JUDGMENT T.C. Raghavan, J. 1. In these second appeals the question to be decided is the same; and that is whether Ext. B1 of June 1923 was a mortgage or a lease. The Subordinate Judge held that the transaction was a kanom, while the District Judge after extracting long passages from as many as ten judgments of this Court which, account for about two thirds of his fairly long judgment and after summarising the provisions of the documents hold that the transaction was a mortgage observing that "applying the principles laid down in the decisions cited above I hold that Ext. B1 evidences a relationship of a debtor and creditor and not that of a landlord and tenant" without indicating how each of the quoted passages applied to the cases before him. It is the correctness of this decision that has to be considered in these second appeals. 2. The only building rule in deciding such questions is the one laid down by the Supreme Court in Ramdhan Puri v. Bankey Bihari ( AIR 1958 SC 941 ) that the intention of the parties must be looked into and that once a debt with the security of land for its repayment was found, then the arrangement was a mortgage by whatever name it was called. In several decisions of this Court the question had been considered ; and ultimately, the matter was considered by a Full Bench of this Court to which I was also a party in Krishnan Nair v. Sivaraman Nambudiri ( 1967 KLJ 84 ). The several recitals and circumstances that usually arise for consideration in such documents have been considered in the said Full Bench decision. I shall now consider the recitals and the circumstances of the cases to find out the intention of the parties to the document in the light of the said Full Bench decision. 3. The suit properties belonged to a devaswom; and the same were outstanding on mortgages with one of the ooralans of the devaswom. The devaswom filed suits for redemption and obtained decrees; and thereafter to deposit the redemption price the devaswom borrowed amounts from a Ravuthan and put him in possession of the properties under an agreement. (The said agreement however has not been produced.) Ultimately, Ext. B1 was executed stating that the document incorporated the agreement already existing between the parties. Ravuthan's rights under Ext. (The said agreement however has not been produced.) Ultimately, Ext. B1 was executed stating that the document incorporated the agreement already existing between the parties. Ravuthan's rights under Ext. B1 were subsequently brought to sale by the devaswom in a suit for arrears of michavaram and the said rights were purchased under Ext. B2 by the appellant before me, so that the holding by the appellant is under the terms and conditions contained in Ext. B1. 4. The transaction is called karipanayam; and Ext. B1 is the counter part executed by Ravuthan, the original having been executed by the devaswom. Several recitals are pointed out by Mr. M. K. Narayana Menon, the counsel of the appellant, which, he claims, support his contention that the transaction was a lease. The counsel points out that it is not usual to have a counter part if the transaction was intended to be a mortgage. The other circumstances pointed out are that the parties have called the transaction charthu; that the annual income of the properties is termed pattom; that out of the 1750 paras of paddy fixed as the annual pattom, after deducting the interest on the mortgage money and the revenue of the properties, the michavaram payable is 615 paras of paddy and 3 edangalies of gingili oil and neivilakku panam eny/viL6upzM of 2 fanoms; that the gingili oil and neivilakku panam are called parambu pattom; that the michavaram is to be measured to the pattapara before 30th Makaram every year; that there is a term of 12 years; that the transferee had to meet the expenses of surrender after the term; and that the arrears of michavaram bore interest at 2 per 10 for paddy and 12 per cent for money which are the usual rates for arrears of rent. On the other side, Mr. K. Kuttikrishna Menon, the counsel of the devaswom, points out the following recitals, which, the counsel claims, support the case of the devaswom that the transaction was a mortgage. The counsel points out that the amount for which the document was executed was fairly high (Rs. On the other side, Mr. K. Kuttikrishna Menon, the counsel of the devaswom, points out the following recitals, which, the counsel claims, support the case of the devaswom that the transaction was a mortgage. The counsel points out that the amount for which the document was executed was fairly high (Rs. 5,540); that the amount was taken to discharge the decree debts payable to the ooralan, against whom decrees for redemption were obtained; that the transaction was called by the parties karipanayam in several places of the document; that after the term of 12 years the transferee has also the right to claim the amount advanced by him; and that even when the right was brought to sale for the realisation of the decree against Ravuthan the right was called a mortgage and it was that that was purchased under Ext. B2. 5. As already stated at the commencement of this judgment, the intention of the parties to the transaction should be gathered from the recitals in the document and the circumstances so as to see whether they intended the transfer of the properties as security for the money advanced or whether the transfer was intended for the enjoyment of the transferee. In these cases there are some provisions, which might at the first flush indicate that the money was taken as a loan and the transact ion was intended to secure the loan. The amount, as I have already pointed out. is fairly high; but that should not be given undue importance. In the Full Bench decision referred to already it is observed that raising money to the hilt need not necessarily be a borrowing to the hilt for example, there can be a lease for a premium which amounts very nearly to the value of the property so that a high ratio borne by the consideration advanced to the value of the property is not so strong a cirumstance in favour of a mortgage as a low ratio is in favour of a lease. Mr. M. K. Narayana Menon points out in this connection that there is no indication at all that there was pressure from the mortgagee, the ooralan, which necessitated the filing of the suits for redemption. Mr. M. K. Narayana Menon points out in this connection that there is no indication at all that there was pressure from the mortgagee, the ooralan, which necessitated the filing of the suits for redemption. The counsel suggests that the idea of the devaswom might have been to recover possession of the properties from the ooralan and lease them out to another at a higher rent so as to augment the income of the devaswom. Obviously this suggestion has force, because the suits were by the devaswom for redemption and not by the mortgagee for the mortgage money. Again, some of the provisions pointed out by Mr. Kuttkikrishna Menon might indicate that the transaction was intended to secure the money advanced and to that extent the transaction was intended to be a mortgage. Here also I would point out the observation of the Full Bench at the close of Para.6 of the judgment that the question would not be whether the transaction was pre dominently a lease or predominantly a mortgage, but whether it was a lease at all. Therefore, if there is an element of lease in the transaction, though there are other indications that the transaction might have been intended to be a mortgage, the transaction should be construed only as a lease. 6. Bearing these principles in mind when I consider the several provisions of this document, what 1 feel is that the intention of the parties could have only been to transfer the properties for the enjoyment of the transferee. One or two circumstances, which appear to my mind to be fairly clinching, are these. The michavaram payable (note the name michavaram and not purappad) is 615 paras of paddy and 3 edangalies of gingili oil and fanams for neivilakku .This payment of gingili oil and neivilakku fanams is called parambu pattom which indicates that at least a portion of the holding, the paramba, was intended to be enjoyed by the transferee and not given as security for the money advanced by him. If this much is established, it is only reasonable to conclude that the other portion of the properties, namely, the paddy fields, must also have been transferred for enjoyment and not as security. Another circumstance which is equally clinching is the provision for meeting the expenses of surrender by the transferee. This is not a common provision in a mortgage. If this much is established, it is only reasonable to conclude that the other portion of the properties, namely, the paddy fields, must also have been transferred for enjoyment and not as security. Another circumstance which is equally clinching is the provision for meeting the expenses of surrender by the transferee. This is not a common provision in a mortgage. Again, the provision that the paddy has to be dried, winnowed and taken to the devaswom granary and measured to the pattapara also indicates that the transaction was intended to create a landlord and tenant relationship and not a creditor and debtor relationship. Still further, the devaswom filed a suit against Ravuthan and brought his rights to sale for arrears of michavaram, which were purchased under Ext. B2 by the appellant. If the transaction was considered by the devaswom to be one of mortgage, the devaswom would not normally have brought the mortgagee's rights to sale; it could have even kept quiet; and portions of the mortgage would have been wiped out by the arrears of michavaram with the ultimate result that on a final accounting the devaswom would have had to pay only a small amount and probably no amount at all. To these provisions the other provisions and circumstances like the existence of a counter part, the term of 12 years, the rates of interest of 2 per 10 and 12 per cent on the arrears of michavaram, etc. have also to be added. One more circumstance which might incidentally be pointed out is that though this transaction took place in 1923 no attempt appears to have been made to redeem the properties all these years. Even now the question comes up only incidentally in land acquisition proceedings. (Of course, I am aware that limitation for redemption of possessory mortgages is 60 years; and that by the mere fact that no attempt has been made to redeem the mortgage, it cannot be said that the transaction is a lease and not a mortgage.) All these indicate that what the parties had in mind was only the creation of an arrangement for enjoyment and not one for securing the amount advanced. 7. 7. I may add in conclusion that this is atypical instance of a karipanayam created for the purpose of enjoyment, which was fairly common in the old Palghat Taluk and the neighbouring areas and which was slightly more secure than a lease with no considerable premium during the days of no security of fixity of tenure for the tenant. 8. In the result, I set aside the decision of the lower appellate court and restore the decision of the Trial Court. In the circumstances, I direct both parties to bear their respective costs throughout. 9. Since there is already a Full Bench decision, there is no ground for granting leave to appeal; leave is refused.