ORDER M.U. Issac, J. 1. This is a petition to revise the order of the Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Malappuram in M.C. 83/65, by which the learned Magistrate directed the petitioner to pay a monthly maintenance of Rs. 10 to the respondent in this case, who is a minor and whom the learned Magistrate found to be the child of the petitioner. 2. The facts in this case are to a large extent not in dispute; and the controversy relates only to the parenthood of the child. The petitioner and the respondent mother belong to the Muslim community; and they also reside in the same locality. The respondent mother was married to the petitioner on 10th December 1957; and this marriage was conducted in the house of a Musaliar of the place. The child was born to her on 5th May 1958. The mother who was examined as P.W. 1, has admitted that she was pregnant for four months at the time of the marriage. She has also admitted that, before this marriage she had married another Muslim; but she said that she had not lived with him, and that marriage was absolved about one year before she got married to the petitioner. The fact that the first marriage was got dissolved was spoken to by her in her re-examination. There is no other evidence on this matter. The petitioner, as C.P.W. 1 stated that, before his marriage with P.W. 1, he had married another woman and he divorced her very shortly after that marriage. The petitioner further gave evidence that, for about 4 years before his marriage with P.W. 1, he was residing in Bangalore, being employed in a tea-shop, that this marriage was settled through his parents, and that he came down for the marriage only a few days before the date of the marriage. This evidence is corroborated by the evidence of C.P.W. 2. P.W. 1 was asked about this; and she stated that she did not know whether the petitioner was employed in Bangalore; but she added that he had gone out for work only after the marriage. 3. According to P.W. 1, the marriage was conducted in the house of the Musaliar and not in the mosque, because she was pregnant. According to the petitioner and his witness, it was done at the Musaliar house, because the Musaliar was ill. 3. According to P.W. 1, the marriage was conducted in the house of the Musaliar and not in the mosque, because she was pregnant. According to the petitioner and his witness, it was done at the Musaliar house, because the Musaliar was ill. This controversy is not of much relevancy. The case of P.W. 1 is that after the marriage she was taken to the house of the petitioner, with whom she lived for some time, that she went to her own house later for delivery, and that after the delivery the petitioner refused to accept her and the child and she was divorced within one month of the birth of the child. According to the petitioner, before P.W. 1 was taken to his house after the marriage a scandal spread that P.W. 1 was pregnant. He enquired about the matter and he was satisfied that she was really pregnant, with the result that he never took her to his house, and within 15 days of the marriage, he divorced P.W. 1. 4. As indicated above, the only question for determination is whether the respondent is the child of the petitioner. I have heard counsel at great length and also perused the records of this case. I find that the order of the learned Magistrate is vitiated as his findings are based on a misreading of the evidence, as I shall indicate later, and also by a failure to consider the actual points arising for determination in the case. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent contended before me that there is sufficient evidence in this case to hold that the respondent is the child of the petitioner, that the learned Magistrate has, after a consideration of the evidence, come to such a finding, and that this Court, sitting in revision, should not interfere with that finding. The learned Magistrate considers this question under point No. 1. Dealing with this point, he first states that according to P.Ws.1 to 4 the Nikah has taken place at the house of Abdullakutty Musaliar since P.W. 1 was pregnant at the time of the Nikah. It is difficult for me to understand that, if P.W. 1 was pregnant, why should the Musaliar place be chosen for conducting the marriage. Nothing is found in the records of the case that this was in accordance with any custom or would serve any purpose. It is difficult for me to understand that, if P.W. 1 was pregnant, why should the Musaliar place be chosen for conducting the marriage. Nothing is found in the records of the case that this was in accordance with any custom or would serve any purpose. If secrecy was the idea, naturally a better place would have been the house of P.W.1, Coming to the evidence of these winesses, P.W.2 says that the petitioner admitted that he was responsible for the pregnancy of P.W.1. This admission according to him took place immediately before the marriage at the house of the Musaliar. All what P.W.3 says is that the marriage was conducted at the house of the Musaliar, because P.W. 1 was pregnant. As already stated, this reason is hardly convincing. Apart from that, there is nothing in his deposition to the effect that the petitioner admitted that he was responsible for the pregnancy of P.W. 1 or the petitioner ever knew about this at the time of the marriage. P.W. 4 speaks nothing about the marriage or about the pregnancy; but he is a witness only to say that he has found the child on certain occasions in the house of the petitioner. So the statement in the order of the learned Magistrate above referred to, is a patent error on a very material aspect of the case. He repeats this mistake in another part of his order, when considering the same point; and there can be no doubt that he has fallen into a grievous error in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner knew that P. W. 1 was pregnant at the time of the marriage. Apart from what is referred to above and the evidence of P. W. 1, there is absolutely no other evidence to prove that the respondent is the child of the petitioner. Summing up the position is this. P.W. 1 has given evidence that the child is that of the petitioner. P. W. 2 has stated that, at the time of the marriage, the petitioner admitted to him that he was the father of the child. According to P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and all her witnesses reside about a mile away from the place where the marriage was conducted. There is nothing in the evidence of P.W. 2 to show that he had any reason to be interested with this affair. According to P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and all her witnesses reside about a mile away from the place where the marriage was conducted. There is nothing in the evidence of P.W. 2 to show that he had any reason to be interested with this affair. He appears to be a very casual witness. It is very unsafe to act upon the evidence of a person like P.W. 1, when we find support for it only in an alleged admission spoken to by P.W. 2. If these aspects were considered by the learned Magistrate and still he thought for sufficient reason that this evidence could be acted upon, I would have hesitated to interfere with such a finding. I cannot, therefore, uphold the finding of the learned Magistrate that the petitioner knew that P.W. 1 was pregnant at the time of marriage. 6. The next question that the learned Magistrate has considered, when dealing with the first point, is about the date of divorce. This according to me, is not a question which arises for determination in the case, though it has got a relevancy on the question whether the petitioner knew about the pregnancy of P. W. 1 at the time of marriage. Therefore it is not necessary for me to come to a conclusion on the question whether the divorce was effected, as the petitioner speaks, within 15 days of the marriage or only within a month after the child was born. The probabilities are that the petitioner version is true. The petitioner in this case is confronted with the presumption arising under section 112 of the Evidence Act which reads as follows: Section 112. Bulk during marriage conclusive proof of legitimacy: The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten.t Under this section it shall be conclusive proof of the legitimacy of the child which was born during the continuance of a valid marriage or within 280 days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried. This result can be got over only if it is shown that the marriage was invalid, or the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when the child could have been begotten. If we accept the case of P. W. 1 on the question of divorce the child was born during the continuance of the marriage. If we accept the petitioner's case, the child was born within 280 days of the divorce. Therefore in any case the above section is attracted. The petitioner learned counsel met this position in two ways. In the first place he contends that the marriage was not valid on the facts and circumstances of the case. Secondly the evidence in the case shows that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time the child could have been begotten. In support of the first contention the learned counsel cited the decision in Abdul Rahimankutty v. Aysha Beevi, 1959 K.L.T. 1077. This case is almost similar to the one I am concerned with, but this question arose under a slightly different circumstance. The parties concerned in that case were also Muslims. The learned Judge, after a detailed consideration of the question of law bearing on the point, held that the marriage would be void, if at the time of the marriage the bride was pregnant and the bridegroom did not know of the pregnancy. I have already held that the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 to the effect that the petitioner was the parent of the child and that he knew that P.W. 1 was pregnant at the time of the marriage cannot be accepted. Under section 112 of the Evidence Act, it appears to me that, when it is established or when it is found that there was a marriage, the burden will be on the person who pleads that it is not valid to show that why it was invalid. But, when it is further established that at the time of marriage, the bride was pregnant, it ipso facto vitiates the marriage unless the opposite party proves that this fact was within the knowledge of the bridegroom at the time of the marriage. But, when it is further established that at the time of marriage, the bride was pregnant, it ipso facto vitiates the marriage unless the opposite party proves that this fact was within the knowledge of the bridegroom at the time of the marriage. That means, the burden is on the wife, if she was pregnant at the time of the marriage to establish that the factum of pregnancy was known to the husband. I have no hesitation to hold that in this case, the wife has not discharged that burden of proof. The contention of the petitioner learned counsel on this account, is, therefore, entitled to succeed. 7. It is unnecessary for me, in the light of the above finding, to decide the question whether the parties had access to each other at any time when the child could have been begotten. The only evidence on this question is that of C.P.W. 1 and C.P.W. 2, which does not stand contradicted in the sense that, when P.W. 1 was asked about it, she stated that she did not know whether the petitioner was during the relevant time at Bangalore. 8. There is one more circumstance to which reference may be made. The child was born to the petitioner as stated already on 5th May 1958. P.W. 1 got herself married again very soon after the divorce. Her positive averment in the petition before the lower court is that after the divorce the child had not been maintained. If is true that she has in her evidence stated that the child used to go occasionally to the petitioner house and get some sort of maintenance. P.W. 4 was examined to support this case. But it is difficult to accept this version in the light of a positive statement contained in her petition to the contrary. This shows that P.W. 1 allowed this thing to lie by for a period of about 7 years, and one cannot see any reason why this matter has been raked up at such a distance of time. 9. In the result, I hold that the case that the respondent is the child of the petitioner has not been established. Accordingly I allow this petition; but in the circumstances of the case I direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout.