JUDGMENT A. P. Sen, J. - 1. This is an appeal by the defendants from a judgment and decree of the Court of the Additional Judge to the 1st Additional District Judge, Bhopal, dated 16th November 1966 affirming the judgment and decree of the Court of the 1st Civil Judge, Class II, Bhopal, dated 31st August 1965. 2. The parties stand in the relation or landlord and tenant. The appellants are the defendants. Briefly stated, the facts are that the plaintiff sought eviction of the defendants from the suit premises initially under section 12(1)(e) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (No. XLI of 1961). The Court of first instance having negatived any genuine requirement for residential purposes, the plaintiff went up in appeal; and in appeal he incorporated a new ground for eviction, namely, a disclaimer of his title, by amendment of the plaint. This necessitated the framing of an issue whether the defendants had denied his title and a consequent remand under Order 41, rule 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure with a direction to the trial Court to try the issue and record a finding thereon. On remand, the first Court held that the ground under section 12(1) (c) was established. The Court below has affirmed the finding. Hence this second appeal. 3. The main question for determination is whether a disclaimer of the landlord's title is a ground for eviction available under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 4. It is noteworthy that in the repealed Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955, there was a specific provision, namely, section 4(1)(f) in that behalf. The contention of Shri Usmani, learned Counsel for the appellants, is that the law is now altered by the deletion of that clause from the new Act, and, therefore, a disclaimer of the landlord's title is no longer a ground for eviction. The contention cannot be given effect to. It is not a sound rule of construction to interpret one Act with reference to the provisions of another enactment. "When the legislature", said Blackburn, J., "change the words of an enactment, no doubt it must be taken prima facie that there was an intention to change the meaning" Wheatley Vs. Wheatley (1949) 65 TLR 602. This, however, is not necessarily so, for we and, as a matter of fact, that the same learned Judge observed in Hadley Vs. "When the legislature", said Blackburn, J., "change the words of an enactment, no doubt it must be taken prima facie that there was an intention to change the meaning" Wheatley Vs. Wheatley (1949) 65 TLR 602. This, however, is not necessarily so, for we and, as a matter of fact, that the same learned Judge observed in Hadley Vs. Perks 1866 LR 1 QB 444, 457, "in drawing Acts of Parliament, the legislature, as it would seem, to improve the graces of the style, and to avoid using the same words over and over again, constantly change" the words without intending to change the meaning. (See Craise on Statute Law, Sixth Edition, P. 143). The Legislature perhaps felt that the old provision in section 4(1) (f) in the Act of 1955 was a mere superfluity. Learned counsel, however, contends that the language of section 12(1) (c) of the Act of 1961 is not susceptible of any such construction. 5. On a plain construction of clause (c) of section 12(1), it is manifest that eviction of tenants on disclaimer of title is included within its ambit. The provision is in three parts and each of them furnishes a ground for eviction, namely, (1) where the tenant has created a nuisance, (2) where the tenant has done any act which is inconsistent with the purpose of the lease and (3) when the tenant has done any act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord thereon. It is noteworthy that this provision contemplates three different contingencies. The three clauses are separate and distinct, each being separated by the word "or". The third clause "has done any act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord" is wide enough to include acts of denial of the landlord's title. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants' then contends that the words "any act" in clause (c) have reference to a physical act on the part of the tenant which has the effect of causing or permitting to be caused substantial damage to the accommodation. I am unable to accept this contention. To do so would be to render clause (k) of section 12(1) wholly nagatory. I am unable to accept this contention. To do so would be to render clause (k) of section 12(1) wholly nagatory. Clause (k) reads: - "that the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the accommodation;" It would appear that the words "any act" in clause (c) have not been used in relation only to physical acts on the part of the tenant. Whenever the Legislature uses the word "any", it means "each and every" and, therefore, the words "any act" must and ought mean each and every act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord. A denial of the landlord's title undoubtedly affects him adversely, and it also affects him substantially. 7. The construction that I place on clause (c) of section 12(1) finds support from a judgment of Khan, J. in Bashir Mohammad Vs. Jaswantsingh 1965 JLJ SN 8. In that case Khan, J. observed:- The latter part of this Clause, 'or which is likely to affect adversely or substantially the interest of the landlord therein' cannot have any meaning other than what is described by the term "disclaimer." 8. It is well established that where the language of a statute is plain and clear the words must be given their ordinary and natural meaning. Hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the language employed by the Legislature if such meaning is clear on the face of the statute: Per Das, J. (as he then was) in Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax Vs. Keshabchandra AIR 1950 SC 265 . 9. In my opinion, the plaintiff's suit was rightly decreed under S. 12 (1) (c) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.