ORDER Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - This application in revision is directed against an order dated 6-11-1965 passed by the Civil Judge of Bulandshahr in an execution proceeding. It appears that a money decree against the Applicants was put into execution in the court of the Civil Judge. The Applicants objected to the execution, inter alia, on the ground of limitation. The learned Judge thought that it was "a fit case which should be treated as a regular suit", and ordered the Applicants "to add the clause of valuation in his objection u/s 47 CPC within a fortnight and meanwhile pay a court-fee on it." The only reason assigned by the learned Judge for passing the above order was that the Applicants counsel said that the case would "require much time as oral evidence also has to be adduced." As the counsel for the Applicants prayed for an adjournment of the hearing of the case on the date on which the above order was passed the learned Judge also directed the Applicants to pay Rs. 25/- as costs to the decree-holder. It is, however, the order treating the case as a suit and directing addition of a valuation clause to the objection and payment of court fee thereon that is in question before me. 2. I must at once say that the order under revision is entirely without jurisdiction and is based on a grievously mistaken view of the provisions of Section 47 Code of Civil Procedure. 3. It is not disputed that the questions raised by the Applicants in the proceeding taken against them relate to the execution of the decree. Sub-section (1) of Section 47 Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, makes it imperative that the questions be determined by the court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. The learned Civil Judge appears to have been of the view that even where questions arising between the parties to the suit in which a decree was passed relate to matters mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 47 CPC it is open to the court under Sub-section (2) of the said section to treat the proceeding as a suit. This view is patently erroneous. 4. This view is patently erroneous. 4. Section 47 CPC has for its object prevention of unnecessary and protracted litigation and cheap and expeditious determination of questions arising between the parties to a suit or their legal representatives in regard to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree passed in that suit. It is for securing the aforesaid object that it enjoins that questions relating to the above matters shall be determined by the court executing the decree and also imposes a bar against the determination of such questions by means of a separate suit. Sub-section (2) of Section 47 CPC has not been enacted as a proviso to Sub-section (1) and does not have the effect of overriding its mandatory requirement. It is, on the other hand, intended to be a supplementary provision which, while in no manner qualifying Sub-section (1) or lessening its effect, empowers the court to bring a legal action taken by a party into conformity with what has been laid down by Sub-section (1). Whether a question requiring determination is or is not one relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree is a matter which may at times present difficulty, and the party initiating a legal action may, therefore, have been honestly mistaken in the course adopted by him. In such cases he should not be driven to the necessity of starting another kind of legal action for a determination of the same question and the court should have the power to cure the defect in the form of action chosen by him. It is this power which has been conferred by Sub-section (2) of Section 47. 5. It must here be noted that Sub-section (2) of Section 47 has for the first time been introduced in the CPC of 1908 and the earlier Code had no corresponding provision. Yet, the courts exercised, as an inherent power vested in them, the power now expressly conferred by Sub-section (2). The sub-section, therefore, only gives legislative recognition to the practice followed by the courts even under the repealed Code, and expressly invests the courts with the discretion to treat, subject to the conditions; mentioned in the sub-section a legal action which is not in proper form as one in proper form. The sub-section, therefore, only gives legislative recognition to the practice followed by the courts even under the repealed Code, and expressly invests the courts with the discretion to treat, subject to the conditions; mentioned in the sub-section a legal action which is not in proper form as one in proper form. This is a curative discretion and the sub-section provides it for enabling the court in fit cases to make a legal action conform to the requirement of Sub-section (1) and not for arming the court with the power of nullifying that sub-section. 6. If a question raised by a judgment-debtor relates to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree passed against him, it has to be decided by the court executing the decree, irrespective altogether of the complexity of the question and the nature and quantity of evidence proposed to be given by the parties. The judgment-debtor has the right to have the question decided by the court executing the decree without recourse to a suit and without incurring the liability of paying court-fee as on a plaint and defraying other expenses incidental to a suit. Indeed, Sub-section (1) of Section 47 CPC precludes the institution of a suit by him. The order of the learned Judge that the proceeding should be treated as a suit and the Applicants should pay court-fee as in respect of a suit is, therefore, wholly lacking in jurisdiction and it also amounts to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction. 7. I may draw attention to Mani Shanker Vs. Niranjan Swarup, AIR 1955 All 686 , a case decided by Division Bench of this Court. In that case a decree-holder, in execution of his decree for possession, claimed compensation for the loss caused to the immovable property in dispute by the judgment-debtor after the decree. The executing court held that the application made by the decree-holder did lie to it but ordered the execution application to be converted into a plaint because of its being of a high valuation. This order was set aside in appeal, and, thereupon, the judgment-debtor preferred a second appeal to this Court. The executing court held that the application made by the decree-holder did lie to it but ordered the execution application to be converted into a plaint because of its being of a high valuation. This order was set aside in appeal, and, thereupon, the judgment-debtor preferred a second appeal to this Court. The Division Bench which heard the appeal dismissed it and, dealing with the question whether Sub-section (2) of Section 47 CPC empowering the executing court to pass the order in question, observed: The discretion vested in the execution court under Sub-section (2) of Section 47 is to be exercised when the execution court finds that it has no jurisdiction to execute the decree, but that by some bonafide mistake or oversight the decree-holder instead of instituting a suit has filed an execution application. The discretion cannot be exercised to convert an execution application into a plaint when no suit lies and when the matter must be decided in the execution department. The discretion vested in the execution court is a discretion in aid of the law and not to contravene it. There was really no exercise of discretion under Sub-section (2) of Section 47 in the present case. It was in substance a refusal to execute the decree. 8. Reference may also be made to S.R.M.M. Seetharaman Chettiar Vs. A.R.M.N. Chidambaram Chettiar and Others, AIR 1933 Mad 166 . There, a judgment-debtor who had raised an objection to the execution of the decree and whose objection was held to have been properly made u/s 47 CPC was referred to a regular suit for getting the objection decided. On appeal a Division Bench of the Madras High Court set aside the order and observed as follows: The learned Judge apparently seems to think that he has an option either to dispose of the application u/s 47 or refer the parties to a regular suit. In this he seems to be wrong. Is a question to be agitated u/s 47 or by a separate suit? Once it is held that resort to Section 47 is the proper remedy, the Court has no option, but is bound to decide the question in execution under that provision. Para. 1 of the section shows that it is incumbent on the Court to decide the questions referred to there, under that very section. Once it is held that resort to Section 47 is the proper remedy, the Court has no option, but is bound to decide the question in execution under that provision. Para. 1 of the section shows that it is incumbent on the Court to decide the questions referred to there, under that very section. The words used are shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit'. These words are imperative and vest no discretion in the Court. Para. 2 is no doubt not happily worded, but both the parts should be read together and the interpretation I have suggested is the only proper one. 9. The revision is allowed, the order passed by the Civil Judge, except the portion relating to payment of costs, is set aside and the case is sent back to him for being disposed of according to law. No order as to costs.