kishanlal Kanhayalal Teli 1938 N L J 454 : A I R 1939 Nag. 42 and AIR 1942 5 (Nagpur) . 162, AIR 1928 199 (Nagpur) , AIR 1937 80 (Nagpur) , Gulabchand Kanhayalal v. Kishanlal Kanhayalal Teli 1938 N L J 454 : A I R 1939 Nag. 42 and AIR 1942 5 (Nagpur) . It was further contended on behalf of the applicants that in any case they had a good case for condonation of delay and the lower appellate Court had erred in not condoning the delay. Having heard the learned counsel on both sides, I am of the view that there is no substance in this revision application and it must be dismissed. All the decisions on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the applicants are under the Central Provinces and Berar Courts Act, 1917 (Central Provinces Act No. 1 of 1917). According to section 14 of that Act, there were three classes of civil Courts in the territories to which the said Act extended namely- (a) the District Court, (b) the Court of the Subordinate Judge of the First Class, and (c) the Court of the Subordinate Judge of the Second Class. The Courts (b) and (c) were subsequently substituted by the Court of Civil Judge, Class I and the Court of Civil Judge, Class II, respectively, by section 2 of the C. P. and Berar Courts (Amendment) Act, 1945 (No. 9 of 1945). However, the scheme of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1958, which replaced the C. P. and Berar Courts Act, 1917, is different. By the Madhya Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1958 (hereinafter called the Act), the structure, jurisdiction and classification of civil Courts in force in the different integrating units of the new State of Madhya Pradesh in regard to the Constitution and powers of the civil Courts subordinate to the High Court were brought into complete uniformity in the whole of the new State, and the different nomenclature and classification of the Courts which were prevalent in the different integrating units before were repealed. The repealing section is section 24 in the Act. Section 3 enacted that in addition to the Courts established under any other law for the time being in force, there shall be the following classes of civil Courts, namely:- (1) the Court of the District Judge; (2) the Court of the Additional District Judge; (3) the Court of the Civil Judge (Class I); and (4) the Court of the Civil Judge (Class II). Section 5 requires the State Government to establish (a) the Court of the District Judge for each civil district, and (b) so many Court of Additional District Judges, Civil Judges (Class I) and Civil Judges (Class II) for each civil district, as it may think fit. Section 6 provides for the original jurisdiction of civil Courts. In clause (1) (c) it is said that the Court of the District Judge and the Court of the Additional District Judge shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any suit or original proceeding without restriction as regards value. Section 7 is important. It enacts: "7. Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction.- (1) The Court of the District Judge shall be the principal Court of original jurisdiction in the civil district. (2) An Additional District Judge shall discharge any of the functions of a District Judge, including the functions of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, which the District Judge may by general or special order assign to him and in the discharge of such functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge. Section 13 provides for the appellate jurisdiction and lays down- Appellate jurisdiction.-(1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, appeals from decree or order of Courts exercising original jurisdiction shall lie as follows:- (a) from a decree or order of the Court of the Civil Judge (Class I) or of the Civil Judge (Class II)-to the Court of the District Judge; (b) from a decree or order of the Court of the District Judge or Additional District Judge-to the High Court. (2) Notwithstanding the fact that a suit or proceeding was instituted or commenced prior to the commencement of this Act, an appeal against any decree or order passed in such suit or proceeding shall lie as provided in sub-section (1). (3) Nothing in this section shall apply to any appeal instituted before the commencement of this Act. For the purposes of this revision, it is not necessary to specifically refer to other provisions in the Act. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that according to the Act, the Additional District Judge is not a part of the Court of the District Judge. The Court of the Additional District Judge is constituted under the Act a distinct class of Court. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that according to the Act, the Additional District Judge is not a part of the Court of the District Judge. The Court of the Additional District Judge is constituted under the Act a distinct class of Court. u/s 7(2) an Additional District Judge is empowered to discharge any of the functions of the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction but subject to the condition that the District Judge, by general or special order, assigns to him those functions. It is thus clear that the Additional District Judge, for hearing appeals which have been assigned to him, has the same powers as the District Judge but these powers are limited only to the cases with which he is entitled to deal. It is common ground that the Additional District Judge at Sehore was authorised by the District Judge only to hear appeals upto the valuation of Bs. 5,000. Therefore he was competent in dealing with appeals, which the District Judge was himself competent to entertain upto that value but not beyond. The limitation created by section 7(2) is a very different thing from the administrative distribution of work among the Judges of a single Court entitled to divide itself into sections and sit as division Courts. A comparison of the language used in section 6(1)(c) and section 7(2) makes it clear that whereas jurisdiction in respect of a suit or original proceeding without restriction as regards value has been conferred on the Court of the Additional District Judge, it has not been similarly empowered with regard to its functions as an appellate tribunal. Before the enactment of the Act in 1958, the Court of the Additional District Judge in Central Provinces did not form a separate Court but was attached to the District Court and formed part of it and therefore the presentation of an appeal which should have been filed before the District Judge but was wrongly filed before an Additional District Judge was held not to raise a question of presentation because the presentation to an Additional District Judge was really a presentation to the District Court itself for purposes of limitation. The decisions of the Nagpur High Court, referred to above, relied upon on behalf of the applicants, can have no application to cases where the Court of the Additional District Judge is a separate Court and does not form part of the Court of the District Judge. I am fortified in my view by the pronouncement of their Lordships in Kuldip Singh Vs. The State of Punjab and Another, . That case dealt with the provisions of the Punjab Courts Act. The Punjab Courts Act, 1918, makes provision for three classes of civil Courts, namely-(1) the Court of the District Judge, (2) the Court of the Additional Judge, and (3) the Court of the Subordinate Judge. Their Lordships held on consideration of the relevant provisions that as the Punjab Courts Act does not contemplate the appointment of Additional Judges, to the District Court, none can be appointed, and they also held that the Court of the Additional Judge was not a division Court of the Court of the District Judge but a separate and a distinct Court of its own. The reasoning on the basis of which the said conclusions were reached in my opinion, fully apply to the relevant provisions of the M. P. Civil Courts Act, 1958. The impact of the observations made by their Lordships in Kuldip Singh's case was considered by the Punjab High Court in Janak Dulari Vs. Narain Dass, . The question referred to the Division Bench was whether the Court of Additional Judge can be considered to be the principal civil Court of original civil jurisdiction within section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The Division Bench, in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, answered the said question in the negative though the observations made in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 indicate that in Punjab the Additional Judges referred to in the Act have always been popularly known as Additional District Judges and also officially so designated in the gazette notifications regarding their appointments. In actual practice also there have been no exceptions to this practice because nobody is ever appointed simply as an Additional Judge or an Additional District Judge and the persons concerned are invariably appointed as Additional District and Sessions Judges for purposes of exercising both the civil and criminal powers of the District Judge who also is invariably designated as District and Sessions Judge. The reference was answered in the negative as under the Hindu Marriage Act the petitions lie only to the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction which does include the Court of the Additional Judge. The same reasoning holds good in the present case as the definition of the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction, as given in section 7(1) of the Act, does not include the Court of the Additional District Judge. In Dharma Sheela v. Ramdayal 1961 M P L J 979 : 1961 J L J 466, a Division Bench of this Court was required to consider the same question. Their Lordships held the observations made by the Supreme Court to be inapplicable to the facts of that particular case but they came to the conclusion that as soon as the assignment of work is there, the Additional District Judge has jurisdiction to exercise the same powers as the District Judge. The observations make it clear that the Additional District Judge can exercise the powers of the District Judge only after the assignment but not when the assignment has not been made at all. In the present case, it is undisputed that, neither by a general nor by a special order, was appellate jurisdiction in respect of appeals of the valuation of more than Rs. 5,000 conferred on the Additional District Judge, Sehore. In Rajaram Daduji Kunbi v. Paiku and another 1938 N L J 336 : A I R 1938 Nag. 534, a Division Bench of this Court held that when Courts of Civil Judges are separate and distinct, execution application instituted in a Court, other than the Court which passed the decree, cannot be said to be instituted in a proper Court. In that case, 'the Court in which the decree under question was passed was the Court of the First Subordinate Judge, Second Class, while the Court in which the claim suit under Order 21, rule 63 was filed was the Court of the Second Subordinate Judge, Second Class. Their Lordships held that the two Courts under consideration were separate and distinct Courts and therefore the claim suit was not instituted in the proper Court within the meaning of Article 182 (5). Their Lordships held that the two Courts under consideration were separate and distinct Courts and therefore the claim suit was not instituted in the proper Court within the meaning of Article 182 (5). The principle underlying the decision would, in my opinion, apply to those cases where an appeal which is required to be presented in Court A is actually presented in Court B which has no jurisdiction to entertain that appeal. Under Order 41, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, every appeal is required to be presented to the Court or to ouch officer as it appoints in this behalf. A presentation in a Court which has no authority to receive it is no presentation in the eye of law. The word "presentation" has many different significations. It indicates something more than a mere delivery or placing in the legal possession of the presented the thing presented. The appeal is required to be presented to the Court or an officer appointed by that Court. The definite article "the" which has been underlined above, makes it imperative for the appellant to present the appeal only in that Court which has the requisite jurisdiction to receive it. It is also significant that the order of the Additional District Judge, Sehore, returning the appeal for presentation to the proper Court was not challenged in any appeal or revision which could be preferred against that order. Order 7, rule 10, CPC enacts that the plaint shall at any stage of the suit be returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted, and the order made under that provision is a judicial order which is appealable under Order 43, rule 1 (a). The order which an appellate Court may make requiring the appellant to present the appeal in a proper Court may be right or wrong on merits, but the order cannot be said to be a nullity being without jurisdiction and therefore must be held to be good till it is set aside in a competent appeal or revision. Really speaking, the question of considering the application for condonation of delay arises only on the assumption or finding that the appeal continued to be pending in a Court which was not competent to deal with it. Really speaking, the question of considering the application for condonation of delay arises only on the assumption or finding that the appeal continued to be pending in a Court which was not competent to deal with it. As regards the condonation of delay, it may be observed that the question of condonation of delay u/s 5 or section 14 of the Limitation Act is a question for the exercise of discretion of the Court in the given or proved circumstances of the case. The lower appellate Court has exercised its discretion in not condoning the delay relying on the observation made in Mariambai and Another Vs. Hanifabai and Another, . The same view finds support in Pandit Krishan Rao Dattatraya Phalke v. Trimbak and others A I R 1938 Nag. 156, Mohanlal Jagannath Vs. Tej Singh Thakur Kanyalal and Another, and Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., . In the revision there is no scope for interference in the discretion exercised by the lower appellate Court which is based on consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case. Merely because the appeal filed by the applicants in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Sehore, no order was immediately passed by the Court returning the appeal for presentation to the proper Court, it cannot be rightly urged that the applicants acted with proper care and caution in filing the appeal in that Court. Before the appeal could be filed before the Additional District Judge, Sehore, the applicants' counsel should have informed himself as to whether there was any general or special order made by the District Judge empowering the Additional District Judge to entertain appeals over the valuation of Rs. 5,000, and if he did not care to inform himself, in my opinion it cannot be reasonably and properly urged that "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act is made out. It is to be further stressed that the M. P. Civil Courts Act was in force for over four years when the appeal was filed on 20-10-1963. For all these reasons, the revision application is dismissed, but considering the circumstances of the case, I do not make any order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed