JUDGMENT B.N. Nigam, J. - Shatrohan Singh has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for a writ of certiorari quashing the judgment and order dated May 8, 1964 and prohibiting opposite party No. 2, the Consolidation Officer, Maharajganj, district Rae Bareli from proceeding with the remanded case. 2. In the petition I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 3. The petitioner states that all proceedings in connection with the consolidation of holdings in the village upto the allotment of chaks were conducted in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act prior to its amendment by U.P. Act 8 of 1963. Subsequently on June 26, 1963 opposite party No. 4 Thakurain Srimati Raj Kunwar filed an objection purporting to be under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. She also prayed for condonation of the delay. The application was rejected on January 11, 1964. Opposite party No. 4 preferred an appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation which was also dismissed. Thereafter she preferred no second appeal but preferred a revision. The Deputy Director Consolidation without recording any evidence gave finding about the facts on no evidence and without condoning the delay in regard to the objection, appeal and revision allowed the same and remanded the case to the court of the consolidation officer for disposal. 4. The first question for my consideration is whether the case was governed by the Act before its amendment by U.P. Act 8 of 1963 or the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act after its amendment by U.P. Act 8 of 1963. On that point there is no difficulty. Paragraph 1 of the petition has been admitted and the second paragraph of the petition is not denied. It, therefore, appears that the proceedings under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act would be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood prior to its amendment by U.P. Act 8 of 1963. 5. It is, therefore, clear that a second appeal should have been filed and not a revision for under the Act as it then stood a revision application was competent only against the order of a Deputy Director. 6. 5. It is, therefore, clear that a second appeal should have been filed and not a revision for under the Act as it then stood a revision application was competent only against the order of a Deputy Director. 6. I would have maintained this order as prima facie the Deputy Director has not exceeded powers which he could have exercised if a second appeal had been preferred to him but the difficulty is that the Deputy Director could not have granted permission to convert this revision application into a second appeal as it had not been properly instituted as second appeal. In paragraph 9 of the writ petition it is stated that even though rule 111 of the Rules under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act after amendment consequent on the enactment of U.P. Act 8 of 1963 directs that a revision application must be filed before the Deputy Director Consolidation. Here it is alleged as a fact that the revision application was filed before the Director of Consolidation and that fact is not challenged. It, therefore, appears to me that the ordinary presumption of regularity of official acts has been rebutted and it must be held on the evidence on record that this particular revision application was in fact instituted before the Director of Consolidation. In the circumstances, not having been instituted before the Deputy Director Consolidation the proceedings could not be said to be competent as a second appeal and, therefore, this revision proceedings could not have been converted into a second appeal. 7. It was next urged by the learned counsel for opposite party No. 4 that this question of jurisdiction was not raised before the Deputy Director and in the circumstances the petitioner is not entitled to raise that point now. In support of his contention the learned counsel has relied on these decisions. In B.P. Maurya v. Election Tribunal and others, 1964 A.L.J. 155 it was held by a Bench of this court in paragraph 10 of the judgment :- "It is well settled that if a party takes part in a proceeding before the tribunal it cannot be heard to say in the writ petition that the tribunal had no jurisdiction." 8. The other decision is Parabhu and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation U.P. at Gorakhpur and others, 1964 A.L.J. 240. The other decision is Parabhu and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation U.P. at Gorakhpur and others, 1964 A.L.J. 240. At page 243 it was held by another Bench of this Court :- "The writ jurisdiction of this court is an equitable jurisdiction which is to be exercised in the interest of justice and not merely for the purpose of enforcing the technicalities of law." 9. The third decision on which reliance is placed is Sukhraj and another v. Ram Nath and others, 1965 A.L.J. 172. Another Bench of this Court held :- "Where the appellants failed to plead sufficient cause before the Settlement Officer and the Deputy Director, they were not entitled to the benefit of Section 53-B and they could not seek certiorari for the quashing of their orders by pleading sufficient cause for the first time before the High Court." The third decision has really no bearing on the question before me. As regards the first point I have only to refer to the Cantonment Board Ambala v. Pyare Lal, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 108 and the decision in the Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. V.P.J. Pappu and another, Civil Appeal No. 432 of 1965 decided by the Supreme Court on August 16, 1965. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred either by consent of waiver or even acquiescence, and there is no question of not making an enquiry into this point unless the question can not be decided without an investigation into the facts. I am, therefore, unable to see any force in the contention of the learned counsel for opposite party No. 4. 10. It was then urged that some how the proceedings had reached the Deputy Director Consolidation and, therefore, the Deputy Director Consolidation could have entertained a second appeal. I am unable to agree with this contention. According to the rule of law laid down in Raja Soap Factory and others v. S.P. Shantharaj and others, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1449 a proper institution is the condition precedent for the exercise of the jurisdiction. It cannot be said that an appeal could be decided or entertained unless it had been properly instituted. 11. Learned counsel for opposite party No. 4 also referred to the proviso to Section 47(1) of the U.P. Act 8 of 1963. It cannot be said that an appeal could be decided or entertained unless it had been properly instituted. 11. Learned counsel for opposite party No. 4 also referred to the proviso to Section 47(1) of the U.P. Act 8 of 1963. He wanted to urge that actually the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as amended by U.P. Act 8 of 1963 will apply. There is no force in this contention. This point is also covered by Full Bench decision of this court in Prem Chand and another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Barabanki and another, 1966 R.D. 284. 12. No other point has been pressed before me. 13. I, therefore, accept this writ petition and direct the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Deputy Director Consolidation dated May 8, 1964, copy of which is Annexure 3. Since this order has been quashed there is no necessity of issuing any prohibition against the Consolidation Officer. The petitioner will get his costs from opposite party No. 4.