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1967 DIGILAW 153 (ALL)

Heera Lal v. Dy. Director of Consolidation

1967-05-01

K.B.ASTHANA

body1967
ORDER K.B. Asthana, J. - The dispute in this petition relates to a plot No. 188/14. The revenue records show that the said plot was recorded as a talab and this entry continued upto 1359F though in the remarks column the name of one Sankatha Singh was mentioned as in possession. The Petitioner Heera Lal claimed to have taken the said plot on lease from the then Zamindar, the Maharaja of Banaras, who is alleged to have executed a patta in Heera Lai's favour on 10-3-1951, that is, in 1359F. Heere Lal's name, however, was not entered in the revenue records in 1359F. The entry of Khasra in 1361F mentioned the name of Heere Lal as tenant-in-chief and Sankatha Singh as Qabiz but only a very small area of the said plot was shown as cultivated with wheat crops, while the major area was recorded as talab. In the subsequent years some more area was shown as cultivated but major part shown as talab and the entry in the name of Heera Lal as tenant and Sankatha Singh as Qabiz continued. From 1361F to 1365F no crops were recorded as sown on the plot. In the year when the consolidation operation started the name of Heera Lal was recorded as sirdar. Thereupon several objections were filed the decision of which was taken upto the stage of second appeal to the Deputy Director who re manded the case to the Consolidation Officer with the direction that the Gaon Samaj be impleaded as a party ard the whole matter be reconsidered again. The Consolidation Officer impleaded the Gaon Samaj concerned as party and invited all the parties interested to adduce evidence in respect of their respective claims. The opposite-parties Nos. 3 to 7 to this petition claimed to be in cultivatory possession. The Consolidation Officer by his order dated 8-10-1963 on a consideration of the evidence on record and on the basis of spot inspection held that the major portion of the plot was a talab and was the property of Gaon Samaj and only on a small portion thereof the opposite-parties Nos. 3 to 7 were in cultivatory possession. The name of Heera Lal was directed to be expunged. Heera Lal went up in appeal to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). In appeal Heera Lal succeeded. 3 to 7 were in cultivatory possession. The name of Heera Lal was directed to be expunged. Heera Lal went up in appeal to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). In appeal Heera Lal succeeded. It was found that Heera Lal had become the Sirdar of the said plot as a lessee from the former Zamindar. The names of the opposite parties were directed to be expunged and Heera Lai's name was ordered to be recorded as Sirdar. The opposite parties then filed a revision against this order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). The Deputy Director reversed the decision of the Settlement Officer Consolidation. On the material on record the Deputy Director held that whole of the plot was talab and the property of Gaon Samaj. The Deputy Director was not satisfied with the correctness of the entry of the name of Sankatha Singh as Qabiz. He found the name of Sankatha Singh entered after the remarks column had been crossed. The result of the revisional order was that neither the Petitioner nor the opposite-parties 3 to 7 were found to have nny interest in the said plot and it was recorded as the property of Gaon Samaj. It is this order of the Deputy Director which has been questioned by Heera Lal in this petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. I have heard Sri C.S.P. Singh, learned Counsel for the Petitioner. His main contention was that the Deputy Director manifestly erred in holding that the lease dated 10-3-1951 was invalid and did not confer any right on Heera Lal. Learned Counsel submitted that there is no provision in the UP ZA and LR Act rendering a lease granted by the former Zamindar in the year 1951 as void. The learned Counsel further submitted that the Deputy Director acted with material illegality and irregularity in tie exercise of his jurisdiction in arriving at his findings by disregarding the material evidence on record, which showed that Heera Lal was always in possession and actually carried on cultivation. 3. Having given my due consideration to the argument raised at the Bar in support of the petitions, I am not satisfied that the impugned order of the Deputy Director calls for interference. It appears to me to be a just and proper order. The entries in the revenue records upto 1359F clearly show that the whole of the plot was talab. It appears to me to be a just and proper order. The entries in the revenue records upto 1359F clearly show that the whole of the plot was talab. There is no satisfactory evidence establishing the possession of Heera Lal after 1359 F. Some irrigation slips were relied upon by Heera Lal, but there were irrigation slips filed by opposite parties 3 to 7 also. There was thus equally balanced evidence in support of each party's claim for cultivation. If in those circumstances the Deputy Director did not attach importance to irrigation slips, it cannot be said that he manifestly erred. Though there may be some plausibility in the contention that the tease executed by the then Zamindar in 11951 in favour of Heera Lal was not void yet the evidence on record that Heera Lal having failed to establish that he ever gained possession of the plot and cultivated it, the lease deed by itself would not be of much benefit to Heera Lal. It could be disregarded as being of no material value in establishing the claim of Heera Lal. 4. It was next contended that the Gaon Samaj did not claim the land and the Deputy Director manifestly erred in holding that the land belonged to Gaon Samaj in the face of a registered lease-deed in favour of Heera Lal which in law must be given effect to. Learned Counsel referred to the provision of Section 212 of the UP ZA and LR Act and pointed out that the lease executed by the then zamindar in favour of Heera Lal could vest a title in him and he would be entitled to retain possession of the plot, until within the period prescribed, Gaon Samaj took proceedings for ejectment and the ejectment could not be made unless compensation was paid. The Deputy Director seems to have taken the view that lease dated 10-3-1951 was invalid because of the provision of Section 212 of the UP ZA and LR Act. He may not be correct in that view. But the whole emphasis in the argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner rests on the fact that Heera Lal came into possession and cultivated the disputed plot after obtaining the lease. The finding is that Heera Lal did not come into possession and did not cultivate the disputed plot. He may not be correct in that view. But the whole emphasis in the argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner rests on the fact that Heera Lal came into possession and cultivated the disputed plot after obtaining the lease. The finding is that Heera Lal did not come into possession and did not cultivate the disputed plot. Thus there would be hardly any necessity for the true owners of the plot to take proceedings for his ejectment. Section 212 of the Abolition Act contemplates the payment of compensation for the deprivation of possession and cultivation. If a person did not ever come into possession of a plot claimed to have been taken on lease by him he is hardly entitled to any compensation. Moreover, as I read, the provision of Section 212 of the Abolition Act, it does have the effect of making the lease of a land which was recorded as pond or tank executed by the Zamindar after 8-8-1946 as ineffective in law and not conferring any title. That is the very foundation of the right conferred on the Gaon Samaj to eject such a person in possession. The compensation is not payable for loss of title but for loss of possession or cultivation. I am, therefore, not inclined to agree with the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that in not giving effect to the deed of lease dated 10-3-1951 the Deputy Director of Consolidation has fallen into any manifest error or error apparent. 5. As regards the contention that Gaon Samaj ought not to have been held to be the owner of the disputed plot as it had not filed any objection, suffice it to say that the Petitioner has no locus-standi once he has not been found to have any right or title in the disputed plot. The Deputy Director may be in error, though I do not think he is, in directing that the Gaon Samaj be recorded as the owner of the plot in dispute. It does not affect any of the rights of the Petitioner since he was found to have none. 6. For the reasons given above I do not find any merits in this petition and dismiss it with costs.