MEHTA, J.—In Pushkar, near Maliyan-ka-Chowk, Bari Basti, there is Sthanak of the Oswal community. It is marked S towards the south in the site-plan Ex. P. 1. Towards the north site-plan there is the house of Mst. Ramesh-wari Sunar. The plot over which this house exists was admittedly purchased by Mst. Rameshwari from Bal Krishan Brahman of Pushkar, on December 9, 1959, for Rs. 2,500/. This plot is marked M in the said plan. The place of dispute comprises the spot marked CD FG in the plan in between the Sthanak and the house of Mst. Rameshwari. This plot measures 21x8. The Oswal community contend that the said plot is owned and possessed by it; whereas Mst. Rameshwari Devi claims it to be her property and included in her sale-deed executed by Bal Krishna, Ex. 1, dated December 9., 1959. The Oswal community also contends that the lane owned by it was used as a passage for going towards the Sthanak through the gate marked Y in the plan. Mst. Rameshwari Devi put up a latrine in the land and also a gate at the place marked 4 in the plan. The Oswal community further pointed out that Mst. Rameshwari Devi was not legally authorised to block the way and build a latrine. Apprehending breach of the peace, a complaint was made by the Oswals under section 145, Cr.P.C. On December 21, 1961, the Station House Officer, Pushkar, submitted a report to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ajmer, wherein it was stated that the Sthanak had been in existence for the last several years. The opposite party started construction over the land, as a result of which the common passage stood blocked. This passage had been in existence for about 40 years. It was also reported by the Station House Officer that the construction made by the opposite party was illegal and that the disputed land was under lawful possession of the Oswal community. The opposite party not only encroached upon the land illegally but was adopting an aggressive attitude, which was likely to result in breach of the peace. The Station House Officer, therefore, submitted that the opposite party should be dealt with according to the provisions of secs. 145, and 147 Cr.P.C., with a view to avert breach of the peace. The opposite party not only encroached upon the land illegally but was adopting an aggressive attitude, which was likely to result in breach of the peace. The Station House Officer, therefore, submitted that the opposite party should be dealt with according to the provisions of secs. 145, and 147 Cr.P.C., with a view to avert breach of the peace. On receipt of this report, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ajmer, drew up a preliminary order on 4 1-1962, in accordance with S. 145, Cr.P.C., and the parties were called upon to attend his court and to put in their statements in regard to their respective claims. The parties were also directed to produce documentary evidence or affidavits in support of their respective claims. In pursuance of the preliminary order, party No. 1, i.e., the Oswal community, filed its statements on March 14, 1962 in which it was contended that the land had been purchased by it from Chunnilal Brahmin on Sawan Sudi 5, Samvat year 1990 (somewhere in the year 1933) for using it as a passage for going to their Sthanak. It was also mentioned in the said statement that the deceased Chunnilals son Bal Krishna confirmed the sale. Party No. 1, produced affidavits of Hiralal, Kan Mal, Inder Chand, Madan Lal, Ratanlal, Madan Chand and Bal Krishna. The substance of those affidavits is that the plot was bought by the Oswal community from Chunnilal deceased 28 years back and that party No. 2 was forcibly blocking the way by putting up shutters etc. on the land. It was also stated in the affidavits that the plot in dispute was not included in the sale-deed of party No. 2. 2. Party No. 2 filed a statement wherein it was given that the plot was purchased by Mst. Rameshwari Devi from Balkrishna for 2,500/- and in that plot the disputed land was included. In support of this assertion two documents were submitted. Ex. A.2, dated December 3, 1959, is the agreement for sale and Ex. A. 1 dated December 9, 1959, is the registered sale-deed. Both these documents were executed by Bal Krishna Party No. 2 also put up affidavits of Mst. Rameshwari Devi and Manak Chand Sunar, wherein it was given that the disputed plot of land was bought by Mst. Ex. A.2, dated December 3, 1959, is the agreement for sale and Ex. A. 1 dated December 9, 1959, is the registered sale-deed. Both these documents were executed by Bal Krishna Party No. 2 also put up affidavits of Mst. Rameshwari Devi and Manak Chand Sunar, wherein it was given that the disputed plot of land was bought by Mst. Rameshwari Devi from Bal Krishna, son of Chunnilal for Rs 2,500/- in 1959, and that the opposite party had been in possession of the land ever since. The opposite party also put up a latrine over the disputed land. It was further stated in the affidavits that party No. 1 was not in possession of the disputed plot, nor was it in possession of any title deed in respect thereto. As both the parties advanced their rival claims learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ajmer, referred the matter to the City Munsiff, Ajmer, on November 3, 1962, after formulating the following question: Question whether any or which of the parties was in possession of the subject of dispute at the preliminary order." On receipt of the above reference, learned Munsiff examined the documentary evidence. He also recorded the statements of Inder Chand P.W. 1, Madan Chand P.W. 2, Ratanlal P.W. 3 and Kan Mal P.W.4 on behalf of party No.1. Party No.2 examined Manakchand D.W. 1, Mst. Rameshwari Devi D.W. 2, and Ganga Dhar Joshi D.W. 3. Thereafter the following finding was given by the civil court on August 2, 1965: "From the evidence produced by party No 1 it has been established that party No. 1 that is the Oswal community was in possession of the disputed property within 2 months next before the date of the preliminary order passed under sec. 145, Cr.P.C. but was forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed by party No. 2 Manakchand and Rameshwari Devi thereafter." On receipt of the above finding, learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ajmer, passed order in the following terms on August 18, 1965,— "You (S.H.O., Pushkar) are, therefore, hereby ordered that the possession of disputed land be delivered to Sarvashri Inderchand and Madan Lal for Oswal community Pushkar by removing blocking etc. thereon." Against the above order, a revision-petition was filed in the court of learned Sessions Judge, Ajmer, but it proved fruitless. Hence this revision-petition. 3. Learned counsel representing Manakchand Sunar and Mst. thereon." Against the above order, a revision-petition was filed in the court of learned Sessions Judge, Ajmer, but it proved fruitless. Hence this revision-petition. 3. Learned counsel representing Manakchand Sunar and Mst. Rameshwari Devi raised the following points: — (1) that the preliminary order drawn up by Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ajmer, under sec. 145, Cr.P.C., was illegal. The dispute pertained to the right of passage and, therefore, the order ought to have been passed under sec. 147, and not under sec. 145. Cr.P.C. (2) that the civil court went beyond the point referred to it by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on November 3, 1962: (3) that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate wrongly held that party No. 2 was in possession of the land within two months next of the day date of the preliminary order and that it was forcibly dispossessed by party No. 2. 4. Mr. T.C. Mehta, appearing for party No. 1, raised a preliminary objection to the effect that under sec. 146 (1-D), Cr.P.C., no appeal lies from any finding of the civil court given on a reference under sec. 146, Cr.P.C., nor any review or revision of any such finding is allowed and, therefore the revision, petition should be dismissed straight way. He has cited Taashuq Hassain vs. State (1), wherein it was observed that a finding given by a civil court under sec. 146 Cr.P.C. not being a finding of criminal court can not be revised under sec. 435 Cr.P.C. No appeal or revision is provided against such a finding in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, even in the absence of sec. 146-(1-D) the civil courts finding cannot be challenged by appeal or application in revision, and that the provisions in sec. 146 (1-D), Cr.P.C., must have been enacted in order to prevent the finding being challenged even indirectly or collaterally. With respect, I do not agree with the ratio decidendi of the Allahabad case. A similar matter came up before our own High Court in the case of Inder Singh and others vs. State and another (2), in which it was observed that the order passed by a Magistrate under sec. 146(1-B) Cr.P.C., is an order of inferior criminal court and should be amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the court mentioned in sec. 435, Cr.P.C. Sub-sec. 146(1-B) Cr.P.C., is an order of inferior criminal court and should be amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the court mentioned in sec. 435, Cr.P.C. Sub-sec. (1-D) only prohibits filing of appeals, revisions and reviews against the finding of the civil court on the civil side and not on the criminal side under sec.435 and 439. Cr.P.C. The purpose of sec. 146 (1-D), Cr.P.C. is simply to shut an appeal or revision from the finding of a civil court, but it does not go further than that. By no means it has any effect on the applicability of sec. 435, Cr.P.C. from a final order passed under sec. 145 Cr.P.C. When an order has been passed under sec.145 Cr.P.C. it cannot be disputed that such an order cannot be revised under sec. 435 Cr.P.C. Such a view cannot be said to be inconsistent with the provisions of sec. 146 (1-D), Cr.P.C. which is confined only to the civil side of the matter and not the criminal side. That being the position, the contention of Mr. T.C. Mehta that the revision petition should be dismissed straightway does not appear to be sound and is consequently rejected. 5. I now take up point No. 1 raised on behalf of party No.2. 6. Sec. 147, Cr.P.C, relates to disputes pertaining to right of user of immovable property and empowers the Magistrate to pass temporary order until the rights of the parties are decided by civil courts. Sec. 147, does not relate to disputes concerning immovable property itself for which provision is made in sec. 145 and, 146, Cr.P.C. If the right to use land is claimed as an incident of ownership and is alleged that a dispute has arisen as regards such user, it would be really a dispute relating to the land itself. In the present case the dispute relates to the possession and use of the land since each of the two parties claims possession over and right to use the property and, therefore, the Magistrate, was right in taking action under sec. 145, Cr.P.C. and not under sec. 147, Cr.P.C. That apart, party No. 2 allowed initiation of proceeding under sec. 145 Cr.P.C. to go unchallenged by not filing any revision petition against it and it chose to wait and take a chance of judgment in its favour. 145, Cr.P.C. and not under sec. 147, Cr.P.C. That apart, party No. 2 allowed initiation of proceeding under sec. 145 Cr.P.C. to go unchallenged by not filing any revision petition against it and it chose to wait and take a chance of judgment in its favour. That party, therefore, cannot in revision be heard to complain of excess of jurisdiction in the proceedings by the Magistrate under sec. 145, Cr.P.C., when the final order has gone against it: vide Shibnarayan Das and others vs. Satyadeo Prasad and another(3). In the instant case, as I have already pointed out above, the actual dispute between the civil parties pertains to the right of possession of land. Party No. 2 contested the case both in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate as also in the court of the Munsiff, Ajmer, City. It led evidence. It cannot now challenge the preliminary order at this stage on the point of jurisdiction, when the finding of both the Munsiff and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate went against it. The first contention of learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, is of no substance. 7. I now switch on to the second contention The Sub-Divisional Magistrate formulated a reference that the case be forwarded to the District Munsiff, Ajmer, to decide the questions whether any or which of the parties was in possession of the subject of the dispute at the date of the preliminary order. The civil court after recording oral evidence, led by both the parties, and after persuing the documentary evidence, came to the conclusion that the Oswal community was in possession of the disputed property within two months next before the preliminary order dated January 4, 1962, was passed under sec. 145, Cr.P.C. If, further held that party No. 1. was forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed by party No. 2. A careful scrutiny of the above order of learned Munsiff shows that that finding is not inconsistent with the reference made to it by the Sub Divisional Magistrate. The finding of the civil court is specific on the point that within two months next before the date of the preliminary order the possession over the property was that of party No. 1 and that it was forcibly dispossessed thereafter. The finding of the civil court is specific on the point that within two months next before the date of the preliminary order the possession over the property was that of party No. 1 and that it was forcibly dispossessed thereafter. I fail to appreciate the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners as to how the finding of the civil court had travelled beyond the question referred to it by Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ajmer. Thus, the second point raised on behalf of the petitioners is also devoid of merit. 8. I now take up the last point. Party No. 1 has, besides submitting affidavits of Hiralal, Kan Mal, Inder Chand, Madanlal, Ratanlal and Madan Chand, submitted the affidavit of Bal Krishna son of Chunnilal, who was alleged to have sold the land to the Oswal community, on Sawan Sudi 5, Smt. 1990, for a sum of Rs. 99/-. Bal Krishan has positively stated that the land was sold by his father to party No. 1 and since then party No. 1 has been in its possession and that party No. 2 forcibly blocked the way by putting up shutters etc. He has also pointed out that the disputed plot was not included in the sale-deed of party No. 2. Party No. 1 also relied on the documentary evidence produced by party No. 2, Ex. A. 1 and Ex. A. 2. dated December 3 1959, is the agreement to sell, executed by Bal Krishan and Ex. A. 1, dated December 9,1959 is the registered sale-deed executed by Bal Krishna. In both these documents the southern boundary is shown as a lane and thereafter the property of the Oswal community. If the. disputed plot had really been sold to Mst. Rameshwari Devi by Ex. A. 1, the southern boundary ought to have been shown as Sthanak of Oswal community. But that has not been done. Thus, the documentary evidence led by party No. 2 itself goes against it. From the statements of Inderchand, Madanchand, Ratanlal and Kanmal it is further clear that within two months next of the passing of the preliminary order the possession over the property was that of party No. 1 and that party No. 2 encroached upon this land during this period. This has not been satisfactorily refuted by the testimony of Manak Chand D W. 1, Mst. Rameshwari Devi D.W. 2 and Ganga Dhar, D.W. 3. This has not been satisfactorily refuted by the testimony of Manak Chand D W. 1, Mst. Rameshwari Devi D.W. 2 and Ganga Dhar, D.W. 3. In the face of the documentary evidence relied upon by party No. 1, the vague statements of the witnesses of party No. 2 cannot form the basis for arriving at the conclusion that within two months next before the passing of the preliminary order party No. 2 was in possession of the property. From the evidence of party No. 1 it is further manifest that the sale-deed executed by Chunnilal was lost by Inder Chand after showing the same to Vakil Shri Devilal Bhargava and Shri Nagendra Kumar Bhargava. There is also another important piece of evidence on the record. Bal Krishna wrote a letter, dated Migsar Sudi 1, Smt, 2011, to the Oswal community. That document is marked Ex. 2. In that letter it is contained that the land had been sold to patty No. 1 on Sawan Sudi 5 Smt. 1990 for Rs. 99/-, and since then party No. 1 had been in its possession. This letter has not been seriously challenged by party No. 2. 9. Thus, from the evidence discussed above, it is plain that party No. 1 was forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed of the property within two months next of the passing of the preliminary order and that the plot in dispute was under the possession of party No. 1 as has been held by the court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and the Sessions Judge, Ajmer. Thus the last contention, raised on behalf of party No. 1, stands repelled. 10. Order passed under sec. 145, Cr.P.C. is discretionary. Normally the High Court will decline to interfere in revision with such an order made by the Magistrate on inquiry under sec. 145, Cr.P.C. where, from the evidence, the Magistrate was satisfied as to there being likelihood of breach of the peace. In other words, where the Magistrate gives a finding that a particular party is in possession of land on the material date and such finding is based on evidence, High Court will hardly interfere in revision on the ground that it could possibly have arrived to a different conclusion on similar evidence. In other words, where the Magistrate gives a finding that a particular party is in possession of land on the material date and such finding is based on evidence, High Court will hardly interfere in revision on the ground that it could possibly have arrived to a different conclusion on similar evidence. In a matter like this the Magistrate does not purport to decide a partys title or right to possession of land but reserves that question to be decided by a civil court Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Dinomoni Chowdharni vs. Broji Mohini Chowdharani (4), (1901) 2b Indian Appeals 24, tersely laid down the effect of order under sec. 145, Cr.P.C. C. thus. "These orders are merely police orders made to prevent breaches of the peace. They decide no question of title." 11. In that views of the matter also, I feel reluctant to disturb the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the aforesaid two courts. 12. In the result, this revision-petition fails and is dismissed.