This is a Writ Petition filed by the petitioner Shri Gauranga Chandra Deb of Joynagar Agartala, under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for a Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate Writ quashing the order No. 13 Cof.-L.C.60 dated 25-2-1960 of the Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs, Shillong, with his office at Aeartala for the State of Tripura, confiscating 41 gold bars weighing 426 tolas, 3 annas and 3 ratis under Sec 67(8) of the Sea Customs Act (Act VIII of 1878) read with Section 19 of the same Act, as made applicable by Section 23 (A) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (Act VII of 1947), directing the confiscation to be absolute in terms of Section 23(A) of the Foreign Exch­ange Regulation Act read with Section 183 of the See Customs Act and further imposing a penalty of Rs 25,000 under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act and to quash the Criminal Proceedings in Cr. Case No. 657 of 1959 pending before the S.D.M. Sadar Agar­tala under Section 23 of the Foreign Exch­ange Regulation Act. (2) The facts of the case as alleged by the petitioner in his Writ Petition and as disclosed by the documents filed, which led to the institution of this Writ Petition are briefly as follows: (a) On the strength of a search warrant, dated 29-10-1959, signed by the then S.DM., Agartala. and endorsed in favour of the third respondent Shri S. C Paul, Deputy Super­intendent of Central Excise and Land Customs and the Officer-in-charge, Circle Pre­vention Force in Agartala (on his requisi­tion as per Ex. A-l) the residential house of the petitioner was searched, as per Ext. A-2 between 6 A.M. and 8 A.M. on 30-10-1959, by the Officers of the Central Excise and Land Customs attached to the Agartala Office, lei by the second respondent who was the Superintendent of Central Ex­cise and Land Customs-in-charge of Circle I in Agartala The searching party seized 28 gold bars from a bed, 2 gold bars from a shoe heel and II gold bars from the cushion of Goddess Laxmi valued at Rs. 51,759. one Japan Pilot fountain-pen valued at Rs. 13 and one cig­arette case with lighter valued at Rs. 20.50 in the presence of Shri Arunoday Roy Choudhury, Nani Gopal Paul Choudhury, Jatindra Chandra and Subhir Chandra Das of Joyngar, Agaratala. 51,759. one Japan Pilot fountain-pen valued at Rs. 13 and one cig­arette case with lighter valued at Rs. 20.50 in the presence of Shri Arunoday Roy Choudhury, Nani Gopal Paul Choudhury, Jatindra Chandra and Subhir Chandra Das of Joyngar, Agaratala. The search war­rant was returned to the Magistrate on 30-12-1959 as can be seen from Ext. A-2. The petitioner was arrested by the second res­pondent on 30-12-1959 between 6 A.M. and 8 A.M. He was taken to the Office of the Central Excise and Land Customs He was forced to write a statement according to a draft prepared by the respondents 1 and 2. Later on, the petitioner was produced be­fore the District Magistrate, Tripura, under arrest at about 3PM with a report that he arrested the petitioner at 2 P .ML Vide Ext, A-3. (b) The District Magistrate. Tripura, sent the petitioner to the S.D.M.. Sadar under arrest. The S.D.M, Sadar registered a case against the petitioner under Section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act in Criminal Case No 657 of 1959 and remand­ed the petitioner to custody till 12-11-1959 by his order, dated 30-10-1959. The S.D.M. passed an order on 2-11-1959 directing the release of the petitioner from custody on bail for Rs 55.000 with two sureties for a like amount as can be seen from Ext A-4. On a motion the Sessions Judge. Tripura, however, reduced the bail amount from Rs. 55,000 to Rs. 10,000 by his order dated 10-11-1959 in Criminal Motion No. 134 of 1959, as can be seen from Ext. A-5. The respondents filed a formal complaint be­fore the SDM Agartala on 8-4-1960 (c) The second respondent issued two show cause notices as per Exts A-6 and A-6(a) dated 5-11-1959 directing the peti­tioner to show cause if he had any general or special permission from the competent authorities to import the sold in question in to India from any foreign Territory and to show cause why he should not confiscate the gold and levy penalty on the petitioner under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act on the allegation that the gold was im­ported by the petitioner by land from Pakis­tan into India on or before 30-10-1959 with­out any valid permit and through unautho­rised route. The petitioner sent his reply as per Ext. A-7 on 9-12-1959 denying having im­ported the gold from Pakistan unauthorisedly. The petitioner sent his reply as per Ext. A-7 on 9-12-1959 denying having im­ported the gold from Pakistan unauthorisedly. He asserted that the gold was his personal property and that he was retaining the same in his own pos­session and in the State of Tripura even from before the birth of Pakistan. He also stated that the respondents 2 and 3 obtain­ed the statement of the petitioner as per Ext. B-14 under threat, intimidation and coer­cion. At the request of the petitioner, the first respondent heard the petitioner at Shillong on 19-1-1960. The first respon­dent sent a letter as per Ext. A-8 to the petitioner intimating him that an enquiry would be held on 4-2-1960 in the Office of the Central Excise in Agartala. Accord­ingly, the Assistant Collector held the en­quiry or 4-2-1960 in which the petitioner was represented by his Advocate Shri J. Choudhury and Pleader Shri H Dutta. In the enquiry 4 witnesses including the second respondent were examined and cross-exa­mined The first respondent supplied the petitioner with carbon copies of the deposi­tions of the witnesses examined by the As­sistant Collector as can be seen from Ext. A-9. As the copies of the depositions were not signed by the Inquiring Officer, the first respondent informed the petitioner, as '"in be seen from Ext A-10, letter dated 8-4-1960, that the original depositions with sig­nature^ were in the Office and that the copies of the same were sent to the peti­tioner The first respondent did not fix any other date for further enauirv (d) After the gold was seized by the second respondent the second responden-t asked the petitioner, by his letter as per Ext. A-11 dated 24-11-1959, to appear in his office in Agartala at 9 A.M. on 28-11-1959 to be present when the samples of the gold were taken. Though the petitioner address­ed a letter to the first respondent, as per Ext A-12 dated 26-12-1959. requesting him to give him a copy of the report of the expert who tested the sold, he did not send any copy of the report The petitioner was not supplied with a copy of the report even In Criminal Case No. 657 of 1959 before the S.D.M Sadar Agartala (e) Ultimately the first respondent sent an order as per Ext. A-14 dated 25-2-1960, confiscating the entire gold and imposing personal penalty of Rs. A-14 dated 25-2-1960, confiscating the entire gold and imposing personal penalty of Rs. 25,000 upon the peti­tioner He, however ordered that the fountain pen and the cigarette lighter should be released to the petitioner. Subsequently Shri S R. Barua who signed the complaint petition, as per Ext A-13 dated 8-3-1960, served a notice upon the petitioner direct­ing him to produce before him any authori­ty or any general or special permission to import the gold from Pakistan or any other foreign country into India under Section 23(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, though cognizance of the offence under Section 23 of the said Act was already taken by the S. D. M. Sadav against the peti­tioner on 30-10-1959. The order of the first respondent as per Ext A-14 is liable to be set aside for the grounds mentioned in the petition. The Criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner before the S.D.M., Sadar. Agartala are also liable to be quash­ed. (3) Rule nisi was issued to which the respondents filed a counter-affidavit. The petitioner filed a further reply. (4) The points which were argued and which arise for consideration are: (i) Whether the petition is not maintainable, (ii) Whether the prosecution of the petitioner for offence under Section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (Act VII of 1947) is hit by Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and is liable to be quashed: and (iii) Whether the order of the first res­pondent as per Ext A-14 dated 25-2-1960 is liable to be quashed for the various grounds mentioned in the petition. (5) Point (i):-The contention of the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents is that under Section 188 of he Sea Customs Act (Act VIII of 1878) an appeal lies to the Cthef Customs Authori­ty that the petitioner should have filed an appeal to the Cthef Customs Authority against the order covered by Ext A-14 and that, therefore, the present Writ Petition does not lie. In support of this contention he relied on a decision of this Court reported in Usha Ranjan Banik v. Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs, AIR 1954 Tripura 7. In that case the petitioner was detected attemp­ting to export currency from India to Pakis­tan in contravention of Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and Section 8(2) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 read with Reserve Bank of India Notifications. In that case the petitioner was detected attemp­ting to export currency from India to Pakis­tan in contravention of Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and Section 8(2) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 read with Reserve Bank of India Notifications. The amount was confiscated by the Customs authorities under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. It was held that there was an adequate alternative remedy for the petitioner to file an appeal and that there­fore the petitioner could not have any resort to the extraordinary procedure under Arti­cle 226 of the Constitution of India. But, as rightly contended by the learn­ed Counsel for the petitioner, in the pre­sent case the remedy of appeal provided by Section 188 of the Sea Customs Act is almost illusory and is practically of no avail to the petitioner since he had to deposit the en­tire sum of Rs. 25,000 under Section 189 of the Sea Customs Act before the appeal was disposed of by the Cthef Customs Authority. The deposit of the penal amount of Rupees 25,000 was a condition precedent as can be seen from Shri Digviiaysinhji Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1958 Bom 305 . By imposition of such a huge amount of Rs. 25,000 towards fine, the remedy of the petitioner to file an ap­peal after depositing' the said amount has become nugatory and is inadequate. In such circumstances the law is clear that the peti­tioner can move the High Court for the necessary writ if otherwise he is entitled to the same. Vide Analo India Jute Mills Co., Ltd. v S K Dutt. AIR 1956 Cal 450 . It was held in that case that, if a statute re­quires the entire money to be paid or de­posited, it is not an alternative remedy which precludes an application for a high prerogative writ Vide also Himmatlal Harilal Metha v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 403 . It was held that the remedy provided by the C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act (Act II of 1947! was of an onerous and burdensome character, since the assessee could avail of it only after depositing the whole amount of the tax and that therefore such a provision could hardly be described as an adequate alternative remedy. It was held that the remedy provided by the C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act (Act II of 1947! was of an onerous and burdensome character, since the assessee could avail of it only after depositing the whole amount of the tax and that therefore such a provision could hardly be described as an adequate alternative remedy. Besides, in this case, the petitioner alleges that his fundamental right regarding the gold was violated under Article 31(2) of the Consti­tution of India. This question also has to be gone into. So, the Writ Petition is main­tainable (6) Point (ii):-The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that after the petitioner was arrested on 30-10-1959, he was produced before the District Magistrate in Agartala, that the latter sent the petitioner to the S.D.M., Sadar, Agartala, that the latter took cognisance of the case under Section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (Act VII of 1947) in Crimi­nal Case No. 657 of 1959 on his file and that, thereafter the first respondent had no jurisdiction to proceed with the enquiry. The learned Counsel for the petitioner developed his argument on the basis of Exts. A-6 and A-6(a) show cause notices issued by the second respondent on 5-11-1959. In Ext. A-6 (a1) it was alleged that the petitioner im­ported the gold without valid permission or an import, license as required by the Govern­ment of India. The learned Counsel for the petitioner developed his argument on the basis of Exts. A-6 and A-6(a) show cause notices issued by the second respondent on 5-11-1959. In Ext. A-6 (a1) it was alleged that the petitioner im­ported the gold without valid permission or an import, license as required by the Govern­ment of India. Ministry of Commerce and Industry I.T.C Order No. 17/55 dated 7-12-1955, read with Section 19 of the Sea Cus­toms Act as made applicable under Section 3(1) of the Imports and Exports Control Act of 1947 and without a valid permission granted by the Reserve Bank of India, under the Government of India, Ministry of Fin­ance Notification No. 12(II)Fl/48 dated 25-8-1948 and 12(II)F 1/51 dated 27-2-1951 as amended by Notification No. 2/36/-EF7/53 dated 5-2-1955 issued under Section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and S. 19 of the Sea Customs Act, as made appli­cable under Sec. 23 (A) of the Foreign Ex­change Regulation Act A-6 (a) further shows that the petitioner was called upon to show cause why the goods should not be confiscated under Sec­tions 5(3) and 7(1) of the Land Customs Act 1924 and Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, read with Section 19 ibid as made applicable by Section 3(2) of the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947 and Section 23(A) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and why penalty also should not be levied against him under Section 7 of the Land Customs Act, 1924 and Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the Sea Customs Act (Act VIII of 1878) came into force on 8-3-1878 that the Foreign Ex­change Regulation Act (Act VII of 1947) was enacted on 11-3-1947 that as the second res­pondent imposed to take action under Sec­tions 19 and 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act as made applicable by Section 23 (A) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, and that as the alleged offence in question is punish­able under both the Acts, the relevant pro­visions of the Sea Customs Act, which are inconsistent with those in the subsequent enactment of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act must be held to be not applicable that cognizance of the case was taken by the S.DM.. Sadar. Sadar. Agartala in case No. 657 of 1959 under S 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act on 30-10-1959 and that, therefore, the first respondent, could not pro­ceed with the departmental enquiry preju­dicing the rights of the petitioner under Sec­tions 2^ and 23(A1 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (7) To appreciate this argument, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provi­sions in both the Acts. Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act empowers the Central Gov­ernment by issuing notification in the offi­cial gazette from time to time to prohibit or restrict the bringing or taking by Sea or by land goods of any specified description into or out of India across any customs frontier as defined by the Central Govern­ment Section 182 of the Act runs as follows: "In every case, except the cases men­tioned in Section 167, Nos. 26, 72 and ?4 to 76. both inclusive in which, under this Act, anything is liable to confiscation or to in­creased rates of duty: or any person is liable to a penalty, such confiscation, increased rate of duty or penalty may be adjudged- (a) without limit by a Deputy Com­missioner or Deputy Collector of Customs, or a Customs Collector: (b) unto confiscation of goods not ex­ceeding two hundred and fifty rupees in value, and imposition of penalty or increas­ed duty, not exceeding one hundred rupees, by an Assistant Commissioner or Assistant Collector of Customs: (c) up to confiscation of goods not ex­ceeding fifty rupees in value, and imposi­tion of penalty or increased duty not ex­ceeding ten rupees, by such other subordi­nate officers of Customs as the Cthef Cus­toms authority may, from time to time, em­power in that behalf' in virtue of their of­fice; Provided that the Cthef Customs au­thority may, in the case of any officer per­forming the duties of a Customs Collector, limit his powers to those indicated in clause (b) 01 in clause (c) of this Section, and may confer on an officer, by name or in virtue of his office, the powers indicated in clauses (a), (b) 01 (c) of this Section." Section 183 of the same Act lays down that whenever confiscation is authorised by the said Act. the Officer adjudging it shall give the owner of the goods an option to pay, in lieu of confiscation, such fine as the officer thinks fit. the Officer adjudging it shall give the owner of the goods an option to pay, in lieu of confiscation, such fine as the officer thinks fit. So under this Section the Cus­toms Officer is bound to give the owner of the goods an option to Day fine in lieu of the confiscation. Section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act runs as follows: "(1) If any person contravenes the pro­visions of Section 4, Section 5, Section 9 or sub-section (2) of Section 12 or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder, he shall- (a) be liable to such penalty not exceeding three times the value of the foreign exchange in respect of which the contra­vention has taken place or five thousand rupees, whichever is more, as may be ad­judged by the Director of Enforcement in the manner hereinafter provided, or (b) upon conviction by a Court. be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years. or with fine, or with both (1A) Whoever contravenes- (a) any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule, direction or order made there ­under, other that, those referred to in sub­section (1) of this section and Section 19 shall upon conviction by a Court, be puni­shable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both. (b) any direction or order made under Section 19 shall, upon conviction by a Court, be punishable with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees. (IB) Any Court trying a contravention under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1A) and the authority adjudging any contraven­tion under clause (a) of sub-section (1) may, if it thinks fit, and in addition to any sen­tence or penalty which it may impose for such contravention, direct that any curren­cy, security gold or silver, or goods or any other money or property in respect of which the contravention has taken place, shall be confiscated to the Central Govern­ment and further direct that the foreign ex­change holdings if any of the person com­mitting the contravention or any part there­of shall be brought back into India or shall be retained outside India in accordance with the directions made in this behalf Explana­tion. - For the purposes of this sub-sec­tion, property in respect of which contra­vention has taken place shall include de­posits in a bank, where the said property is converted into such deposits. (2) Notwithstanding anything contain­ed in Section 32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, it shall be lawful for any Magistrate of the first class, specially em­powered in this behalf by the State Gov­ernment, and for any Presidency Magis­trate to pass a sentence of fine exceeding (two thousand) rupees on any person con­victed of an offence punishable under this section. (3) No Court shall take cognizance- (a) of any offence punishable under sub­section (1) except upon complaint in writing made by the Director of Enforcement, or (b) of any offence punishable under sub­section (1A) of this section or under Section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as applied by Section 19 of this Act, except upon complaint in writing made by the Director of Enforcement or any officer au­thorised in this behalf by the Central Gov­ernment or the Reserve Bank by a general or special order: Provided that where any such of tenet is the contravention of any of the provi­sions of this Act or any rule, direction or order made thereunder which prohibits the doing of an act without permission no such complaint shall be made unless the person accused of the offence has been given an opportunity of showing that he had such per­mission. (4) Nothing in the first proviso to Sec­tion 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. shall apply to any offence punishable under this section." Section 23A was introduced by the Central Amendment Act (Act VIII of 1952) giving discretion to the officer to direct payment of fine in lieu of confiscation which is otherwise mandatory under Section 183 of the Sea Customs Act It runs as follows: "Application of Sea Customs Act. 1878 Without prejudice to the provisions of Sec­tion 23 or to any other provision contained in this Act, the restrictions imposed by sub­sections (1) and (2) of Section 8, sub-sec­tion (1) of Section 12 and clause (a) of sub­section (1) of Section 13 shall be deemed to have been imposed under Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. 1878 Without prejudice to the provisions of Sec­tion 23 or to any other provision contained in this Act, the restrictions imposed by sub­sections (1) and (2) of Section 8, sub-sec­tion (1) of Section 12 and clause (a) of sub­section (1) of Section 13 shall be deemed to have been imposed under Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. and all the provi­sions of that Act shall have effect accord­ingly, except that Section 183 thereof shall have effect as if for the word 'shall' there­in the word 'may' were substituted " (8) The argument of the learned Coun­sel for the petitioner is that if the prosecu­tion of the petitioner in Criminal case No. 657 of 1959 was proceeded with under Sec­tion 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, he stood the chance of an acquittal, that in such a case there would be no con­fiscation of his gold or imposition of fine, and that, even if the case ended in convic­tion, it was in the judicial discretion of the Magistrate to order forfeiture of the gold but that as the first respondent proceeded under the Sea Customs Act, the petitioner was prejudiced with reference to S. 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and that therefore, the order of the first respon­dent Ext A-14 is liable to be quashed. His contention that the later Act must prevail and that by necessary implication, the repeal of the earlier Act can be infer­red when in same matter is covered by both the Acts unless both can be reconcil­ed is supported by Emperor v. Probhat Chandra Baruah, AIR 1927 Cal 432. His further contention that when an individual is sought to be proceeded against for an of­fence of contravention of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, then Section 182 of the Sea Customs Act must be deemed to have been abrogated is supported by the decision of Bose J of the Calcutta High Court in Shew Pujan Rai Indrasan Rai Ltd v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1952 Cal 789 . In that case the petitioners were charged with violation of Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act read with Section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Re­gulation Act. In that case the petitioners were charged with violation of Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act read with Section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Re­gulation Act. It was held that the peti­tioners' case came within Section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, that the adoption of the procedure under Section 182 of the Sea Customs Act had prejudiced Sec­tion 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and that the entire proceedings before the Customs authorities were without juris­diction It was further held that if the peti­tioners, were not implicated in the charge, it might have- been open to the Customs au­thorities to proceed under S 182 of the Sea Customs Act. if steps were intended to be taken only against the offending foods (9) It is also the contention of Sri M R. Choudharv the learned Counsel for the peti­tioner that Ext A-4 shows that as soon as the petitioner was sent to the S.D.M., Sadar, for trial on 30-10-1959 the S.D.M., took cognizance of the case on the same date by registering it under Section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and re­manded the petitioner to custody for 14 days and adjourned the case to 12-11-1959 for further report of the second respon­dent and that therefore in view of the de­cision of Bose J referred to above the first respondent had no jurisdiction to proceed with the departmental enquiry As to the Point of time when a case can be said to have been taken cognizance of. he relied on Paramananda Brahmachari v Emperor. AIR 1930 Pat 30 where it was held that "taking of cognizance" of a case occurs as soon as the Magistrate as such applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. In Dalu Gour v. Moheswar Mahato, AIR 1948 Pat 25 it was held that it is well set­tled that when a case is transferred to a sub­ordinate Magistrate under Section 192(1') Cr P. C the latter has the same authority to deal with the case as regards issuing of process and other matters connected with the inquiry or trial, as is vested in the superior Magistrate from whom he receiv­ed the case on transfer. Ext. Ext. A-4 shows that the S. D. M., Sadar, registered the case against the petitioner under Section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, though no formal complaint was made after it was transferred to him by the District Magistrate With regard to this aspect of the case, the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents is that under Section 174 of the Sea Customs Act the second respondent was bound to produce the petitioner before the nearest Magistrate, that subsequently the Magis­trate granted his bail under Section 175 of the said Act and that no cognizance of the offence was taken by him until the com­plaint was actually filed before him on 8-4-1960 It. is no doubt true that, under Section 174 of the Sea Customs Act, every person arrested on the ground that he is guilty of the offence under the Act should forthwith be taken and produced before the nearest Magistrate or Customs Collector and that under that provision the petitioner was produced before the District Magistrate in the first instance. But. Ext A-4 certainly show? that the S.D.M took cognizance of the case by passing an order registering the case under Section 23 of the Foreign Ex­change Regulation Act and awaiting fur­ther report of the second respondent So the S.D M. must be held to have taken cog­nizance of the case on 30-10-1959 (10) Another contention of the learn­ed Counsel for the petitioner in connection with the same Point No. (ii) is that the pro­ceedings before the first respondent were in the nature of "prosecution" and that the petitioner cannot be prosecuted and punish­ed for the same offence more than once under Article 30(21 of the Constitution of India. (11) The above arguments and the con­tentions of the learned Counsel for the peti­tioner were all adverted to and repelled by the Supreme Court in Thomas Dana v. State of Punjab, AIR 1959 SC 375 by a majority of 4 Judges In that case after a departmental inquiry, the Coflator of Customs directed "Absolute confiscation" of several kinds of currency (of the value of more than Rs. 8| lacs) under S. 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act read with Ss. 23A and 23B of the Act. He also direct­ed confiscation of a car (from which the smuggled currency was seized) and ordered that it could be redeemed on payment of a redemption ''fine" of Rs. 8| lacs) under S. 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act read with Ss. 23A and 23B of the Act. He also direct­ed confiscation of a car (from which the smuggled currency was seized) and ordered that it could be redeemed on payment of a redemption ''fine" of Rs. 50,000/-. He also ordered confiscation of a pocket radio, time­piece and some other articles under Section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act. read with Section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act. 1947 and Section 7 of the Land Customs Act, 1924. He further imposed a heavy personal penalty of Rs 25,00,000/-on each of the petitioners under Sec. 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act (as in the present case). Again, the customs authority filed a Criminal complaint against the petitioners and another under Section 23 read with Section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regula­tion Act and under Section 167 (81) of the Sea Customs Act. The petitioners challenged their criminal prosecution and convictions and the sentences as infringing the protec­tion against double jeopardy enshrined in Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India. It was also urged before the Supreme Court that the orders of the Customs authority in levying a heavy "penalty" of Rs. 25,00,000/-on each of the petitioners and order of con­fiscation of currency and properties worth over 81/2 lacs called for distinguishment of the cast from the previous decision of the Supreme Court in Maqboof Hussain v. State of Bombay AIR 1953 SC 325 that the pro­ceedings before the Customs authorities do not constitute a "Prosecution" to sustain a plea of double jeopardy. But the Supreme Court, by a majority of the Judges, repel­led the petitioners' contentions and held that the proceedings before the Sea Customs authorities under Section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act are not "prosecution" within the meaning of Article 20 (2) of the Con­stitution of India and that, therefore, the fact that in such a proceeding the Customs Authorities confiscated the goods and also inflicted a heavy penalty, doe? not bring into operation the provisions of Art. 20 (21 of the Constitution of India so as to pre­vent his prosecution and imprisonment under Section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Art read with Sections 23 and 23B of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. not bring into operation the provisions of Art. 20 (21 of the Constitution of India so as to pre­vent his prosecution and imprisonment under Section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Art read with Sections 23 and 23B of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. It was also held that the Customs Officer is not a Court, that simply because a Customs Offi­cer took a very serious view of the smug­gling activities of a person and imposed very heavy penalties under Section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act would not convert the authorities into a Court of law or the penalty imposed on that person as a "punishment" imposed by the Criminal Court It was further held that there is difference in the nature of the proceedings against the offending articles and offending persons The proceedings against the former are proceed­ings in rem (even if the offender is not known). The proceedings against the latter are proceedings in Personam where the offender is known. Where the offender is known, both the types of proceedings can be taken under the Sea Customs Act and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. So the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the proceedings before the first respondent are invalid, as the S. D M, Sadar took cognizance of the case and that there could not be two proceedings viz one before the first respondent (Customs Offi­cer) and another in the Criminal Court is not correct The fact that cognizance of the Criminal case was taken by the S. D M. Sadar, Agartala even on 30-10-1949 there­fore does not vitiate the departmental proceedings before the first respondent. Though the decision of Bose, J. in AIR 1952 Cal 789 was not referred to by the Supreme Court, it must be held to have been over­ruled and it is no longer good law. This Court is bound to follow the judgment of the Supreme Court. (12) Point (iii) :- The learned Counsel for the petitioner' assailed the order cover­ed by Ext. A-14 on various grounds. His first contention is that the first respondent should not have relied upon the statement of the petitioner as per Ext. B-14 made by the petitioner on 30-10-1959 after the gold was seized from his house. Exhibit B-14 shows that he made voluntary statement be­fore the witnesses Arunoday Roy Choudhury, Nani Gopal Paul Choudhury and Sudhir Ch. His first contention is that the first respondent should not have relied upon the statement of the petitioner as per Ext. B-14 made by the petitioner on 30-10-1959 after the gold was seized from his house. Exhibit B-14 shows that he made voluntary statement be­fore the witnesses Arunoday Roy Choudhury, Nani Gopal Paul Choudhury and Sudhir Ch. Das, that he originally belonged to the Village of Kaimpur, P. O. Mandha-bhag. Thana-Kasba, District - Tipper ah, East Pakistan, that his mother had died, that hit, father is still living in that village, that the petitioner came away to Tripura about 7 or 8 years priof to the date of his statement that he had neither refugee card nor Indian Nationality certificate and he had no Indian or Pakistan passport. He further stated as per Ext. B-14 that after he came over to India, he began to maintain his livelihood by selling patent medicines, that he was earning Rs. 250 or Rs. 300 a month, that he has a wife, son, sister and brother, that he gave a sum of Rs. 50,000 to one Santosh Kumar Das. son of Sachindra Chandra Das. Village Kandir-par, P. O. Comilla, Distiict- Tipperah, East Pakistan, that Santosh Chandra Das brought the gold bars to him from Pakistan and that thus he "caused" the sold/bars to be brought from Pakistan to his residence at Agartala. He went on to state that the documents seized from his house were papers connect­ed with his purchase of gold, that he bor­rowed moneys from others, that he dis­charged the same, that he purchased 5 tickets for himself, his wife, children and relations to go to Calcutta on 31-10-1959 by air that the Customs Officers seized the tickets and returned them and that they also seized the ornaments of his wife and returned them to him after verification He appended a list of articles seized from his house to the statement.' There are. however somi- disputed facts which cannot be gone into ^n this petition. however somi- disputed facts which cannot be gone into ^n this petition. They are, firstly whe­ther the petitioner was arrested between 7 A. M. and 8 A. M. on 30-10-1959 as alleged by bin or whether he was arrested at about 2 P. M. as alleged by the respondents; se­condly whether the statement /as per Exhi­bit B-14 was taken from the petitioner by compulsion as alleged by him or whether he gave it vofuntarily as alleged by the res­pondents; thirdly whether the S. D. M. postponed granting bail to the petitioner till 8-11-1959 and fourthly, whether the wife of the petitioner was also taken to the second respondent's office along with her ornaments. The disputed facts cannot be en­tered into in this Writ Petition. (13) The first respondent considered the statement of the petitioner covered by Exhi­bit B-14 in his order as per Ext. A-14 in the light of the evidence of the other witness­es and concluded firstly, that the records of Agartala Land Customs Station showed that the petitioner held a Pakistan Passport No. A/371610 dated 12-6-1958 that he made two journeys on the strength of the said pass­port, that he left India through the Land Customs Station on 16-9-1959, that there was no record to show his re-entry into India through the same Land Customs Sta­tion and that his connection with Pakistan was thus evident. Secondly, he held that the gold bars were seized on a reasonable belief that they were smuggled, but that the petitioner did not produce any document showing licit import of the gold bars from Pakistan into India and that, therefore, the goods were liable to be seized by the Land Custom Officers. Thirdly, he held that though there was some vague indication of a threat by the Second respondent, still it was not believable that the petitioner would have waited until 9-12-1959. (when he sent his reply as per Ext. A-7' complaining of compulsion) without making a complaint to the authorities that the statement as per Ext B-14 was taken from him by coercion or threats and that, therefore, Ext. B-14 statement of the petitioner was a voluntary one. (when he sent his reply as per Ext. A-7' complaining of compulsion) without making a complaint to the authorities that the statement as per Ext B-14 was taken from him by coercion or threats and that, therefore, Ext. B-14 statement of the petitioner was a voluntary one. Fourthly, he held that illicit import of the seized gold bars was established and that they were liable to be confiscated and that the petitioner is also liable to be fined under Section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act read with Section 19 ibid as made ap­plicable by Section 23A of the Foreign Ex­change Regulation Act (14) The above findings of the first res­pondent were vehemently attacked by the learned counsel for the petitioner. With regard to the first finding of the first res­pondent that the petitioner is a Pakistan national, there is a reported decision regarding the self-same petitioner in question in Shri Gauranga Chandra Deb v. Tripura Administration AIR 1964 Tri­pura 7 It was held that the petitioner here­in entered into India after 16-9-1959 with­out a valid visa and that he was liable to be convicted under Rule 6 (a) of the Pass-port Rules, 1950, framed under the Passport Act of 1920. It is very pertinent to note that the seizure of gold bars from his resi­dential house in Agartala in Indian State took place within about 14 days after he entered India Ext B-14 also shows that the petitioner made preparation to leave Agar­tala for Calcutta on 31-10-1959 (evidently along with the gold bars). The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the above judg­ment cannot be looked into for the purpose of arriving at a finding whether the petitioner is a Pakistan national and relied on Anil Behan Ghosh v Smt. Latika Bala Dassi, AIR 1955 SC 566 . In that case there was a proceeding for revocation of the grant of probate under Section 263 Indian Succes­sion Act. The question was whether the son of the testator murdered him. It was held that it could not be assumed on the basis of a previous judgment of a Criminal Court convicting the son of the murder of his father and sentencing him to transportation for life, that the son was the murderer of the testator But. The question was whether the son of the testator murdered him. It was held that it could not be assumed on the basis of a previous judgment of a Criminal Court convicting the son of the murder of his father and sentencing him to transportation for life, that the son was the murderer of the testator But. it was held that the judgment of the Criminal Court was relevant to show that there was such a trial resulting in the conviction and sentence of the son to transportation for life In view of this deci­sion, it follows that the judgment of this Court mentioned above is relevant to show that the petitioner was prosecuted for violation of the Passport Rules on 16-9-1959 and that the prosecution resulted in his con­viction There is material in the present case to show that the petitioner crossed India from Pakistan without a valid Passport on 16-9-1959 about 14 days before the gold bars were seized from his residence (15) Regarding the second finding of the first respondent that the burden of proof lay on the petitioner to prove that the seiz­ed gold was brought by him from Pakistan to India under a valid permit, the learned Counsel fof the petitioner argued that the burden of proof was wrongly cast on the petitioner. Section 178A of the Sea Cus­toms Act is the relevant provision It runs as follows: "(1) Where any goods to which this section applies are seized under this Act in the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods shall be on the person from whose possession the goods were seiz­ed. (2) This section shall apply to gold, gold manufactures, diamonds and other precious stones, cigarettes and cosmetics and any other goods which the Central Government may. by notification in the Official Gazette specify in this behalf (3) Every notification issued under Sub­section (2) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament as soon as may be after it is issued " The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the initial bur­den lay on the respondents to show that the goods were smuggled and that thereafter only the burden would be shifted to the petitioner to show that they were not smug­gled goods. Smuggling is nothing but im­portation or exportation of goods secretly or clandestinely without payment of duty. Smuggling is nothing but im­portation or exportation of goods secretly or clandestinely without payment of duty. Vide also Balchand Patni v. Officer-in-charge Customs Agartala. AIR 195fi Tripura 35. In support of his contention that the initial burden lay upon the respondents to show that the goods were smuggled, the petitioner's Counsel relied on Amba Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 264 . It was held that if Section 106 of the Indian Evi­dence Act applied to a case, then by ana­logy, the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence equally applied; that it therefore followed that the onus was on the Customs authorities to prove the case against the accused and that where the Customs authorities did not discharge the burden, the order of confiscation was bad. In that case the goods were seized prior to 14-7-1951 and the order of confiscation was passed on 18-1-1952 But, Section 178A of the Sea Cus­toms Act was introduced by the Sea Cus­toms Amendment Act XXI of 1955 and it was held that the said Section 178A did not govern the case because the Section was not retrospective in operation. As such, this decision does not apply to the facts of this case. The petitioner's counsel also relied on HiralalSarawgi v Collector of Central Ex­cise and Land Customs for Assam, AIR 1962 Assam 39. It was held that although under Section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act a special jurisdiction is conferred on the autho­rities to confiscate certain goods, which have been imported in contravention of the order of prohibition issued by the Central Govern­ment either under Section 19 of the Sea Cus­toms Act or under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 still when the person contravenins the provisions was tried of an offence, the Department was bound to prove that the goods in question were in fact im­ported in Contravention of the prohibition order and that the burden of proof, which lay on the Department was not discharged by merely holding that the petitioner failed to prove the bona fide purchase of the goods alleged by him The decision of the Supreme Court re­ferred to above viz., AIR 1961 SC 264 was applied. But the Judgment shows that Sec­tion 178A of the Sea Customs Act was not considered at all. As against these rulings the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents are more to the Point. But the Judgment shows that Sec­tion 178A of the Sea Customs Act was not considered at all. As against these rulings the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents are more to the Point. In Sheimal Tain v Collector of Central Ex­cise and Land Customs AIR 1956 Cal 621 it was held that, by the introduction of Sec­tion 178A in the Sea Customs Act and in the Schedule of Land Customs Act, the onus to prove that the goods were not contraband lies upon the person from whose possession the goods were seized In Kshetra Nath Basak v. Collector of Land Customs, AIR 1959 Cat 356 it was held that Section 178A of the Sea Customs Act applies under two conditions. The first condition is that the goods must be seized under the Act under the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods. The second condition is that the burden of pro­ving that they are not smuggled goods shall be on the person from whose possession the goods were seized. It was also held that Sec­tion 178A of the Sea Customs Act relates to the procedural rights & discharge of onus of proof, & that the onus of proof comes into operation (after the goods are seized and when the matter is taken up for hearing) that they are not smuggled goods. I respect­fully agree with these decisions of the Cal­cutta High Court. The proceedings before the Customs authorities are not a criminal pro­secution and all the principles of criminal jurisprudence do not apply to them. (Vide AIR 1959 SC 375 ). The provisions of Sec­tion 178A of the Sea Customs Act cannot be rendered nugatory and nullity by being ignored. The goods were seized by the second respondent under a reasonable belief that they were smuggled. At the time of the in­quiry before the first respondent the burden lay upon the petitioner to show that they were not smuggled goods. So, the first res­pondent did not go wrong in casting the burden upon the petitioner. (16) Regarding the third finding of the first respondent, the contention of the learn­ed counsel for the petitioner was two-fold. His first contention was that the second res­pondent violated the fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioner under Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution by compell­ing him to be a witness against himself and to make the statement as per Ext. (16) Regarding the third finding of the first respondent, the contention of the learn­ed counsel for the petitioner was two-fold. His first contention was that the second res­pondent violated the fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioner under Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution by compell­ing him to be a witness against himself and to make the statement as per Ext. B-14 and that therefore his statement should have been rejected He relied on M. P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 300 where it was held that the fundamental right covered by Arti­cle 20(3) of the Constitution of India con­sists of (i) a right of a person accused of an offence, (ii) a protection against compulsion to be a witness and (iii) a protection against such compulsion resulting in his evidence against himself. It was further held that the guarantee under Article 20(3) of the Con­stitution of India f would be available to a person against whom a formal accusation re­lating to the commission of an offence has been levelled, which in the normal course may result in his prosecution. In that case searches made under the Criminal Procedure Code were the subject matter of decision. Vide also Collector of Customs v. Calcutta Motor and Cycle Co., AIR 1958 Cal 682 which followed the above decision. It was held that accusations made in the search warrants at the instance of the customs authorities and in one of their notices at a pre-trial stage (which might in the nor­mal course result in a prosecution) would attract the protection of Art. 20(3) of the Constitution of India. I. (17) But, Section 171A of the Sea Cus­toms Act (inserted by the Sea Customs Am­endment Act XXI of 1955) runs thus: "(1) Any officer of Customs duly em­ployed in the prevention of smuggling shall have power to summon any person whose at­tendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document or any other thing in any inquiry which such officer is making in connection with the smuggling of any goods. (2) A summons to produce documents or other things may be for the production of certain specified documents or things or for the production of all documents or things of a certain description in the possession or under the Control of the person summoned. (2) A summons to produce documents or other things may be for the production of certain specified documents or things or for the production of all documents or things of a certain description in the possession or under the Control of the person summoned. (3) All persons so summoned shall be bound to attend either in person or by an authorised agent, as such officer may direct and all persons so summoned shall be bound to state the truth upon any subject respect­ing which they are examined or make state­ments and to produce such documents and other things as may be required: Provided that the exemption under Sec­tion 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (5 of 1908) shall be applicable to any requisition for attendance under this section. (4) Every such inquiry as aforesaid shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding with­in the meaning of Section 193 and Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of I860)." Analogous provisions in S. 240 of Indian Companies Act were considered by the Bom­bay High Court in Narayanlal Bansilal v. Maneck Phiroze Mistry, AIR 1959 Bom 320 . It was held that Article 20(3) of the Consti­tution should be read in the context of the two clause^ which precede it and that it should not be read in the light of the Ameri­can Constitution or the American decisions and that in the case of an inquiry held under S. 235 of the Indian Companies Act in the first instance there is no accusation and that the compulsion introduced by the provision in Section 240 of the Companies Act is not a compulsion, which can be struck down by Article 20(3) of the Constitution. This deci­sion was approved by the Supreme Court in Raja Narayanlal Bansilal v. Maneck Phiroz Mistry AIR 1961 SC 29 . It was held that when a person is called upon under Section 240 of the Companies Act to give evidence and to produce documents, he cannot be said to be a person who is accused of any offence as required by Art. 20(3) of the Indian Con­stitution. It was held that when a person is called upon under Section 240 of the Companies Act to give evidence and to produce documents, he cannot be said to be a person who is accused of any offence as required by Art. 20(3) of the Indian Con­stitution. It was further held that at the com­mencement of the enquiry there could be no accused person, no accuser and no accusation against anyone that he has committed an offence and that a general enquiry and in­vestigation into the affairs of the company contemplated cannot be regarded as an "in­vestigation", which started with an accusation contemplated in Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent is that on the ana­logy of the provision contained in S. 240 of the Indian Companies Act, it could not be said that there was any accusation when the house of the petitioner was searched and that the statement of the petitioner would fall under S. 171A of the Sea Customs Act. Also, he argued that the proceedings before the Customs Officers are not criminal in nature and are not in the nature of "prosecution" against the petitioner as laid down by the Supreme Court in Thomas Dana v. State of Punjab, AIR 1959 SC 375 already referred to. But, the disposal of the contentions of the learned counsel for both the parties (which are equally sound) depends on the apprecia­tion of the evidence recorded in the Depart­mental inquiry. This Court exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India cannot function as a Court of appeal and sift the evidence. So, I would prefer to base my judgment on this Point on the finding of fact arrived at by the 1st respondent that the statement of the petitioner as per Ext B-14 was a voluntary one. In such a case, it is not hit by Art 20(3) of the Constitution of India. (18) In this connection the learned coun­sel for the petitioner contended that the second respondent issued the show-cause notices as per Exts. A-6 and A-6(a) dated 5-11-1959 that the first respondent examin­ed 4 witnesses on 6-11-1959, but that copies of their statements were not furnished to the petitioner, that the petitioner sent his reply as per Ext. (18) In this connection the learned coun­sel for the petitioner contended that the second respondent issued the show-cause notices as per Exts. A-6 and A-6(a) dated 5-11-1959 that the first respondent examin­ed 4 witnesses on 6-11-1959, but that copies of their statements were not furnished to the petitioner, that the petitioner sent his reply as per Ext. A-7 dated 9-12-1959 that there was violation of the principles of natural justice and that the proceedings before the first respondent are liable to be quashed. Reliance was placed by him on 4 decisions in support of this contention In James Bushi v. Collector of Ganjam. AIR 1959 Orissa 152 it was held that if there was a preliminary enquiry (not of a confidential nature) preceding the hold ing of a regular departmental enquiry, the delinquent offi­cer should be given copies of statements made by witnesses during that preliminary enquiry, but that a secret investigation made by the C.I.D. specially of the Anti-Corrup­tion Branch stands on an entirely different footing and that the copies of the statements recorded by the C.I.D Officers need not be furnished to the delinquent In Sharmanand v Supdt Gun-Carriage Factory Jabalpur, AIR 1960 Madh Pra 178 It was held that the delinquent in a depart­mental enquiry should be given a reason­able opportunity to defend himself, that the opportunity includes not only a right to cross-examine the witnesses for the depart­ment but also to cross-examine them effec­tively In M/s Valimahomed Gulamhussain Sonavala and Co v C.T.A. Pillai Addl. Collector of Customs AIR 1961 Bom 48 it was held that the rule of natural justice in quasi-judicial proceedings requires that an oppor­tunity should be given to a person to cross-examine those who have made statements, which are to be used against him. Vide also Narendra Chandra Das v. Collector of Cen­tral Excise and Land Customs, AIR 1962 Assam 145 In that cast the enquiring Offi­cer gathered secret information and did not Rive any opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine them In the present case the petitioner did not take the objection in his petition at all. On the other hand he alleged in paragraph 9 of his petition that at the request of the petitioner the first respondent informed him that Shri M. K. Punshi, I.R.S., Assistant Collector, Central Excise, with Headquarters at Shillong informed the petitioner as can be seen from Ext. On the other hand he alleged in paragraph 9 of his petition that at the request of the petitioner the first respondent informed him that Shri M. K. Punshi, I.R.S., Assistant Collector, Central Excise, with Headquarters at Shillong informed the petitioner as can be seen from Ext. A-8 that he would hold en­quiry on 4-2-1960 in the Office of the Cen­tral Excise at Apartala. The petitioner stated in para 10 of his petition that there­after on 4-2-1960 Shri Punshi, I.R.S., the Assistant Collector actually held the pro­posed enquiry in the office of the Central Excise at Agartala in which the petitioner was represented by his Advocate Shri J. Choudhury and pleadei Shri H. Dutta, that 4 witnesses were examined and cross-exa­mined and that out of them one was the second respondent and the other three witnesses were the witnesses to the search. He further stated in para 10 of his petition that at the request of the petitioner the first respondent supplied him with carbon copies of the depositions of the witnesses as per Ext. A-9 (to which copies of the depositions are attached) and that the first respondent also informed the petitioner as per Ext. A-10 that the original depositions were with him in his office. If the petitioner was not sup­plied with the-copies of-the depositions of the witnesses examined in-cthef, it is im­possible to believe that his advocates cross-examined them without any material. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Advocates cross-examin­ed the witnesses without having the cthef-examination before them and with refer­ence to some facts from their memory can­not at all be believed. If the petitioner was not given copies of statements of the wit­nesses, then he would have mentioned the same as a ground in the Writ Petition and it would have been a very valid ground. If the petitioner was not given copies of statements of the wit­nesses, then he would have mentioned the same as a ground in the Writ Petition and it would have been a very valid ground. (19) With regard to the fourth finding of the first respondent, mentioned in para 13 of this judgment, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the petitioner was not a person connected with the smuggling of the goods within the meaning of S. 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act that the offence of smuggling, if any, was completed when the goods crossed the border between East Pakistan and India and that the mere possession of the goods by the petitioner is not an offence under Sec­tion 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. In sup­port of this contention he relied on a num­ber of decisions. In S. Balbir Singh v. Collector of Central Excise and Land Cus­toms. AIR 1960 Punj 488 it was held that under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act the penalty can be levied only if the per­son has been concerned in the offence of importation or exportation of goods, which are prohibited or restricted and that in the absence of such finding on the record, the order imposing the penalty cannot be sus­tained. In Gopal Mayaji Parab v. T. C. Seth, AIR 1960 Bom 478 it was held that the offence under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Ad is complete when the goods crossed the customs barrier and that any subsequent attempt to destroy evidence of smuggled goods does not form part of the offence as mentioned in Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. In Sitaram Agarwalla v Additional Collector of Customs, Calcutta, AIR 1960 Cal 670 it was held that the expression "to be concerned in" in Section 167(8) Col. 3 of the Sea Customs Act means "to take part in or to be related to" and that, therefore, if there is no material to show that a person who is about to buy or deal with smuggl­ed gold took any part in the importation of it. then he cannot be penalised under Sec­tion 167(8) of the Act. 3 of the Sea Customs Act means "to take part in or to be related to" and that, therefore, if there is no material to show that a person who is about to buy or deal with smuggl­ed gold took any part in the importation of it. then he cannot be penalised under Sec­tion 167(8) of the Act. But, it was further held that if anybody takes part in the pro­cesses leading to the import into or export from India, then he is a person "concerned" in the offence of importing or exporting the goods and that he is liable to be penalised under Section 167(8) of the Act In Devichand Jestimall and Co. v. Collector of Central Excise AIR 1960 Mad 281 it was held that in the absence of evidence to show that a person imported the gold, mere possession of it. which has been unlaw­fully imported into India cannot be dealt with under Section 167(8) of the Sea Cus­toms Art In Radha Kishan Bhatia v. Union of India, AIR 1965 SC 1072 it was held that the requirement of the expression 'concern­ed in any such offence' under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act is that the person to be penalised must be interested or invofv­ed or engaged or mixed up in the commis­sion of the offence referred to in the first column of Section 167(8) of the Act. that the offence must be at a stage prior to the completion of the offence of illegal importa­tion of goods as the offence is complete when the goods have crossed the Customs frontier and that, when the goods have been imported any subsequent interest cannot bring the person showing such interest with­in the purview of Section 167(8) for the pur­pose of the imposition of the penalty. In the present case, as can be seen from Ext. B-14. the petitioner paid a sum of Rs. 50,000 to one Santpsh Kumar Das of Kandirpar village in Tipperah District in East Pakis­tan and the latter purchased the smuggled gold and delivered the same to the petitioner. Both of them belonged to the same District of Tipperah in East Pakistan. The petiti­oner, thus, caused the gold bars purchas­ed and smuggled into India. So, he was "concerned in the offence of smuggling" and the above decisions, therefore, equally apply to this case. Both of them belonged to the same District of Tipperah in East Pakistan. The petiti­oner, thus, caused the gold bars purchas­ed and smuggled into India. So, he was "concerned in the offence of smuggling" and the above decisions, therefore, equally apply to this case. (20) The learned counsel for the peti­tioner further argued that there is no find­ing of the first respondent in Ext. A-14 that the petitioner was the "person concerned" under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act and that therefore the order is illegal. He relied or AIR 1960 Punj 488 and AIR 1965 SC 1072 which have been already referred to. In para 11 of Ext. A-14 the first res­pondent stated that the petitioner admitted having brought the gold in question from Pakistan, but that he did not produce any documentary evidence to show the licit im­port of the gold and that therefore illicit import of the gold was established. In para 12 of the order he passed the impugned order. So, there is no force in the conten­tion of the petitioner's counsel that the first respondent did not specifically find that the petitioner was a "person concerned" in the offence. (21) As can be seen from Ext. All the petitioner was asked by the second respon­dent to appear in his office at Agartala at 9 A.M. on 28-11-1959 to be present when samples of the seized gold were to be taken for analysis. Ext. A-12 shows that the peti­tioner requested the first respondent to give him a copy of the report of the expert, but that no copy was given to him. The first respondent made a wrong statement in para­graph 6 ->f his order Ext. A-14 that the peti­tioner requested him to give him a copy of the report of the Expert only in case the Expert's opinion was to be used against him The observation is incorrect. No­where did the petitioner mention in his let­ter that he should be given a copy of the report of the Expert only if it was to be used against him The petitioner stated in the petition that adverse inference should be drawn against the respondents from their conduct in suppressing the report and that, therefore, the gold bars were not of Pakis­tan origin. But, the respondent filed Exts. B-2 to B 10 Assay Certificates issued by the Dy. But, the respondent filed Exts. B-2 to B 10 Assay Certificates issued by the Dy. Master of the India Government Mint at Alipore, which show that the Expert gave his opinion only about the fineness of the gold bars They mention that the gold sent to the Expert bore "Alipore Mint" Marks To find out whether the gold ban really bore "Alipore Mint" Marks, I direct­ed the respondents to produce the gold ban into the Court. The sealed bag was brought by the respondents from the State Bank of India and was opened by the S.D.M. Sadar Agartala in the open Court in the presence of all concerned. On in examination of the gold bars it was found that there are no marks on them at, all So, the statements of the Master of the Mint in Exts. B-2 to B-10 that the gold bars bore "Alipore Mint" Marks refer to only the sample pieces and not to the gold bars as a whole. In view of Ext. B-14, it follows that the gold bars in question were caused to be imported by the petitioner from Pakistan into India (22) Thus a thorough scrutiny of the evidence and the contentions of the respec­tive parties do not show that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. The common law Writ of Certiorari in En­gland, which is called as the order of Certi­orari in India is not meant to take the place of an appeal. Its purpose is only to determine on an examination of the record whether the inferior Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has- not proceeded in ac­cordance with the essential requirement of the law, which it is meant to administer. Mere formal or technical errors, even though of law will not be sufficient to attract this extraordinary jurisdiction. Where the er­rors cannot be said to be errors of law ap­parent on the face of the record, but are merely errors in appreciation of document­ary evidence or affidavits or errors in draw­ing inferences or omission to draw infer­ences or errors which a Court sitting as a Court of appeal could have examined and corrected, then there is no case for the ex­ercise of the Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. Vide Parry and Co. Ltd. v Commercial Employees Associa­tion Madras. Vide Parry and Co. Ltd. v Commercial Employees Associa­tion Madras. AIR 1952 SC 179 ; G Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd AIR 1952 SC 192 ; Ebrahim Aboobakar v Custodian General of Evacuee Property AIR 1952 SC 319 : Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Isha-que. AIR 1955 SC 233 and Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr of Hills Division and Ap­peals IR 1958 SC 398 In this view the depositions of the witnesses examined in the enquiry and considered by the first respon­dent cannot be scrutinised as in the case of an appeal to judge whether the apprecia­tion of the evidence by the first respon­dent is propei or not (23) Nothing in this judgment should be taken by the S D M. as expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and he should try the Criminal case independently. The several Points had to be discussed in the Judgment because they were argued before me. T'here are some disputed facts, which are left open to be considered by the S.D.M (24)- In the result, the petition is dis­missed and the rule is discharged But, under the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Petition dismissed.