JUDGMENT J.N. Takru, J. - Ahmad alias Ajaz Mohammad appellants has filed this revision against the judgment and order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bareilly upholding his conviction and sentence of one year's rigorous imprisonment under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act. 2. According to the prosecution the applicant was a Pakistani National. He came to India on Pakistani Passport dated the 8th of April, 1953, and Indian Visa dated the 14th of May, 1953 and he overstayed in India beyond the authorised period without obtaining a permit to that effect. The applicant was, therefore, prosecuted for contravening paragraph 7 (1) of the Foreigners' Order 1948. The applicants' case, however, was that he was an Indian Citizen and as such had every right to stay in India. Both the courts below repelled the applicant's plea and accepting the prosecution case recorded the conviction and sentence of the applicant as stated above. On behalf of the applicant his learned counsel, Sri Bashir Ahmad, advanced two contentions in support of this revision but after hearing him I am satisfied that neither of them has any force. I shall, therefore, deal with them though not necessarily in the order in which they were pressed before me. 3. The main contention of Sri Ahmad was that as the order passed by the Central Government declaring that the applicant had voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Pakistan after the 26th of January, 1950 and before the 2nd April, 1953 was neither expressed to be in the name of the President as required by Article 77 (1) of the Constitution nor was it authenticated in the manner laid down in Article 77 (2) of the Constitution it was not a valid order and as such had no legal force. The order in question reads thus: "Whereas it has come to the notice of the Central ,Government that Shri Aijaz Mohammad s/o Niaz Mohammad, by caste Musalman, resident of Bazaria Puranmal Nainital Road, Bareilly, has claimed Indian Citizenship notwithstanding his having obtained a Pakistan Passport and a short term visa for entry into India front Pakistan, and whereas a question has arisen as to whether the said Shri Aizaz Mohammad has acquired the Citizenship of Pakistan. Now, therefore, the Central Government acting under Section 9 (2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, and rule 30 of the Citizenship Rules, 1956, and giving due regard to the principles of evidence contained in Schedule III to the aforesaid Rules, and after considering the cause shown by the said Shri Aijaz Mohammad against the proposed action under the said section and rule, hereby determines that the said Sri Aijaz Mohammad has voluntarily acquired the Citizenship of Pakistan, after 26th January, 1950, and before 2-4-1953. Sdl-S. Kaur, Under Secretary to the Government of India". 4. It will be noticed that the first contention of the learned counsel posses two questions viz. (1) whether the aforesaid order expresses to be in the name of the President, and if not, what is its effect and (2) whether it is authenticated as required by Article 77 (2) of the Constitution, and if not, what is its effect. Now so far as both these questions are concerned a bare look at the order shows that it is neither expressed to be in the name of the President nor does it purport to have been authenticated in the manner in which authentication is usually made, though in view of S. R. 0. No. 167 dated 19th of January, 1960 made by the President under Clause (2) of Article 77 of the Constitution, it was conceded that the Under Secretary to the Government of India who signed the said order was a person competent to authenticate it in the name of the President. 5. Thus the only question which remains to be considered in this connection is whether, and if so to what extent, the validity of the order is effected by these omissions. Fortunately the answer to this question presents no difficulty as the Supreme Court, while interpreting the analogous provisions of Article 166 (I) and (2) of the Constitution, in Dattatraya Moreshwar v. The State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1952 SC 181 and P. Joseph John v. State of Travancore-Cochin, A.I.R. 1955 SC 160, has laid clown that those provisions were directory only and non-compliance with them did not make the order invalid but only made it necessary to see whether there had been a substantial compliance with those provisions. In the latter decision the-Supreme Court even laid down, the criteria for determining the ques,ion of 'sufficient compliance'. In the latter decision the-Supreme Court even laid down, the criteria for determining the ques,ion of 'sufficient compliance'. It was held in that case that as the show cause notice issued to the petitioner was signed by the Chief Secretary of the State, and was ex-pressed to be on behalf of the Government, and it gave an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause against the action proposed to he taken against him, and the petitioner accepted the notice and in pursuance of it applied for time to put in his defence, the intention of the petitioner's learned counsel that since that notice was not expressed as required by Article 166 was devoid of force. In the instant case since the validity of the impugned order was not challenged on the grounds on which it is attacked now the stage of the hearing of the revision, I have no hesitation in holding that the present grievance is purely imaginary and sufficient compliance with the provisions of Article 77 (I) and (2), must be held to base been made. 6. On behalf of the applicant reliance was placed on the decision in Messrs. Ghaio Mal and Sons v. State of Delhi, A.I.R. 1959 SC 65. This decision. however, has no application to the facts of the present case. In the case the impugned order was incorporated in a letter and the question which the Supreme Court was called upon to consider was whether the said letter could be said to be the order of the Chief Commissioner. After considering the affidavits filed by the parties, the Supreme Court held that not only was that letter not authenticated in the loan in which authentication is usually made, there was also no material on the record from which it was possible to hold that document as the order of the Chief Commissioner. Thus in this case also the Supreme Court held that there were two ways of showing that a decision had in fact been taken by the appropriate authority viz. (1) by complying strictly with the pro-visions of Article 166 (1) ann (2), and (2) by leading evidence to that effect - the only difference between the two being that while in the former case the order in question was immune from attack, in the latter it was a matter of proof. (1) by complying strictly with the pro-visions of Article 166 (1) ann (2), and (2) by leading evidence to that effect - the only difference between the two being that while in the former case the order in question was immune from attack, in the latter it was a matter of proof. In other words the decision in that case also proceeded on the basis that there was nothing on the record to show that there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of Article 166 (1), and (2) of the Constitution, or what comes to the same thing Article 77 (1) and (2) of the Constitution. That this is so is made crystal clear in the very next paragraph of that judgment where the Supreme Court, while explaining its decision in Dattatraya Moreshwar held that 'the infirmity in the form of authentication in that case did not vitiate the order passed therein, as there was ample evidence on its record to prove that a decision had in fact been taken by the appropriate authority, which was not the case in Messrs. Ghaio Mal and Sons3. 'Thus the position which emerges from an examination of the authorities is that either the order in question showed ex fade lie in strict compliance with the requirements of Article 77 (1) and (2) or there should be some reliable material on the record to show that a decision had in fact been taken by the appropriate authority. No doubt in the instant case, there is nothing, beyond the impugned order, to show that a decision had in fact been taken by the appropriate authority, but as against it there is the very important circumstance that the validity of the said order was not challenged during the trial, or for the matter of that at any stage prior to the hearing of this revision, on the grounds on which it is now sought to he questioned. Had it been challenged on those grounds at the appropriate time and place then, as held in Dattatraya Moreshwarl, the State authorities could have shown that the order was in fact made by the President in accordance with the rules framed under Article 77(2) of the Constitution. the challenge to the validity of the impugned order on this score is clearly very belated and cannot be entertained. the challenge to the validity of the impugned order on this score is clearly very belated and cannot be entertained. Thus the main contention of the appellants learned counsel fails and is rejected. 7. The Second contention of Sri Bashir Ahamd was that as the prosecution of the applicant was launched long before the declaration regarding his nationality was given by the Central Government, it was premature and a conviction based upon such a prosecution was liable to quashed. This contention also has no force. The order of the Central Government declaring that the applicant had voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Pakistan after the 26th of January, 1950 and before the 22nd of April, 1963 was passed on the 7th of January, 1964 while the cognisance of the offence was taken, by the Magistrate on the report of the police on the 7th August, 1964 on which date he registered the case and summoned the applicant. It si true that the police report against the applicant was submitted to the Magistrate for orders on 6/8th July, 1962 but s no cognisance of the offence was taken till long after the Central Government had passed its order, I am unable to see any Illegality in the Magistrate taking cognisance of the offence on the 7th of August 1964. thus the Second contention also fails and is rejected. 8. Finally learned counsel, relaying upon the decision in Yaqub v. State, 1960 ALJ 924, to which I was a party, Contended that as the applicant was not a foreigner on the date of his entry into India he could not become one latter on. This case is, however, clearly distinguishable as there was no declaration by the Central Government in it as is to be found in the present case. A declaration given by the appropriate authority and in conformity with the procedure provided in the statute, is conclusive and beyond the reach of the Courts. 9. No other point arises. The result therefore, is that this revision fails and is dismissed. The applicant was granted bail for the pendency of his revision. He shall surrender for with and serve out the sentence imposed upon him.