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1967 DIGILAW 118 (CAL)

Bishnupada Mondol v. Ranibala Mondol

1967-06-12

A.K.DUTTA, P.N.MUKHERJEE

body1967
JUDGMENT 1. This appeal, is by the judgment-debtor and it arises out of a proceeding for execution of a final decree for partition. 2. Under the said final decree, certain properties were allotted to the decree-holder (respondent No. 1) exclusively and certain properties to the judgment-debtor exclusively. Some of the properties were also divided between the parties in different parts. The owellty money under the decree was only Rs. 107/-, payable by the defendant No. 1, that is, the present appellant judgment-debtor, to the plaintiff respondent. The circumstances, under which the present appeal has arisen are as follows : that a third party, claiming interest in four of the C. S. plots, namely, C. S. plots Nos. 316, 442, 452 and 488, included in the above partition decree, instituted a suit for declaration of her rights therein and obtained, in the said suit, a temporary injunction, restraining the parties to the instant suit from obtaining possession of the said four plots. 3. In view of the above injunction, the decree-holder in the instant case applied for possession of only the remaining properties in her allotment in execution of the above final decree for partition. Thereupon, the judgment-debtor appellant raised an objection that such piece-meal possession or piece-meal execution of the final decree for partition was now permissible in law, and, that objection having been overruled by the learned Subordinate Judge, who allowed the plaintiff's prayer for possession of the said remaining properties in execution of the above final decree for partition, the jud ment-debtor appellant has filed the present appeal and his contention is that the plaintiff's application for possession in execution should not be allowed,-at any rate, until the disposal of the above suit, instituted by the third party, as aforesaid. 4. In our view, there can be no general proposition, as a matter of law, that, in circumstances like the present, a final partition decree cannot be executed piece-meal or delivery of possession in execution thereof cannot be given of some of the properties, involved in the partition suit. The decision of that question will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. In the instant case before us, we find that, of the plots in dispute, C. S. plots Nos. 442 and 452 have been allotted solely and exclusively to the plaintiff under the above final partition decree. The decision of that question will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. In the instant case before us, we find that, of the plots in dispute, C. S. plots Nos. 442 and 452 have been allotted solely and exclusively to the plaintiff under the above final partition decree. No suit or injunction in respect of the same and no dispute regarding the said plots can, therefore, in any way, affect the judgment-debtor, and, accordingly, it is open to the plaintiff to refrain from taking possession of the said two plots. 5. As regards the other two plots, namely, C. S. plots Nos. 316 and 488, although the same have been divided between both the parties and allotted to them in different portions, it appears from the Commissioner's report that, in C. S. Plot No. 316, the portion, allotted to the decree-holder, bears the valuation of Rs. 7,600/-, while the portion, allotted to the judgment-debtor, bears the value of Rs. 8,000/ -. This difference of rs. 400/- in the two valuations makes it clear that, by the exclusion of this plot from the present execution, both parties will be more or less equally affected and the defendant (judgment-debtor), therefore, cannot complain of any prejudice by reason of such exclusion. 6. As regards C. S. plot No. 488, the position is even worse from the point of view of the judgment-debtor as the major part of that plot has been allotted under the above partition decree to the plaintiff. In the circumstances, by the exclusion of this plot from the present execution, it will be the decree-holder, who will be more affected than the judgment-debtor. We would, accordingly, hold that, on the plaintiff's prayer for delivery of possession of. the remaining properties in her allotment, that is, excluding her allotment, in respect of the above four disputed plots, the defendant will not be affected in any way and cannot make any grievance and cannot have any reason or cause for complaint. His objection, therefore, that the plaintiff (decree-holder) should not be allowed to pray for delivery of possession of the remaining properties, as aforesaid, under the above partition decree, has no substance and has been rightly rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge. 7. Before concluding, we deem it necessary to refer to one other matter to remove a patent misconception. His objection, therefore, that the plaintiff (decree-holder) should not be allowed to pray for delivery of possession of the remaining properties, as aforesaid, under the above partition decree, has no substance and has been rightly rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge. 7. Before concluding, we deem it necessary to refer to one other matter to remove a patent misconception. Although, for very good reasons, the appellant's sweeping argument before the lower court that a final decree for partition cannot be executed by delivery of possession was not repeated before this court, inasmuch as the said argument appears to have dominated the field, when the matter was before the lower court, and occupied the major part of the lower court's judgment under appeal, and, as the decision of this Court, reported in (1) 34 C. L. J. 101, (Shyama Charan das v. Satya Prasad Chaudhuri), was cited and pressed there as a clear, direct and unequivocal authority in support of that argument, we will add a few words ta express our view on the relevant law in the matter. 8. The above argument seems to us to be absurd and preposterous. A suit for partition involves and implies a claim for separate possession of the claimants-co-sharers' allotments. The final partition decree, to the extent it decrees the suit and allows the claim for partition, in the absence of any provision or indication to the contrary, entities the decree-holder or the party concerned to possession of his allotment in execution of the decree. The decision in 34 CLJ 101, (supra), lays down nothing to the contrary. There, although the suit was inter alia for partition, it was disposed of on compromise, which, in their Lordships' opinion, on proper construction of its terms in the light of all the relevant context there, was merely declaratory of the rights of the parties in the disputed properties and meant nothing more. The emphasis in their Lordships' judgment on the absence of any provision in the decree for obtaining possession in execution must be read in that light and context. It is not the law that a final partition decree, unless it decrees possession in express terms or provides in terms for delivery of possession in execution, cannot be executed for obtaining possession. It is not the law that a final partition decree, unless it decrees possession in express terms or provides in terms for delivery of possession in execution, cannot be executed for obtaining possession. The law, on the other hand, is just the opposite and, in the absence of any provision or indication in the decree to the contrary, a final partition decree entitles the decree-holder or the party concerned to possession of his allotment and can be executed for the purpose. That has always been well recognized in theory and in practice. In the instant case, the decree contains no contrary provision or indication. On the other hand, having regard to the plaint, which contains a specific claim for separate allotment and possession, it (the decree) must be construed as entitling the plaintiff decree holder to such possession and, accordingly, to such possession, claimable in execution of that decree. The appellant's objection on the point was, therefore, rightly overruled by the lower court and, for obvious reasons, Mr. Sen Gupita has not challenged the lower court's view on the point as it is patently unassailable. In the above view, we affirm the order of the learned Subordinate Judge and dismiss this appeal. In the circumstances of this case, however, there will be no order for costs in this Court. Let the records go down as quickly as possible.