Research › Browse › Judgment

Orissa High Court · body

1967 DIGILAW 115 (ORI)

DEBRAJ HOTA v. STATE

1967-11-16

RAY

body1967
JUDGMENT : Ray, J. - This is an application in revision filed by the Petitioner. Debraj Hota against the order of Sri R.N. Das, Sub- divisional Magistrate, Bhanjanagar, convicting the accused u/s 3(5) of the (Madras) Town Nuisance Act and sentencing him to a fine of Rs. 20/ - in default to undergo simple imprisonment for five days. 2. P.w.4 the S.I. of Bhanjanagar submitted a prosecution report u/s 3(12) of the (Madras) Town Nuisance Act, 1889, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on the allegation that the Petitioner on 13-10-1965 at about 9.30 p.m., being under the influence of liquor, that is, in a drunken state, misbehaved with the Medical Officer, Government Hospital, Bhanjanagar, on the verandah of the hospital building. The other act alleged against the Petitioner was that he was making hulla in that state of intoxication. The Medical Officer (p.w.5) sent information to the police station after which two constables were deputed to apprehend the Petitioner and the Petitioner was taken to the Thana and put under police lock up until he became sober when he was let off on bail. 3. Five witnesses were examined by the prosecution. P.w.1 is the sweeper of the hospital, p.w.2 is the constable, p.w.3 is the A.S.I. who received information from the doctor. P.w.4 is the I.O. and p.w.5 is the doctor himself. The learned Magistrate believed the prosecution witnesses and convicted and sentenced the accused as above. Though in the ordering portion the Magistrate quotes Section 3(5) to he the section under which conviction is made, he apparently meant it to be Section 3(12) of the Act and it is on this footing the case was argued here. 4. The defence was a total denial of the charge of drunkenness. The Petitioner's case was that he wanted to make a representation about his arrear salary to the Civil Surgeon who was then camping there and wanted permission of the doctor, p.w.5 to do so. On the doctor's refusal to grant permission the accused insisted and persisted in his request. In consequence the doctor got angry and shouted at him and this is how the hulla was created. In support of his defence he examined two witnesses to show that at the material point of time he was not drunk. 5. P.w.1 is a subordinate of the doctor, p.w.5. In consequence the doctor got angry and shouted at him and this is how the hulla was created. In support of his defence he examined two witnesses to show that at the material point of time he was not drunk. 5. P.w.1 is a subordinate of the doctor, p.w.5. He categorically states that the accused at the alleged time was in a normal state of mind and was talking normally. P.w.2, the constable who apprehended the accused and took him to the police station fully corroborates p.w.1 in this regard. P.w.4 the I.O. is a formal witness and may be disregarded. P.ws.3 and 5, however, support the prosecution case of drunkenness and disorderly behaviour on the part of the Petitioner. As against this, d.ws. 1 and 2, who had legitimate business at the hospital and were there at the time in question fully support the defence story that it was p.w.5 who was shouting at the accused whereby a commotion was created and people gathered there to find out the cause. In this state of evidence the Magistrate finds: From these statements, it is clear that there was an incident during which there was a hulla and people gathered. Relying, however, on the bare statement of p.ws.3 and 5 that the accused was drunk, he jumped to the conclusion that the accused was guilty of disorderly conduct in a state of drunkenness. Admittedly there was no medical examination of the accused to find out if he has consumed liquor and the evidence of p.ws. 3 and 5 does not lay any foundation for coming to the conclusion that the accused was in a drunken state. When the other three prosecution witnesses state that the accused was sober and was talking normally, there does not appear to be any basis for the conclusion that the accused was drunk, especially when none of the witnesses says that he was smelling of liquor. In view of this evidence, I must hold that the accused is entitled to the benefit of the finding that the prosecution has failed to establish that the accused was drunk at the material point of time and he must be acquitted of that charge. 6. Apart from factual merits of the cage as discussed above, the learned Counsel for the defence also raised two other legal points in pressing for an acquittal. 6. Apart from factual merits of the cage as discussed above, the learned Counsel for the defence also raised two other legal points in pressing for an acquittal. They are: (i) The town of Bhanjanagar having been constituted a Notified Area u/s 417-A of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 (Orissa Act 23 of 1950), and the said area having never been declared to be a Municipality, Section 3(12) of the Act under which the Petitioner has been convicted, has no application; and (ii) Assuming Section 3(12) has application to the area of Bhanjanagar, still there cannot be any conviction of the Petitioner, inasmuch as the place where the offence is alleged to have been committed, cannot be said to come within the meaning of the expression "place of public resort", it being a verandah of the of the hospital. 7. Subsection (2) of Section 1 of the Act provides: Sections 1 and 2 of this Act extend to the whole of the Fort St. George, and the remaining sections extend to all the towns in the said Presidency which may have been or may here after be declared to be Municipalities under Madras Act 4 of 1884 or other Act of the same nature for the time being in force and the Provincial Government may, from time to time, by notification in the official gazette, extend such sections or any part or parts thereof permanently or for a time or for specified occasions only from such date as may be specified in the notification, to any other local area in the Presidency of the Fort St. George outside the limits of the town of Madras and may cancel or modify in the said notification, 8. The town of Bhanjanagar was at one time included within the territory of Madras and upon formation of the Province of Orissa, this area was transferred to Orissa and has since been a territorial part thereof. It was argued by the learned Counsel for the defence that this area has never been declared to be a Municipality under Madras Act 4 of 1884 or any other Act of similar nature by the Government of Madras. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State conceded that nothing was forthcoming even after a thorough search at the Government level to indicate the contrary. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State conceded that nothing was forthcoming even after a thorough search at the Government level to indicate the contrary. In the circumstances, as at present advised, I hold that the area of Bhanjanagar had never been constituted to be a Municipality while being administered by the Government of Madras. Madras Act 4 of 1884 was repealed by Madras Act v. of 1920 which again was repealed wholesale by Orissa Act 23 of 1950. It is admitted that the town of Bhanjanagar was declared a Notified area by State Government Notification dated 13-1-61 issued u/s 417-A of the Orissa Municipal Act. This section provides that an area which is not a Municipality can only be declared to be a Notified area. This, in my opinion, conclusively indicates that the town of Bhanjanagar had never been constituted a Municipality at any time before it was declared to be a Notified Area under the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950. Learned Counsel for the State, after enquiry in the office of the Collector of Ganjam as well as in the Secretariat of the Government of Orissa, states that nothing is forthcoming to show that the Madras Town Nuisance Act was ever extended to the area of Bhanjanagar, and he produced a letter from A.D.M., Ganjam, to that effect. That being so, the conviction of the Petitioner cannot be said to have been made in accordance with any law in force. The accused must accordingly be acquitted on this ground also. 9. The second contention is based upon the working of Section 3 of the Act which runs as follows: Whoever in any public street, road, thoroughfare or place of public resort commits any of the following offences, shall be liable to conviction and fine not exceeding Rs. 50/ - or imprisonment of either description not exceeding eight days. .... (12) Whoever is found drunk and incapable of taking care of himself or is guilty of any riotous disorderly or indecent behaviour. The hospital Verandah according to some, or the compounding room according to others, where the accused is said to have behaved in disorderly manner is not a "place of public resort." This term has not been defined in the Act and accordingly its ordinary dictionary meaning has to be attributed to it. The hospital Verandah according to some, or the compounding room according to others, where the accused is said to have behaved in disorderly manner is not a "place of public resort." This term has not been defined in the Act and accordingly its ordinary dictionary meaning has to be attributed to it. In ordinary English language it means a place where the public or a part of the public repair or frequent for any particular purpose or a place where a large number of persons congregate for any common end or purpose. A place does not cease to be a "public resort" merely because the entry is restricted to a section of the public or is regulated for reasons of discipline. This meaning has been accepted in the case reported in (Avoor) Ramaswami Iyer and Another Vs. Emperor which was a case under Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the (Madras) Town Nuisance Act. This also seems to be the basis of the decision in In Re: Chinniah alias Krishnaswami Naidu AIR 1924 Mad. 729. The hospital is a place where the public have a right of access though the entry into it is restricted to a section of the public and is regulated in the interest of discipline. In view of the normal connotation of the expression, and in the view of the aforesaid two decisions, the second contention must fail. 10. This, however, does not affect the decision of the case in View of my finding on merits. In the result, the petition is allowed, and the order of conviction and sentence passed upon the Petitioner must be set aside and the Petitioner acquitted. Fines, if paid, shall be refunded. Final Result : Allowed