ORDER Singh, J.- 1. This is a second appeal by the plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed by the Courts below. 2. The plaintiff's case in the plaint which was presented on 7-4-1961 was that he was Bhumiswami of the suit lands and was in possession for the last twenty years, that the defendants nearly a year before trespassed on the lands and caused loss to the plaintiff by committing theft of his crop and a criminal case instituted against them is pending, that he was still in possession but as the defendants were again threatening to take forcible possession, he should be granted a decree of permanent injunction against them. The defendants in their written statement denied the title of the plaintiff and pleaded that they never committed any act of trespass or theft and the criminal case against them was false, that they have been in possession of the suit lands for a long time and the plaintiff was never in possession and that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief claimed by him. The plaintiff in his deposition which was recorded all 21-9-1962 stated that the defendants by their acts of trespass and other unlawful acts dispossessed him two years before. The trial Court in its Judgment which was delivered on 30-9-1963 held that the plaintiff was Bhumiswami of the suit-lands and that he was in possession till three years before (i. e. till 1960) when he was dispossessed by the defendants. The Court further held that as the plaintiff was out of possession he should have claimed the relief of possession and was not ell titled to the relief of permanent injunction. The' plaintiff's' suit was, therefore, dismissed. He then went in appeal to the Court of the Additional District Judge, Sehore. During the pendency of his appeal in that Court, he filed an application on 17-8-1966 under O. 6, R. 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure for permission to amend the plaint and to incorporate in it an averment of dispossession in 1960 and a relief for possession. The Additional District Judge has rejected this application and has dismissed the appeal. 3. In this second appeal, Shri Jakatdar, the learned counsel for the appellant, has raised only one contention that the application for amendment should have been allowed. 4. The Additional District Judge has rejected this application and has dismissed the appeal. 3. In this second appeal, Shri Jakatdar, the learned counsel for the appellant, has raised only one contention that the application for amendment should have been allowed. 4. The Additional District Judge in disallowing the plaintiff to amend the plaint, has given the following reasons:- (i) the plaintiff was aware of the fact of his dispossession which he now seeks to introduce in the plaint; (ii) the prayer for amendment was a belated one; (iii) the amendment seeks to introduce a different cause of action, and; (iv) granting of amendment would involve a fresh trial with fresh pleadings and fresh evidence. 5. In my view, the aforesaid reasons stated by the learned Additional District Judge in his order are not good reasons in law. 6. I have already mentioned that the plaintiff did state in the plaint that in 1960 the defendants committed acts of trespass and theft of his crop. According to the case as laid in the plaint, the plaintiff (more correctly his counsel) did not think that these acts of trespass or theft resulted in his dispossession. I cannot blame the plaintiff or his lawyer for this lapse. Even jurists have failed to give universally acceptable de fill it ion of possession. "The search for a unitary concept of possession in the Jaw is one doomed to frustration;' (Paton's Jurisprudence, pp. 499, 500). Holmes, a great jurist and a great judge, defined possession as follows:- "When we say of a man that he has possession, we affirm directly that all the facts of a certain group are true of him, and we convey indirectly or by implication that the law will give him the advantage of the situation. Contract, or property or any other substantive notion of the Jaw, may be analyzed in the same way, and should be treated in the same order. The only difference is, that, while possession denotes the facts and connotes the consequence, property always and contracts with more uncertainty and oscillation, denote the consequence and connote the facts." The common Law, pp. 169, 170.) Writing about the definition, Paton says, "Holmes saw one important aspect of the complicating factors concerned; "but he produced, none-the-less, an oversimplification which having shed some light, obscured further investigati0n;" (Jurisprudence, 3rd Edn., p. 523). According 10 him. 169, 170.) Writing about the definition, Paton says, "Holmes saw one important aspect of the complicating factors concerned; "but he produced, none-the-less, an oversimplification which having shed some light, obscured further investigati0n;" (Jurisprudence, 3rd Edn., p. 523). According 10 him. "One might describe 'possession' as a word which serves as a useful symbol to refer to the link between diverse conditions of fact and equally diverse conditions in law." (Jurisprudence, 3rd Edn. p. 523). 7. Thus, the concept of 'possession', in legal terminology is a complex one. Narainbhai Ichharam Vs. Narbada Prasad, 27 MPLC 368-ILR 1941 Nag. 474. And similar is the case with the concept of 'Dispossession'. To constitute 'Dispossession' "There must in every case be positive acts which can be referred only to the intention of acquiring exclusive control and the new comer must effectually excludes' the former possessor". (Rustomji's Limitation Act, 6th edition, p. 810, citing Pollock on possession, pp. 85, and 44). Acts which may prima fade be acts of dispossession may not in law amount to dispossession. (Basant Kumar Vs. Secretary)' of Slate), AIR 1971 PC 18 P. 22. Occasional trespass or theft of the standing crop may not be accompanied by the requisite intention of taking exclusive control of the lands and may not amount to dispossession of the person already in possession. Be that as it may, I am not prepared in the circumstances of this case to blame the plaintiff or his legal advisor of knowingly making false averments in the plaint. The trial Court inferred from the evidence that the defendant's acts were such that plaintiff was dispossessed. As a result of this adverse finding against the plaintiff, all that can be said is that the plaintiff's lawyer who drafted the plaint made mistake in drawing the inference of plaintiff's continuity of possession and in not claiming relief for possession but the facts that were stated were substantially correct. In S. K. Buty Vs. Shriram Had Tambe AIR 1954 Nag. 65., while upholding an amendment allowed in first appeal by the District Judge, it was said by Deo, J.- "Necessity for amendment of pleadings frequently arises on account of blunderings of inefficient, inactive or negligent legal advisers. It would be unfair to visit the litigants invariably with the sins of omission of the members of this monopolistic profession." (p. 69 of report). 8. It would be unfair to visit the litigants invariably with the sins of omission of the members of this monopolistic profession." (p. 69 of report). 8. These observations, though somewhat cynical, have a ring of truth. In my view, when in substance the facts are correctly stated in the plaint but there has been a mistake in drawing proper legal inferences and thereby a failure to claim proper relief, amendment of the plaint should be normally allowed. 9. As regards delay, the Additional District Judge is right in observing that the amendment application is belated. The plaintiff should have, soon after the presentation of the appeal, applied for amendment. But delay alone is not sufficient to defeat an amendment application which is otherwise proper. If the finding of the trial Court is correct that the plaintiff was dispossessed in 1960, the relief for possession even now is not time barred and the defendants cannot be said to have acquired any valuable right because of the plaintiff's delay in not claiming this relief in the initial stage of the suit. Any inconvenience to them can be adequately compensated by an award of costs. 10. Then, it has been said, that the amendment introduces a new cause of action. This is clearly wrong. The expression "cause of action" in the context of amendment of pleadings means "a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts"; but where "the amendment amounts to no more than a different or additional approach to the same facts", it cannot be said that the amendment introduces a new cause of action. This legal position is clearly brought out from a recent decision of the Supreme Court in A. K. Gupta & Sons Vs. Damodar Valley Corporation AIR 1967 SC 96 , from which the following two passages may be usefully quoted:- "But it is also well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts to no more than a different or additional approach to the same facts, the amendment will be allowed even after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation (See Charan Das Vs, Amir Khan 47 IA 255=AIR 1921 PC 50 and L. J. Leach & Co. Ltd. Vs. Jardine Skinner and Co. 1957 SCR 438 - AIR 1957 SC 357 ." (Para 7. p.98). Ltd. Vs. Jardine Skinner and Co. 1957 SCR 438 - AIR 1957 SC 357 ." (Para 7. p.98). "The expression "cause of action" in the present context does not mean "every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed" as was said in Cooks Vs. Gill (1873) 8 CP 107, 116, in a different context, for if it were so, no material fact could ever be amended or added and, of course, no one would want to change or add an immaterial allegation by amendment. That expression for the present purpose only means, a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts." (Para 9, p. 98) 11. Lastly, the Additional District Judge is of the view that the amendment, if allowed, will result in a fresh trial on fresh evidence. This also is wrong. The case of the parties as to title and prior possession has already been fully tried. The plaintiff by alleging that he was dispossessed in 1960 will now be admitting a part of the defendants' case that they were in possession. The addition of this fact in the plaint, coupled with a relief for possession, will Dot necessitate amendment of the written statement. No fresh trial of any issue will be necessary and the first appeal Court will be in a position to decide the case on merits. When an amendment is allowed in appeal, the Court must, having regard to the circumstances of the case, see if additional pleadings and evidence are necessary; but when it is only formal and in substance adds a relief on the facts which have already been fully tried, it cannot be said that the amendment is such which will necessitate fresh pleading and fresh evidence and that in itself is a good reason for allowing the amendment. (See Gopal Vs. Mahomed Jaffer AIR 1954 SC 5 ; Lakshminurasimnachari Vs. Shri Agastheshwaraswamivaru, AIR 1960 SC 622 . 12. In my view, the amendment application should have been allowed. The application is dated 17-8-1966 and is in the record of the Court of first appeal. That application is hereby allowed. 13. The Additional District Judge has not decided all the questions raised in the suit and which were also contested in the appeal. Therefore, the ca5e will have to be remitted back to him for fresh hearing. 14. The application is dated 17-8-1966 and is in the record of the Court of first appeal. That application is hereby allowed. 13. The Additional District Judge has not decided all the questions raised in the suit and which were also contested in the appeal. Therefore, the ca5e will have to be remitted back to him for fresh hearing. 14. As a result, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge are set aside and the case is remitted to him for further hearing. He is directed to permit the plaintiff to incorporate in the plaint amendment prayed for in the application dated 17-8-1966. After that is done he should decide the appeal on merits after' hearing it afresh. The appellant will pay Rs. 100 as costs to the respondents for the amendment. The amount will be paid on the first hearing now to be fixed in the first appeal Court or within such time as may he ordered by that Court, No order as to costs of this appeal.