JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - This petition challenges the order of the State Government directing the reinstatement of respondent no. 3. 2. Respondent no. 3 was appointed as Head Master of the Municipal Higher Secondary School, Auraiya on a probation of one year on 28th November, 1964. In the meantime the Municipal Board was by fresh elections constituted on 10th December, 1964. The new Board terminated the services of the third respondent on 31-12-1964. It is stated that in spite of direction to that effect, the third respondent did not hand over the charge and on 9-1-65 took away all the records of class IX and the money of the games and examination fees. Ultimately on 31-3-1965 the petitioner, Municipal Board. reinstated the third respondent to his original post. On 11-6-1965 the Board served a notice to show cause upon the third respondent mentioning certain charges therein. It threatened the respondent no. 3 that his services will be terminated in case his explanation is not found satisfactory. The respondent was asked to submit his explanation within a week. The respondent submitted his explanation on 20th July, 1965. On 31-7-1965 the Municipal Board by resolution held that the third respondent was not capable of being the Head Master with any sense of responsibility, that he committed mal-administration, defalcation in accounts and the records, and was seeing the higher authorities without permission etc. and hence his services are being terminated. Against this order the Respondent No. 3 filed an appeal. By the impugned order dated January 14, 1966 the State Government held that the resolution terminating the services is not in order because the first eight charges framed by the Municipal Board related to the period of his service prior to his reinstatement, and the last charge is not so serious as to call for termination of services. It held that on his reinstatement the third respondent was absolved of the irregularities, if any, committed by him before that date. It held that on his reinstatement the third respondent was absolved of the irregularities, if any, committed by him before that date. The State Government, therefore, allowed the appeal and directed that, (1) the appellant should be reinstated to the post of Principal Municipal Inter College, Auraiya and given charge of his duties immediately on the condition that he returns the register and examination fee of IX class, as stated by the Municipal Board in charges framed against him, provided this charge is correct and (2) that the appellant should be paid by the Municipal Board, Auraiya his full salary and D. A. for the entire period he remained out of employment. 3. The District Magistrate then went into the question of the loss of registers and the examination fee and found that the charge of taking away the registers was not established. He also held that the delay in the reinstatement of Sri Pandey shall put the Board to a further loss and, therefore, he should be reinstated immediately. This was communicated by the District Magistrate to the President .of the Municipal Board on 3rd February, 1966. The Board took up the attitude that it will enquire into the charges whether the registers etc. have been taken away by the third respondent or not. The District Magistrate did not agree and directed the Municipal Board to comply with the State Government's order. On 22nd June, 1966 the State Government issued another order stating that they are now satisfied that the charge of taking away the school registers by Sri Ganesh Shanker Pandey has not been established. The Government was also satisfied that the examination fee amount to Rs. 2.44 has to be paid by Sri Pandey. It directed that Sri Pandey be reinstated to his post on the condition that he returns a sum of Rs. 2.44 to Municipal Board, Auraiya. This order is also sought to be quashed. 4. For the petitioner three points have been urged. It was at the threshold urged that no appeal lay against the order of the Municipal Board terminating the services of the third respondent who was only a probationer. 2.44 to Municipal Board, Auraiya. This order is also sought to be quashed. 4. For the petitioner three points have been urged. It was at the threshold urged that no appeal lay against the order of the Municipal Board terminating the services of the third respondent who was only a probationer. Reliance in this connection has been placed upon Section 74 of the Municipalities Act which says that subject to any provisions to the contrary contained in Section 57 to 73 a servant may be dismissed, removed or otherwise punished, or the services of a probationer may be terminated by the President of the Municipal Board, subject to the right of appeal, except in the case of the termination of the services of a probationer, to such authority and within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed. It is stated that in consequence of this provision, the U. P. Municipal Boards Servants (Enquiry, Punishment and Termination of Services) Rules were framed in Appeal 1960. In these rules also no right of appeal is given against an order terminating the services of a probationer. Under rule 3 it is stated that the provisions of these rules shall apply in respect of servants mentioned in column 3 of the schedule appended hereto, with such modification or supplementary provisions as shown in column 4 thereof. In the schedule in entry no. 2 servants on the educational establishment are mentioned. This entry is in respect of rules 4 to 9. In column 4 is mentioned the U. P. Municipal Board Educational Establishment Services Rules, 1954 published by notification dated February 28, 1955. Thus the applicability of rules 4 to 9 in respect of servants on the educational establishment is subject to the U. P. Municipal Board Educational Establishment Services Rules, 1954. Learned counsel has further urged that even the Municipal Board Educational Establishment Services Rules, 1954 do not provide for any appeal against an order of termination of services of a probationer. These rules do not apply to Head Masters at all. The position, according to the petitioner, therefore, is that neither Section 74 or the 1954 rules nor 1960 provide for an appeal against an order terminating the services of a probationer. 5. Section 74 of the Municipalities Act is itself subject to any other provisions contained in Sections 57 to 73. The position, according to the petitioner, therefore, is that neither Section 74 or the 1954 rules nor 1960 provide for an appeal against an order terminating the services of a probationer. 5. Section 74 of the Municipalities Act is itself subject to any other provisions contained in Sections 57 to 73. It will hence apply only subject to any provision to the contrary being made by Section 73. Section 73 deals with servants on the educational establishment. Sub-Sec. (2) of Section 73 states that the State Government will make rules regulating the recruitment, punishment, and other conditions of service of persons appointed to the educational establishment of a Board. It is not disputed that the third respondent being the Principal of a Higher Secondary School was appointed to the educational establishment, in the Municipal Board. He would hence be directly covered by any rules that may be made under sub-Sec. (2) of Section 73. If there is any provision under Section 73(2) the third respondent will not be affected at all by Section 74 or any rules made in that behalf. In the U. P. Gazette of August 13, 1955 in Part I at page 1006 a notification no. A-204/XV-2233-55 dated August 6, 1955 was published. This notification was made in exercise of the powers conferred under sub-Sec. (1) of Section 73. 1t specifies the various appointing authorities in respect of the various posts in Higher Secondary Schools maintained by the Municipal Board. Thereafter this notification states that appointments to the posts other than teaching staff shall continue to be regulated under Section 74 and 75 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 as amended from time to time. Pending finalisation of the rules under Section 73(2) regulating appointment, punishment, dismissal 30 and appeals etc. of the members of the teaching staff of the Higher Secondary Schools, the appointing authorities specified above shall be the punishing authorities. Thus under this part of the notification the appointing authorities mentioned were also made the punishing authorities. Then the notification proceeds to state : "appeals against the orders of punishment amounting to dismissal, removal including discharge and reduction to a lower rank or lower stage in the time scale shall lie to the State Government within 30 days of the communication of the said order and shall be presented to the prescribed authority for being forwarded to the State Government". 6. 6. This later part of the notification is a provision in respect of appeals against orders of punishment, a matter spoken by sub-Sec. (2) of Section 73. This provides for appeals against orders of discharge as well. The order of termination of the third respondent's services as a probationer would amount to an order of discharge, even if it is not an order of dismissal or removal from service. Hence the third respondent would have a right of appeal to the State Government through the prescribed authority. 7. But, for the petitioner it was urged that this part of the notification will not apply to the third respondent because. firstly, this was not a rule. Section 73 (2) requires that the State Government may frame rules for the mentioned matters. Section 73 or any other provision in the Municipalities Act does not lay down any form or formula for making the rules. The last part of the notification will be a temporary rule. The only relevant provision is Section 300 of the Municipalities Act which says that the power of the State Government to make rules or regulations under this Chapter is subject to the condition of the rules or regulations being made after previous publication, and that they shall not take effect until they have been published in the official gazette. The condition is of their prior publication and of their taking effect on publication in the official gazette. This notification was published in the official gazette. There is no allegation in the affidavit filed by the petitioner that this notification was not published previously. It cannot, therefore, be held that this notification was not made after prior to the publication, what ever that phrase may mean under Section 300. 8. The second objection of the learned counsel was that this notification was made in exercise of the powers under sub-Sec. (1) of Section 73. It, therefore, cannot enure for the provisions of sub-Sec. (2) of Section 73. This is a mere technicality. The last part of the notification specifically deals with matters mentioned in sub-Sec. (2). It will, therefore, enure as a rule contemplated by sub-Sec. (2). This notification being applicable, it is clear that the third respondent had a right of appeal to the State Government. 9. This is a mere technicality. The last part of the notification specifically deals with matters mentioned in sub-Sec. (2). It will, therefore, enure as a rule contemplated by sub-Sec. (2). This notification being applicable, it is clear that the third respondent had a right of appeal to the State Government. 9. The second submission of learned counsel was that the State Government's order dated 14th January, 1966 was based upon a misapprehension of facts. They misunderstood the nature and effect of the charges framed against the third respondent when they stated that the first eight charges related to a period prior to the order of reinstatement which took effect on 2nd April, 1965. This is a fresh point. It has not been taken in the petition. The grievance of the learned counsel for the respondent was that if this aspect of the case had been emphasised in the petition they would have given detailed facts in the counter-affidavit to show that the view of the State Government related to real facts. In paragraph 30 of the petition it is averred that the reason for allowing the appeal of the respondent no. 3 by the State Government on the first eight charges is erroneous inasmuch as previously no charges were made against Shri Pandey by the Board and his services were terminated simply because the Board had decided to abolish class IX of the Higher Secondary School for a year. This grievance has been taken in the grounds in ground no. 6. There is no ground that the State Government erred in holding that in fact the charges did not relate to the period prior to 2-4-1965. I am, therefore, not inclined to go into this aspect of the case. Taking ground no. 6, as it is, it wrongly reads the view expressed by the State Government. The State Government did not hold that the services of the third respondent had been terminated earlier on these charges. It said that these charges related to a period of time antecedent to his reinstatement and, therefore, the order of reinstatement will be deemed to have absolved the third respondent from all that had happened prior to his reinstatement. I do not find any merit in this ground either. 10. It said that these charges related to a period of time antecedent to his reinstatement and, therefore, the order of reinstatement will be deemed to have absolved the third respondent from all that had happened prior to his reinstatement. I do not find any merit in this ground either. 10. The last point urged was that the State Government erred in law in allowing the appeal and directing the reinstatement of the third respondent without recording a finding on the second charge but leaving the question open for further enquiry and .directing that the order of reinstatement would be subject to the condition that that charge was found correct. In my opinion the State Government did not leave anything to be done afterwards. This matter related to the charge that the third respondent did not hand over charge of his office and took away registers and the money after his services had been terminated in December 1964. This incident, according to the charge itself, took place at a time prior to the reinstatement of respondent no. 3 on 31-3-1965. This matter, therefore, was covered by the finding of the State Government that it was a matter antecedent to the reinstatement. All the charges have been completely dealt with by the State Government. The order of the State Government cannot be read to mean that it left open this question and hence had not decided the appeal so far as it related to this charge. The State Government decided all the matters, but after so deciding. it thought fit that this was a charge which needed further examination and if that was proved to be correct the third respondent would not be entitled to reinstatement in spite of the finding that it related to a period prior to his reinstatement. This view of the Sale Government really was in favour of the Municipal Board. It was a direction outside the appeal. If at all, the third respondent could have a grievance against this part of the order. The matter was enquired into by the District Magistrate and was later on examined by the State Government also. Ultimately the State Government having felt satisfied that there was no substance in the charge that the respondent took away the registers of the school, if in its ultimate order of 22nd June. The matter was enquired into by the District Magistrate and was later on examined by the State Government also. Ultimately the State Government having felt satisfied that there was no substance in the charge that the respondent took away the registers of the school, if in its ultimate order of 22nd June. 1966, found that the third respondent had to pay a sum of Rs. 2.44. It accordingly made a direction that the third respondent will be reinstated on the condition that he returns the amount of Rs. 2.44. 11. Under all the circumstances this procedure of the State Government does not betray any unjustness. It tried to do justice between the parties even in spite of the fact that the appeal of the third respondent was on its merits allowed. This, therefore, is not a fit case for interference on this technicality. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed. Revision dismissed.