(1) Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - S. 54 - right to rent and profits - before proper conveyance of title - is with the vendor - vendor wilfully delaying completion of a proper conveyance - liable to pay mesne profits. A contract for sale transfer is not a right in rem. Rents and profits accruing due before the transfer are not the legal incidents of the property transferred. The law, therefore, allows the vendor the right of appropriation of rents and profits till there is a proper conveyance of title against payment of price as until then he is still the owner subject to an obligation to fulfil the contract. Where the vendor parts with possession, he is, in equity, entitled to interest on the unpaid price. [Para 6 The lien does not entitle the vendor to retain possession and, therefore, where he wilfully delays completion of a proper conveyance, he would be liable for mesne profits. (1871) 7 Beng. L.R. 133 & (1919) 43 Bom. 18 relied on. [Para 7 (2) Tort - action for damages - frivolous and vexations legal remedies pursued - action for damages lies for abuse of the process of the Court - rightful owner kept out of possession - damages - mesure of. A process in itself perfectly well founded may amount to a legal wrong if vexatiously and unnecessarily repealed. It is obviously a grievance that an individual should be harassed by legal proceedings improperly instituted. If there is no foundation for them they will undoubtedly ultimately not succeed, but during their progress they may cause great injury. [Para 11 An abuse of the right to put the law into motion may of necessity be injurious, as involving damages to property. The expenses to which one is put contesting such malicious or vexatious proceedings may not be sufficiently recompensed by mere award of costs and the aggrieved person may, in proper case, show that the injury was much greater. [Para 12 An action for damages lies when the rightful owner is kept out of possession or enjoyment of his rights by the taking of frivolous or vexations and/or dilatory proceedings. [Para 14 The measure of damages would be the "profits taken" by the defendant during his occupancy, i.e., mesne profits. [Para 15 JUDGMENT A.P. Sen, J. - 1. [Para 12 An action for damages lies when the rightful owner is kept out of possession or enjoyment of his rights by the taking of frivolous or vexations and/or dilatory proceedings. [Para 14 The measure of damages would be the "profits taken" by the defendant during his occupancy, i.e., mesne profits. [Para 15 JUDGMENT A.P. Sen, J. - 1. This is an appeal by the defendant against a decree of the 2nd Addition District Judge, Jabalpur, dated 22nd June 1964, affirming a decree of the Court of the First Additional Civil Judge; Class II, Jabalpur. 2. The facts no longer in dispute are: One Pannalal purchased a house from Smt. Padmavati arid Deoraj, and executed an agreement for re-conveyance. In due course, the vendors brought a suit for specific performance and obtained a decree for re-conveyance against Pannalal. By a deed dated 4th February 1961, the vendors assigned their right, thereunder in favour of the present plaintiffs, Chhedilal and Phoolchand who started proceedings in execution. The present defendant Pannalal raised various objections to the assignment, namely that the deed was bogus, sham, fictitious and inoperative and objected that the plaintiffs. Chhedilal and Phoolchand had no right to execute the decree. The executing Court upheld the assignment and its order was affirmed in appeal by the Second Additional District Judge, and later by this Court. In execution of the decree a deed of re-conveyance was ultimately executed on 30th April 1962 by the Court in favour of the plaintiffs. During this period, the defendant admittedly recovered rent till 31st March 1962. On these facts, the plaintiffs assert that in view of decision by this Court in the suit for specific performance, the defendant was not entitled to recover any rent after 7th December 1954, and in so far as he wilfully avoided execution of a deed of re-conveyance by raising frivolous objections, they are entitled to be reimbursed in respect of the amount of rent recovered by the defendants from the 4th February 1961 to 31st December 1962, by way of damages. The defendant denied the claim on various grounds. The first Court upheld the entire claim for damages but on appeal, the Court below has restricted the claim to the period between 7th September 1961 and 31st March 1962. The defendant has appealed. The plaintiffs have filed a cross-objection. 3. The defendant denied the claim on various grounds. The first Court upheld the entire claim for damages but on appeal, the Court below has restricted the claim to the period between 7th September 1961 and 31st March 1962. The defendant has appealed. The plaintiffs have filed a cross-objection. 3. Shri Rameshwar Prasad Verma, learned counsel for the appellant, assailed the decree on four grounds, firstly the right to the rents and profits accrued to the plaintiffs after the execution of a deed of re-conveyance; secondly, pursuit of legal remedies, however frivolous or dilatory, is not an actionable wrong; thirdly, the delay in execution was to the plaintiffs' own laches and, fourthly, the period between 7th September 1961 to 31st March 1962 was taken up by settlement of necessary preliminaries towards execution of the deed. 4. In reply, Shri T. C. Naik, learned counsel for the respondents, urges that when a deed of re-conveyance is executed, in pursuance of a decree for specific-performance, the deed is subject to the terms imposed, and reading those terms into the deed, a "different intention appears" or is "necessarily implied" within the meaning of section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act. In other words, the rights of the defendant were limited upto 7th September 1954 by the terms of the decree and, any appropriation of the rents and profits thereafter, was wrongful. The equities were worked out by this Court in the suit for specific-performance on the basis that the parties stood in relation of debtor and creditor; Interest was, therefore, allowed upto 7th September 1954. The only condition for re-conveyance was payment of Rs. 9,900 which was ascertained as the amount payable, inclusive of interest till 7th December 1954. The rents and profits accuring after that date were recoverable by the plaintiffs. The defendant has been mulcated with damages on account of their wilful obstruction in the execution of a deed of re-conveyance, by dilatory tactics and frivolous objection. 5. 9,900 which was ascertained as the amount payable, inclusive of interest till 7th December 1954. The rents and profits accuring after that date were recoverable by the plaintiffs. The defendant has been mulcated with damages on account of their wilful obstruction in the execution of a deed of re-conveyance, by dilatory tactics and frivolous objection. 5. Although, on the first point, learned counsel is perhaps right in so far as he contends that the right to rents and profits accrues on a completion of transfer, nevertheless, for reasons which I shall presently state, the appellant cannot escape his liability for damages The following passage in Mulla's Transfer of Property Act, 5th Edition, at p. 89, states the correct law: "A buyer's right to rents and profits therefore accrues on the date of the transfer. This is made dear by section 55 (4) (a) under which the seller is entitled to the rents and profits of 1he property until the ownership passes to the buyer, and also section 55 (6) (a) which declares the buyer entitled to rents and profits when the ownership of the property passes to him." 6. A contract for sale transfer not a right in rem. Rents and profits accruing due before the transfer are not the legal incidents of tile property transferred. The law, therefore, allows the vendor the right of appropriation of rents and profits till there is a proper conveyance of title against payment of price as until then he is still the owner subject to an obligation to fulfil the contract. Where the vendor parts with possession, he is, in enquiry, entitled to interest on the unpaid price. What happens when the vendor wilfully delays completion of a proper conveyance? 7. The question is not free from difficulty. The balance of authority seems to be in favour of the view that the lien does not entitle the vendor to retain possession and, therefore, where he wilfully delays completion of a proper conveyance, he would be liable for mesne profits see, Nilkamal Vs. Sri Gunomani (1871) 7 Beng. LR 113 (PC, and Mulla's Transfer of Property Act, 5th Edition p. 336, The appellant would, therefore, be liable for damages since he wilfully delayed completion of the deed of re-conveyance. 8. Sri Gunomani (1871) 7 Beng. LR 113 (PC, and Mulla's Transfer of Property Act, 5th Edition p. 336, The appellant would, therefore, be liable for damages since he wilfully delayed completion of the deed of re-conveyance. 8. The legal significance of the date 7th September 1954 fixed by this Court would become discernible from the• following passage in Mulla's Transfer of Property Act, 5th Edition, at p. 335 : "The right to interest depends upon the following broad and clear consideration. Unless there be something in the contract of parties which necessarily imports otherwise, the date when one party enters into p0ssession of the property of another is the proper date from which interest on the unpaid price should run. On the one hand the new owner has possession, use, and fruits; on the other, the former owner parting with these, has interest on the price. This is sound in principle, and authority fully warrants it." See, Ratanlal Choonilal Vs. Municipal Commissioner (1919) 43 Bom. 181=45 IA 233, 245. 9. Perhaps this Court was guided by equitable considerations. By fixing a particular dale after which interest on the amount due would cease to run, the Court apparently implied that rights of the parties, whatever they be, shall be worked out with advertence to that date. Thereafter, the vendor would be charged for use and occupation. Without such direction, the vendor would be entitled, in enquiry, to interest on the unpaid price from that day till the date of completion of transfer but, in view of the direction, no such relief can be given. 10. In this context, the rather ingenious argument advanced by learned counsel for the respondents acquires significance. When a deed of re-conveyance is executed under the present circumstances, in pursuance of a decree for specific performance, the deed is necessarily subject to the terms imposed. Reading then into the deed, a "different intention", undoubtedly, "appears" or is "necessarily implied", within the meaning of section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act. The right of the defendant, therefore, was limited upto 7th September 1954, under the terms of the deed. Thereafter, any appropriation of rents and profits would be wrongful. All that the defendant acquired was interest in a definite ascertained sum and nothing more. 11. The contention that pursuit of legal remedies, however frivolous or vexatious, is not an actionable claim, cannot be accepted. Thereafter, any appropriation of rents and profits would be wrongful. All that the defendant acquired was interest in a definite ascertained sum and nothing more. 11. The contention that pursuit of legal remedies, however frivolous or vexatious, is not an actionable claim, cannot be accepted. It has been held that a process in itself perfectly well founded may amount to a legal wrong if vexatiously and unnecessarily repeated (see, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts. 12th Edition, p. 1736). It is obviously a grievance that an individual should be harassed by legal proceedings improperly instituted. If there is no foundation for them no doubt they will not ultimately succeed, but during their progress they may cause great injury (see, Clerk and Lindsell, 12th Edition, p. 1691). 12. An abuse of the right to put the law into motion may of necessity be injurious, as involving damage to property damage to property. The expenses to which one is put in contesting such malicious or vexatious proceedings may not be sufficiently recompensed by mere award of costs and the aggrieved person may, in proper case, show that the injury was much greater. 13. If an action for damages is not sustained under such circumstances, it would be tantamount to holding that law has no remedy for abuse of the process of the Court however wanton or malicious. Dr. Winfield in his learned treatise on Tort, 7th Edition, very aptly, suggests, at p. 715 : "But does the law go still further and make the malicious institution of any civil proceeding actionable? There is no historical reason why it should not." 14. The weight of authority is against the appellant and I would hold that an action for damages lies when the rightful owner (by which, I mean, the person entitled to a thing or property) is kept out of possession or enjoyment of his rights by the taking of frivolous or vexatious and for dilatory proceedings. 15. The measure of damages would, in my view, be the "profits taken" by the defendant during his occupancy, i.e., mesne profits. In the present case, the damages suffered by the plaintiffs through having been kept out of possession, would be the rents and profits which the defendant appropriated to himself, and they are entitled to be recouped to that extent. 16. In the present case, the damages suffered by the plaintiffs through having been kept out of possession, would be the rents and profits which the defendant appropriated to himself, and they are entitled to be recouped to that extent. 16. Lastly, on the quantum of damages, I think the Court below is right in limiting the claim for damages from 7th September 1961, i.e., the date when the defendants actually prevented the plaintiffs from enjoying the fruits of their decree by neglecting or refusing to execute a deed of re-conveyance on one pretext or another. 17. The result is that the appeal as well as the cross-objection both are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs in this Court but the parties shall bear the costs as directed in the Court below.