JUDGMENT Lakshmi Prasad, J. - This is an opposite parties special appeal from the order of a learned Single Judge by which the Respondent's petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution For the issue of a writ of certiorari has been allowed. 2. The Respondent Petitioner was a Pradhan. On certain complaints made against him the Additional Sub-Divisional Officer proceeded to inquire into the charges and on finding that the charges wire proved passed an order of dismissal. The Respondent Petitioner then went in appeal which came to be dismissed. Thereafter he approached this Court by a petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for the quashing of the order of dismissal passed by the Additional Sub Divisional Officer and confirmed in appeal by the District Magistrate, Unnao. 3. The main ground on which the, Respondent Petitioner challenged the impugned orders was that the Addition al Sub-Divisional Officer had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter and as such, the order passed by him was a mere nullity and remained so despite its confirmation in appeal. That the impugned order of dismissal came to be passed Under Clause (g) of Sub-section (1) of Section 95 of the UP Panchayat Raj Act is not in controversy. Under that provision power is given to the State Government to take action. Then we have Section 96-A of the Act to say that the State Government may delegate all or any of its powers under the Act to any officer or authority subordinate to it subject to such conditions and restrictions as it may deem fit to impose. 4. By notification No. 4483-P XXXIII-50-57 dated 19-12-1958 published in Part III of the UP Gazette dated 27-12-1958, the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred on it u/s 96-A of the Act delegated its power to take action Under Clause (g) of Sub-section (1) of Section 95 of the Act to "the Sub-Divisional Officer" subject to the condition that an order of removal passed by the sub-divisional officer shall be subject to appeal before the District Magistrate within thirty days from the date of such order. The contention of the Respondent Petitioner which has been upheld by the learned Single Judge was that by virtue of the above mentioned delegation the Additional Sub-Divisional Officer did not get authority to deal with the matter, notwithstanding the definition of the expression "Sub-Divisional Officer" as given in Section 2(ss) of the Act. The said definition says that a Sub-Divisional Officer includes an Additional Sub-Divisional Officer designated or appointed as such by the appropriate authority. 5. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. The learned Counsel for the Appellants has raised exactly the same points he raised before the learned Single Judge. His first contention is that having regard to the definition of the term Sub-Divisional Officer in the Act itself, the delegation made in favour of the Sub-Divisional Officer under the notification referred to above must be taken to ensure in favour of the (Addl.) Sub-Divisional Officer also. We are unable to accept the contention. Exactly similar arguments appear to have been raised in Gaya Dutt v. S.D.O. II Maharajsjanj District Rai Bareli and Anr. 1964 ALJ 145 decided by a Division Bench of this Court and the same were rejected. That case was with reference to Rule 25 of the Panchayat Raj Rules, which requires that a petition challenging an election is to be presented before "The Sub-Divisional Officer." Relying on the phraseology of Rule 25 the Division Bench held that it was not possible to hold that the person presenting an election petition could choose to present it either before the Sub-Divisional Officer or before an Additional Sub-Divisional Officer. The view taken in that case is that since the law directs the presentation of an election petition to the Sub-Divisional Officer, i.e. the officer who is in charge of the Sub-Division, it has got to be presented to that officer and to no other officer, even though it may be that the expression "Sub-Divisional Officer" as defined in the Act includes an Additional Sub-divisional Officer also. If we may say o with due respect to the Hon'ble Judges, who decided that case, we are in complete agreement with the reasoning advanced by them. If we may say o with due respect to the Hon'ble Judges, who decided that case, we are in complete agreement with the reasoning advanced by them. On principle, the present case stands on exactly the same footing, because here also the delegation under the notification referred to above is made in favour of "the" Sub-Divisional Officer, i.e., the officer, in charge of a Sub-Division and not to any other officer, who may have by virtue of his appointment as an Additional Sub-Divisional Officer, all or any of the powers of the Sub-Divisional Officer. We, therefore, repel the contention and see no reason to differ from the view expressed by the learned Single Judge on that point. 6. The other contention raised by the learned Counsel is that even if the order of dismissal was defective, the defect stood cured the moment it was confirmed in appeal, which was undoubtedly decided by an authority competent to decide it. This point has been dealt with at some length by the learned Single Judge and in support of the view taken by him he has referred to the cases of Collector of Customs, Madras Vs. A.H.A. Rahiman, AIR 1957 Mad 496 and State of UP v. Mohd. Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86 . We find that the observations reproduced from the aforesaid Supreme Court case in the judgment of the learned Single Judge fully cover the point raised in the present case. It is clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in that case that to quash an order passed by a subordinate Tribunal without jurisdiction a writ has to issue. 7. Whether that order has been confirmed in appeal or whether no appeal has been preferred against it. The position appears to be that an order passed without jurisdiction is a mere nullity and it does not attain any higher status simply because an appeal is preferred from it and it is confirmed in appeal. It may be that the appellate court in disposing of an appeal has the same powers which the trial court possesses in respect of a matter. It may also be that the pendency of any appeal is tantamount to the pendency of original proceedings in an appellate court. None of these propositions appears to help the contention that an order, though a mere nullity, becomes a valid and effective order, because of its confirmation in appeal. It may also be that the pendency of any appeal is tantamount to the pendency of original proceedings in an appellate court. None of these propositions appears to help the contention that an order, though a mere nullity, becomes a valid and effective order, because of its confirmation in appeal. We accordingly see no substance in the other contention raised by the learned Counsel and repel the same. 8. It was faintly urged that the Respondent Petitioner should not have been allowed relief because he does not appear to have challenged the jurisdiction of the Additional Sub-Divisional officer in dealing with the matter either before him or in appeal. It does not appear from the judgment under appeal if this contention was raised before the learned single Judge. However, be that as it may, the fact remains that the contention is not quite correct, in so far as we find from the memorandum of appeal, annexure 2, that in its paragraphs 4 and 5 the point which is the basis for the petition giving rise to this appeal, has been raised therein. We accordingly refuse to accept the contention that the Respondent Petitioner is not entitled to relief because of his failure to raise the point before the subordinate tribunal. 9. No other point has been urged before us. The special Appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.