JUDGMENT :- On June 7, 1965, Laik J. issued a rule calling upon the sole opposite party, Dulli Chand Barman, to show cause why pending the hearing of the connected appeal, admitted under O. 41, R. 11, of the Civil P.C. on September 13, 1963, he should not be restrained from having his name mutated in the books of the Khardah Municipality as respects the land in controversy here: the subject-matter of the aforesaid appeal. 2. On August 9, 1966, I made the rule absolute. I was told that day on behalf of the sole opposite party that he had since transferred the land in controversy here to two other persons who, as it now appears upon affidavit evidence, are Sudhir Kumar Ganguly and Mohit Lal Mitra, the purchasers from the sole opposite party Dulli Chand, by a sale-deed dated April 19, 1961. 3. On November 10, 1966, the municipality mutated the names of these two purchasers, Sudhir and Mohit, in its books. 4. These are the bare bones of the allegations upon which rest the petition filed in Court on December 9, 1966, by Moni Mohan Ghosal, the appellant in the second appeal concerned, for contempt against Dulli Chand (opposite party No. 1), the Chairman and the Commissioners of the Khardah Municipality (opposite parties numbering 2 to 7) and the two purchasers from Dulli Chand (opposite parties 8 and 9). 5. That none of the opposite parties save Dulli Chand are parties to the interlocutory proceedings arising out of the second appeal and leading to the grant of the injunction is plain to be seen. I cannot, therefore, hold them guilty of contempt that way, that is to say, as principal offenders. 6. Nor can Dulli Chand be touched. He was ordered not to have his name mutated. He has not mutated his name either. 7. But it is said that all the opposite parties before me aided and abetted the breach of the injunction. If that is so, surely they have committed contempt, even though they do not happen to be parties to the proceedings had in this Court. 8. In order, however, to come to a finding that they are aiders and abettors all, it must be proved : I. that the injunction is in breach, and, II. that they have assisted in committing the breach. 9. Take the first ingredient first. What is the injunction ? 8. In order, however, to come to a finding that they are aiders and abettors all, it must be proved : I. that the injunction is in breach, and, II. that they have assisted in committing the breach. 9. Take the first ingredient first. What is the injunction ? The injunction is: 'You Dulli Chand Barman, do not mutate your name in the books of the Khardah Municipality.' Has this injunction been in breach? That is to say, has Dulli Chand Barman mutated his name in the books of the municipality in defiance of the injunction ? He has not. Ergo, no breach of injunction as ordered by the Court is to be seen here. 10. Now, come to the second ingredient listed above. No breach being there, no aiding and abetting the breach can be there too. It is quite a conceivable proposition than an abetment there may be but without being successful. Should that be so, say, one who abets the breach of a solemn order of the Court, even though unsuccessful, can be caught. But upon all the facts I have had put before me, I find it impossible to say that any one of the other alleged contemners said to Dulli Chand : 'Go and get your name mutated in the books of the municipality, no matter what the order of the Court is, no matter that the order of the Court forbids you so to do.' No such inference can be implied either upon the whole of the affidavit evidence. 11. So, that is that. And, to my thinking, that is so plain and clear. Two authorities cited do not seem to carry the petitioner further. In Seaward v. Paterson, (1897) 13 TLR 211, one Murray, not a party to the action, was no doubt found to have committed grave contempt of Court on the principle that it was for the benefit of the public that the course of justice was not obstructed. Two authorities cited do not seem to carry the petitioner further. In Seaward v. Paterson, (1897) 13 TLR 211, one Murray, not a party to the action, was no doubt found to have committed grave contempt of Court on the principle that it was for the benefit of the public that the course of justice was not obstructed. And the course of justice was very much obstructed, (i) because of the form of the injunction upon the defendant Paterson, his under-tenants, agents and servants, perpetually restraining them from doing or suffering to be done anything which might interfere with the full and quiet enjoyment by the plaintiff Seaward, or his under-tenants, of the premises in controversy there, (ii) because of Murray having been present in the boxing contest in the aforesaid premises held in defiance of the injunction, and that too not as a mere spectator, (in that case, he would have come nowhere near contempt), but as "one of the persons interested in the club" which organized the performances, just what was found by the trial Judge, North J. (Seaward v. Paterson, (1897) 13 T L R 204 at p. 205), as one who really ran the club and "was at the bottom of the whole thing," just what was found by Lindley L. J. in the Court of Appeal ((1897) 13 T L R 211 at p. 212), (iii) and also because "he knew all about it (the order for an injunction) immediately after it was made," to quote the words of North J., again. This can hardly be said of the alleged contemners before me. One, the form of injunction is upon Dulli Chand and Dulli Chand alone, not his assigns (here opposite parties numbering 8 and 9, Sudhir Kumar Ganguly and Mohit Lal Mitra). Two, the opposite parties other than Dulli Chand were certainly participants in the operation mutation, but such mutation did not set the order of the Court at defiance, the order having been upon Dulli Chand and Dulli Chand alone. Three, say, the Chairman and the Commissioners of the municipality, the opposite parties numbering 2 to 7, had known all about the order before November 10, 1966, when they mutated the names of Sudhir Ganguly and Mohit Mitra in their books. But, what is the order ? The order is not : 'Do not mutate the names of Ganguly and Mitra'. But, what is the order ? The order is not : 'Do not mutate the names of Ganguly and Mitra'. The order is : 'Do not mutate the name of Dulli Chand.' That the alleged contemners, the chairman and the commissioners of the municipality, have not done. To compare, therefore, the contemners before me with Murray is to compare the two uncomparables. 12. The other authority is the majority decision of the Supreme Court in Hoshiar Singh v. Gurbachan Singh, AIR 1962 S C 1089. Quoting and adopting the rule as succinctly put by Oswald in his great book on Contempt, 3rd Edn., pages 199 and 203, the majority decision of the Supreme Court lays down the law as under : For founding an action in contempt, service of the order is not essential when the order is a prohibitory one. It is enough if the contemner has had notice of such an order aliunde. 13. I bow to this authority, as, indeed, I must. More, I see in the order of injunction I am dealing with a prohibitory order. But what does it prohibit ? It prohibits Dulli Chand and Dulli Chand alone to get his name mutated into the books of the municipality in place of Ghosal. Dulli Chand has not done what he has been prohibited to do. So, what does it matter if each and every one of the nine members of the opposite party has had notice aliunde, if that, of the order of this Court? No breach of the order is there. Ergo, no contempt is there too. 14. It is said that the problem before me should be examined from a broad common sense point of view. I agree. At the same time, it will not do to forget that proceedings in contempt, though not criminal, are of quasi criminal nature: Nripendra Narayan Choudhury v. Bedabala Dabi, 55 Cal W N 479 : ( AIR 1952 Cal 702 ), and, if I may refer to my own decision, sitting with A. N. Ray J., without any impropriety on my part ; Prosanta Kumar Sur v. Amulya Kumar Sur, (1964) 68 Cal W N 330. So the charge as laid down must be brought home to the contemners. No violation of the Court's order being there, the charge refutes itself. So the charge as laid down must be brought home to the contemners. No violation of the Court's order being there, the charge refutes itself. This is also examining the problem from a broad common-sense point of view-the result of such examination disclosing that the petitioner has been outwitted, even though Dalli Chand gave the petitioner an opportunity on August 9,1966, not to be so outwitted, by submitting through his advocate that he had sold the land to other persons. 15. I have not overlooked the salutary provisions of S. 138 (2) of the Bengal Municipal Act, 15 of 1932, infraction of which by the municipality is clear to be seen. For that, let the municipality and its human agency, namely, the chairman and the commissioners, be condemned by all means. To say so is one thing - And to say that they have committed grave contempt of Court is another. 16. Upon all I see, I find no substance in this rule which I discharge. But I make no order as to costs. P. S. After I have just delivered the judgment, Mr. Chandra appearing on behalf of the petitioner requests me to make a special mention of Dulli Chand's letter to the municipality in the matter of mutation of the names of his vendees. Mr. Chandra is right. That letter has been referred to in the very resolution recorded by the municipality on November 10, 1966, as will appear from Annexure "L" to the main petition of contempt. But it defeats me how that can alter the fortunes of the case one way or the other. I repeat what I have recorded above. The order as it stands is not in breach. That being so, none of the alleged contemners come anywhere near contempt. Rule discharged.