JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is from an order of Datta, J. dated 27 February 1967. 2. The order was passed on the notice of Motion dated 16 August 1966, taken out by the appellant for an order that the preliminary decree passed in the suit and dated 15 June 1966, may be varied or modified by incorporating suitable directions for the sale of premises no. 24, Guruprosad Chowdhury Lane, Calcutta, by the Commissioner of partition appointed in the suit by public auction after fixing a reserve price and without limiting the sale amongst the parties only. The suit was filed on 2 September 1963 for a declaration of the shares of the respective parties in premises No. 24, Guruprosad Chowdhury Lane, for partition of the premises amongst the parties according to their respective shares, alternatively for sale of the premises and for other incidental reliefs. The appellant had roughly an undivided l/3rd share in the premises. Each of the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 had an undivided 7/288 share in the premises. The suit came up for hearing before Datta, J. on 15 June 1966, when a preliminary decree was passed declaring the shares of the parties in the premises and directing the premises to be sold by auction. The sale was, however, directed to be confined amongst the parties only with liberty to them to bid at such sale. The appellant contended in the trial Court that the decree was not drawn up or completed and that the appellant had, in the meantime, received an offer from an outsider for purchasing the same at Rs. 60,000/ -. The appellant also contended that none of the parties was affluent enough to buy his co-sharer's share in the premises at its proper price. On these allegations the appellant asked for a preliminary decree to be varied or modified by incorporating suitable directions for sale by public auction. 3. It should be stated here that the appellant also preferred an appeal from the preliminary decree. That appeal has been also heard and common arguments were advanced in the present appeal and in the other appeal. 4. Counsel for the respondents raised the preliminary objection that the appeal was not maintainable. 3. It should be stated here that the appellant also preferred an appeal from the preliminary decree. That appeal has been also heard and common arguments were advanced in the present appeal and in the other appeal. 4. Counsel for the respondents raised the preliminary objection that the appeal was not maintainable. Counsel for the appellants on the other hand contended first that the learned Judge had jurisdiction to hear the matter because the order was not perfected and if the learned Judge declined to hear the matter it would be exercising wrong principles and there would be failure to exercise jurisdiction. In other words, the emphasis that Counsel for the respondents placed on the order made was that the preliminary decree was passed without jurisdiction because it was not an order for public sale and the learned Judge in refusing to hear the matter again failed to exercise jurisdiction and, therefore, the appeal is competent. 5. Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the decision in (1)Harrison's Share Under A Settlement reported in 1955 Ch. 260, where it was held that an order pronounced by a Judge, whether in open court or in chambers, can always be withdrawn, altered or modified by him, either on his own initiative or on the application of a party, until such time as the order has been drawn up, passed and entered. In harrison's case (supra), the Judge in chambers pronounced orders on 15 march 1954. On 25 March 1954, the house of Lords gave its decision which made it clear that the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to make the order in that case. The learned Judge directed the Registrar not to proceed further with the order and desired to hear further argument. All parties to the applications contended that the Judge had no power to, or alternatively ought not to, recall the orders which he had pronounced. The learned Judge varied his orders which he had originally pronounced. An appeal was preferred and since the appeal was maintainable in that case it was contended by Counsel for the respondents that the present appeal was competent. 6. The ratio in Harrison's case (supra), was that the learned judge decided to hear the matter further because of a new decision in the House of Lords which rendered the decision of he learned Judge without jurisdiction. 6. The ratio in Harrison's case (supra), was that the learned judge decided to hear the matter further because of a new decision in the House of Lords which rendered the decision of he learned Judge without jurisdiction. In exercising such power the learned Judge neither failed to exercise jurisdiction nor did the learned Judge exercise jurisdiction which he did not possess. There was no challenge to the maintainability of the appeal in that case. In the present case Counsel for the respondent rightly contended first, that there were no grounds in the petition for setting aside the preliminary decree because of lack of jurisdiction, secondary, that no grounds were urged in the petition contending that he order was made without any jurisdiction. These points are unassailable. On the contrary the appellant asked for variation or modification of the decree. 7. Counsel for the respondents further rightly contended that what was heard was merely the petition and not the suit. At the hearing of the application counsel for the appellant contended that the learned Judge has passed a preliminary decree without jurisdiction and it was brought to the notice of the learned Judge that since the preliminary decree was passed without jurisdiction the learned Judge should rehear the matter. In refusing to rehear the matter the learned Judge did not fail to exercise any jurisdiction. It was competent to the learned Judge to rehear the matter or not to rehear the matter. There is no error patent on the face in refusing to rehear the matter. It was said by Counsel for the appellant that the learned Judge allowed the question of jurisdiction to be gone into at the hearing of the application. The learned Judge might have heard the parties and particularly the appellant on the question of jurisdiction involved in regard, to the passing of a preliminary decree but in allowing the parties to place their submission on the preliminary decree which was passed, the learned Judge did not transgress any jurisdiction, nor did the learned Judge thereby exercise any jurisdiction which was not vested in him. 8. In the present case the sale was by the decree. That decree was not impeached in the application. The us was terminated by the decree. 8. In the present case the sale was by the decree. That decree was not impeached in the application. The us was terminated by the decree. The application that the appellant made with regard to hearing could lead to rehearing of the suit but it would not be open to contend thereby that the application of the appellant brought the Us to a termination. Unless and until the decree could be set aside there would be no termination of the Us. In my opinion, the real reason why this appeal is not maintainable is because the application that was made wa? an application invoking the jurisdiction of the learned Judge in regard to inherent jurisdiction under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It has been laid down in the case of (2)Keshardeo Chameria v. Radha Kissern Chameria and others, reported in AIR 1953 SC 23 , that an order passed under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not appealable. At page 28 of the Report the Supreme Court said in regard to the application which was made in that case for restoration of the execution case that the learned Judge had jurisdiction to make the order and in making the order he neither acted in excess of his jurisdiction nor did he assume jurisdiction which he did not possess. In the present case as I have indicated allowing the matter to be reopened or refusing to do so is within the jurisdiction of the learned Judge and it does not amount to any infirmity in regard to exercise of jurisdiction or non-exercise of jurisdiction. 9. Counsel for the appellant finally submitted that though an order under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure might not be appealable but if there was something more than that, namely, that if there were exceptional features in a case the appeal could be maintained and in aid of that contention reliance was placed on the decision of Harrison's Share Under A Settlement (supra. I have already indicated the distinctive features in Harrison's case (supra), which did neither have any aspect of lack of jurisdiction nor of maintainability of appeal. I have already indicated the distinctive features in Harrison's case (supra), which did neither have any aspect of lack of jurisdiction nor of maintainability of appeal. In the present case Counsel for the respondents rightly contended that if the appellant preferred an appeal from the preliminary decree the appellant could not convert this appeal into an appeal against the preliminary decree in view of the fact that the application was concerned only with regard to the hearing of the matter of modification of the decree. 10. The contentions on behalf of the appellant do not have any merit and substance. Counsel for the respondents is right in his submission and contention that the appeal is not maintainable. The appeal is, therefore dismissed with costs. Certified for two counsel.