JUDGMENT : Bhargava, J. (May 1, 1967) 1. This Appeal relates to property which belonged to one Akwak Singh, who died in the year 1894, leaving his widow Smt. Mehtab Kaur. In the year 1926, Smt. Mehtab Kaur gifted the disputed land to Harnam Singh, the predecessor -in interest of the appellants. The collaterals of Akwak Singh at that time challenged the gift by filing a Suit for declaration that Smt. Mehtab Kaur, the widow, being a limited owner, could not make a gift of the property, and that the gift would not be binding on them as reversioners after her death. The defence taken, inter alia, in that Suit was that the property had come to Smt. Mehtab Kaur under a Will executed by Akwak Singh, so that she was absolute owner of the property and was entitled to make the gift. The Suit was dismissed, but, on Appeal, the Appellate Court held that the Will was not genuine and, consequently, decreed the Suit holding that the deed of gift will not be binding on the reversioners after the death of Smt. Mehtab Kaur. That decree became final, so that the claim of succession of Smt. Mehtab Kaur under the Will was finally negatived. 2. On 17th June, 1956, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (No. 30 of 1956) (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") came into force. Smt. Mehtab Kaur died on 16th October, 1957, and then on 21st January, 1958, the present respondents, as reversioners of Akwak Singh, brought a Suit for possession of the property, which had been gifted to Harnam Singh, against the appellants who had succeeded on the ground that, on the enforcement of the Act, Smt. Mehtab Kaur had become full owner of the property and consequently, the appellants were entitled to retain the property as donees under the deed of gift executed by her. The Suit was dismissed by the Trial Court, but on Appeal, the first appellate Court decreed the Suit in respect of ¾th share in the disputed property, holding that Smt. Mehtab, Kaur did not become full owner of the property on the enforcement of the Act. The Suit in respect of ¼th share was not decreed on the ground that the reversioners, who were entitled to that share, had not joined in the Suit as plaintiffs. The Suit in respect of ¼th share was not decreed on the ground that the reversioners, who were entitled to that share, had not joined in the Suit as plaintiffs. In second Appeal, the High Court of Punjab upheld this decision of the first Appellate Court. The appellants have, therefore, come up to this Court in this Appeal by special leave. 3. On the facts stated above, the only question that falls for decision is whether Smt. Mehtab Kaur had become full owner of the property when the Act came into force on 17th June, 1956. The view accepted by the High Court is that, since Smt. Mehtab Kaur had already gifted the property to Harnam Singh and had parted with the possession of the property, it could not be held that this property was possessed by her when the Act came into force and, consequently, the provisions of Section 14(l) of the Act did not become applicable. In our opinion, the view taken by the High Court is correct and must be upheld. 4. The provisions of Section 14(1) came up for consideration before this Court in four cases. The earliest case was that of Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Sotra Veerayya, 1959 Suppl 1 SCR 968 in which, on the date on which the Act came into force, the property in dispute was in possession of a person purported to have been adopted as a son by the widow, but his adoption was held to be invalid. The question to be considered was whether the property could be held to be possessed by the widow, even though the actual physical possession was with another person, whose claim of adoption by tho widow had been negatived. The next case was that of Brahamdeo Singh v. Deomani Missir, C.A. No. 120 of 1960 decided on 15.10.1962. In that case, the widow of the last male owner had transferred the property by two sale-deeds in favour of the purchasers before the Act came into force, and the reversioners claimed possession of the property pleading that the widow was not possessed of the property at the commencement of the Act, as he had alienated her rights and had delivered possession to the purchasers. the third case is Eramma v. Veerupana, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1879. the third case is Eramma v. Veerupana, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1879. That was a converse case in which the female Hindu did not possess any legal right or title to the property, though she was actually in physical possession of it, and this Court had to decide whether it could be held that the property was possessed by her at the commencement of the Act. The fourth and the last case is that of Mangal Singh v. Smt. Rattno, C.A. No. 51 of 1964 decided on 6-4-1967. In this last case, Smt. Harnam Kaur, the widow of the last male owner, was dispossessed by his collaterals some time in the year 1954, so that the widow was not in possession when the Act came into force. She died subsequently while the Suit was still pending and after the Act had come into foroe, and, thereupon, the question arose whether she had become the full owner under Section 14(1) of the Act or not so as to entitle the respondent, Smt. Rattno, to succeed to her on the basis that she was absolute owner of the property. In all these cases, the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act were examined and the meaning to be given to the expression 'possessed by a,female Hindu" was laid down. It does not appear to be necessary to reproduce the decision in all these four cases. It is enough to quote from the latest judgment in the case of Mangal Sinigh & Others (supra), in which the views expressed by this Court in the earlier three cases were considered. The Court, after considering the meaning given to the words "possessed" and possession" in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, Vol. 3. and Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Ed., held, "It appears to us that the expression used in Section 14(1) of the Act was intended to cover cases of possession in law also, where lands may have descended to a female Hindu and she has not actually entered into them. It would, of course, cover the other cases of actual or constructive possession. It would, of course, cover the other cases of actual or constructive possession. On the language of Section 14(1), therefore, we hold that this provision will become applicable to any property which is owned by a female Hindu, even though she is not in actual, physical or constructive possession of that property." The Court then referred to the decision in the case of Gummala Pura Taggina Matada Kot trusrewami, (1959) Supp1 1. S.C.R. 968 (supra) and agreed with the earlier decision. that "possessed" in Section 14 is used in a broad sense and, in the context, means that state of owning or having in one's hand. or power. On further reference to the decision of this Court in Brahamdeo Singh, C. A. No. 51 of 1964 decided on 6.4.1967. (supra), the Court held, "It was thus made clear in that case that the property was held not to be possessed by the widow, because, the alienation made by her being binding on her, she had no longer any legal right left in that property even in the sense of being in the state of owning it. The case, thus, explains why, in cases of alienation or a gift made by a widow, even though that alienation or gift may not be binding on a reversioner, the property will not be held to be possessed by the widow, because the alienation or the gift would be binding on her for her life time and she, at least, would not possess any such rights under which she could obtain actual, or constructive possession from her transferee or donee. Having completely parted with her legal rights, in the property, she could not be said to be possessed of that property any longer. From the decision of this Court in" Eramma v. Varupana and others (Supra) the inference drawn was, expressed as follows : "This case also, thus, clarifies that the expression "possessed by" is not intended to apply to a case of mere possession without title, and that the Legislature intended this provision for cases where the Hindu female possesses the right of ownership of the property in question. Even mere physical possession of the property without the right of ownership will not attract the provisions of this Section. Even mere physical possession of the property without the right of ownership will not attract the provisions of this Section. This case also, thus, supports our view that the expression "possessed by" was used in the sense of connoting state of ownership, and; while the Hindu female possesses the right of ownership, she would become full owner if the other conditions mentioned in the Section are fulfilled. The Section will, however, not apply at all to cases where the Hindu female may have parted with her rights so as to place herself in a position where she could, in no manner, exercise her rights of ownership in that property any longer." 5. It is clear from the questions reproduced above that, on the principles laid down by this Court in the case of Mangal Singh and others (Supra), it has to be held in the present case that the property in dispute cannot be held to be' possessed by Smt. Mehtab Kaur, because, after gifting the property to Harnam Singh and parting with the possession of the property, she was not left with any rights at all under which she could regain possession in her own life time. The gift executed by her was binding on her, even though it may not have been binding on the reversioner. She could not, therefore, avoid the deed of gift and could not claim back possession from Harnam Singh or his successors in interest. Having thus completely parted with her rights, she could not be held to be possessed of the property when the Act came into force and, consequently, she could 'not become full owner of it. 6. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the 'appellants sought to distinguish all these cases decided by this Court on the ground that in none of those cases had the property been transferred by a deed of gift, so that those cases do not directly deal with the point arising in this case. We do not think that any such distinction is possible, because in those cases, this Court explained the full significance of the expression' "possessed by a Hindu female" and the meaning accepted by the Court clearly covers the case of a female Hindu who may have parted with the property, by making a gift of it. We do not think that any such distinction is possible, because in those cases, this Court explained the full significance of the expression' "possessed by a Hindu female" and the meaning accepted by the Court clearly covers the case of a female Hindu who may have parted with the property, by making a gift of it. Once she gifts away the property, she is no longer in a position to claim any legal right to that property; and in the absence of such a right, she cannot be held to be possessed of it. The same view has been expressed, by several High Courts when dealing with the effect of gifts or settlements made by a widow. 'Reference may be made to, the decisions of, the Patna High Court in Harak Singh v. Kdilash Singh, SIR 1958 Patna 581, the Punjab High Court in Amar Sigh v. Sewa' Ram, ILR (1960) 2 Punj 348. the Orissa High Court in, Ganesh Mahanta v. Sukris Bewa AIR 1963 Orissa 167 and the Madras High Court in Kurruppuayar v. Periathambi Udayar, AIR 1966 Madras 165. In all these cases, gifts or settlements made by a widow were held to lead to the result that, the widow could not be held to be possessed of the property which she had gifted away or given away by settlement. The ground taken by the appellants, therefore has no force. The Appeal fails and is dismissed' with' costs.' H.L.S. Appeal dismissed