JUDGMENT 1. The plaintiff has instituted this suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.20,000/-under his Fire Insurance Policy against the defendant company for the loss of goods he suffered due to fire in his shop at 107, Old China Bazar Street, Calcutta-1 on 19th September, 1954. The plaintiff has also claimed interest on the sum representing the loss and costs. 2. According to the plaint, the plaintiff was carrying on business in stationery goods in his said. shop and by a policy dated 20th of May, 1953 got his goods in the shop insured by the defendant company against loss or damage by fire. The total sum insured was for Rs.20,000/-, Rs.19,000-/ being the insured amount for stationery goods and Rs.1,000/- for furniture, fittings, etc. The said policy was duly renewed up to 29th of June, 1955 and the loss by fire took place during the period covered by the said policy. According to the plaint, he suffered loss of goods the value of which would be not less than Rs.20,000/ -. His grievance is that Mr. Chopra, a Surveyor, appointed by the defendant company did not take into account many valuable items of the goods in the shop of the plaintiff. The plaintiff categorically states that he is not conversant at all with English and the assessment of damage made by the said surveyor was neither explained nor interpreted to him. The plaintiff alleges that under a fraudulent misrepresentation the said Surveyor got his signatures in some blank forms or papers. The defendant, in his written statement, has stated that the plaintiff is not entitled to any sum exceeding Rs.3,527-2-0 inasmuch as the total value of the plaintiff's goods destroyed in the said shop and that of the furniture and fittings would amount to Rs.5027-2-0 and Rs.250/- respectively aggregating to Rs.5,277-2-0. According to the written statement, the value of the goods and that of the furniture and fittings etc. salvaged would amount to Rs.1,600/- and Rs.150/- respectively aggregating to Rs.1,750/ -. Deducting the said sum of Rs.1,750/- from the total value amounting to Rs.5,277-2-0, according to the defendant, a sum of Rs.3,527-2-0 is payable to the plaintiff under the said policy. It is also stated that the plaintiff himself duly submitted a claim for loss on or about 27th September, 1954 where the total sum he claimed was Rs.5,600/ -. Deducting the said sum of Rs.1,750/- from the total value amounting to Rs.5,277-2-0, according to the defendant, a sum of Rs.3,527-2-0 is payable to the plaintiff under the said policy. It is also stated that the plaintiff himself duly submitted a claim for loss on or about 27th September, 1954 where the total sum he claimed was Rs.5,600/ -. In view of the fact that the assessment was done by M. C. Chopra is presence of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is not entitled to get any sum beyond Rs.3,527-2-0. The defendant has made out a definite case in paragraph 5 of the written statement that on 27th September, 1954 it was agreed between the plaintiff and the defendant represented by the said M. C. Chopra that in consideration of the defendant accepting the liability for a sum of Rs.3,527-2-0 the plaintiff would accept the said sum in full settlement and discharge of his said claim under the said policy. It is however added in the said paragraph that the terms of such agreement are contained in or evidenced by a letter dated 27th September, 1954 duly signed by the plaintiff which letter however inadvertently mentions the sum of Rs.3,500/- instead of Rs.3,527-2-0. The only other substantial defence that has been raised is that the suit is not maintainable as the plaintiff did not comply with the terms and conditions laid down in clause 18, i.e. the Arbitration Clause, provided in the said Policy, before institution of this suit. 3. The issues settled are as follows : 1. (a) Did the plaintiff sign any blank form or any document under fraudulent misrepresentation as alleged in paragraph 7 of the plaint ? (b) Were the two documents dated 27th September 1954 executed in the manner set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the written statement? 2. Is the plaintiff bound to accept Rs.3,527-2-0 in terms of letter dated 27th September 1954 ? 3. If not, has the plaintiff suffered damages to the extent of Rs.5,600/- as submitted in his claim ? 4. Is the suit maintainable in law ? 5. Is the plaintiff entitled to any damage ; if so, to what extent ? 4. 2. Is the plaintiff bound to accept Rs.3,527-2-0 in terms of letter dated 27th September 1954 ? 3. If not, has the plaintiff suffered damages to the extent of Rs.5,600/- as submitted in his claim ? 4. Is the suit maintainable in law ? 5. Is the plaintiff entitled to any damage ; if so, to what extent ? 4. Before I discuss the issues, the following admitted facts may be stated: The fire took place on 19th September, 1954; the plaintiff has suffered loss as a result if destruction of some goods by fire; the loss suffered is fully covered under a valid fire insurance policy; a letter and telegram were sent to the Insurance Co. by the plaintiff on 20th September, 1954: on the same date the company wrote a letter to M. C. Chopra Esq., 47 Khangraputty Street, Calcutta, appointing him to survey and assess the loss; L.C. Chopra, son of M. C. Chopra Esq. visited the shop on 21.9.54 and removed the goods to his place of business at the premises No. 47, Khangraputty Street Calcutta ; an inventory of goods was prepared by the said L.C. Chopra in presence of the plaintiff and signed by Mm. But the defendant's positive case is that on 27th September, 1954 the plaintiff submitted a claim form duly filled in where the amount claimed was Rs.5,600/- and on the same day, according to the defendant, the plaintiff also signed a Loss Acceptance Form which in effect would amount to plaintiff's acceptance of Rs.3,500/- in full satisfaction of his claim under the policy. The plaintiff, however, has admitted his signature in the inventory, in the Claim Form and in the Loss Acceptance Form. But, according to him, these two documents were written in English and the plaintiff put his signature without understanding the contents of the same at the direction of L.C. Chopra on the assurance that he would get the full insured sum under the policy, i.e., the sum of Rs.20,000/ -. The main issue of fact to be decided is the extent of damages suffered by the plaintiff in the facts and circumstances of the case. I therefore propose to discuss first the issue No. 1 (b. Issue No. 1 (b): the first document referred to in this issue is a printed Claim Form for loss by fire (Ex. 4,. The main issue of fact to be decided is the extent of damages suffered by the plaintiff in the facts and circumstances of the case. I therefore propose to discuss first the issue No. 1 (b. Issue No. 1 (b): the first document referred to in this issue is a printed Claim Form for loss by fire (Ex. 4,. The printed portion of the document is written in English ; the written portion also is filled in English One Sambhunath Das also signed the document possibly as witness ; under the column against "signature of claimant" the plaintiff had signed in Bengali. On the second page of the Claim Form there is a statement of the claim where the following entries are made in writing : "description of the property destroyed or damages particulars to be given in detail (printed). Value at salvage fire Value of time of (printed) Amount claimed (printed) Stationery and Manihari goods Furniture and fittings Rs.5,600/- Rs.500/- Rs.5,100/- Rs.1,000/- Rs.500/- Rs.500/- Rs.5,600/- This part of the Claim Form is also signed in Bengali by the plaintiff at the bottom and counter-signed by the said Sambhunath Das as witness. According to the plaintiff after the inventory of the goods was prepared by L.C. Chopra for about 3 or 4 days, on or about 27th September, 1954 the plaintiff put his signatures in several documents as directed by the said L.C. Chopra on the latter's assurance that he would get the total insured amount if he would comply with the formalities. He cannot read and write English at all. The said Claim form was not explained to him either. He does not know Sambhunath Das who is supposed to have signed the documents in two places in English as witness. According to the plaintiff, the entries in the blank space in the said form were made at the instance of L.C. Chopra by some person known to the latter. L.C. Chopra has, however, stated that this particular printed form was handed over to the plaintiff by him a few days prior to 27th September, 1954 and on the 27th September 1954 the plaintiff accompanied by one Sushil Chandra Das saw him in the morning and handed over the document which was already duly filled in and signed by the plaintiff. According to L.C. Chopra, later on, there was a discussion between him and the plaintiff at his office where the plaintiff had agreed to accept the sum of Rs.3,500/-and put in his signature in a document which is known as Loss Acceptance form. This is the second document referred to in the present issue. The document reads as follows: "M. C. Chopra, government Recognised Insurance assessor and Surveyor. Subject to the Insurer's admitting liability I hereby offer to accept the sum of Rs.3,500/- (Sum of Rupees Three thousand and five hundred) in full settlement and discharge of claim for loss by fire under policies (particulars of 47, Khongraputty Street, Calcutta-7, dated 27.9.1954 which are set forth below) and which occurred on the 19th day of September 1954 and I declare that there is no other insurance covering the same property. Nityanando Dutta (Signed in Bengali) Rs.3500/- Proprietor, M/s. N. N. DUTTA & CO. Name of the Company Policy No. Amount. Caledonian Insurance Co. 847388 End. 13498 Rs.20,000/- N. B. The correct figure of loss should be Rs.3527-2-0 instead of Rs.3,500/ -. Sd/- M. C. Chopra. " According to L.C. Chopra, the plaintiff agreed to sign this document because the plaintiff received back salvaged goods from him. The value of the salvage was determined at Rs.1,600. The reason why the plaintiff agreed to accept the said sum of Rs.3,527-2-0, according to L.C. Chopra, is set out in his report dated 19th October, 1954 (Ex. 4) the material portion of which is set out below: "the net loss payable to the insured is accordingly Rs.3,527-2-0 summarised as under : Stocks : Value at risk . . . . . . Rs.5,027/2/- Rs.3,427/2/- less salvage . . Rs.1,500/- Furniture etc. : Value at risk Rs.250/- less salvage . . . . . . Rs.150/- Rs.100/- Total Rs.3,527/2/-" According to L.C. Chopra, the value of the goods was determined on the basis of the inventory (Ex. 2) prepared by him on the 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 24th September, 1954 in' presence of the plaintiff and signed by him. Mr. P. N. De, learned counsel for the defendant, has strongly relied upon these two documents and has contended that the plaintiff having agreed to accept the said sum of Rs.3,527/2/- in full satisfaction of his claim under the policy, is not entitled to any sum in excess of that amount. Mr. P. N. De, learned counsel for the defendant, has strongly relied upon these two documents and has contended that the plaintiff having agreed to accept the said sum of Rs.3,527/2/- in full satisfaction of his claim under the policy, is not entitled to any sum in excess of that amount. He has also stated that the genuineness of these two documents is substantiated by Chopra and J. Bhattacharjee, the Officer-in-Charge of the Fire Section of the defendant company. Mr. M. M. Sen, learned counsel for the plaintiff, has submitted, on the contrary, that the plaintiff's signature was obtained by L.C. Chopra on his representation that if he signs this document, the full insured value under the policy, i.e., the sum of Rs.20,000/ - would be paid by the Insurance Company. According to him, the plaintiff being ignorant of English language has signed these documents without understanding the contents thereof. 5. In my opinion, Mr. De's explanation of the circumstances under which the Loss Acceptance Form has been signed by the plaintiff cannot be accepted as correct. The reasons why I come to the said conclusion are stated as follows : (a) Admittedly, the second document described as the Loss Acceptance form is written in English. Unlike the Claim Form, the alleged Loss Acceptance Form is neither a printed one, nor was it sent by the defendant company to M. C. Chopra. This is not a document of the defendant company (Chopra : Q. 121-124. The form is supposed to have been typed out at the office of L.C. Chopra (Chopra : Q. 249. Mr. Chopra has admitted that the plaintiff does not know English. There is nothing to show that the document has been explained to the plaintiff by L.C. 106 ; Chopra or any other person on behalf of M. C. Chopra or the Insurance Company In view of the fact that the plaintiff does not know English, it is expected that L.C. Chopra should have got this document explained to the plaintiff at the time when the plaintiff signed the document. Mr. De contends that the plaintiff has admitted his signature in this document and therefore the contents of the document should be presumed to be understood by the plaintiff who has signed the document, under section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Mr. De contends that the plaintiff has admitted his signature in this document and therefore the contents of the document should be presumed to be understood by the plaintiff who has signed the document, under section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. But, in my view, such presumption cannot be said to be irrebutable where the body of the document is written in English and the signatory is a person who does not admittedly understand English. It seems to me that presumption, if any, has been satisfactorily rebutted by two important facts, viz., (1) the plaintiff cannot read, and write English, and (2) the contents of the document have not been explained to the plaintiff. Further, according to L.C. Chopra, the document is supposed to be attested by a witness called Sambhunath Das, The plaintiff has stated that he does not know Sambhunath Das. L.C. Chopra, on the other hand, has stated that Sambhunath Das is a person who is known to the plaintiff and naturally the defendant could not call Sambhunath Das as their witness. It is expected that Mr. Chopra, supposed to be an agent of the insurance company on all matters including the settlement of claim, should have by way of precaution got the address and particulars of Sambhunath Das. The very fact that the body of the document is written in English and the plaintiff has signed in Bengali, greater precaution should have been taken by L.C. Chopra to prove the contents of the document. Similarly, Mr. Chopra has stated that Loss acceptance Form has been filled in by one Sushil Chandra Das who came to Chopra's office on 27th September 1954 along with the plaintiff. Mr. Chopra has stated that subsequently the said Sushil Chandra Das used to come and see him in connection with the insurance business as he happened to be a man connected with the insurance business. In fact, during cross-examination, Mr. Chopra has produced a card (Ex. F)which showes that he later came to know Shusil Chandra Das well, it appears from the card that his address is known to L.C. Chopra. No attempt has been made by the defendant to call the said Sushil Chandra Das by subpoena. It may be stated that Sushil Chandra Das, according to the defendant, is under the control of the plaintiff and, therefore, he could not be called by the defendant. No attempt has been made by the defendant to call the said Sushil Chandra Das by subpoena. It may be stated that Sushil Chandra Das, according to the defendant, is under the control of the plaintiff and, therefore, he could not be called by the defendant. But the fact remains that the defendant will have to prove the written portion in the body of the Loss Acceptance Form to substantiate the fact that the plaintiff understood or had knowledge of the contents of the document. The plaintiff has stated that he does not know Sushil Chandra Das at all. Knowing full well that the plaintiff does not understand English, Mr. Chopra should have been more careful in getting the document explained to the plaintiff by some: person known to them. In my view, where there is a document written in. English and the signatory is a person who does not know English, mere proof of the signature does not by itself prove that the signatory has understood the contents of the document. Relying on the principles decided in (1) Abdul Hasan v. Wajit-un-Nessa, A (1948) Pat. 187, I hold that the plaintiff, in the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be said to have understood the contents of the document. (b) In paragraph 5 of the written statement, the defendant company has categorically pleaded that there was an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant company represented by M. C. Chopra whereby the plaintiff agreed to accept the sum of Rs.3,527-2-0 in full settlement and discharge of his claim under the Insurance policy. This aspect of the case has not been proved by the defendant. The letter dated 20th September 1,954 (Ex. 1) shows that the defendant company has appointed M. C. Chopra, Esq., to survey and assess the loss. There is nothing to show that M. C. Chopra, Esq. has been authorised to enter into agreement with the plaintiff. The Loss Acceptance Form has not been signed by either M. C. Chopra or any officer of the Insurance Company, nor there could be an oral agreement between the plaintiff and M. C. Chopra, because M. C. Chopra had no authority to settle the claim. Admittedly, M. C. Chopra took no part in the whole transaction. The Loss Acceptance Form has not been signed by either M. C. Chopra or any officer of the Insurance Company, nor there could be an oral agreement between the plaintiff and M. C. Chopra, because M. C. Chopra had no authority to settle the claim. Admittedly, M. C. Chopra took no part in the whole transaction. It was his son, L.C. Chopra who surveyed and assessed the goods, sent the letter dated 1st October 1954 to the Insurance Company and submitted his report on 19th October 1954. The oral and documentary evidence show that M.C. Chopra had nothing to do with the alleged substituted agreement. The defendant in paragraph 5 of the written statement has used the word "substituted Contract". Assuming that there was an oral agreement between L.C. Chopra as the agent of M. C. Chopra and the plaintiff, such agreement has never been accepted by the Insurance company itself. There is not one letter from the Insurance Company which directly or indirectly accepts such agreement. The loss acceptance form has not been signed by L.C. Chopra either. In fact, the plaintiff was asked to sign another document by J. Bhattacharjee, but he refused to sign the same. Thus, even admitting that the oral agreement did take place between L.C. Chopra and the plaintiff, such agreement was never accepted by the management of the defendant company (Vide: J. Bhattacharjee, Qs. 257-258, 265-266. J. Bhattacharjee has agreed that M. C. Chopra was appointed only to assess the loss and nothing beyond that (vide: J. Bhattacharjee, Qs. 433-435. Thus, the case in the written statement on the Loss Acceptance Form has not been proved at all. (c) L.C. Chopra's definite evidence is that on 27th September, 1954 the plaintiff agreed to accept Rs.3,500/- in full satisfaction of his claim. This document itself reveals the fact that the correct figure of loss is Rs.3,527/2/ -. This correction has been done by an endorsement at the bottom of the document by L.C. Chopra and the latter has said that he did this endorsement subsequently (vide : Chopra, Qs. 354, 359-360. The letter of L. C, Chopra dated 1st October 1954 addressed to the defendant company (Ex. E) shows that the assessed figure is Rs.3,527-2-0. This correction has been done by an endorsement at the bottom of the document by L.C. Chopra and the latter has said that he did this endorsement subsequently (vide : Chopra, Qs. 354, 359-360. The letter of L. C, Chopra dated 1st October 1954 addressed to the defendant company (Ex. E) shows that the assessed figure is Rs.3,527-2-0. Thus, L.C. Chopra has assessed the loss at Rs.3,527-2-0 after 27th of September 1954 and before 1st of October 1954 and, as such, there was no occasion for the plaintiff to agree to the sum of Rs.3,500 as set out in the document itself. An attempt has been made to show that Rs.3,500 is a mistake and the amount should be Rs.3,527-2-0. If it is a mistake, then the plaintiff could not have agreed to a sum of Rs.3,500 on 27th September 1954. On 27th September 1954 the plaintiff has either agreed to Rs.3,500 or Rs.3,527-2-0. Although the document says Rs.3,500, L.C. Chopra says it is a mistake. According to Mr. Chopra this mistake was detected later on. If the correct figure has been discovered subsequent to 27th September 1954, there could not be an agreement for the said sum on 27th September 1954. The ascertainment of the loss by taking into consideration the value of the salvaged goods could only take place on or about 1st October 1954. Accordingly, there could not be any basis or substratum for the plaintiff agreeing to Rs.3,500 or to Rs.3,527-2-0 on 27th September 1954. (d) According to L.C. Chopra, the Loss Acceptance Form was signed by the plaintiff after some discussion on the value of salvaged goods (vide : Chopra, Qs. 305, 312, 358, 360, 436-443; 674-677, 737, 887-889. Whereas the plaintiff's case is that on 27th September 1954 he was asked to sign certain documents by L.C. Chopra on his assurance that if he signs those documents he would get the full insured sum (vide : Nityananda, Qs. 192-196, 384-387, 476-483, 499-502. The plaintiff's evidence, in my opinion, is supported by his conduct, by documents and by surrounding circumstances. L.C. Chopra wrote a letter to the Insurance Company on 1st of October, 1954. This letter admittedly was received by the defendant company on 18.10.54. 192-196, 384-387, 476-483, 499-502. The plaintiff's evidence, in my opinion, is supported by his conduct, by documents and by surrounding circumstances. L.C. Chopra wrote a letter to the Insurance Company on 1st of October, 1954. This letter admittedly was received by the defendant company on 18.10.54. There is no evidence to show that L.C. Chopra after 8.10.54 saw J. Bhattacharjee or that J. Bhattacharjee sent for L.C. Chopra, although admittedly the plaintiff repudiated any settlement and refused to accept the alleged sum of Rs.3,500. According to J. Bhattacharjee, the plaintiff came and told him to increase the said agreed amount of Rs.3,500. The plaintiff has deposed that he asked for the full insured amount. Whichever version is correct, it is clear that the plaintiff gave impression to J. Bhattacharjee that the sum of Rs.3,500 was not agreed upon by him. The report was sent on 19th October 1954. Immediately thereafter, the plaintiff saw J. Bhattacharjee who offered him Rs.3,500 as agreed sum payable to him. But, admittedly, plaintiff refused to take the cheque for Rs.3,500. Banamali also saw J. Bhattacharjee asking the latter to settle the amount at increased figure. On 26th October 1954 two letters were written by the plaintiff's pleader, Bhuban Mohan Saha claiming the sum of Rs.20,000 as the plaintiff's loss. On 9th November 1954 the plaintiff again wrote to the Insurance Company reminding him of his claim under the said policy. All these facts show that the plaintiff did not agree to the sum of Rs.3,500 as evidenced in the said document. In contradistinction to the plaintiff's conduct, the defendant's con-duct is extraordinary. On 1st of October 1954 Mr. Bhattacharjee, the Officer-in-Charge of the Fire Insurance company received the letter from Mr. Chopra wherein not a word is mentioned about his agreement with the plaintiff as to the settled sum of Rs.3,527-2-0. This letter is a contemporaneous document and absence of any reference to such agreed amount is very significant. In the report dated 19th October 1954, Mr. Chopra has stated that the plaintiff agreed to accept a sum of Rs.3,527-2-0. At one place of the report he has stated : "I obtained a Loss Acceptance form duly signed by the insured to this effect. " there is no doubt that the plaintiff signed the documents, but the question is whether Chopra duly obtained the loss Acceptance Form signed by the plaintiff. At one place of the report he has stated : "I obtained a Loss Acceptance form duly signed by the insured to this effect. " there is no doubt that the plaintiff signed the documents, but the question is whether Chopra duly obtained the loss Acceptance Form signed by the plaintiff. Immediately after the report was submitted, the plaintiff and banamali saw Mr. Bhattacharjee. But for reasons best known to J. Bhattacharjee, not one letter was written by him or by anybody on behalf of the Insurance Company confirming the plaintiff's admission to liability on 27th September 1954. The plaintiff's pleader wrote two letters alleging fraud and claiming Rs.20,000 and yet the defendant company or its officer did not consider it necessary to reply to those letters. Mr. Bhattacharjee tried to explain this extraordinary conduct on his part by saying that he was going to reply to such letters, but because the plaintiff came and saw him, he did not do so. This explanation does not appear to me satisfactory. Mr. Bhattacharjee has tried to explain this act of inefficiency by shelving the responsibility on the manager of the Calcutta branch, Mr. Basu, Mr. Bhattacharjee has even stated that letters of the plaintiff were dealt with by him after they passed through the said manager. But, the letters which he has received do not show any endorsement by the manager (Qs. 424-425. It is the evidence of Mr. Bhattacharjee that the allegations set out in the pleader's letter were, to use his own language, palpably false (Q. 54. But, when he was asked (Q. 179) to explain why the allegations are false, he has answered : "I had every faith that Mr. Chopra would not adopt any improper means to obtain the documents. " in answer to my questions 55 and 56, Mr. Chopra has said that he came to this conclusion that the plaintiff's story is false without seeing Mr. Chopra, according to him, the plaintiff was seeing him repeatedly; Banamali was asking him, to settle the money ; the lawyer was protesting against the conspiracy by designing persons and, yet, it did not strike Mr. Bhattacharjee that he should ask Mr. Chopra about the circumstances under which the plaintiff signed the document on 27th September 1954. If Mr. Bhattacharjee's evidence is correct on this point that the plaintiff was only asking to increase the "settled" amount, Mr. Bhattacharjee that he should ask Mr. Chopra about the circumstances under which the plaintiff signed the document on 27th September 1954. If Mr. Bhattacharjee's evidence is correct on this point that the plaintiff was only asking to increase the "settled" amount, Mr. Bhattacharjee could have easily disposed of the matter by agreeing to pay a sum of Rs.1,600 or less. But, strangely enough, he refused to compromise because he thought Mr. Chopra's version must be correct. It may be added that J. Bhattachajee and L.C. Chopra knew each other long prior to the date when J. Bhattacharjee joined the defendant company. J. Bhattacharjee unfortunately attached more importance to his friendship with L.C. Chopra than to the interests of the defendant company (J. Bhattacharjee, Qs. 71-80, 179, 36s. Thus, the plaintiff's version of the story is substantiated by the surrounding circumstances, whereas the defendant's case is not consistent with the conduct of their officers or L.C. Chopra. (e) Both the Loss Acceptance form and the Claim Form were submitted to L.C. Chopra on 27th September 1954. Even assuming that Mr. Chopra's version is correct, there is glaring contradiction between the figures mentioned in the Claim Form and the figures mentioned in the Loss acceptance Form. Firstly, the plaintiff's claim in the Loss Acceptance Form amounts to Rs.3,500/- whereas the plaintiff's claim in the Claim Form is Rs.5,600/ -. Even if Mr. Chopra's version is accepted that the figure Rs.3,500/-is a mistake and Rs.3,527/2/- is the correct figure, still the figure Rs.3,527/2/-in the Loss Acceptance Form is different from the figure in the Claim Form. Secondly, according to Mr. Chopra, this figure Rs.3,527/2/- was arrived at on the basis that the value of the stocks is Rs.5,027/2/- from which salvage amounting to Rs.1,600/- was deducted and therefore the net figure would be Rs.3,427/2/ -. Similarly, the value of furniture and fittings was calculated at Rs.250/- from which there was deduction in respect of salvage amounting to Rs.150/-, and the net value of the furniture and fittings is calculated at Rs.100/ -. Calculating the net value of the stocks and net value of the furniture and fittings, the total amount, according to Mr. Chopra's report, (Ex. 4, p. 6) appears to be Rs.3,527/2/ -. Calculating the net value of the stocks and net value of the furniture and fittings, the total amount, according to Mr. Chopra's report, (Ex. 4, p. 6) appears to be Rs.3,527/2/ -. But the Claim Form shows that the value of the stock was shown as Rs.5,600/ - from which the value of salvage amounting to Rs.500/- is deducted and the value of furniture and fittings shown as Rs.1,000/- less value of the salvage Rs.500/ -. On the basis of this calculation in the Claim Form, the plaintiff claimed Rs.5,600/ -. Thus, it is improbable that the plaintiff on the same day would mention different figures on same heads. (f) The oral evidence of L.C. Chopra and J. Bhattacharjee also lead to the same conclusion that the plaintiff signed the Loss Acceptance Form without understanding the contents of the same. L.C. Chopra has stated that the defendant company appointed the firm, M.C. Chopra as a surveyor and assessor in the matter. But the letter of appointment shows that the letter was addressed to his father Mangal Chand Chopra described as M. C. Chopra, Esq. The survey and the assessment were made by him representing the firm or his father, L.C. Chopra submitted the report and his father admittedly never came into the picture at all from the beginning till the end. Mr. Chopra admits that the plaintiff does not know English and, yet, did, not get the disputed documents explained to him by any responsible person. According to practice, as he has stated, he not only surveyed and assessed the loss but also settled the claim. He is representing a big insurance company and yet he is careless in doing his part of the job. He prepares an inventory in some loose: sheets of papers in a clumsy way there is no letter head; all the items are written in English excepting a few in Hindi; at places, the rate and the quantity of the goods in the shop were not mentioned. According to him, the rates he mentioned were all obtained by him from the market. There is no evidence that any other shopkeeper of stationery goods has corroborated his evidence. A copy of the original inventory (Ex. 2) was prepared by him. Subsequently (Ex. 3) where some additions were made. According to him, the rates he mentioned were all obtained by him from the market. There is no evidence that any other shopkeeper of stationery goods has corroborated his evidence. A copy of the original inventory (Ex. 2) was prepared by him. Subsequently (Ex. 3) where some additions were made. He did not take into consideration many items of goods in the inventory about which other witnesses have deposed. In finalising the assessment, he only considered the value of the goods that were removed by him from the shop to his office, but did not consider the value of the goods which were completely destroyed by fire. The plaintiff, Banamali and Shamim all have given evidence that many goods were completely destroyed. In the natural course of things, I should say that when a fire takes place in a shop, at least some goods however small in quantity are destroyed by fire. Mr. Chopra admits that the books of account were completely destroyed by fire. It is unbelievable that excepting the books of account all other things in the shop remained intact. According to Mr. Chopra, writings in the Claim form are in the pen of persons whom he does not know. His evidence is that Sushil Chandra Das who accompanied the plaintiff with the Claim Form already filled in by somebody earlier is a person who was not known to him prior to 27th September 1954. He also states that Sambhunath Das, the witness in the document, is also not known to him. Yet, there is nobody from his firm or any other independent person known to Mr. Chopra was taken into confidence. No attempt was made to call Sushil Chandra Das although he visited L.C. Chopra subsequently for his personal business and he knew the address. There is nothing to show that Sushil Chandra Das explained the contends of the Claim Form to the plaintiff. The Claim Form was supposed to have been submitted on 27th September 1954. There is no endorsement anywhere either by L.C. Chopra or by anybody on behalf of M. C. Chopra that, the form was duly received by him. L.C. Chopra and the plaintiff were supposed to have agreed to a settled amount on the same day. The Claim Form was supposed to have been submitted on 27th September 1954. There is no endorsement anywhere either by L.C. Chopra or by anybody on behalf of M. C. Chopra that, the form was duly received by him. L.C. Chopra and the plaintiff were supposed to have agreed to a settled amount on the same day. But there is no endoresment in the Loss Acceptance form either by him as an independent surveyor or as one representing the alleged firm, M.C. Chopra, Esq. or the insurance company. Mr. J. Bhattacharjee's evidence is that he told the plaintiff at his office to agree to the: said figure and to take the cheque for Rs.3,500/ -. The document, as discussed earlier, cannot be construed as an agreement by itself. Even assuming that the oral agreement did take place and the document is only an evidence of the oral agreement, why would then Mr. Bhattacharjee ask the plaintiff to agree to the settled amount once again and to accept the cheque. Even if the oral agreement did take place between mr. Chopra and the plaintiff, how could the defendant company assert that it is conclusive so far as the plaintiff is concerned. Mr. M. C. Chopra or far less L.C. Chopra was never authorised to enter into agreement with the plaintiff. According to L.C. Chopra, he was authorised to settle the claim (Q. 324), but according to J. Bhattacharjee, (Qs. 431-435), Chopra was not so authorised. Even assuming that Mr. Chopra acted as the company's representative in settling the matter on the basis of "practice", it is surprising that Mr. Bhattacharjee did not consider it necessary at all to reopen the matter or settle the claim in the interest of the company. The agreement was supposed to have been entered on the 27th September 1954. Mr. Chopra wrote a letter to the defendant company on 1st of October 1954 which, according to Mr. J. Bhattacharjee, was received by his office on the 8th of October 1954. The assessment figures were mentioned in that letter, but the report was submitted on the 19th of October, 1954. All these days, according to Mr. Bhattacharjee, the plaintiff on many occasions and Banamali on one occasion saw him for getting the matter settled. But Mr. J. Bhattacharjee, was received by his office on the 8th of October 1954. The assessment figures were mentioned in that letter, but the report was submitted on the 19th of October, 1954. All these days, according to Mr. Bhattacharjee, the plaintiff on many occasions and Banamali on one occasion saw him for getting the matter settled. But Mr. Bhattacharjee would never agree to any amount beyond Rs.3,500/- which was alleged to have been settled between L.C. Chopra and the plaintiff. Mr. Bhattacharjee appears to me to be smart, intelligent man with ability to answer in a straightforward manner excepting on occasions when he took long time to answer when it was impossible for him to explain away the inefficiency which he has shown in dealing with this matter. Although the Loss Acceptance Form is not expressed in a printed document, although the form was not countersigned by L.C. Chopra or anybody on behalf of M. C. Chopra, although the document is written in English and the plaintiff knows only Bengali, yet it did not strike him for a minute why the plaintiff immediately after the so-called settlement would see him again and again refusing to agree to accept the alleged settled amount. It did not strike him either why Banamali came to see him. The previous letter was formally written to him protesting against Mr. Chopra's assessment and yet not one letter was written either by Mr. Bhattachrjee or by any officer of the Insurance Company. Mr. Bhattacharjee tried to shelve his responsibility by staging that he was informing all the developments in this matter to his superior officers. But I had not the advantage of hearing superior officers why such a world-wide concern would remain silent when objections and protests were being made by the claimant against L.C. Chopra. Mr. Bhattacharjee's evidence goes to show that the plaintiff did not agree to accept the said sum of Rs.3,500/- in full settlement of his claim. There is no documentary evidence that the defendant company accepted or confirmed the arrangement or settlement between the plaintiff and L.C. Chopra. In cross-examination, suggestion was made (Q. 521) by Mr. De that the plaintiff went to see Mr. Bhattacharjee for raising the figure of Rs 3,500/- to that of Rs.5,600/ -. He has been called only to corroborate Mr. Chopra's evidence on many points but I cannot accept Mr. In cross-examination, suggestion was made (Q. 521) by Mr. De that the plaintiff went to see Mr. Bhattacharjee for raising the figure of Rs 3,500/- to that of Rs.5,600/ -. He has been called only to corroborate Mr. Chopra's evidence on many points but I cannot accept Mr. Chopra's evidence so far as his depositions in respect of the Claim Form and the Loss Acceptance Form are concerned. Apart from the fact that his evidence does not fit in with the surrounding circumstances, i am not impressed by his demeanour and the manner in which he tried to explain away his conduct. He himself has stated in his report (Ex. 4): "I judge the insured to be a simple person with possibly no harm in him but lacking education and independent judgment. . . . . . . . . . ", and he took advantage of his simplicity and got the two documents signed by him without explaining the contents of the same. The plaintiff was at that time anxious to reopen the shop as the shopping season for the Pujas started and in his anxiety to get the insured amount he confided in him and Mr. Chopra betrayed that confidence. I thought over the matter that what interest Mr. Chopra would have in defrauding the plaintiff. It is not proper for me to surmise. It might be that he wanted to prove his efficiency so that he might get more work from the company or there might be some mysterious consideration which may not see the light of the day. It has pained me to find that Caledonian Insurance Company should have dealt with the claim of an insured person in an irresponsible manner. The written statement has been verified by Mr. Himangsu Sekhar Basu, who is supposed to have personal knowledge in the matter contained in the written statement. Mr. Basu has not been called to support the company's case in the written statement. The evidence shows that the insurance company completely left the matter to Mr. J. Bhattacharjee, the officer-in-charge of the Fire Section. Mr. Bhattacharjee has appointed M. C. Chopra, Esq., as the surveyor and assessor in the matter and Mr. Bhattacharjee was more Catholic than Pope in supporting whatever Mr. Chopra has stated in this matter. Mr. The evidence shows that the insurance company completely left the matter to Mr. J. Bhattacharjee, the officer-in-charge of the Fire Section. Mr. Bhattacharjee has appointed M. C. Chopra, Esq., as the surveyor and assessor in the matter and Mr. Bhattacharjee was more Catholic than Pope in supporting whatever Mr. Chopra has stated in this matter. Mr. Bhattacharjee had no personal knowledge about the circumstances under which the Claim form and the Loss Acceptance Form were signed and yet inspite of objections and protests being made against Mr. Chopra's assessment immediately after such assessment was made, Mr. Bhattacharjee did not think it necessary to get the company's case recorded in a letter or to consult the Insurance company's lawyer. Although L.C. Chopra offered to produce the inventory whenever the Insurance Company would want it, Mr. Bhattacharjee did not consider it necessary to examine the same or even to apply his mind to the correctness of plaintiff's allegation. In short, the substance of his evidence is that because Mr. Chopra has said that the plaintiff has agreed to settle the amount, the matter must end there. 6. My criticism of Mr. Chopra's evidence and Mr. Bhattacharjee's evidence and the improbable story of the defendant company's case, as discussed above, in dealing with the Loss acceptance Form would apply with equal force in accepting Mr. Chopra's evidence on the claim Form itself. It appears from the letter of the Insurance Company dated 20th September 1954 that a Claim Form was sent to M. C. Chopra, Esq. when the latter was appointed to assess and survey the loss. There is no documentary evidence to show that the Claim Form was handed over by L.C. Chopra to the plaintiff. The Claim Form, unlike the Loss Acceptance form, is a formal oriented document where there are many blank columns which are required to be filled in. The plaintiff does not know English and he has fully co-operated with L.C. Chopra at the time of assessment of the goods. The plaintiff thought that Chopra would correctly assess; the same and that he would get the; proper damages for the loss. But Mr. Chopra got his signature in those documents without explaining to him that the amount mentioned in the form was Rs.5,600/ -. Mr. The plaintiff thought that Chopra would correctly assess; the same and that he would get the; proper damages for the loss. But Mr. Chopra got his signature in those documents without explaining to him that the amount mentioned in the form was Rs.5,600/ -. Mr. Chopra's evidence on his point is that the form was already filled in by somebody who was known to the plaintiff and naturally he would not know who did this mischief. Well, on this point, I prefer to accept the plaintiff's evidence that he put in his signatures at several places in some 107 documents including the Claim Form an the 27th September 1954 as requested by Mr. Chopra without understanding the particulars mentioned in the said Claim Form. The blank columns in the Claim Form could not be written by the plaintiff. The document shows that the writings on the body of the claim Form could not be those of Sambhunath Das. Mr. Chopra's evidence is that he does not know who has written them. The plaintiff's evidence also is that he does not know either who filled in the forms. The defendant company is relying upon this document. It was the defendant's duty to find out in whose hands the writings were made in the said Claim Form specially in view of the fact that the signatory to that document cannot read and write English. Mr. Bhattacharjee has stated that after he got the report from Mr. Chopra he had not the slightest suspicion that the plaintiff's policy was a case of over-insurance. Until October 1954 when the plaintiff's claim was far below the full insured amount, Mr. Bhattacharjee did not take the trouble of finding out even from the agent or from the registered book of the Insurance agent in the company whether wrong representations were made by the plaintiff or by the insurance agent as to the value of the goods in the plaintiff's shop. All these facts show that the defendant company through its officer Mr. Chatterjee and its agent M.C. Chopra, Esq. have dealt with the matter in a most careless manner. It may be contended that the plaintiff is an elderly experienced businessman and he should not be believed when he has stated that he put his signature in the Claim Form and the Loss acceptance Form without understanding the contents of the same. In this connection, Mr. have dealt with the matter in a most careless manner. It may be contended that the plaintiff is an elderly experienced businessman and he should not be believed when he has stated that he put his signature in the Claim Form and the Loss acceptance Form without understanding the contents of the same. In this connection, Mr. De, relying on (2) Howatson v. Well, (1907)1 Ch. D. 537, 543-544, has argued that the alleged inducement by L.C. Chopra to the plaintiff in signing the documents should be rejected inasmuch as there is no question of mis-representation in this case on the nature of the document in which the plaintiff put his signature. It is quite true that the relation between the plaintiff and the defendant is based upon a contract of 'insurance and the only transaction between them took place in connection with the plaintiff's Fire Insurance Policy. There was no question of any other transaction between them. Admittedly, the plaintiff knew that L.C. Chopra was acting as the surveyor on behalf of the defendant company. There is not the slightest doubt that the plaintiff understood that L.C. Chopra was assessing the damages on behalf of the defendant company. Nor is there any dispute that the goods from the plaintiff's shop were removed to Mr. Chopra's office. Inventory of the goods was prepared and it is impossible to believe that the plaintiff did not understand and what Mr. Chopra was doing. The plaintiff was asked to sign in the inventory in two places and he did so. The natural conclusion would be that the plaintiff knew that he was signing in a document where a list of the goods of his shop was made. I agree with Mr. De that there is no scope for any misapprehension that the plaintiff understood what he was doing when he signed at two places in the inventory (Ex. 2. In fact, the plaintiff admitted that the goods were removed to Chopra's office and a list was prepared of those goods in the said office. The various items of goods were discussed and in most cases the rate and the quantity were also mentioned. It was in that background that the plaintiff put in his signature in Ex. 2. Under these circumstances, I hold that the plaintiff understood the nature of the document (Ex. 2) when he put in his signature in Bengali. The various items of goods were discussed and in most cases the rate and the quantity were also mentioned. It was in that background that the plaintiff put in his signature in Ex. 2. Under these circumstances, I hold that the plaintiff understood the nature of the document (Ex. 2) when he put in his signature in Bengali. But the circumstances under which the Claim Form and the Loss acceptance Form were signed are different. There is no doubt that the plaintiff in these two cases also understood that he was signing in a document connected with his claim for the insured amount against the defendant company. But, as discussed earlier, in these two documents only plaintiff's signatures were proved but nobody came to give evidence as to who wrote out the written portion of the two documents. In the special circumstances of the case, as the plaintiff only knows Bengali language and the documents are written in English, it does not follow from the signature that the person who signed the document has understood the contents of the same. The onus is shifted to the defendant, which remains undischarged. Apart from the internal contradictions in the said two documents, as stated above, I am impressed with the demeanour of the plaintiff whose simple, unostentatious behaviour has appeared to me to be the evidence of a person who has been betrayed by Mr. Chopra, a well-educated man on whom the plaintiff completely depended for getting the loss under his insurance Policy. The doctrine of non est factum would apply in the case of the Claim Form and the Loss Acceptance Form inasmuch as the presumption of the signatory's knowledge as to the contents of the document is rebutted by much stronger evidence to the effect that the plaintiff was not told about the most important part of the transaction, namely, the determination of the quantum of loss under the Policy. The doctrine of non est factum is a rule of evidence which has to be applied with great caution in the background of extensive commercial activities of the society. But to promote commercial expediency the plea should not be allowed to validate an instrument of fraud. The doctrine of non est factum is a rule of evidence which has to be applied with great caution in the background of extensive commercial activities of the society. But to promote commercial expediency the plea should not be allowed to validate an instrument of fraud. The strict meaning of the expression is that although the event has happened, it is non-existent, in its application to a document it means that the mind did not go with the pen or vice versa. Although the signature may be there, the signatory does not understand the contents of the document in which he has signed. Ordinarily, a man who puts his signature in a document understands the contents of the same and naturally the normal presumption is that the writer understands the contents of the document in which he has put in his signature. But the presumption which is a result of the application of general rule of evidence is not absolute. There may be strong evidence where this initial presumption is completely overshadowed by facts which lead to the conclusion that the signatory has not understood the contents of the document in which he has signed. The plea of non est factum is to be allowed within manageable bounds, according to the facts and circumstances of each case. It is not correct that in every case where a party signs a document on the representation of another party, the signatory must be held to be bound by the contents of the document, nor can it be correct to say that in no case the writer should not be held responsible for the i contents of the documents in which he has put in his signatures. Evaluation of such documents is to be judged in the context of all the evidence adduced in the case and the surrounding circumstances. There is great force in the argument that a signature put in on a misrepresentation as to the character and class of the document in question as distinguished from its contents invalidates such document. It is also true that when a person signs a document after understanding its nature and character he should not be allowed to disown the contents. But, it should be remembered that in a proper situation the contents may be as fundamental as the nature and the character of the document. It is also true that when a person signs a document after understanding its nature and character he should not be allowed to disown the contents. But, it should be remembered that in a proper situation the contents may be as fundamental as the nature and the character of the document. It is quite possible that the nature or the character of the document is determined by its contents. The two documents were not understood by the plaintiff as claim Form and Loss Acceptance Form and, thus, there was a misapprehension even as to the nature and character of the two documents when the plaintiff put in his signatures. The evidence shows that the plaintiff in the hope of getting the maximum sum under the policy signed the documents under instructions from L.C. Chopra. Further, in the claims under insurance policy where there is an element of trust or confidence or a fiduciary relationship between the insured and the surveyor, the onus is much heavier on the party who is in a position to dominate over the will of the other. In the instant case, the evidence is that the plaintiff completely relied upon Mr. Chopra for the realisation of his claim under the policy. The documents are all written in English and the plaintiff knows only Bengali. There is no attesting witness to these two documents who is in a position to say that the contents were explained to the plaintiff and the latter understood the same. Mr. Chopra's office is a busy commercial centre in Calcutta and his evidence in not calling any independent disinterested man from other parts of his office building confirms my conclusion that Mr. Chopra lost no time in obtaining the plaintiff's signatures in the document on the basis of false assurance or misrepresentation. I agree with Mr. De that the plaintiff might not have been expecting the sum of Rs.20,000/- as loss or compensation. But, I cannot persuade myself to believe that the plaintiff agreed to accept the said sum of Rs.3,500/- as his claim under the policy. Mr. Chopra might not have assured him to help him in securing the entire sum of Rs.20,000/, but he must have represented to the plaintiff, in my opinion, that Mr. Chopra would endeavour to secure the maximum amount from the defendant company. Mr. Chopra might not have assured him to help him in securing the entire sum of Rs.20,000/, but he must have represented to the plaintiff, in my opinion, that Mr. Chopra would endeavour to secure the maximum amount from the defendant company. The misrepresentation necessary to reject the validity of a document need not necessarily be fraudulent. It is true that, in the instant case, the fraud has been pleaded but the particulars of the fraud were not exhaustively mentioned. In the instant case, the averment in paragraph 7 of the plaint cannot be said to be totally inadequate for the plaintiff to establish fraud against Mr. Chopra. The alleged representations should have been set out in the plaint itself, but the statement to the effect that the plaintiff signed the documents written in English as he knew only Bengali, does indicate that the plaintiff has been induced to sign the documents by fraudulent representations on the part of Mr. Chopra. In fact, the evidence shows that Mr. Chopra and Mr. Bhattacharjee knowing full well that the plaintiff does not know English relied upon his signatures in the two documents as their strongest point without any attempt on their part to convince the court by independent evidence that the documents were explained to the plaintiff before the latter put in his signatures. Even, assuming that there is no element of fraud on the part of Mr. Chopra, I feel that even a careless, reckless or innocent misrepresentation to a person not knowing English in the matter of the execution of a document written in English might, on proper evidence, lead to the same conclusion, namely, that the mind of the signatory did not go with the pen. In my view, there are enough materials in the instant case wherefrom I cannot escape the conclusion that the plaintiff signed the two documents dated 27th September, 1954 without understanding the nature or the character of the documents. In the premises, I answer this issue against the defendant company. 7. Issue No. 1 (a) : Paragraph 7 of the plaint specifically mentions fraudulent misrepresentation. Ordinarily, the misrepresentation on the basis of which the plaintiff is alleged to have been defrauded should have been mentioned in the plaint itself. In the instant case, it has been urged by Mr. De that no evidence has been adduced as to what fraudulent representation Mr. Ordinarily, the misrepresentation on the basis of which the plaintiff is alleged to have been defrauded should have been mentioned in the plaint itself. In the instant case, it has been urged by Mr. De that no evidence has been adduced as to what fraudulent representation Mr. Chopra made which induced the plaintiff to sign the document. But, in my opinion, the objection is more of form than of substance. It is not always easy to find out whether a man has fraudulent intention or not as it is often said the devil does not know the mind of a man. The objective behaviour and conduct of the parties from which the intention could be spelt out must have to be examined. In the instant case, the fact remains that Mr. Chopra knew that the plaintiff had no knowledge in English. Mr. L.C. Chopra's father M. C. Chopra esq. was appointed the surveyor by the defendant company. Neither M. C. Chopra nor L.C. Chopra has any responsibility to settle the claim. Even if assuming that L.C. Chopra is the proper authorised person to settle the claim, he should have taken extra precaution, in getting the plaintiff's signature. Both the Claim Form and the Loss acceptance Form were supposed to have been delivered on the same day and, yet, the amount mentioned in the two documents contradict each other. The writing parts of the documents were admittedly done by person other than the plaintiff. The plaintiff's conduct, as discussed earlier, is consistent with the plaintiff's case that he never understood the documents where he was asked to sign. Whereas Mr. Chopra's and the Insurance company's conduct in dealing with the matter show, as stated earlier, that they did not behave in a business-like manner. In fact, Mr. Bhattacharjee's own evidence is that immediately after the assessment was made the plaintiff saw him and wanted more money and. refused to accept a cheque for Rs.3,500/- or sign a receipt for Rs.3,500/ -. This contemporaneous conduct indicates that the plaintiff immediately protested against such alleged agreement and he had to file the suit after making frantic attempts in persuading the company to change their mind. According to the defendant, the Loss acceptance Form is the evidence of the plaintiff's agreement to accept the sum of Rs.3,500/-, but it appears that the document is a unilateral transaction. According to the defendant, the Loss acceptance Form is the evidence of the plaintiff's agreement to accept the sum of Rs.3,500/-, but it appears that the document is a unilateral transaction. The plaintiff did not understand the document to be an agreement or admission to accept the sum of Rs.3,500/- when he put in his signature. Thus, the plaintiff was induced to sign the two documents without understanding the nature and character of the documents. In my view, the evidence adduced in his case is sufficient for me to come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has been defrauded by Mr. Chopra in getting the documents signed by him. Relying upon the observations of the Supreme court in (3) Bhagwati v. Chandra Maul, A.I.R 1966 SC 735, I am of opinion that the absence of detailed particulars of fraud cannot overshadow the evidence before me that the plaintiff was induced to sign the two documents by fraudulent representation. I accordingly answer the issue in the affirmative. 8. It has been contended by Mr. De that apart from the question of fraudulent representation, the issue should be answered against the plaintiff inasmuch as the plaintiff has not definitely stated in his evidence that he was asked to sign any blank form or document. It is true that the specific question was asked to the plaintiff on this point. But the plaintiff has stated that he does not remember whether the document in which he put his signature was blank or not. I agree with the contention of Mr. De that the plaintiff has not definitely stated that he was asked to sign any blank form or any blank document. If the issue would have been expressed in the following way, i.e., "did the plaintiff sign any blank form or any blank document, under fraudulent misrepresentation as alleged in paragraph 7 of the plaint ?" there would have been great force in Mr. De's contention. But the language used in this issue is-"did the plaintiff sign any blank from or any document under fraudulent misrepresentation as alleged in paragraph 7 of the plaint ?" the issue is wide enough to cover all documents, blank or not, where the plaintiff was alleged to have signed on fraudulent misrepresentation. De's contention. But the language used in this issue is-"did the plaintiff sign any blank from or any document under fraudulent misrepresentation as alleged in paragraph 7 of the plaint ?" the issue is wide enough to cover all documents, blank or not, where the plaintiff was alleged to have signed on fraudulent misrepresentation. The issue having been framed widely, I am of opinion that there is sufficient evidence, in the instant case, which leads to the conclusion that the two documents dated 27th September, 1954, although not originally blank, were signed by the plaintiff on the misrepresentation of Mr. Chopra. I accordingly hold that issue should be decided against the defendant. Issue No. 2.-According to the defendant company, the plaintiff is bound to accept Rs.3,527/2/- as agreed upon by the plaintiff on 27th September, 1954. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the defendant company has relied upon the said Loss acceptance Form and also the oral evidence of Mr. Chopra and Mr. J. Bhattacharjee. For the reasons already disenssed, the said Loos Acceptance Form was not signed by the plaintiff with the knowledge of the contents therein. The plaintiff was induced to sign in the said document on the hope that he would get the maximum sum payable under the policy. I have also discussed Mr. Chopra's evidence on this point and, in my view, Mr. Chopra's evidence cannot be accepted. Mr. J. Bhattacharjee's evidence cannot be given much importance in view of the fact that he had no personal knowledge of the circumstances under which the said document was signed at Mr. Chopra's office. As stated above, the plaintiff's consistent conduct after the 27th September, 1954 is that he never agreed to accept the said sum of Rs.3,527/2/- in full settlement of his claim. The plaintiff was induced to sign the Claim Acceptance Form by L.C. Chopra who obtained his signature without explaining the contents of the said document. In the premises, I hold that this issue should be answered in the negative. 9. Issue No. 3.-The learned counsel for the defendant company has relied upon the Claim Form (Ex. 4) where the plaintiff has put in his signature claiming a sum of Rs.5,600/ -. The signature has been admitted by the plaintiff, but the plaintiff's case is that the contents of the document were not explained to him. 9. Issue No. 3.-The learned counsel for the defendant company has relied upon the Claim Form (Ex. 4) where the plaintiff has put in his signature claiming a sum of Rs.5,600/ -. The signature has been admitted by the plaintiff, but the plaintiff's case is that the contents of the document were not explained to him. There is evidence to show that Mr. Bhattacherjee sent a Claim Form to I.C. Chopra. Mr. Chopra has stated that the claim Form was handed over to the plaintiff two or three days prior to 27th September. 1954. According to Mr. Chopra, the plaintiff after getting the said form duly filled in by another person not known to Mr. Chopra signed the same and returned it to Mr. Chopra on the morning of 27th September, 1954. Apart from the oral evidence there is nothing to support Mr. Chopra's evidence that the form was duly returned to Mr. Chopra after it was being filled in. Mr. Chopra's evidence on this point cannot be accepted because Mr. Chopra knew that the plaintiff does not know English and yet Mr. Chopra did not take the trouble of explaining the contents of the document. No satisfactory evidence was given by the defendant company to controvert the plaintiff's case. There is no evidence to show that the writings in the Claim Form were made by a particular person or that the writings were explained to the plaintiff before the plaintiff put in his signature. I have already explained the improbability of the defendant company's case, inasmuch as the plaintiff agreed to accept the sum of Rs.5,600/-, as set out in the Claim Form, on the morning of 27th September, 1954 and on the same day in the evening consented to the claim of Rs.3,500/-as his loss under the Fire Policy. I therefore answer the issue in the negative. 10. Issue No. 4.-Mr. De has relied upon that arbitration clause in the Insurance policy in support of his contention that this suit is not maintainable inasmuch as no arbitration proceeding was resorted to nor any award was made before this suit was instituted as specifically provided in the said clause. Clause 18 of the said Insurance Policy reads as follows : "18. De has relied upon that arbitration clause in the Insurance policy in support of his contention that this suit is not maintainable inasmuch as no arbitration proceeding was resorted to nor any award was made before this suit was instituted as specifically provided in the said clause. Clause 18 of the said Insurance Policy reads as follows : "18. If any difference arises as to the amount of any loss or damage such difference shall independently of all other questions be referred to the decision of an arbitrator, to be appointed in 'writing by the parties in difference or if they cannot agree upon a single arbitrator, to the decision of two disinterested persons as arbitrators, of whom one shall be appointed in writing by each of the parties within two calendar months after having been required so to do in writing by the other party. In case either party shall refuse or fail to appoint an arbitrator within two calendar months after receipt of notice in writing requiring an appointment, the other party shall be at liberty to appoint a sole arbitrator ; and in case of disagreement between the arbitrators, the difference shall be referred to the decision of an umpire who shall have been appointed by them in writing before entering on the reference and who shall sit with the arbitrators and preside at their meetings. The death of any party shall not revoke or affect the authority or powers of the arbitrators or umpire respectively ; and in the event of death of an arbitrator or umpire, another shall in such case be appointed in his stead by the party or arbitrators (as the case may be)by whom the arbitrator or umpire so dying was appointed. The cause of the reference and of the award shall be in the discretion of the arbitrator arbitrators or umpire making the award. And it is hereby expressly stipulated and declared that it shall be a condition precedent to any right of action or suit upon this policy that the award of such arbitrator, arbitrators or umpire of the amount of the loss or damage if disputed shall be first obtained. "Mr. De has submitted that admittedly no award has been made in the instant case and thus the institution of the suit is void ab initio under this clause. In. support of the said condition, Mr. "Mr. De has submitted that admittedly no award has been made in the instant case and thus the institution of the suit is void ab initio under this clause. In. support of the said condition, Mr. De has referred me to the well known case (4) Scott v. Avery, (1856) 5 HLC 811, where the action was brought by the insured under three maritime policies each of which contained clause and conditions with respect to payment of indemnity and the ascertainment of the amount by the award of the arbitrators. There also a similar arbitration clause was set out and it was held by the House of Lords that until an award was made no action was maintainable. A similar arbitration clause was construed in a subsequent House of Lords' decision in (5) Calendonian Insurance company v. Andrew Golmour, 1893 AC 85. The House of Lords following Scott v. Avery (supra), came to the conclusion that the condition to ascertain the damage by arbitration formed an integral part of the contract of indemnity and therefore was a condition precedent to the bringing of any action upon the policy. Mr. Sen has referred me to the decision of (6) Juriedini v. National British and Irish Miller's Insurance company Limited, 1915 AC 499, where the facts in Scott v. Avery (supra), were distinguished from those in the appeal before the House of Lords. It may be added here that clause 18 of the arbitration Clause in the Fire Policy before me is exactly the same as the clause XVII of the Arbitration Clause in the decision in Juriedini v. National British' and Irish Millers' Insurance company Limited (supra. In this case also reference to arbitration was a condition precedent to any right of action upon the policy. But it was held that if the repudiation of the claim of the insured is made by the Insurance Company on a ground which goes to the root of the contract, the company would be precluded from pleading the Arbitration Clause as a bar to an action to enforce the claim. In the said case, the insurance company repudiated the claim in toto on the grounds of fraud and arson and the house of Lords decided that although there was no arbitration proceedings before the suit was instituted, the suit must be held to be maintainable. Mr. In the said case, the insurance company repudiated the claim in toto on the grounds of fraud and arson and the house of Lords decided that although there was no arbitration proceedings before the suit was instituted, the suit must be held to be maintainable. Mr. Sen has also referred me to the decision of the leading case, (7) Heyman and Another v. Darwin's Limited, (19-42) 1 All. ER 337, in support of the proposition that where there is a total breach of contract between the parties so as to release the other of obligation under it, the Arbitration Clause, if its terms are wide enough, still remains effective. The similar point arose in (8) Benichand Murlidhar v. Concord of India Insurance Company, suit No. 1383 of 1939 (unreported judgment delivered on February 2, 1942) where panckridge, J. following the principles in Juriedini's case (supra), refused to apply the arbitration clause because the claim of the insured was sought to be defeated by the Insurance company on grounds of fraud and consequent forfeiture of all benefits on the policy accrued. The appeal against the said judgment of Panckridge, J. was heard by Gentle and Sen. JJ. (Appeal No. 16 of 1942) where the Court of Appeal in delivering judgment of 25th of July, 1944 followed the decision in Juriedini's case (supra) and dismissed the appeal. In my view the facts in Scott v. Avery (supra) and Caledonian Insurance Company v. Golmour (supra) are distinguishable from the facts in the instant case. In Scott v. Avery (supra) it is true that a decision by the arbitrator was made a condition precedent to the institution of a suit. But there one of the conditions of the policy was that the sum to be paid for loss in the first instance was to be ascertained by a committee in the first instance but if a difference should arise between the insurer and the committee relating to the settling of any loss, or to a claim for average, or any other matter relating to the insurance, the difference was to be referred to an arbitration, provided always that so insurer who refuses to accept the amount settled by the committee shall be entitled to maintain any action on his policy until the matter has been decided by the arbitrators. Thus, the ascertainment of damage was first to be made by a committee and if the difference arises between the claimant and the committee, it must be referred to arbitration. There the arbitration clause would only be effective if there is ascertainment of loss by the committee and there is a difference as to the quantum of the loss. Secondly, the difference there may be a difference to any matter relating to the insurance. The language used there is too wide and naturally if the parties agree among themselves to refer to a particular procedure of settling their differences they cannot be allowed to give a go-bye to their agreement. But it should always be remembered that the difference must be a difference under the contract itself where the arbitration clause is provided. In Caledorsian insurance Company v. Golmour (supra) also the policy of five insurance provided that – ''where the company did not claim to avoid its liability under the policy an the ground of fraud, or non-fulfilment of any of the conditions therein set forth, but the difference at any time arose between the company and the insured as to the amount payable in respect of any alleged logs or damage by fire, every such difference when and as the same arose should be referred to the arbitration of persons chosen by the parties. " There must be an existing difference under the contract itself as to the quantum of the loss payable to the inured in case of a fire when and when alone the difference should be referred to the arbitration of persons. But the clause gives an indication that where the policy itself has been challenged on the ground of fraud or breach of any condition, the arbitration clause would not be applicable. In fact, it seems to me that this particular exception has given rise to a new qualification to the rules in Scott v. Avery (supra) which ii3 subsequently laid down in Juriedini's case (supra. In my view, no general proposition could be laid down that wherever the arbitrator's award is made a condition precedent to the institution of a suit, the suit must fail unless an award is made. In my view, no general proposition could be laid down that wherever the arbitrator's award is made a condition precedent to the institution of a suit, the suit must fail unless an award is made. The rule in Scott v. Avery (supra) enunciates that where the parties agree by a solemn contract to comply with a particular procedure in case of any difference as to the quantum of damages payable to the insured under the policy they cannot be allowed to resile from that contract. But that rule is not an absolute one. It could only be made applicable if the words used are wide enough to cover all cases of differences and disputes between the parties. A difference between the parties is not the same thing as a difference as to the ascertainment of damage or loss between them. If the language is too wide, the decision in Hayman v. Darwin's Limited (supra) should apply but if the language is not wide enough, the principles in Juriedini's case may be invoked in a proper case. Even where the award is a condition precedent to the institution of a suit, the conditions required to refer to arbitration, as set out in the agreement itself, must be present. If the rule in Scott v. Avery (supra) has got to be invoked, the following conditions must be present : (a) The acceptance of the validity and continuance of the policy itself. (b) No repudiation by the insurer challenging the substratum of the claim of the insured, i.e., challenging the claim on the ground that the plaintiff has no right to claim the damage at all. (c) A bonafide difference as to the ascertainment of the quantum or value or amount of damage. (d) The difference to be existing difference and relating to the actual loss suffered by the insured. (e) The nature of the difference to be within the scope of the terms of the arbitration clause itself. Applying these principles I am of opinion that Clause 18 of the Fire Insurance Policy before me is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. It is true that here also the ascertainment of damage was made by a surveyor as it was done by the committee in Scott v. Avery (supra. Applying these principles I am of opinion that Clause 18 of the Fire Insurance Policy before me is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. It is true that here also the ascertainment of damage was made by a surveyor as it was done by the committee in Scott v. Avery (supra. It may be remembered that the ascertainment of damage by the committee in the latter case was specifically mentioned in the arbitration clause itself. Be that as it may, m. C. Chopra, Esq. was appointed to assess the damages but, in fact, M. C. Chopra never took part in the assessment. The assessment was done by his son, L.C. Chopra. Even the assessment report was made by L.C. Chopra. L.C. Chopra's right to assess the damage has been challenged before me. Even assuming that L.C. Chopra as the agent of M. C. Chopra Esq. has duly submitted his report to the insurance company, the arbitration clause would have been operative if the plaintiff would have disagreed with the amount actually assessed by L.C. Chopra. But the defendant company's case is totally different. According to the defendant company, there could not be any question of difference as to the quantum of damages because the quantum of damages has been agreed upon by the plaintiff. According to Mr. J. Bhattacharjee, there was no scope for the insurance company paying a penny more than the sum of Rs.3,500/- which, according to L.C. Chopra, was agreed upon by the plaintiff in the Loss Acceptance Form. In fact, in para 5 of the written statement, it is clearly provided that on or about 27th September, 1954 the plaintiff agreed with the defendant company represented by the said M. C. Chopra Esq. to accept the sum of Rs.3,527/2/- in full settlement and discharge of his claim under the said policy. The policy was taken out for a sum of Rs.20,000/ -. The plaintiff, according to the defendant company, by way of novation or a substituted contract, as the defendant company itself has described in the said paragraph, agreed to accept Rs.3,527/2/- in substitution of his right under the original contract. Thus, the defendant company is attacking the very basis and the foundation of the plaintiff's claim under the contract of insurance. The plea of substituted contract taking place on 27th Sept. Thus, the defendant company is attacking the very basis and the foundation of the plaintiff's claim under the contract of insurance. The plea of substituted contract taking place on 27th Sept. 1954, is not an alternative case of the defendant company and naturally the defendant company could not be allowed to approbate and reapprobate which is really the foundation of the rule in Scott v. Avery (supra. It is argued by Mr. De that in any event the plaintiff in the Claim form has claimed a sum Rs.5,600/- as his loss, whereas the defendant company agreed to pay Rs.3,500/ -. Thus a difference arose as to the ascertainment of damage and, therefore, the difference should have been referred to arbitration. Both before the suit and after the suit the plaintiff has categorically stated that the Claim Form in which Rs.5,600/- was mentioned is a document where the plaintiff put in his signature without understanding the contents of it. As already stated, the signatures in the claim Form and the Loss Acceptance form have been fraudulently obtained from the plaintiff by L.C. Chopra. I therefore extending the principles laid down in Juriendini's case (supra) hold that the plea of the defendant company alleging a new contract substituting the original contract strikes at the root or foundation of the plaintiff's claim under the original contract itself and, as such, the defendant company could not be allowed to challenge the maintainability of the suit under the said original contract. Further, the difference here is not that the defendant has ascertained the loss as Rs.3,500/- and the plaintiff valued the same as Rs.5,600/ -. The difference relates to the factum of the agreement between the parties on 27th September, 1954. Lastly, I may add here that the defendant company at no stage raised this question of referring the dispute to arbitration. Even assuming that the defendant company has the right to challenge the maintainability of the suit under the arbitration clause, the said right has been waived by the defendant company's own conduct in keeping a mysterious silence on the plaintiff's insistent claim. Reference may be made, in this connection, to Halsbury's Law of England, 3rd edition, Vol. II, page 19, para 47 where the following observation has been made: "stipulation making arbitration a condition precedent to the right to sue may be waived by conduct. Reference may be made, in this connection, to Halsbury's Law of England, 3rd edition, Vol. II, page 19, para 47 where the following observation has been made: "stipulation making arbitration a condition precedent to the right to sue may be waived by conduct. " I, therefore, answer the issue in the affirmative. Issue No. 5: Mr. De has contended that the plaintiff is entitled to get only a sum of Rs.3,527/2/- as the value of his total loss inasmuch as the plaintiff agreed to accept the said sum. I have already held that the story of this agreement cannot be accepted. Mr. De has alternatively argued that in any event the plaintiff cannot get any sum in excess of Rs.5,600/- which is the sum he claimed in the Claim Form duly submitted by him to L.C. Chopra on 27th September, 1954. On this point also I have already come to the conclusion that the Claim Form was unduly submitted by the plaintiff because the plaintiff was induced to sign the Claim Form and he signed the same without understanding its contents. The plaintiff, on the other hand, has claimed the full insured amount under the policy on the ground that the stock of goods in his shop was much more than Rs.20,000/ -. The plaintiff has supported his case by referring to his pleader's letter dated 26th October, 1954 claiming the sum of Rs.20,000/ -. But, in my view, the plaintiff has not been able to prove that he lost goods worth Rs.20,000/ -. The material portion of the pleader's letter dated 26th October, 1954 (Ex. 5) reads as follows: 'that my aforesaid client has timely submitted a claim for Rs.20,000/-to you. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " there is no evidence before me that plaintiff submitted such claim for Rs.20,000/- before 26th of October, 1954. The claim for Rs.20,000/-, in my opinion, is an afterthought and he must have been asked by his advisors, Banamali bhattacharjee and Bhuban Mohan saha to claim the full insured amount. The plaintiff was asked questions on this point in cross-examination but the plaintiff could not categorically say that Mr. Chopra gave him the hope that the Insurance company would pay the entire insured amount of Rs.20,000/- (Q. 446. His definite evidence is that he signed the document and left Mr. The plaintiff was asked questions on this point in cross-examination but the plaintiff could not categorically say that Mr. Chopra gave him the hope that the Insurance company would pay the entire insured amount of Rs.20,000/- (Q. 446. His definite evidence is that he signed the document and left Mr. Chopra's place on the impression that he would get Rs.20,000/ -. Mr. Chopra might have given him some hope that he would be able to get the insured money as much as possible, but it is not clear that Mr. Chopra gave him the assurance that he would see the Insurance Company pay him the full insured amount. Mr. Chopra has admitted that when he went to the shop on the 21st September, 1954 he found that all the books of account, stock book, etc. were destoryed by fire. The plaintiff himself did not prepare any list of the goods he had in his shop immediately after the fire. It would have been natural for him to make out an inventory at that time from his own memory, because every thing was fresh in his mind. On the contrary, he agreed to get an inventory of goods prepared by L.C. Chopra in the letter's office. The inventory is the only contemporaneous document before me. The inventory was prepared in presence of the plaintiff and the goods one after another were considered and the quantity of the goods was mentioned as much as possible. The inventory was prepared in four days, i. e, from 21st September, 1954 to 24th September 1954. I found the plaintiff signing the list at two places on the 21st September, 1954 and 22nd September, 1954. No suggestion in cross-examination of Mr. Chopra was made by Mr. M. M. Sen that the list prepared on 23rd and 24th are concocted documents, inasmuch as the plaintiff did not sign at the end of the said two lists. The plaintiff's main grievance was that the document was written mostly in English and some portion of them in Hindi and the plaintiff did not understand and the contents of the same. Admittedly, the goods were examined, the list was prepared in presence of the plaintiff and it is impossible to believe that the plaintiff did not understand what Mr. Chopra was doing when he put in his signature in the said lists. Mr. Admittedly, the goods were examined, the list was prepared in presence of the plaintiff and it is impossible to believe that the plaintiff did not understand what Mr. Chopra was doing when he put in his signature in the said lists. Mr. Sen has further contended that the inventory is not correct and complete. In fact, he has first argued that the full insured amount should be paid to his client. But, as stated earlier, his client's claim for Rs.20,000/- cannot be accepted, because there is no satisfactory oral or documentary evidence on which I could come to the conclusion that the plaintiff lost goods worth Rs.20,000/ - or that he duly submitted his claim for Rs.20,000/ - to the Insurance company. Mr. Bhattacharjee himself has given evidence saying that the plaintiff was asking him repeatedly for increasing the said sum of Rs.3,500/ -. The plaintiff did not ask for any written Claim Form from the Insurance Company nor he submitted any. The only Claim Form which was signed by him was the document in which he put his signature without understanding the meaning thereof. I accept the plaintiff's evidence to the effect that he was not told about the amount mentioned in the claim Form which he signed. But, I reject his evidence when he said that he said that he had been asking for Rs.20,000/ - from the very beginning. As discussed earlier, the circumstances under which the inventory was prepared for four consecutive days lead me to the conclusion that he understood the nature and character of the document where he put in his signature and, as such, he must be held to be bound by the same. A fair copy of the original inventory has: been tendered by Mr. Chopra and marked Ex. 3. This is not a contemporaneous document, but it is a true copy of the original inventory which was prepared by L.C. Chopra in presence of the plaintiff immediately after the fire took place. According to the calculation in Ex. 3, the value of the goods is Rs.5,027/2/ -. Mr. M. M. Sen has on the contrary, tendered a document (Ex. I) where, according to him, his client has calculated the value of the goods on the basis of rate and the quantity mentioned in the original inventory. According to this document, the plaintiff's claim would come to Rs.5,480/ -. 3, the value of the goods is Rs.5,027/2/ -. Mr. M. M. Sen has on the contrary, tendered a document (Ex. I) where, according to him, his client has calculated the value of the goods on the basis of rate and the quantity mentioned in the original inventory. According to this document, the plaintiff's claim would come to Rs.5,480/ -. I have examined all the three documents (Exts. 2, 3 and I) and have come to the conclusion that Ex. I should not be relied upon. The document has been prepared and tendered through Madhusudan whose evidence is based upon his experience in selling stationery goods and his memory. He is supposed to know the rate of goods prevailing in 1954. There is no documentary or independent evidence which supports his quotations. He is giving evidence about the rate now before me in 1967. He is known to the plaintiff well and cannot be called a disinterested witness. Ex. I is supposed to be the verbatim copy of Ex. 2 excepting that he has made a total of the value of the goods on the basis of the rate mentioned by Mr. Chopra in Ex. 2. But the words in Ex 2 are not always distinct or legible. Some of the items were written even in Hindi and, accordingly, there is a possibility of Madhusudan's mistake in quoting the rate. To illustrate, in Ex. 2, item No. 3 states "mahabhringaraj, Star Chemical quantity 7, Rate 15/- per doz. " Ex. 3 has been made out by the same Mr. L.C. Chopra who is the writer of Ex. 2. Thus, Mr. Chopra has copied the items from his own writings and, naturally, it should be correct. But, in Ex. I madhusudan wrote the rate as 6 as. each. In my view, it is not safe to rely upon the calculations made in Ex. I. Ex. 3 is a clean copy of Ex. 2 prepared by Mr. Chopra. Ex. 2 undoubtedly is a contemporaneous document. Writings in Ex. 2 are in many places not distinct. The list on particular features is more or less correct save and except a very few items where the rate was not originally mentioned in Ex. 2 but was added in Ex. 3 by him. The rate mentioned by him is much more dependable than the rate mentioned by madhansudan as stated earlier. 2 are in many places not distinct. The list on particular features is more or less correct save and except a very few items where the rate was not originally mentioned in Ex. 2 but was added in Ex. 3 by him. The rate mentioned by him is much more dependable than the rate mentioned by madhansudan as stated earlier. In my view, the total value of the goods should be Rs.5,027/2/4p as mentioned in Ex. 3. Save and except the oral evidence of L.C. Chopra, there is nothing to show that the plaintiff took back the goods which had been removed by L.C. Chopra to his office on 21st September, 1954. In the absence of any receipt showing the return of the goods to the plaintiff, the story as to ascertainment of the sum of Rs.1,600/- as salvage must be rejected and should not be excluded from the said sum of Rs.5,027/2/4p. Further, the damages to furniture, fixtures, fittings, etc. are shown in Ex. 2 as Rs.100/ -. This figure is not mentioned in Ex. 2 at all. This amount was added in Ex. 3 by L.C. Chopra much later and arbitrarily. There cannot be any question that the furniture, fittings etc. were damaged. It is quite possible they might not have been completely destroyed by fire. The plaintiff's and Madhusudan's evidence, Nityananda Qs. 164-170, 326, 420-426, 443. Madhusudan Q. 112-116 on this point, may not be exactly correct, but in the absence of any break-up of the loss of furniture, fittings etc. in detailed particulars, there is no reason why the plaintiff should be denied with the full insured amount for furniture, etc. which amounts to Rs.1,000/ -. There is no issue that the insured amount has been fraudulently entered. There is no evidence that the shelves, racks etc. were repaired and proper valuations were made. In the premises, the plaintiff is entitled to the full insured amount of Rs.1,000/ - as loss of furniture, fittings, etc. Mr. Sen has not seriously claimed compensation for the goods completely destroyed by fire. Further, the plaintic has not been able to prove the value of the goods completely destroyed by fire. In fact, Mr. Chopra has stated that only a part of the shop was burnt and most of the goods were saved. According to Mr. Chopra's report, the value of the furniture is fixed at Rs.250/ -. Further, the plaintic has not been able to prove the value of the goods completely destroyed by fire. In fact, Mr. Chopra has stated that only a part of the shop was burnt and most of the goods were saved. According to Mr. Chopra's report, the value of the furniture is fixed at Rs.250/ -. The plaintiff's evidence as to the value of the furniture, fittings, etc. is not based upon any contemporaneous document. The incident took place in 1964 and the plaintiff has given evidence in 1967. There is no document to show that the plaintiff fixed the value of furniture or the value of his goods at a particular figure, whether below the sum of Rs.20,000/- or above it. The evidence of Madhusudan is also based upon surmise and guess work. The evidence as to the rate which is given is also based upon his memory only. 11. In this connection, the defendant company has claimed a deduction of the sum of Rs.1,600/- and Rs.150/-as the salvaged value of goods and furniture respectively (vide: Ex. F. In my view, this deduction cannot be allowed because I do not accept the evidence of Mr. Chopra that the goods were returned to the plaintiff after the inventory was prepared. Excepting Mr. Chopra's oral evidence, no other witness has stated that the goods were returned to the plaintiff. On this point, it will not be safe for me to rely on Mr. Chopra's evidence, because the way and the manner in which he had dealt with the transaction has not convinced me that he was telling the truth. An experienced man like Mr. Chopra returned the goods after preparing the inventory, but it did not strike him that he ought to get a receipt from the plaintiff. Mr. Chopra is supposed to be acting on behalf of a well known insurance company and, yet, he is careless enough not to insist on a receipt from the plaintiff when the alleged delivery of the goods took place. I could understand Mr. Chopra giving evidence to the effect that the plaintiff refused to sign when the delivery took place, but that was not his evidence. There is no letter either from Mr. Chopra or from the insurance company to the effect that the goods were returned to the plaintiff. I could understand Mr. Chopra giving evidence to the effect that the plaintiff refused to sign when the delivery took place, but that was not his evidence. There is no letter either from Mr. Chopra or from the insurance company to the effect that the goods were returned to the plaintiff. I accordingly hold that the goods were not returned to the plaintiff and, therefore, the defendant company is not entitled to the deduction on grounds of salvage. 12. In my opinion, the plaintiff is entitled to get a sum of Rs.6,027/2/4 p. as the total loss he has suffered for the loss of goods including furniture, etc. on account of fire in his shop. The plaintiff will also be entitled to get interest at the rate of 6% on the said amount with effect from the date of the institution of the suit, that is, 8th august, 1955. In this connection, reference may be drawn to (9) Bengal Nagpur Rly Co. v. Tuttanji Ramji, 65 Indian Appeal 66 at p. 73. I, therefore, answer the issues in the following manner: issue No. 1 (a) -The plaintiff did not sign any blank form but signed the two documents dated 27th September, 1954 under fraudulent representation. Issue No. 1 (b)-No. Issue No. 2.-No. Issue No. 3.-No. Issue No. 4.-Yes. Issue No. 5.-The plaintiff is entitled to a decree for Rs.6,027/2/4p. and interest @ 6% on Rs.6,027/2/4 with effect from 8.8.55 until payment. The plaintiff is entitled to costs. Certified for two Counsel.