ORDER This is a writ application filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for issue of a writ of certiorari or a writ of like nature for quashing the order dated 25-2-1963 passed by the District Soldiers Sailors and Airmens Board, Manipur and the subsequent order dated 13-7-1964 issued by the Indian Soldiers Sailors and Airmens Board, New Delhi. 2. The facts of the case (as alleged by the Petitioner) leading to the institution of the present writ application are as follows : (a) The Central Government at New Delhi framed certain rules for constituting the Indian Soldiers Sailors and Airmen Board at New Delhi and similar Boards in the States and Districts for the benefit of the ex-army men. (b) The petitioner served in the regular army for about 8 years in the rank of J.C.O. in the last World War II After his retirement from the military service, he was appointed as Grade III Secretary of the District Soldiers Sailors and Airmens Board Manipur (hereinafter called as the District Board, Manipur) on 4-11-1953 as per Ext. B/1 under the District Soldiers, Sailors and Airmens Boards Employees (Conditions of Service) Rules of 1951 (hereinafter called as the Rules of 1951). The Deputy Commissioner, Manipur, is its Ex-officio President. (c) The Rules of 1951 were framed by the Central Government regulating the conditions of service of the employees of the District Board. The Rules came into force on 1-9-1951. The petitioner was under the control and superintendence of the office of the District Board, Manipur, under Rule 5 of the Rules. But, the first respondent was said to be the drawing and disbursing officer in respect of the District Board. The first respondent was also responsible for the account matters including the maintenance of the cash book and accounts. All the account matters were directly put up by the clerk to the first respondent, who used to sign the cash book. The key of the cash book was said to be with the clerk, and the cash box was kept in the Government treasury. (d) The then Additional District Magistrate put the petitioner under suspension on 7-8-1958 by an Order No. 670 dated 7-8-1958 issued by him on behalf of the first respondent under sub-rule (1) if Rule 12 of the Central Services. Classification. (d) The then Additional District Magistrate put the petitioner under suspension on 7-8-1958 by an Order No. 670 dated 7-8-1958 issued by him on behalf of the first respondent under sub-rule (1) if Rule 12 of the Central Services. Classification. Control and Appeal Rules of 1957 (hereinafter called as the Rules of 1957) as can be seen from Ext. A/1. A Departmental proceeding was drawn up against the petitioner and two charges were framed against him as can be seen from Ext. A/2. The first charge was that the petitioner embezzled Government money amounting to Rupees 2,558.15 Np. and Flag-day collection of Rupees 817.00. The second charge was that the petitioner was absent without leave from 1-7-1958 and that later on he absconded. The petitioner filed written statement of defence on 15-9-1958 as per Ext. A/3. (e) Subsequently, the first respondent issued a letter to the petitioner under Memo No. 56/O-P/DSSAB/2383-I Vol. Manipur Administration dated 11-7-1962 stating that disciplinary action would be taken against the petitioner under the Rules of 1951. Two charges were framed as per Ext. A/4 against the petitioner. The first charge was that the petitioner failed to take adequate measures for safe custody of the cash balance handed by him and his staff from 17-12-1956 to 2-7-1958 and that subsequently there was a loss of Rs. 2,907.26 Np. belonging to the District Board The second charge was that the petitioner did not act with integrity and devotion to duty and that the manner in which he discharged his responsibilities disclosed his utter carelessness and negligence. (f) The petitioner filed written statement of his defence on 7-8-1962 as per Ext. A/5. On 24-7-1962 he had made an application to the first respondent to hear him in person. The first respondent fixed 6-9-1962 as the date for hearing the petitioner as per Ext. A/6. On 6-9-1962, the petitioner appeared before the first respondent. But there was no hearing in the manner contemplated by law. After a short talk with the first respondent for about 3/4 minutes, the petitioner left the residence of the first respondent. Then the petitioner was provisionally proposed to be dismissed. Under Ext. A/7 dated 26-9-1962, the petitioner was directed to show cause why the proposed action of dismissal of the petitioner should not be taken. The petitioner submitted a memorandum as per Ext. A/8 showing cause against the proposed action. Then the petitioner was provisionally proposed to be dismissed. Under Ext. A/7 dated 26-9-1962, the petitioner was directed to show cause why the proposed action of dismissal of the petitioner should not be taken. The petitioner submitted a memorandum as per Ext. A/8 showing cause against the proposed action. But, finally the District Board sent an Order as per Ext. A/9 dated 25-2-1963 discharging the petitioner from service. (g) The petitioner submitted a memorandum of appeal to the second respondent on 15-3-1963 against the order of discharge. But, his appeal was dismissed on 13-7-1964, as can be seen from Ext. A/10 without adequate reasons. 3. At the very outset, it has to be considered whether the petitioner was validly appointed and whether the order of discharge as per Ext A/9 dated 25-2-1963 passed by the first respondent is valid and whether the writ petition is not maintainable as contended by the learned counsel for the respondents. Under Rule 4 of the Rules of 1951 Grade I Secretaries should be appointed by the State concerned in consultation with the President of the District Board and the Local Public Service Commission concerned. But, Grade II and Grade III Secretaries should be appointed by the appropriate State Boards in the meetings of the Boards and where a State Board does not exist then they should be appointed by the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant Governor. The petitioner was appointed as Grade III Secretary. There is no State Board in Manipur. So the petitioner should have been appointed by the Chief Commissioner of Manipur. But, Ext. B/1 shows that the petitioner was appointed by the first respondent, the President of the District Board on 4-11-1953 as Grade III Secretary in the pay scale of Rs. 80-5-120. So the appointment itself was illegal. Under Rules 7 and 8 of the Rules of 1951 it is the appointing authority referred to in Rule 4 which can validly impose a punishment, of discharge from service provided by Rule 7(f) of the Rules of 1951. But, in the present case the Order of discharge as per Ext A/9 was passed not by the Chief Commissioner, but by the first respondent, District Board. So, the appointment of the petitioner was illegal and the proceedings taken against him were also illegal. But, in the present case the Order of discharge as per Ext A/9 was passed not by the Chief Commissioner, but by the first respondent, District Board. So, the appointment of the petitioner was illegal and the proceedings taken against him were also illegal. (4) The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner served from 1953 to 1958, that his service was ratified and that, therefore, the illegality in the appointment was cured. But, there was no ratification of the appointment by the Chief Commissioner. As the appointment itself was illegal, the petitioner must be deemed to be an usurper of the post. Similarly, the 1st respondent District Board also must be held to have usurped the functions of the Chief Commissioner in appointing the petitioner and also in discharging him from the service. In Union of Workmen of R.S.N. and I.G.N. and Rly. Co. Ltd v. The River Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. AIR 1951 Assam 96 it was held that Article 226 of the Constitution of India contemplates a duly constituted person or authority, including in appropriate cases a Government, and not any person or authority or Government not duly constituted and that a High Court does not issue writs of high prerogative against usurpers of office and that its writs are issued only against duly constituted authority. Vide also Anwar Ali Sarkar v. State of West Bengal. AIR 1952 Cal 150 . It was held that when there was a total lack of authority in the person or persons who tried the case, the proceedings were not merely voidable but wholly void and that in such cases no writ of certiorari would lie. In the present case also, the appointment of the petitioner was illegal and the order of his discharge from service was also Illegal. The proceedings were wholly void and no writ can be issued. 5. The next contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the District Board is not a statutory Board constituted under any statute, that it has no statutory functions and that, therefore, no writ of certiorari lies against the order of a non-statutory body. He relied on R. v. Disputes Committee of the National Joint Council for the Craft of Dental Technicians, 1953-1 All ER 327. He relied on R. v. Disputes Committee of the National Joint Council for the Craft of Dental Technicians, 1953-1 All ER 327. It was held that the bodies to which, in modern times, the remedies of these prerogative writs have been applied are all statutory bodies, on whom Parliament has conferred statutory powers and duties, the exercise of which may lead to the detriment of the subjects. As the District Board was formed for the benefit of the Ex-servicemen it is a domestic body. It is not a statutory body with any statutory functions, As such, for this reason also the present writ petition is not maintainable. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the petitioner was a Government servant, that at first proceedings were taken against him under the Rules of 1957 (Central Services. Classification Control and Appeal Rules of 1957) as can be seen from Exts. A/1 to A/3, that subsequently, the first respondent dropped the proceedings under the said Rules of 1957 and initiated proceedings under the Rules of 1951, that the fact that the action was dropped under the Rules of 1957 and taken up under the Rules of 1951 does not take away the official character of the petitioner as a Government servant, that the petitioner was prosecuted under Section 409 I.P.C. in G.R. 751/1958 on the file of the S.D.M. Imphal, East, but that he was given benefit of doubt and acquitted as can be seen from Ext. A/11 and that, therefore, the present writ petition lies under Article 311 of the Constitution of India, since the procedure mentioned therein was not followed. The Government of Manipur declared the Post of the Secretary of the District Board, Manipur, as a permanent one with effect from 1-3-1963 as per Order No. 52-2-63-F dated 9-4-1963 of the Finance Department. Also, the Government of Manipur revised the scale of the Secretary in Manipur Governments Employees Revision of Pay Scales published in the Gazette of 16-3-1966. It has to be noted that the Orders of the Government of Manipur are not retrospective in operation. The petitioner was not a Government employee when he was in service of the District Board and when the proceedings were started against him. The fact that the petitioner was prosecuted under S 409 I.P.C. would not make him a Government servant, if in fact, he was not. 7. The petitioner was not a Government employee when he was in service of the District Board and when the proceedings were started against him. The fact that the petitioner was prosecuted under S 409 I.P.C. would not make him a Government servant, if in fact, he was not. 7. Another contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the first respondent himself had the financial control and superintendence over the petitioner and the other staff under Rule 5 of the Rules of 1951, that he was a witness and that, therefore, he could not be the Enquiry Officer also. He relied on Ashutosh Das v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1956 Cal 278 where it was held that in a departmental enquiry the enquiry officer cannot rely on his own evidence, that this is contrary to the rules of natural justice and that therefore, a man who is entrusted with the enquiry cannot be both a Judge and a witness. But, this objection was not taken by the petitioner before the enquiry officer. So, he must be held to have waived it as laid down in Manaklal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi, AIR 1957 SC 425 . 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the first respondent did not make any enquiry at all, that he referred to some documents in Ext. A/7 which were not proved by any one, that the petitioner was not given any opportunity to defend himself, that he was simply asked to show cause against the nature of punishment to be imposed and not against the infliction of the punishment itself and that, therefore, the present writ application lies. He relied on Baishnab Charan Das v. State of Orissa, AIR 1957 Orissa 70; The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ladli Saran Sinha. AIR 1958 Madh Pra 326 and Khem Chand v. Union of India. AIR 1958 SC 300 . He further argued that the Rules of 1951 are self-contained, that Rules 7 and 8 lay down the procedure which the Appointing Authority should follow in inflicting the major punishments mentioned in Rule 7 but that no enquiry was held according to those Rules. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the Rules of 1951 are only administrative and that their non-compliance does not warrant interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the Rules of 1951 are only administrative and that their non-compliance does not warrant interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. This contention is not correct. For, in the present case the first, respondent, no doubt complied with Rule 8 by issuing Appellant notice as per Ext. A/7 to show cause why the proposed punishment of dismissal from service should not be inflicted. But, he did not make any enquiry in the presence of the petitioner. He did not get the documents mentioned in Ext. A/7 proved by any one. So, the first respondent did not make any proper enquiry at all. If it is held that the petition is otherwise maintainable, then the proceedings are liable to be quashed. However, in view of my finding that the petition is not maintainable, the proceedings cannot be quashed. 9. In the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. But, under the circumstances of the case I direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Petition dismissed.