ORDER.- These petitions have been filed under sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the order of the Fifth Presidency Magistrate, directing delivery of the properties to the respondents appointed as trustees by the Deputy Commissioner of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments under section 101 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (hereinafter to be called as the Act). A preliminary objection is taken by the respondents to the maintainability of these petitions on the ground that the First Class Magistrate is not an inferior Criminal Court within the purview of the provisions of sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the functions exercised by him are under section 101 of the Act either ministerial or executive functions and that he does not act in a judicial capacity, and at any rate he exercises his jurisdiction as persona designata. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri P. N. Venugopalan in Criminal R.C. No. 1270 of 1965 contended that the Magistrate exercising his functions under section 101 of the Act is a judicial officer exercising functions as a Magistrate and that he is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction as contemplated under sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To appreciate the points involved in these revision petitions, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of section 101 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. To appreciate the points involved in these revision petitions, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of section 101 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. “ Section 101: (1) Where a person has been appointed (a) as trustee or executive officer of religious institution, or (b) to discharge the functions of a trustee of a religious institution in accordance with the pro-visions of this Act in any scheme framed by the Board before the 30th September, 1951 and such person is resisted in or prevented from,obtaining possession of the religious institution or of the records,accounts and properties thereof, by a trustee, office-holder or servant of the religious institution who has been dismissed or suspended from his office or is otherwise not entitled to be in possession or by any person claiming or deriving title from such trustee, office-holder or servant, not being a person claiming in good faith to be in possession on his own account or on account of some person not being such trustee, office-holder or servant, any Presidency Magistrate or any Magistrate of the First Class in whose jurisdiction such institution or property is situated shall, on application by the person so appointed, and on the production of the order of appointment and where the application is for possession of property, of a certificate by the Commissioner in the prescribed form setting forth that the property in question belongs to the religious institution, direct delivery to the person appointed as aforesaid of the possession of such religious institution, or the records, accounts and properties thereof, as the case may be.” This provision corresponds to section 87 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act of 1951 which is in pari materia with section 101 of the Act. The material points, that arise for consideration, in the light of the provisions of section 101 of the Act relevant for the purpose of decision in these petitions, are as follows:- (1) Any Presidency Magistrate or any Magistrate of the First Class having territorial jurisdiction where the properties are to be delivered is empowered to deal with, under this section ; (2) that such Magistrate can direct delivery of the possession of religious institution, records and accounts and properties thereof as the case may be after complying with the following conditions mentioned therein: (a) on the production of the order of appointment by the Commissioner ; (b) on the production of the certificate issued by the Commissioner in the prescribed form setting forth that the property in question belongs to the religious institution ; (c) that the applicant was resisted in or prevented from obtaining possession of the religious institution or properties thereof by a trustee, office-holder or servant of the religious institution who has been dismissed or suspended from the office or is otherwise not entitled to be in possession ; and (d) that such applicant was resisted in or prevented from taking possession of the properties by any person claiming title from such trustee, office-holder or servant not being a person claiming in good faith to be in possession on his own account or on account of some person not being such trustee, etc. It is clear from this section that the Magistrate has to decide on the issues whether the order of appointment, and certificates produced by the applicants are true and genuine, whether the persons who offer resistance to the trustee appointed by the Commissioner taking delivery of the property have title of their own to continue in possession and whether the claim in that behalf is in good faith. Before coming to a decision on the issues, the Magistrate has to hold an enquiry into the matter. He has to issue notice to the parties who may be affected by his order. In doing so the Magistrate is discharging his functions judicially and the proceedings before him are judicial proceedings. It cannot be said that the functions exercised by the Magistrate under section 101 of the Act are either ministerial or executive. On this point Mr. He has to issue notice to the parties who may be affected by his order. In doing so the Magistrate is discharging his functions judicially and the proceedings before him are judicial proceedings. It cannot be said that the functions exercised by the Magistrate under section 101 of the Act are either ministerial or executive. On this point Mr. P. N. Venugopalan besides citing several decisions, mainly relied upon two decisions Prattipathi Dandaiah v. Venkatarama Dikshitulu1, and B. Krishna v. D. Chenchi Reddy2. These two decisions dealt with section 87 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act of 1951 which as already stated in in pari materia with section 101 of the Act. In the earlier decision Subba Rao, J., as he then was on behalf of the Division Bench expressed in the following terms relating to the functions of a Magistrate exercising powers under the provisions of section 87 of the Act of 1951: “ A Magistrate is a judicial officer and the Legislature must be presumed to know that he follows the rules of judicial procedure. Before a Magistrate can direct delivery of possession of property under section 87 of Madras Act (XIX of 1951) he should issue notice to the party affected. An order made by a Magistrate without issuing notice to the archaka or the tenants claiming under him is bad because it offends the fundamental principles of natural justice.” I respectfully agree with the abovementioned observations and I am certainly bound by them. In the latter decision, Chandra Reddy, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the Bench on this point, agreed with the observations made by Subba Rao,. J., as he then was and stated that the proceedings under section 87 of the Act of 1951 before the Magistrate were judicial in character as he has to hold an enquiry into the matter before reaching a conclusion. It is therefore clear that the proceedings before the Magistrate under section 101 of the Act are undoubtedly judicial proceedings. The next important point to be considered is whether the Magistrate exercising; powers under section 101 of the Act is a Court or persona designate. If the Magistrate is found to be a Court, then there is no difficulty in holding that it is an inferior criminal Court within the purview of sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the Magistrate is found to be a Court, then there is no difficulty in holding that it is an inferior criminal Court within the purview of sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On this point also the learned Counsel, Mr. P. N. Venugopalan cited several authorities mainly relying upon B. Krishna v. D. Chenchi Reddy2, which I had already mentioned in connection with another point in the previous paragraph. Chandra Reddy, J., as he then was in reversing the judgment of a single Judge reported in Anjayya v. Venkateswara Das Bavaji3held that the Magistrate exercising; powers under section 87 of the Act of 1951 is a Court and not a persona designata. The learned Judge based his conclusion mainly on the ground that the Magistrate exercises a judicial function and that additional duties are entrusted to him as is enlarged, quite dissimilar to the situation where an officer is constituted as special authority. I do not think that it is necessary to go into the details of the discussion relating to this point in the said decision on the view that I am taking in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Dargah Committee v. State of Rajasthan1. The Supreme Court held that the Magistrate entertaining an application and holding an enquiry under section 234 of the Ajmer-Merwara Municipalities Regulation (VI of 1925) does so as a “ persona designate ” and not as a Magistrate functioning and exercising his authority under the Code of Criminal Procedure irrespective of the fact whatever may be the character of the proceedings whether it is purely ministerial or judicial or quasi-judicial. Section 234 of the said Regulation provides inter alia that any tax claimable or recoverable by this Act after a demand has been made therefor in the manner prescribed by rule can be recovered on an application to a Magistrate having jurisdiction within the limits of the Municipality or in any other place where the person by whom the amount is payable may for the time being reside, by the distress and sale of movable properties within the limits of such Magistrate’s jurisdiction belonging to such person. The power to direct the recovery of the tax by sale of any movable property by distress and sale is conferred on a Magistrate having territorial jurisdiction. The power to direct the recovery of the tax by sale of any movable property by distress and sale is conferred on a Magistrate having territorial jurisdiction. Similarly under section 101 of the Act the power to direct delivery of the properties is conferred on a First Class Magistrate having territorial jurisdiction namely where such properties are situate. Both these provisions do not confer powers on a Court. Powers are conferred by the respective enactments on the Magistrates for limited purposes. It is no doubt true that the Supreme Court has said that the nature of enquiry contemplated by section 234 of the Ajmer-Merwara Municipalities Regulation (VI of 1925) partakes of the character of ministerial enquiry rather than the judicial enquiry. But it has been laid down as a statement of law, the following principle, in unequivocal terms which, with great respect, I am of the view applies to the present revision petitions: “ Now looking at section 234 that the proceedings initiated before a Magistrate are no more than recovery proceedings..............In any event it is difficult to hold that the Magistrate who entertains the application is an inferior criminal Court. The claim made before him is for the recovery of a tax and the order prayed for is for the recovery of the tax by distress and sale of the movable property of the defaulter. If at all, this would at best be a proceeding of a civil nature and not criminal. That is why we think, whatever may be the character of the proceedings, whether it is purely ministerial or judicial or quasi-judicial, the Magistrate who entertains the application and holds the enquiry does so because he is designated in that behalf and so he must be treated as a persona designata and not as a Magistrate functioning and exercising his authority under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He cannot therefore be regarded as an inferior criminal Court.” The proceedings under section 101 of the Act directing delivery of the properties are in my view of civil nature and not criminal, as the recovery of tax by distress and sale of movable properties are found to be civil proceedings and not criminal. I therefore hold that the Magistrate exercising powers under section 101 of the Act which though judicial in character, is persona designata and not a Court much less inferior criminal Court. I therefore hold that the Magistrate exercising powers under section 101 of the Act which though judicial in character, is persona designata and not a Court much less inferior criminal Court. On this preliminary point, I find that these petitions under sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not maintainable. It is therefore not necessary to decide either on merits or any other point of law raised in the petitions. The petitions are dismissed. The petitioners, if so advised, may file petitions under section 227 of the Constiution. R.M. ------- Petitions dismissed.