JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a second appeal by a tenant from the concurrent judgments of ejectment from a house in an area to which the Accommodation control Act does not apply. There is no controversy either about the landlord-tenant relationship or the validity and service of the notice under section 106, transfer of Property Act. However, the plaintiff-landlord having accepted the earliest out of a series of money orders undesignated by the due months, the tenant contended that the notice had been waived and the landlord had rendered himself incompetent to bring the suit. This contention being repelled by the two lower Courts the tenant has come up in second appeal. ( 2. ) THE facts for our purpose are simple and practically common ground. The plaintiff-respondent owns a house in a village which he let out to the defendant-appellant on 25-10-1961 on a rental of Rs. 12/-per month, the tenancy being monthly commencing on that date ; there was also a rent note. Things went on smoothly for a few months, the tenant paying rent in the usual manner till on 12-1-1962 the plaintiff noticed him to quit with effect from the 25th February 1962. It is common ground that the notice was served in time and was valid in terms of section 106, Transfer of Property Act. The defendant did not deliver possession on that date but continued to be in the premises. After February he sent some money orders one of which, handed in at the post office on 22-3-1962 for Rs. 12 /- was accepted by the plaintiff on 3-4-1962. The money order or the coupon attached to it did not mention for what month this was supposed to be the rent, though the figure indicated that the payment was made by the defendant either as rent (or what is equivalent in the popular mind) as compensation for the use of the property during one month. There was no letter from either side. In the next two months also the defendant sent similar money orders which, however, were not accepted. Three months later the plaintiff brought his suit. ( 3. ) THE sheet anchor of the defendants case was that the plaintiff had in all accepted and admittedly accepted money for "five months". There was no letter from either side. In the next two months also the defendant sent similar money orders which, however, were not accepted. Three months later the plaintiff brought his suit. ( 3. ) THE sheet anchor of the defendants case was that the plaintiff had in all accepted and admittedly accepted money for "five months". This includes which in fact is the last payment, the money order sent on 22nd March and accepted on the 3rd April, the four other payments being Rs. 12 /- each for the months ending on the 25th of November, December, January and February. These four payments have not been supported by any receipts; but as the plaintiff himself speaks of five payments" and this money order is one of them we can safely accept the story given by the defendant, the controversy being in fact as to the legal effect. The defendants argument is that for the last of these five months, that is to say, for the month between the 25th February and the 24th March 1962 rent had been accepted by the plaintiff, and accordingly the notice which terminated the tenancy on the 24th or the 25th of February had been waived. Therefore, it was urged, the suit should fail. As against it, the plaintiff argued that waiver is a bilateral transaction and until there was a clear indication of the plaintiffs intention to waive the notice a waiver cannot be inferred. What had really happened was, according to the plaintiff, that the defendant was sending money orders and in due course plaintiff accepted one of them. This was inadvertent, especially, because the money order did not mention that it was meant to be the rent for the month beginning with the 25th of february. In any case money was due to the plaintiff for the use of the premises and such an acceptance of money order which was undesignated cannot become a waiver. When the plaintiff noted that more money orders were coming he realised what the defendant was up to and refused them. Thus the question resolves as to whether in these circumstances there has been a waiver on the lines suggested in Illustration (a) to section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act. ( 4. ) THE law on this subject, is quite clear and is supported by a number of rulings. Thus the question resolves as to whether in these circumstances there has been a waiver on the lines suggested in Illustration (a) to section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act. ( 4. ) THE law on this subject, is quite clear and is supported by a number of rulings. As pointed out by the defendant-appellant some of the recent rulings do not really apply to cases under the Transfer of Property Act but ones under the Accommodation Control Act. In the latter class of cases there is what for want of better language has been called "statutory tenancy" persisting even after the termination of the tenancy by notice; if during that period the landlord does knowingly and intentionally accept the rent for a period after his termination by notice there is no waiver. These considerations cannot be introduced where the law applicable is the Transfer of Property Act only. There of course once the tenancy is terminated by notice the landlord-tenant relationship is broken and any conscious and intentional acceptance of money as rent for subsequent period it becomes a waiver. Naturally, once there is a waiver properly so called, the landlord has to issue a fresh notice and cannot bring a suit on the old notice. In such a situation the question would not be whether having intentionally accepted the money as rent the landlord has or has not waived the notice, but whether the act and conduct of the landlord does, considering the entire picture, amount to a conscious and intentional acceptance of money as rent. ( 5. ) IN the instant case the factual position is simple enough. The defendant went on sending money-orders taking care not to mention on any of them for what month exactly he was remitting the rent. It was just Rs 12/- on each money order ; that was a monthly rent; but whether the tenant designated it for this or that month or whether he designated it as rent proper and not merely compensation for the use of the house was left by him conveniently vague. He was in fact laying a trap for the landlord. On one occasion, and only one occasion, the landlord did walk into it by accepting the money order ; but as more money orders came, he declined. He was in fact laying a trap for the landlord. On one occasion, and only one occasion, the landlord did walk into it by accepting the money order ; but as more money orders came, he declined. On the one hand, there is acceptance of money in a form that is popularly called rent and on the other there is no bilateral discussion or correspondence or independently of it an unmistakable" indication that the landlord did actually intend to waive the notice. ( 6. ) IN the case reported in Chaturbhuj v. Manjibai (AIR 1959 Bombay 292.) it was laid down :- "waiver of notice determining tenancy can be inferred from the conduct of the person serving notice indicating an intention to treat the lease as subsisting. In the absence of any other circumstance, acceptance of rent which has become due in respect of the premises since the expiration of the notice amounts to waiver of the notice. That is made clearly by illustration (a) to section 113, Transfer of Property Act. " In that case the landlord had after accepting a postal-order : issued a second notice with a future date, which clearly meant that he was himself aware that the first notice was no good. In the instant case, however, the landlord had done nothing to suggest that he had lost confidence in the effect of the first notice. The dictum in this case is unexceptionable but there can be in different cases different circumstances indicating that the landlord never intended to waive even though he has accepted money sent by post or by money order. The peculiarity of payment by money order or by postal order or even by cheque unaccompanied by other communication is that it is an impersonal one and unless those instruments clearly speak about the exact purpose of the payment, there is bound to be inadvertency or mistake. In the instant case there was no communication and the money order itself was undesignated. ( 7. ) THE defendant-appellant has also relied upon the ruling reported in kamaksha v Prasad Smt. Parvatibai (1960 M. P. L. J 375-A I R 1960 M. P 182.) Actually there is nothing in this ruling which supports him in the present contention: "ordinarily acceptance of rent is a strong circumstance from which an inference can be drawn that the notice to quit has been waived. But that by itself is not sufficient to show waiver under section 113, T. p. Act in order to constitute waiver there must be an intention not only on the part of the lessor but also on the part of the lessee to treat the lease as subsisting. " ( 8. ) A number of other rulings have also been cited by either party ; but they relate to cases to which the Accommodation Control Act was applicable. But apart from it the following dicta are of interest as bearing on our problem; for example, in Abdul Karim v. Abdul Rahman (1960 m. p. l. j. 705-1960 j. l. j. 417.) "in order to constitute waiver under section 113, T. P. Act, there must be an intention. . . . . . The assent of a landlord for the continuance of a tenancy must be founded on the acceptance of rent as such and in clear recognition of the tenancy rights asserted by the person who pays it. " Similarly, in the case reported in Narain Singh v. Amarsingh. (1960 M. P. L. J. 861-1960 j. l. j. 882 (d. b ).) "acceptance by the landlord of rent due after the expiration of a notice may be evidence. But in each case the question is of the intention with which the rent is accepted and in every case, it is the intention of the parties which must be determined. . . . . . . . . What is required is a consensus ad idem between the parties to renew the lease or to treat it as subsisting. If there is a suit merely by acceptance of rent it cannot possibly be said that the lessor intends to treat the lease as subsisting unless he withdraws the suit. " ( 9. ) THE position in this case is that the tenant was sending money orders on the off chance of the landlord accepting any one of them so that he could put out the argument of waiver. The landlord for his part did accept one money order which did not on its face show for what month it was meant. There was absolutely nothing else and the very refusal of the other money orders shows that there was no intention to waive the notice. The landlord for his part did accept one money order which did not on its face show for what month it was meant. There was absolutely nothing else and the very refusal of the other money orders shows that there was no intention to waive the notice. Even for the period after the termination of tenancy the landlord was entitled to money by way of compensation for the use of the premises as long as the defendant-tenant continued to occupy it. ( 10. ) THE result of the discussion is that the appeal is without substance and is accordingly dismissed. The defendant-appellant shall pay costs of the respondent in this appeal along with pleaders fee calculated according to rules. Appeal dismissed.