J. B. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THE original accused Babubhai Prabhudas Modi has filed this revision application against his conviction by the learned City Magistrate 10 Court Ahmedabad for the offence under sec. 131a of the Bombay Police Act 1951 hereinafter to be referred as the Act in that he had kept his tea kettle in a four wheel band-cart and served tea to customers without a licence. The learned City Magistrate has imposed a sentence of fine of Rs 10/- only and in default of payment of fine ordered the accused to undergo simple imprisonment of five days. Even though the amount of fine is small the accused has filed this revision application in the nature of a `test case and in view of the importance of this matter which involves a question of interpretation of the definition of the term place of public entertainments in sec 2 (10) of the Acts this matter has been referred to a Division Bench and that is how it has come before us. ( 2 ) THE case of the prosecution was that on 21st June 1966 the accused kept his tea kettle in a four wheel hand-cart and served tea to the customers without obtaining a licence under Rules issued under sec. 33 (1) (v) of the Act and he had thereby committed an offence punishable under sec. 151a of the Act. The accused pleaded not guilty to the said charge. His defence was that he had not kept any place of public entertainment and therefore no licence was necessary for his four wheel hand-cart where he kept his tea kettle and he had therefore committed no offence whatsoever. The learned City Magistrate relied on the definition of the term place in sec. 2 (3) of the Act and held that as it was very wide to cover even the buildings or open place such a vehicle which occupied a place was covered under sec. 33 (i) (w) and such a place could be regulated by licensing rules. Accordingly the learned City Magistrate held that the accused having kept his four wheel hand-cart containing tea kettle without a licence and as he served tea to the customers without a licence the prosecution case was proved and he convicted the accused. The accused has challenged his conviction in this Revision Application. Accordingly the learned City Magistrate held that the accused having kept his four wheel hand-cart containing tea kettle without a licence and as he served tea to the customers without a licence the prosecution case was proved and he convicted the accused. The accused has challenged his conviction in this Revision Application. ( 3 ) WITH great respect to the learned City Magistrate he has decided the entire matter on the definition of the term place under sec. 2 (3) of the Act without even making any reference to the special definition of the term place of public entertainment in sec. 2 (10) of the Act with which we are concerned. Sec. 33 (1) (w) of the Act provides that the Commissioner and the District Magistrate in area under their respective charges or any Part thereof may make alter or rescind rules or orders not inconsistent with this Act for: (I) Licensing or controlling places of public amusement or entertainment (ii) prohibiting the keeping of places of public amusement or entertainment or assembly in order to prevent obstruction inconvenience annoyance risk danger or damage to the residents or passengers in the vicinity (iii) regulating the means of entrance and exit at places of public amusement or entertainment or assembly and providing for the maintenance of public safety and the prevention of disturbance thereat. It will be noted at this stage that under sec. 33 (1) (c) such rules can be made for regulating the conditions under which vehicles may remain standing in streets and public places and the use of streets as halting places for vehicles or cattle. Under the definition of the term vehicle in sec. 2 (17) a vehicle means any carriage cart van dray truck hand cart or other conveyance etc. or under sec. 33 (1) (c) regulations could have been made for a hand-cart which remains standing in the streets and public places and for regulating the use of streets as halting places for such hand-carts. In the present case the charge against the accused is not for breach of any such regulations for halting of a vehicle. The charge against the present accused is only under the rule made under sec. 33 (1) (w) in that he had not obtained a licence for keeping a place of public entertainment. In the present case the charge against the accused is not for breach of any such regulations for halting of a vehicle. The charge against the present accused is only under the rule made under sec. 33 (1) (w) in that he had not obtained a licence for keeping a place of public entertainment. That is why what is important for our purpose is to look at the definition of the term place of public entertainment and not the definition of the term place by itself because the licensing regulation can be made under sec. 33 (1) (w) only for licensing a place of public entertainment and not merely any place as such. The term place of public entertainment is defined in sec. 2 (10) of the Act:place of public entertainment means any place to which the public are admitted and where any kind of food or drink is supplied for consumption on the premises by any person owning or having an interest in or managing such place and includes a refreshment room eating-house coffee-house liquor-house boarding-house lodging house hotel tavern or wine beer spirit-arrack taddy ganja bhang or opium stop or a shop where any kind of food or drink is supplied to the public for consumption in or near such shop. If we analyse this exhaustive definition it not only defines what the term place of public entertainment means but by an extension seeks to include even other places mentioned In the latter part of this clause. The place contemplated in the main part which defines this term place of public entertainment is only that place which satisfies the following two tests:- (I) to which the public are admitted and (ii) where any kind of food or drink is supplied for consumption on the premises by any person owning or having an interest in or managing such place. Therefore it is clear from this main definition that a place becomes a `place of public entertainment only if the public are admitted to that place and are supplied by the person owning having interest therein or managing such place any kind of food or drink for consumption on the premises itself. Therefore it is clear from this main definition that a place becomes a `place of public entertainment only if the public are admitted to that place and are supplied by the person owning having interest therein or managing such place any kind of food or drink for consumption on the premises itself. Therefore there cannot be any doubt so far as the main definition is concerned that premises element is a must and the entertainment of the public must be by supply of food or drink for consumption on such premises as far as the inclusive part is concerned it is the settled rule of Interpretation that these inclusive words are by way of an extension of the main definition and they make the definition more extensive by including categories of places of public entertainment which clearly would not have fallen in the main definition clause. This inclusive portion includes a refreshment room eating house coffee-house liquor-house boarding house lodging-house hotel tavern as they are included specifically in this definition of a place of public entertainment. Thereafter therein a further inclusive clause which includes shops of certain categories namely; wine shop beer shop spirit shop arrack shop taddy shop ganja shop bhang shop or opium shop and further a general category of shops where any kind of food or drink is supplied to the public for consumption in or near such shop. It is not necessary for us in the present case to consider whether the limitative words where any kind of food or drink is supplied to the public for consumption in or near such shop govern all those shops or opium a shop in the residual category. We are at present concerned only with the residual category as the contention of the learned Assistant Government Pleader is that this mobile tea shop falls under this part of the definition. Tea being an article of drink which is supplied to the public it is contended that as it is supplied for consumption to the public in or near such mobile shop the said shop falls within this inclusive definition even though there are no fixed premises for this tea shop and the whole business of selling tea is carried on only from this four wheel hand-cart. We have therefore to consider whether the element of premises is not a must in so far as this residuary clause of any shop where any kind of food or drink is supplied for consumption to the public in or near such shop is concerned. The element of premises as we have seen was present in the main definition. It is also present in that part of the Inclusive definition in which various specific categories of places are mentioned namely; refreshment room eating-house coffee-house liquor- house boarding-house lodging-house hotel tavern etc. When however inclusion is made of other shops it is the contention of the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the element of premises need not be present in cases of such shops. ( 4 ) THE expression shop as per its ordinary dictionary meaning except in the context where it means a work-shop means a place where goods are sold by retail. It is ordinarily used to describe a place or premises set apart for sale of articles by retail. Shops also mean places where instead of goods being sold services are supplied like a Barbers Saloon or a Washermans place etc. In any event the expression shop always has an element of premises i. e. some definite premises where the public would get goods or services on certain payments. therefore. even though in the dictionary definition the term place is used to describe the shop a shop has always the element of premises present as it is not any place but the place where goods are sold by retail or a definite business place. Even in the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act 1948 in sec. 2 (27) the expression shop has been defined in the same sense. This definition of the term shop in the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act 1948 had come up for interpretation before Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Kalidas v State of Bombay A. I. R. 1955 Supreme Court 62. A question had arisen in connection with a small establishment situated in Ahmedabad known as Honesty Engineering Works. the owner employed three workers and did business in a very small way by going to certain local mills and collecting orders from them for spare parts which were manufactured in that work-shop and delivered to the mills. A question had arisen in connection with a small establishment situated in Ahmedabad known as Honesty Engineering Works. the owner employed three workers and did business in a very small way by going to certain local mills and collecting orders from them for spare parts which were manufactured in that work-shop and delivered to the mills. There was no buying or selling done on the premises of Honesty Engineering Works and the question had arisen whether it was a shop within the meaning of sec. 2 (27) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act 1948 which was in the following terms:-SHOP means any premises where goods are sold either by retail or wholesale or where services are rendered to customers. and includes an office a store room godown ware-house or work place whether in the same premises or otherwise mainly used in connection with such trade or business but does not include a factory a commercial establishment residential hotel restaurant eating house theatre or other place of public amusement or entertainment. So far as the main definition clause was concerned it related to premises where goods are sold and so Their Lordships held that it was rightly admitted that the main portion of the definition which related to premises where goods are sold could not exclude the premises element and that unless there were premises on which goods were sold the main portion of the definition could not apply e. g. in the case of a street hawker or of a man who toted his goods from house to house and sold them at the door Thereafter at page 63 Their Lordships further considered the contention whether the main definition was extended by the inclusive clause and whether the use of the expression work place in the inclusive clause shifted the emphasis which was on the premises to the nature of the business so that wherever was a business of selling any work place wherever situate mainly used in connection with it would always fall within the definition. Their Lordships held that the inclusive clause merely linked on the main definition ancillary places such as store rooms godown work places etc. Their Lordships held that the inclusive clause merely linked on the main definition ancillary places such as store rooms godown work places etc. which were mainly used in connection with the business and business meant the kind of business defined in the earlier part of the definition that is to say not business in general nor even the business of selling in general but that portion of the business of selling which was confined to selling on some defined premises. Therefore even when such an artificial definition will such inclusive clause was construed In view of the user of the expression such trade or business Their Lordships held that the element of `premises must be satisfied by the Place to come under the definition of shop in sec. 2 (27) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act. As in the case before their Lordships there was no business of sale on any definite premises it was held that M/s. Honesty Engineering Works was not covered by the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act. ( 5 ) IN the case of Ardeshir v. Bombay State A. I. R. 1962 Supreme Court 29 Their Lordships had to consider the expression `premises in the context of the definition of a factory in sec. 2 (k) of the Factories Act 1948 as the question had arisen before Their Lordships whether the Salt Works which was carried on in open land would amount to a `factory. The definition of a factory in sec. 2 (k) is any premises including the precinets thereof provided other conditions regarding the number of workers and manufacturing process were satisfied. Their Lordships held at page 31 that the expression premises was a generic term which meant open land or land with buildings or building alone. Their Lordships considered the other provisions of the Act and even the word place in sec. 85 which empowered the State Government to apply the Act to any place wherein a manufacturing process was carried on with or without the aid of power or was so ordinarily carried on notwithstanding certain matters mentioned in the section. The word place was again a general word which was applicable to both open land and to buildings and in that view even the Salt Works carried on in the open land was hold to be a factory as it had the element of premises. The word place was again a general word which was applicable to both open land and to buildings and in that view even the Salt Works carried on in the open land was hold to be a factory as it had the element of premises. In the present case as we have already analysed the definition in sec 2 (10) both in the main definition and in the specific categories in the inclusive clause we have found that the element of premises is a must. Even in the residuary clause where various shops are specified or even a general shop is included for supply of any kind of food or drink to the public for consumption in or near such shops the element of premises must be present and there is no reason why this element must be treated as absent. In fact the very use of the limitative words where any kind of food or drink is supplied to the public for consumption in or near such shop would definitely indicate that the shop must have some definite premises in or in the vicinity of which the public must be supplied entertainment by way of food or drink and in that case alone the shop in question would amount to a place of public entertainment. Thus there is intrinsic evidence even in this inclusive clause itself which should negative a wide interpretation as suggested by the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the element of premises is totally absent so far as this residuary clause of such a general shop in concerned. There is another important reason which would land to the same inference. If the Legislature intended to make the explanation as wide as possible so as to cover any place at or near which food or drink was supplied to the public it would have used the expression place instead of the term `shop in this residuary general clause dealing with shop because the term `place in sec. 2 (8) of the Act has an inclusive definition which includes a building a tent a booth or other erection whether permanent or temporary or any area whether enclosed or open. 2 (8) of the Act has an inclusive definition which includes a building a tent a booth or other erection whether permanent or temporary or any area whether enclosed or open. Thus there is intrinsic evidence provided by the statutory dictionary itself Even if it was a case where two interpretations are said to be possible by interpreting the term shop in a general manner not as fixed premises where the sale or supply of articles of food or drink is being done but as any place without any fixed premises we cannot accept such a wide construction for various reasons. We must keep in mind that we are dealing with a licensing provision which seeks to impose a reasonable restriction by putting a fetter on the fundamental right of a citizen to carry on his trade or business of selling certain articles in his shop. If such a mobile shop was sought to be included it would mean that all the hawkers or wheel-cart vendors who move from place to place and street to street or the basketwalas who go on toting door to door for carrying on their business could not carry on their business without getting a specific licence to carry on their trade. In fact there should be a great difficulty in roping in such mobile shops as they have no place for setting up their business. There would be nothing to licence as a place of public entertainment. No doubt they would have a vehicle which moves from place to place and in that sense their mobile shop occupies some space as it moves from place to place. There would however be nothing fixed by way of premises where any business shop is established which could be licensed specifically and regulated under this Police Act. It must be further kept in mind that sec. 131a (1) provides for conviction of a person who fails to obtain a licence under this Act in respect of a place of public entertainment. It also provides under sub-sec. It must be further kept in mind that sec. 131a (1) provides for conviction of a person who fails to obtain a licence under this Act in respect of a place of public entertainment. It also provides under sub-sec. (2) that it shall be obligatory on the Court trying any such offence to direct in addition that the person keeping a place of public entertainment in respect of which the offence is committed shall close such place until he obtains a licence or a fresh licence as the case may be in respect thereof and thereupon such person shall comply with such direction. Thus sec. 181a not only provides for conviction for not obtaining a licence for keeping a place of public entertainment but it provides for a mandatory direction to be given by the Magistrate trying such offence requiring such person to close down his place of business until he obtains a licence or a fresh licence as the case may be in respect thereof. The provision therefore which we are to interpret is a licensing provision putting a fetter on the fundamental rights of a citizen to carry on his business and therefore such provision would have to be strictly construed. It is also a settled rule of construction that the penal statute should be strictly construed without straining the meaning of the words used and whenever there is any doubt it should be resolved in favour of the subject for none can be put on peril on an ambiguity In criminal law. Therefore we must find out whether on a strict construction the provision regarding the licence is strictly applicable to a mobile vehicle by reason of its being a place of public entertainment. The only category relied upon is a residuary category of the shop and therefore unless the mobile vehicle comes strictly within the definition of the term shop it cannot be held that it falls within the scope of this provision Such a restriction would have to be strictly construed so as to confine the restriction within the four corners of the provision and only to the extent it is clearly laid down therein There would be no room for intendment and we would not read anything in the statutory provision or imply anything which is not there. Even if we keep in mind the context and settling of this provision in this Police Act which provides for such licensing of a place of public entertainment for reasons of maintaining public order or public safety we cannot come to any different conclusion. The object of licence is not to see to the health or welfare of the public by regulating the quality of food-stuffs supplied to the public for consumption as in the case of Municipal Legislation. What as sought to be regulated is not the activity of sale of articles of food or drink in or the vicinity of such shop as such but what is intended is to licence the place of public entertainment after the police authorities sro satisfied that such a place is suitable for the purpose and the person who is issued a licence as a keeper of the place is a suitable person in the opinion of the police authorities. ( 6 ) IF we turn to the licensing rules which are framed in this conncetion under sec. 33 (1) of the Act under clauses 33 (1) (w) and (y) which relates to the procedure it is also clear that no such wide construction can be intended Rule 1 provides that no person shall open or keep a place of public entertainment unless he holds a valid licence granted under these rules. Rule 3 provides that no licence to open or keep a place of public entertainment shall be granted to any person applying for such licence unless he satisfies the licensing authority: (I) that he is a suitable person for holding the licence (II) that the locality and the place or premises where he proposes to open or keep the place of public entertainment are suitable for the purpose; (III) that the means of entrance and exit to and from the place are convenient easy of access adequate and satisfactory; (IV) that keeping of a place of public entertainment at the place proposed to be used for the purpose is not likely to cause obstruction inconvenience annoyance risk danger or damage to the residents or passengers in the vicinity thereof; and (V) where the place of public entertainment is proposed to be open in any enclosure building tent booth or any other erection that arrangements regarding ventilation and precaution against fire are adequate and suitable. Thereafter rule 7 provides every person who has been granted a licence under these rules shall comply with the provisions of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act 1948 and the rules made thereunder in so far as they apply to him. Rule 8 provides that no person keeping a place ox public entertainment shall keep it open except during such hours as may be specified in his licence. Provided that if on any of the following occasions the provision of the Bombay Shops and Establishment Act 1948 as respects closing hours are suspended under sec. 6 of the said Act in respect of places of public entertainment of class of such places a licensee of such place may keep his place open upto such hours on the occasions as may be notified by the Commissioner of Police in that behalf. Finally even the form of the hotel licence annexed in appendix requires description of the place licenced as such to be given therein with its house number and other details. ( 7 ) THUS these provisions of the licencing rules have no doubt that the places of public entertainment sought to be licenced by these rules are places having definite premises which are considered by the police authorities to be suitable for the purpose with proper entrance exit and other facilities and whose keeper is a person suitable in the opinion of the police authorities to keep such a place as a place of public entertain- ment In fact Rules 7 and 8 specifically contemplate the application of the provisions of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act 1948 to such places of public entertainment in so far as they are applicable. Rule 7 casts a mandatory duty to comply with those provisions on the licensee and that rule itself would leave no doubt in our mind that a shop which can amount to a place of public entertainment must be a shop within the meaning of Bombay Shops and Establishments Act 1948 and which definition as interpreted by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kalidass case as aforesaid must have an element of premises. It is true that ordinarily the main statutory provisions cannot be construed by reference to the rules for in case of conflict it is the rules which have to give way as they would be ultra vires or beyond the scope of the statute. It is true that ordinarily the main statutory provisions cannot be construed by reference to the rules for in case of conflict it is the rules which have to give way as they would be ultra vires or beyond the scope of the statute. Where however the contravention alleged is of the rule and the rule is not said to be ultra vires and when we have come to the conclusion that the statutory provision and the rules are consistent we would be fortified in our conclusion by reference to these rules which leave no doubt whatsoever that only a narrow interpretation is intended of the term shop in the definition given in sec. 3 (10) of the Act of the place of public entertainment. ( 8 ) WE were referred to certain English decisions where such mobile vehicles with no fixed location and position have been held not to be shops in the sense of a place where any retail trade is carried on. In the case of Eldorado Ice Cream Company Limited v. Clark and Eldorado Ice Cream Company Limited v. Keating 1938 K. B. 715 Lord Hewart C. J. had to consider a question whether a movable box-tricycle which sold to public by retail ice-cream stored therein was a `shop in as much as it was a warehouse open for serving of customers within the meaning of sec. 11 of the English Shops Act and that in any case it was a shop within the extended meaning of sec. 15 which applied that Act to any place where retail trade or business was carried on. Both the contentions were negatived at page 721 as the moveable barrow was used only as a place to store Ice-cream and was a none storing place and there was nothing in that Act which brought it within the scope of a warehouse. Even the sale by retail from that box-tricycle was not at any fixed place but at the movable barrow and so it would not fall within the definition of the term `shop. At page 722 Lord Hewart C. I observed that throughout those sections one found words which connoted defined and fixed locality and position and even the form of Record of Sunday Employment address of the shop or place should be stated His Lordship suggested a query as to what would be the address of the box-tricycle. Thereafter. At page 722 Lord Hewart C. I observed that throughout those sections one found words which connoted defined and fixed locality and position and even the form of Record of Sunday Employment address of the shop or place should be stated His Lordship suggested a query as to what would be the address of the box-tricycle. Thereafter. his Lordship pointed out that it would be wrong to treat as synonymous the expressions the box-tricycle is a place and the box-tricycle is at a place. This decision was followed in Stone w. Boreham 1959 (2) All E. R. 715 by Lord Goddard C. J. in case of a mobile van equipped as shop and stocked with a variety of goods which stopped in a street on Sunday and sold to a customer who was standing on the roadway a packet of tea. As in Eldoraboes case the contention was repelled that such B mobile van itself would be place a distinction was urged in that case that the ground on which the mobile van rested at the time was atleast `a place where such retail trade was carried on and therefore the said place was a place within the extended meaning of sec. 13. At page 717 His Lordship Lord Goddard C. J. held that it would be fanciful to distinguish the case from Eldorados case on the ground that case was-dealing with a charge which alleged that a man sold from a tricycle while in the case before Their Lordships it was sold from a place namely where the tricycle or van stopped. His Lordship observed that they must try to construe these matters in a way which the public could understand. It would be wholly artificial to hold that the place at which a tricycle came to a stand was within the Act. It was not a place where the respondent had set up a place of business or bad established himself as for example people establish themselves now-a-days at the side of a road on Sundays by putting out a table and selling flower or fruits. It was simply the place where the respondent stopped. It was not a place where the respondent had set up a place of business or bad established himself as for example people establish themselves now-a-days at the side of a road on Sundays by putting out a table and selling flower or fruits. It was simply the place where the respondent stopped. Slade J. and Davlin J. had agreed with Lord Goddard C. J. Finally in the case of Kahn v. Newberry 1959 (a) All E. R. 202 where the appellant was trading from a costermongers wheel barrow the wheel barrow was not held to be a shop. It is true that Lord Parker C. J. has reserved his opinion for a future occasion on the question whether if a barrow was at a fixed location either by practice or by licence it would come within the definition of the term shop. Therefore even these judicial decisions which are based on the extended definition of the term shop as a place where retail business is carried on do not hold such a mobile vehicle to be a shop for the simple reason that a mobile vehicle is always at some place but the vehicle itself is not a place. A shop as interpreted in these decisions must be some fixed place having a definite position and location which must have been set up or established for carrying on retail trade. It is only when the place is set up as a place of business or the business is established at that place that it becomes a `shop. ( 9 ) THUS looking to the intrinsic evidence which is supplied by the limitative words that the consumption of articles of food or drink must be in or in the vicinity of such shop and from the use of the term shop itself it is clear that both in the main definition clause as well as in the inclusive portion the element of premises or the place having some fixed location must be established before a place could be said to be a place of public entertainment. The rules also lead to same conclusion. Even sec. 131a which we have considered contemplates a mandatory order by the Magistrate to the person concerned to close the place of public entertainment. The rules also lead to same conclusion. Even sec. 131a which we have considered contemplates a mandatory order by the Magistrate to the person concerned to close the place of public entertainment. That also indicates that a place must be a fixed place having fixed premises which would be considered suitable and whose keeper also would be considered a suitable person by the police authorities and which would be licenced under the Act. Mr. Nanavati the learned Assistant Government Pleader urged that such closure could be done by stopping the business activity. We cannot agree with that contention of Mn Nanavati for the simple reason that what is contemplated is closing of a place of public entertainment which must be the licensed shop itself. Therefore even after the place in closed the shop must remain at that place as a closed shop which is not open as a place of public entertainment for entertaining the public in or in the vicinity of that shop. In case of a mobile van which has no fixed place whatsoever there would be no question of closing of the shop itself as it would not remain a shop after it is closed and its closure could be done only by stopping the trade itself. Thus both the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence which we have considered lead us to the necessary conclusion that such mobile vehicle with no fixed place would not come within the scope of a place of public entertainment which could be licenced under sec. 33 (1) (w) of the Act. We would be really in the guise of interpretation substituting new words by recasting the section by replacing the term shop by the term an place fixed or mobile which the Legislature hands advisedly not used. Unless the plain literal construction of the statute leads to any absurdity or any inconsistency or defeats the purpose the Legislature may reasonably be considered to hive intended it is not open to any Court to rewrite the provisions of the statute or to modify its language especially when we are dealing with such licensing provisions which are of a penal nature. Therefore our final conclusion is that the aforesaid mobile vehicle cannot be called a shop which would come within the definition of the term place of public entertainment udder sec. Therefore our final conclusion is that the aforesaid mobile vehicle cannot be called a shop which would come within the definition of the term place of public entertainment udder sec. 3 (10) of the Act and therefore such a place would not require any licence to be obtained under the licensing rules which are made under the said section. ( 10 ) IN the result we must allow this revision application and the order of conviction and sentence passed against the the accused must be set aside and the accused must be acquitted of the charge laid against him. ( 11 ) THE Revision Application is therefore allowed and the order of conviction and sentence passed against the accused is set aside. He is acquitted of the charge laid against him. The fine if any recovered from him shall be refunded. ( 12 ) RULE is accordingly made absolute. Rule made absolute. .