Ram Chandra Singh v. Additional Commissioner — 1967 DIGILAW 12 (ALL)

ORDER Satish Chandra, J. - This and the connected writ petitions are directed against the same order dated 28-2-1966. They raise common questions and can be conveniently decided by a common judgment. 2. M/s. Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., Respondent No. 2, moved an application dated 5-2-1965 before the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut. The application was headed u/s 6 of the Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It was stated that the Mills had prior to 1-7-1956 held the mentioned plots on a lease and that those plots constituted an agricultural area as defined by Section 2 of the Act. In proceedings for demarcation of the Agricultural areas the aforesaid plots were left out. It prayed that the omission be rectified and effect be given to the provisions of law according to which the areas mentioned are agricultural areas. The matter seems to have been transferred to the Additional Commissioner, who called for a report from the Demarcation Officer, Ghaziabad. Ultimately by the impugned order dated 28-2-1966, the Additional Commissioner, the first Respondent, held that the plots constituted agricultural area as defined in the Act and they ought to have been demarcated. He observed that the Demarcation Officer ought to have made enquiries Under Rule 8 in respect of the land in question which was held on lease duly executed prior to 1-7-1956 and an entry to that effect ought to have been made in the remarks column of the khasra. He ultimately held that failure to do so is clearly an accidental omission and must be cured u/s 6 of the Act. 3. This order is challenged on several grounds. It is urged that a notification u/s 8 of the Act was published on 30-6-1962 and that the proceedings could not be reopened after that date by the Additional Commissioner. If at all, the remedy of the Mills was to file an appeal u/s 5(3) of the Act before the Board of Revenue. In the next place it is stated that Respondent, No. 2 had moved a similar application u/s 6 of the Act in 1964 but the same was dismissed by the Additional Commissioner on 14-5-1964 and the Additional Commissioner had no jurisdiction to revise his earlier order. In the next place it is stated that Respondent, No. 2 had moved a similar application u/s 6 of the Act in 1964 but the same was dismissed by the Additional Commissioner on 14-5-1964 and the Additional Commissioner had no jurisdiction to revise his earlier order. In paragraph 12 of the petition it has been slated that the Mills had moved another application in September 1965 praying that the matter be recommended to the Board of Revenue for correction of the mistake in the demarcation list. This seems to be incorrect because a copy of this application which has been filed as annexure 'V' to the petition is one which was filed by the Modi Industries Ltd. and not by the Petitioner. It is also urged that this was not a case of any clerical or arithmetical error and as such the Additional Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the application of the 2nd Respondent u/s 6 of the Act. 4. The last point taken is that the document relied upon by the Mills as a lease, is in fact and in law only a license and as such the plots of land covered by it do not constitute Agricultural Area as defined by the Act. 5. For the Respondents two preliminary objections have been raised. It is urged that the impugned order was passed on 28-2-1966. Writ petition No. 2276 of 1966 filed by Ram Chandra and Chotu Singh and Writ Petition No. 2289 of 1966 filed by Shyam Singh were presented in this Court on 4-7-1966 and Writ Petition No. 2594 of 1966 filed by Ch. Raghunath Singh and another was presented on 2-8-1966. There is no explanation for the delay. 6. The impugned order is dated 28-2-1966. Normally a writ petition can be filed within 90 days. This period of 90 days expired during the Summer Vacations of this Court. The two writ petitions presented on 4-7-1986 were within time because they were presented on the reopening day of the Court. Notice of Writ Petition No. 2594 of 1966 was served on the Standing Counsel on 5-7-1966. Normally a writ petition can be filed within 90 days. This period of 90 days expired during the Summer Vacations of this Court. The two writ petitions presented on 4-7-1986 were within time because they were presented on the reopening day of the Court. Notice of Writ Petition No. 2594 of 1966 was served on the Standing Counsel on 5-7-1966. Excluding the two weeks for that purpose this writ petition is undoubtedly beyond time by about two weeks, but I am not inclined to dismiss the petition on that ground, even though there is no explanation for this delay in the petition, because this petition was at the time of admission connected with the earlier writ petition No. 4138 of 1965. The points raised are common and since all the writ petitions are being decided together, it will not be a sound exercise of discretion to throw out this writ petition as belated. 7. The other preliminary objection has substance. It has been urged that Section 82 of the Act makes the provisions of Section 333 of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 applicable to suit?, applications or proceedings under this Act. u/s 333 aforesaid the Board of Revenue has jurisdiction to exercise the revisional powers analogous to the power of revision conferred on this Court by Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure. It is urged that the Petitioners had an adequate alternative remedy of filing a revision before the Board of Revenue u/s 333 of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 read with Section 82 of the Act. 8. For the Petitioners it is urged that on the language of Section 82 of the Act, Section 333 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 is applicable only to such proceedings as are mentioned in the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 and not to new proceedings contemplated and provided for the first time by the Act of 1956. I am unable to endorse this submission. Section 82 of the Act reads as follows: The provisions of Section 331, 331 A and 333 of the UP ZA and LR Act, 1950 shall apply in relation to suits, applications or proceedings under this Act as they apply in relation to suits, applications or proceedings under the said Act. I am unable to endorse this submission. Section 82 of the Act reads as follows: The provisions of Section 331, 331 A and 333 of the UP ZA and LR Act, 1950 shall apply in relation to suits, applications or proceedings under this Act as they apply in relation to suits, applications or proceedings under the said Act. The provisions of Section 333 are applicable to suits, applications or proceedings under this Act (namely Act I of 1956) and the applicability is to the same extent and to the same effect as in respect of proceedings under the ZA and LR Act, 1950. The proceedings u/s 6 of Act of 1956 will attract the applicability of Section 333 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. A revision will hence be maintainable against the impugned order of the Additional Commissioner by which he decided the application u/s 6 of the Act. 9. The Board of Revenue exercises a supervisory power u/s 333. The Board of Revenue could grant the Petitioner the same relief as he seeks by the present petition from this Court. The jurisdiction of this Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution is also, generally speaking, supervisory in nature. The jurisdiction of supervision possessed by this Court extends to the Board of Revenue as well. The Board of Revenue is under the superintendence of this Court. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is equitable and discretionary. It will not be, in my opinion, a sound exercise of the discretion to interfere with the order of the Additional Commissioner and thereby deprive the Board of Revenue of its jurisdiction to express it; opinion as to the validity of the impugned order passed by the Additional Commissioner. The jurisdiction under j Article 226 is not intended to supersede or supplant the jurisdiction possessed by other courts, subject to the superintendence of this Court. There are no extraordinary features in these cases which may impel this Court to depart from this general rule and permit the Petitioners to circumvent the Board of Revenue. In my opinion, the Petitioners have an adequate alternative remedy and the present petitions are, therefore, liable to be dismissed on that ground. 10. During the course of hearing, the Petitioners applied for amendment by adding certain grounds. In my opinion, the Petitioners have an adequate alternative remedy and the present petitions are, therefore, liable to be dismissed on that ground. 10. During the course of hearing, the Petitioners applied for amendment by adding certain grounds. The additional grounds challenge Sub-section (d) of Section 2(1) of the Act as violating Articles 14, 19 and 31(a) of the Constitution of India and it is urged that since the said definition is an integral part of the entire fabric of the Act the whole Act is liable to be struck down as unconstitutional. The Petitioner has not impleaded the State as a party to the writ petition. In the absence of the State the vires of the Act cannot be determined. The petitions, therefore, cannot succeed on these additional grounds. 11. It was next urged that the Commissioner acts as a persona designata while dealing with proceedings under the Act and not as a court. The provisions of Section 333 of the U.P. Zamin lari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 as adapted to proceedings under the Act give jurisdiction to the Board of Revenue to call for the record of any suit or proceedings decided by the subordinate court. It has no jurisdiction over decisions of persona designata. Hence, the Petitioner could not go to the Board of Revenue in revision and hence had no alternative remedy. I am not satisfied that the Commissioner was a persona designata. The Commissioner is an existing officer. The Act confers certain jurisdiction on an existing Officer. In proceedings for demarcation under Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act the Commissioner has been conferred certain jurisdictions. u/s 6 clerical or arithmetical mistake in the proposals as regards the demarcation of agricultural areas or errors arising in proceedings u/s 3, 4 and 5 from an accidental omission, can be corrected by the Commissioner. The Commissioner spoken of in these section is the pre-existing Commissioner. This Act does not constitute any such office. u/s 67 of the Act the State Government has been authorised to appoint three classes of Officers, a Compensation Commissioner, Compensation Officers and Demarcation Officers. The Commissioner spoken of in these section is the pre-existing Commissioner. This Act does not constitute any such office. u/s 67 of the Act the State Government has been authorised to appoint three classes of Officers, a Compensation Commissioner, Compensation Officers and Demarcation Officers. u/s 68 the State Government can appoint one or more additional Compensation Commissioners Section 69 says that the Compensation Commissioner and Commissions shall perform such duties and exercise such powers of supervision and superintendence over the work of the Compensation Officers and the Demarcation Officers as may be prescribed. This provision clearly makes a distinction between the Compensation Commissioner and a Commissioner. u/s 71 the Commissioner has also such powers, rights and privileges as are vested in a civil court in respect of the enforcing of the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath, affirmation or otherwise, the compelling of production of documents, the service of notice and the punishing of persons guilty of contempt. u/s 74 a proceeding before a Compensation Officer or a Commissioner shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 226 and for purposes of Section 195 of the Indian Penal Code. It is, therefore, clear that the Commissioner has all the indicia of a court. In my opinion, it makes no difference that Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act do not confer jurisdiction on "the court of Commissioner", but on "the Commissioner." The difference between the two expressions is not conclusive. In my opinion the various tests to signify a persona designata as mentioned in the full Bench decision of this Court in Chatur Mohan v. R.B. Dixit 1964 AWR 141 are not in existence. The Commissioner has been entrusted with judicial functions. It has judicial powers to receive evidence, enforce attendance of witnesses and power to pronounce judgment and carry it into effect between the parties thereto. The Commissioned exercises jurisdiction by sanction of law and not by voluntary submission of the parties. These features, according to the consensus of judicial opinions in this country, take away a person from the category of persona designata. See Ram Chandra v. State 1965 A.L.J. 12 (at p. 17). It cannot, therefore, be urged that the Commissioner acts as a persona designata while deciding applications under Sections 6 of the Act. 12. These features, according to the consensus of judicial opinions in this country, take away a person from the category of persona designata. See Ram Chandra v. State 1965 A.L.J. 12 (at p. 17). It cannot, therefore, be urged that the Commissioner acts as a persona designata while deciding applications under Sections 6 of the Act. 12. The learned Counsel next submitted that the petitions filed by Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. were not maintainable because the mills held the land as a limited company and the Act does not apply to such lands in the absence of special notification applying it to them u/s 1 Sub-section (3) of the Act. According to this provision the Act shall come into force in the areas mentioned in the schedule on such date as the State Government may by notification appoint. In this connection reliance has been placed upon the explanation to Part C of the schedule to the Act. The explanation runs as follows: Explanation--Any area held on the seventh day of July, 1949, for the purposes of a housing scheme by a Co-operative Society registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912, or a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, or a limited liability company under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, shall be deemed to be held for a work of public utility. Under this explanation each and every land held by a limited liability company is not to be deemed to be held for a work of public utility. Only such lands as are held on seventh day of July, 1949 for purposes of a housing scheme by tie three categories of juristic persons, will alone be deemed to be held for a work of public utility. The phrase "any area held for the purposes of a housing scheme" is not meant only for a Cooperative Society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 but applies equally to other two classes of persons. It the opening part is held confined to the first category of Society, the result would be that all lands held by a Society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, will be deemed to be held for a work of public utility. If the Legislature wanted to make a distinction between these two classes of societies it would have mentioned some reason or stated it expressly. If the Legislature wanted to make a distinction between these two classes of societies it would have mentioned some reason or stated it expressly. This strengthens the normal grammatical reading of the explanation, where under the opening part is applicable to ail the three categories. There is no allegation, that the land held by Mod Mills was held for the purposes of a housing scheme. These cases did not, therefore, fall within the schedule and were not covered by Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act. 13. In the result the petitions fail and are dismissed with costs.