ORDER Singh, J.- 1. Sheocharan was the holder of lands, Khasra Nos. 484/2, 513/2, 514/16 and 648/1. He transferred these lands to his brother Sheobagas by a registered sale-deed dated 1-3-1952. Sheobagas, in his turn, sold Khasra No. 484/2 to Bindabai by a registered deed dated 19-1-1953, and also sold Khasra No. 648/1 to Gendlal by another registered deed dated 14-4-1953. 2. One Mohanlal Sethi had obtained a decree for Rs. 890/8/- against Sheocharan in Small Cause Suit No. 43 of 1950, decided on 15-9-1951. In execution of his decree Mohanlal attached all these lands on 20-2-1954. Sheobagas, Bindabai and Gendlal objected to the attachment under O. 21, R. 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and as their objections were dismissed, they filed separate suits being civil suits 89-A, 87-A and 88-A of 1956. In all the three suits Sheocharan and Mohanlal were impleaded as defendants. In these suits it was pleaded by Sheobagas, Bindabai and Gendlal that they had purchased the lands for value and were owners of the lands. Sheocharan in his written statement supported them, whereas Mohanlal contested their claim and pleaded that the sale-deeds were without considerations, fictitious and fraudulent and were made to defeat his claim. These suits were consolidated and decreed by the second Civil Judge, Durg, on 20-7-1956. It was held that Sheobagas, Bindabai and Gendlal had valid title by virtue of their respective sale deeds and the lands- were not liable to be attached and sold in execution of the decree obtained by Mohanlal against Sheocharan. Appeals against the decrees in these suits were dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Durg, on 30-6-1958. Second appeals filed in the High Court were allowed by a Single Bench on 18-4-1960 but that decision was reversed in Letters Patent Appeals on 9-10-1961 restoring the decrees passed by the trial Court. 3. Another creditor, Kapurchand, also obtained a decree for a sum of Rs. 1571 against Sheocharan on 22-2-1954 in civil suit No. 2- B of 1952 and in execution of this decree he also attached the aforesaid lands in July 1958. Objections under O. 21, R. 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure were filed by Sheobagas, Bindabai and Gendlal, being M. J. C. N05. 35 to 37 of 1958. They were allowed on 22-12-1961 and the lands were released from attachment. Objections under O. 21, R. 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure were filed by Sheobagas, Bindabai and Gendlal, being M. J. C. N05. 35 to 37 of 1958. They were allowed on 22-12-1961 and the lands were released from attachment. Kapurchand then filed three suits, out of which the present appeals arise, under O. 21, R. 63 of the Code. Civil Suit No. 11-A of 62 was against Sheobagas; Civil Suit No. 12-A of 62 was against Gendlal; and Civil Suit No. 13-A of 62 was against Bindabai. In all the three suits, Sheocharan being dead, his legal representatives were also joined as defendants. The plaintiff Kapurchand's case was that the sale-deed executed by Sheocharan in favour of Sheobagas and sale-deeds executed by the latter in favour of Gendlal and Bindabai were bogus, without consideration and were made with a view to defeat the creditors of Sheocharan. The defendants Sheobagas, Gendlal and Bindabai took a preliminary objection that the decisions in the earlier suits, which were filed by them against Sheocharan and creditor Mohanlal and in which their title was upheld, operate as res judicata against the plaintiff Kapurchand in the present suits. This objection was upheld by the trial Court and all the three suits were dismissed by a common judgment on 15-12-1963. The plaintiff Kapurchand then filed three appeals. Civil Appeal No. 4-A of 1963 in a Civil Suit No. 11-A of 62, Civil Appeal No 5-A of 1963 in Civil Suit No. 12-A of 62 and Civil Appeal No 6-A of 1963 in Civil Suit No. 13-A of 62. These appeals were decided together and dismissed by the 2nd Additional District Judge, Durg, on 29-2-1964. 4. The plaintiff then filed three second appeals in this Court; Second Appeal No. 318 of 64 in Civil Suit No.11-A of 62, Second Appeal No. 320 of 64 in Civil Suit No. 12-A of 62 and Second Appeal No. 319 of 64 in Civil Suit No. 13-A of 62. Kapurchand, the piaintiff-appellant, died during the pendency of these appeals and his legal representatives were substituted as appellants in all the appeals. 5. These appeals raise a common question of res judicata and were heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment. 6. Kapurchand, the piaintiff-appellant, died during the pendency of these appeals and his legal representatives were substituted as appellants in all the appeals. 5. These appeals raise a common question of res judicata and were heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment. 6. It must be noticed at the outset that Kapurchand, the plaintiff, in the present suits, was not a party in the former suits and unless it can be said that he is a person claiming under a party in those suits, the judgments rendered in them cannot operate as res judicata. It was submitted by Shri Khaskalam, the learned counsel for the respondents, that the judgment-debtor Sheocharan was a party in the former suits and the present plaintiff Kapurchand, who is a decree-holder, is a person who claims under him as he is laying claim to attach the suit properties on the ground that they belong to him. The learned counsel in support of his argument relied upon the following cases: Ramsewak v. Bahal, AIR 1935 All 888, Dinshaw and Company v. Anand Beharilal, AIR 1942 Oudh 327 and Radharani v. Binodmoyee, AIR 1942 Cal. 92. It must be conceded that these cases do support his contention but for the reasons given hereafter, I am not prepared to accept that contention. 7. When a person obtains a decree against another, the decree-holder does not become a person claiming under the judgment-debtor. Similarly, when the decree-holder proceeds to execute his decree and seeks to attach certain property as belonging to the judgment-debtor he only exercises his right conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure and does not lay any claim through or under the judgment-debtor. It is for this reason that any estoppel available against the judgment-debtor in respect of the attached property is of no avail against the decree-bolder. This was laid down in Richards v. Johnston, (1859) 28 LJ Ex. It is for this reason that any estoppel available against the judgment-debtor in respect of the attached property is of no avail against the decree-bolder. This was laid down in Richards v. Johnston, (1859) 28 LJ Ex. 322, where Martin, B., observed : "It is a well established rule that estoppels bind parties and privies and not strangers." "But no authority has been cited to show that a judgment creditor is party or privy to the acts of the judgment debtor." The legal position was put more lucidly by Lord Esher, M. R. in Richards v. Jenkins, 1887-18 QBD 451 (CA), where he said : "I will assume, as was contended, that the execution debtor was estopped from saying that the goods were not of the claimants." "Such an estoppel only prevents the party who is estopped from saying as against some other party that the goods do not belong to such other party, though they infact do belong to him; and it only takes effect between parties and privies. If the execution creditor could for this purpose be said to claim through and under the execution debtor so as to be in privity with him he might be estopped. But I do not think he can be said so to claim; he claims through and by the law as against the execution debtor and not through and under him." (pp. 456 and 457). These observation of the Master of the Rolls which were concurred by Bowen and Fry, Lord Justices, are clear authority for the proposition that the decree-holder while attaching the property of the judgment debtor does not claim "through and under him" but "through and by the law" which enables him to attach the property. This case is still cited as an authority on the point in Halsbury's Law of England (3rd Edn., Vol. 15, p. 198). The reasoning in the passage quoted above is unquestionable and although applied in Richards v. Jenkins (supra), in the context of estoppel equally applies for purposes of section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure for expounding the words "between parties under whom they or any of them claim". If the decree-holder is not a party "claiming through and under", the judgment debtor, a decision in a former suit against the judgment debtor cannot operate res judicata against the decree-holder. If the decree-holder is not a party "claiming through and under", the judgment debtor, a decision in a former suit against the judgment debtor cannot operate res judicata against the decree-holder. In the cases cited by Shri Khaskalam, which 1 have already noted in para 6 above, the reasoning is that by attaching the judgment-debtors' property in execution, the decree-holder asserts the same title as beings to the judgment-debtor, therefore, he claims in respect of that property under him. No doubt, the decree-holder by attaching a property asserts that property belongs to the judgment-debtor but does it lead to the conclusion that his claim is through or under him? In reality his claim is through the decree and by the law contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. Then, it is said that if the decree-holder does not claim under the judgment-debtors, the real owner of the property may be vexed in a number of suits by different decree-holders. But that always happens when a declaratory judgment does not operate as a judgment in rem. A may have his title declared against B but that judgment Will no t be conclusive if C, D and others not claiming through B lay claim to the same property and deny A's title. Moreover, there is another aspect which the argument overlooks. A judgment-debtor having transferred his property to his nominees to save the same from being taken in execution will hardly be interested in defending any suit filed against him by the claimants to whom he had transferred the property. That actually happened in the present case. In the earlier suits filed by the transferees of the judgment-debtor, the judgment-debtor was made a defendant but he did not contest the suits at all and the only contest was in between the transferees and the previous decree-holder. It would be wholly unjust if the present decree-holder is denied the right to establish his claim to attach the property on the ground of res judicata when his so called predecessor, i.e. the judgment-debtor did not contest the earlier suits. 10. I am conscious that in the Calcutta case, Smt. Radharani v. Smt. Binodmoyee, AIR 1942 Cal. It would be wholly unjust if the present decree-holder is denied the right to establish his claim to attach the property on the ground of res judicata when his so called predecessor, i.e. the judgment-debtor did not contest the earlier suits. 10. I am conscious that in the Calcutta case, Smt. Radharani v. Smt. Binodmoyee, AIR 1942 Cal. 92, cited by Shri Khaskalam, Justice Radha Binod Pal noticed the English cases to which I have referred and distinguished them on the ground that they were applicable in the context of estoppel and not in the context of res judicata. That distinction, as I have said earlier, with very great respect to that learned Judge, does not appeal to me. Whether one seeks to apply the doctrine of estoppel or res judicata the question is the same does the decree-holder claim under the judgment-debtor? And, if in applying the doctrine of estoppel the answer is that he does not so claim, there is no reason why a different answer should be given while applying the doctrine of res judicata as embodied in section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. Shri Dharmadhikari, the learned counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to a Full Bench case of the Madras High Court, Narsimhachariar v. Raghava Padayachi, AIR 1945 Mad. 333 , where it is observed that a decree in a suit filed under order 21, rule 63 does not extend beyond the execution of the decree which has given rise to those proceedings. I need only say that, as at present advised, I am not prepared to go that far. 12. For the reasons, that I have earlier expressed, I hold that the judgments in the earlier suits do not operate as res judicata in the present suits which have given rise to these appeals. As a result, these appeals will have to be allowed and the suits will have to be remitted back to the trial Court for disposal according to law. 13. The appeal is allowed. The judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below are set aside and the suit is remanded to the trial Court for disposal according to law.