ORDER M.U. Isaac, J. 1. This case arises out of a complaint filed by the respondent against the petitioner before the District Magistrates Court, Trivandrum, as C. C. No. 55/64, charging the petitioner with the offence of defamation. The trial court found her guilty of the offence and sentenced her under section 500 I.P.C. to pay a fine of Rs. 100 and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. She filed an appeal before the Sessions Judge, Trivandrum, as Crl. A. No. 99/65. The appeal was dismissed confirming the conviction and sentence. The petitioner has, therefore, come before this Court in revision. 2. The respondent is an Assistant Grade I in the Public Works Department (Transport) in the Government Secretariat of Kerala. The petitioner is the wife of a Medical Officer, who retired from Government service. On 21st October 1963 the petitioner sent a petition to the Chief Secretary to the Government, making certain allegations against the respondent, and requesting the Government to take immediate steps against him. This petition is Ext. P-1, and reads as follows: I beg to bring to your kind notice the following facts for your consideration and speedy and favourable disposal. The Sri K. Ranganathan; a clerk in the Panchayat division under Development section in the Secretariat is causing me great financial loss and endless worry. He is a kudikidappukaran in my property called Puthuval Thope Purayidom, Anathalavattom, Kadakkavur P.O. This property is in Chirayinkil village and extends over 3 acres and 40 cents. Some 50 years ago one Kochupappu, Ranganathans father was permitted to reside in this property by the then head of my family. Kochupappu died some 16 years ago and Ranganathan with the mother and sisters continues to say in the property. He is regularly misappropriating coconuts from the property. I warned him many times and yet this nefarious habit still continues. Early in December 1962 he began to put up a shed in the property. I objected to this but he completed the construction heeding little to my objections. On this I filed a suit in the Munsiffs Court, Attingal as O.S. 25/63 for eviction of Ranganathan and his family from my property. The court issued an injunction order prohibiting him from causing any loss to me in the property. The suit is now pending decision with the court. On this I filed a suit in the Munsiffs Court, Attingal as O.S. 25/63 for eviction of Ranganathan and his family from my property. The court issued an injunction order prohibiting him from causing any loss to me in the property. The suit is now pending decision with the court. In spite of the above injunction order not only the nefarious practice of appropriating the yield continued and he turned out my men on 10th August 1963 when they went there to protect the newly planted coconut seedling from stray cattle by putting up a fencing all around. On 3rd October 1963 he collected a large number of his friends of questionable character and feasted them lavishly with tender and ripe coconuts from my property. On 20th October 1963 he turned out my men who went there for collecting coconuts so much so that what coconuts left by him drip one by one, being over ripe. Then he had with him half a dozen of his friends who were armed, some with daggers and others with knives. Sri Ranganathan owes everything in his life to this property. His father a man of practically no means, had his living there and educated his son out of the earning he had from the property. Then my family was an undivided one; so the family heads never felt the loss then. But when the family property underwent sub-division individual holdings become limited, and I consequently began to feel this systematic loss in the yield. Though a kudikidappukaran he has his own property evidently acquired out of the earnings his father could make from the property. This morning on his way to his office he got into the house of one of my men and threatened him with bodily violence. I never expected such behaviour from him more so from a Government employee. Therefore, I request you to take immediate step 1. to enable me to take the yield from my property, 2. to permit me to conduct routine improvements in the property, 3. to stop his nefarious practice of collecting coconuts once for. The above petition was disposed of by the Government as per letter Ext. P-8, dated 31st October 1963 informing the petitioner that the Government cannot interfere in the matter, and that she may approach the court of law or the police authorities for getting her grievances redressed. to stop his nefarious practice of collecting coconuts once for. The above petition was disposed of by the Government as per letter Ext. P-8, dated 31st October 1963 informing the petitioner that the Government cannot interfere in the matter, and that she may approach the court of law or the police authorities for getting her grievances redressed. On 21st October 1964, the anniversary of sending the petition, the respondent filed a complaint, charging the petitioner of the offence of defamation. The petitioner admitted that she sent Ext. P-1 to the Chief Secretary; but she pleaded that what she did fell within 8th and 9th exceptions to section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, and that she was not guilty of the offence. The courts below found that Ext. P-1 was per se defamatory, and that it did not fall within any of the above exceptions. There can be no doubt that the accusations made against the respondent in Ext. P-1 are per se defamatory; and the only question that arises in this case is whether it comes within any of the above exceptions. 3. In order to determine the above question, it is necessary to know the circumstances under which the petitioner sent Ext. P-1 to the Chief Secretary. The respondent is residing with his mother and sisters in a house situate in a property called Puthuval Thope Purayidom in Chirayankil Village. It has an extent of 3.40 acres and it admittedly belonged to the tarwad of the petitioner. In a partition said to have been effected in her family, this property was allotted to the tavazhi consisting of the petitioner and her children. There was a subsequent partition in the petitioner tavazhi, under which the property devolved on her two daughters, of whom one is a minor. On 25th January 1963, the petitioner and her two daughters filed a suit in the Munsiffs Court, Attingal, as O.S. No. 25 of 1963, against the respondent, his mother and his 4 sisters, for an injunction restraining the defendants therein from causing any obstruction to the plaintiffs in taking the usufructs from the aforesaid property, for ejecting the defendants from the house in which they were residing and for directing them to remove the structure said to have been put up by the defendants in the said property by the side of the house. Ext. Ext. D-7 is a certified copy of the plaint in this suit. According to the averments in Ext. D-7, the above-said house belonged to the tarwad of the petitioner. The respondents father, one Kochu Pappu, who was an employee under the karnavan of the petitioner tarwad, was residing in the said house as permitted by the said karnavan. After the death of KochuPappu in Mithunam 1123 (1948 June-July), the respondent, his mother and sisters, who are the defendants in the suit and legal representatives of the deceased, continued to reside in the house. The defendants constructed a small hut by the side of the house without the permission of the plaintiffs and they were causing obstruction to the plaintiffs from taking the income from the property. Along with the institution of the suit, the plaintiffs filed an application for temporary injunction restraining the defendants from taking any income from the plaint schedule property. Ext. D-8 is a certified copy of the petition. This petition was allowed by the court and Ext. D-14 is a certified copy of the courts order, which was served on the respondent, who is defendant No. 2 in the suit, on 26th January 1963. The suit was decreed as prayed for. Ext. D-10, dated 24th March 1964 is a certified copy of the judgment in that case Ext. D-10, shows that the defendants in this suit set up title and possession to 40 cents of the plaint schedule property and the house in which they reside. They contended that the said 40 cents of land were given by the karnavan of the petitioner to the respondents father, Kochu Pappu under an oral sale in the year 1110 (1935) and thereafter Kochu Pappu has been in possession of the said property as absolute owner thereof. It appears that the order of injunction, Ext. D-14, issued by the court had no practical effect as will be seen from the deposition of the respondent as P.W. 1 in this case. To a pointed question put to him in cross-examination whether after the order of injunction was served on him he had taken the coconut income from this property, he said that he had plucked the nuts. To a pointed question put to him in cross-examination whether after the order of injunction was served on him he had taken the coconut income from this property, he said that he had plucked the nuts. He qualified this answer subsequently by saying that the coconuts were plucked not by himself or any of the parties to the suit, but by an elder sister of his by name Bharathi, who is not a party to the suit. He however, admitted that this Bharathi has been married away, but she used to pluck the nuts from the above said 40 cents of property every two months. 4. Ext. P-1, which is the subject matter of this complaint, alleges that in spite of the order of injunction, the respondent interfered with the petitioners possession Saradamma of the property, misappropriated the income there from Ranganathai and continued to cause obstruction to the petitioners men from taking the income therefrom. Ext. P-1 specifically refers to incidents which took place on three days, namely on 10th August 1963, 3rd October 1963 and 20th October 1963. Regarding the incident on 20th October 1963, it is alleged that the respondent with the aid of half a dozen of his friends who were armed, some with dagger and others with Kievas prevented the petitioners men, who went to the property for collecting the coconuts, from doing so. It also states that on the morning of 21st October 1963, the respondent while going to his office got into the house of one of the petitioners men and threatened him with bodily violence. The sum and substance of this petition is that in spite of the pendency of a civil suit and an order of injunction issued against the respondent restraining him from taking the income from the property and causing any obstruction to the petitioners men from collecting the same, the respondent has been ignoring the civil courts order committing several acts of waste in the property preventing the petitioners men from taking any coconuts therefrom, and collecting men of questionable character in the property armed with weapons for the purpose of threatening the petitioners men and thereby achieving his object of effectively preventing the petitioner from taking or enjoying any income from the property. Ext. P-1 therefore prays that steps may be taken against the respondent by the Government, who is his employer and redress her grievances. 5. Ext. P-1 therefore prays that steps may be taken against the respondent by the Government, who is his employer and redress her grievances. 5. Endorsements on Ext. P-1 show that this petition was received in the Development Department of the Secretariat, who forwarded it to the Public Works Department, wherein the respondent was then working for necessary action. The note put up by the Assistant Secretary of the Public Works Department on Ext. P-1 shows that according to the instructions contained in the Government order referred to therein, the Secretaries of Government in the concerned departments are competent to conduct the enquiries regarding the disciplinary action to be taken against the members of the Secretariat staff and that the petition may, therefore be transferred to the Development Department and disciplinary proceedings may be initiated against the respondent, if deemed necessary. Accordingly, the petition was returned to the Development Department. Ext. D-18 is the note submitted by the Development Department on this petition and it states that, as it was a property dispute, there was no necessity for the Government to interfere in the matter. The Government accepted this note; and the letter, Ext. P-8, was sent to the petitioner disposing of Ext. P-1, in terms of the above note. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the complaints or allegations made by the petitioner against the respondent in Ext. P-1 were cognisable by the Government, and that the Government could have taken disciplinary action against the respondent in respect of the said allegations if the Government wanted. Apart from what follows from the endorsements made in the Secretariat on Ext. P-1, there can also be no doubt that the Government are entitled to take disciplinary proceedings against their employees in respect of misconduct not only which arises in the course of or in relation to the discharge of their duties as Government servants, but also in respect of their conduct outside the office, which may affect the reputation of the Government servant concerned or his efficiency, morality or devotion to Government work. The acts alleged against the respondent amount to serious mis-conduct, for which disciplinary action can be taken against him, under the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, I960. The enquiry may end in the dismissal of the respondent, if the allegations against him are established. 6. The acts alleged against the respondent amount to serious mis-conduct, for which disciplinary action can be taken against him, under the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, I960. The enquiry may end in the dismissal of the respondent, if the allegations against him are established. 6. Both parties have adduced a volume of evidence, mainly documentary, relating to the conduct of the parties subsequent to the sending of the petition, Ext. P-1 and till the filing of this complaint. This evidence has no direct bearing on the question to be determined in this case. But the subsequent events are developments of the situation, as it existed at the time of sending Ext. P-1; and they may throw light in determining the circumstances under which Ext. P-1 was sent. With regard to the incident on 20th October 1963 alleged in Ext- P-1, one Sahadevan, who is an agent of the petitioner, lodged a first information in the Kadakkavoor Police Station on 23rd October 1963 against the respondent, complaining of obstruction to pluck coconuts from the property, criminal intimidation with deadly weapons and theft of coconuts. Ext. P-2 is a certified copy of the affidavit. The police, after investigation, submitted a final report against the respondent in the Attingal Sub Magistrates Court, charging him with offences under sections 506 (2) and 379 I.P.C. Ext. D-4 is a certified copy of the police report. The respondent was acquitted in that case as per judgment dated 14th May 1964, holding that the prosecution failed to establish the offences against the respondent. Ext. P-3 is a certified copy of this judgment. Immediately after the above case was registered by the police against the respondent, he filed a complaint against the petitioners husband alleging that he threatened to cause death to the respondent with an open knife, and caused wrongful restraint to him on 24th October 1963. The accused was discharged in this case, holding that the complainant failed to make out a prima facie case. Ext. D-16 is a certified copy of the order of discharge, dated 14th May 1964. On 17th November 1963, the petitioners husband lodged a complaint before the police charging respondent of having committed trespass on the property, preventing him from entering therein and slapping him on the left cheek. Ext. D-16 is a certified copy of the order of discharge, dated 14th May 1964. On 17th November 1963, the petitioners husband lodged a complaint before the police charging respondent of having committed trespass on the property, preventing him from entering therein and slapping him on the left cheek. After investigation, the police submitted a final report in the Varkala Sub-Magistrates Court against respondent for offences under sections 447, 341 and 323 I.P.C. Ext. D-1 is a true copy of this report. The accused was acquitted in this case, holding that the prosecution evidence was discrepant, and that the accused could not be held guilty on such evidence. Ext. P-6 is a true copy of the judgment in this case, and it is dated 21st October 1964. On 4th March 1964 the petitioners husband lodged another information against the respondent before the police, complaining of theft of coconuts from the property. After investigation, the police submitted another final report against the respondent before the Varkala I Class Magistrate Court, to try him for the offence. Ext. D-2 is a certified copy of this report. By judgment dated 19th February 1965, the accused was acquitted holding that the prosecution cannot be said to have succeeded in establishing the guilt of the accused. Ext. P-9 is a certified copy of this judgment. Immediately after the alleged occurrence on 4th March 1964, one Kanakadasan, who is the husband of one of the sisters of the respondent, filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner husband and three others, alleging that he was residing in a part of the property along with the respondent and others, that they were in possession and enjoyment of the same, that on 6th March 1964 the accused trespassed into the property, armed themselves with deadly weapons, threatened to cause death of the complainant, demolished a hut belonging to the complainant and others, and committed theft of certain articles from the hut costing about Rs. 40. Ext. D-17 is a true copy of the order dated 24th June 1964, discharging the accused in this case, holding that the complaint was apparently false. On 5th May 1964, the police submitted another final report against the respondent charging him with the offence of theft of coconuts from the property on 1st March 1964. Ext. D-3 is a true copy of this report. On 5th May 1964, the police submitted another final report against the respondent charging him with the offence of theft of coconuts from the property on 1st March 1964. Ext. D-3 is a true copy of this report. The accused was acquitted in this case, by judgment dated 19th February 1965 holding that there was no reliable evidence regarding the alleged occurrence. Ext. P-10 is a true copy of this judgment. It is seen from the evidence in this case that the respondent was involved in other criminal cases also which concerned different persons and different parties. Finally, the police charge sheeted him along with his companions for furnishing security under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for keeping the peace. That is one side of the picture. Regarding the decree passed against the respondent, his mother and sisters, in O.S. No. 25 of 1963, the respondent and his mother filed an appeal before the Sub Court, Attingal. The petitioner and her daughters, who are respondents in the appeal, moved for appointment of a Receiver alleging that in spite of the order of temporary injunction issued, and the decree passed by the Munsiff court the respondent was preventing the petitioner from taking the yield of the property and that the respondent was forcibly taking the income therefrom. This application was opposed by the respondent as regards 40 cents of the property, which he had been claiming under an oral sale. The Sub Court, on being satisfied about the allegations made against the respondent, appointed a Receiver for the whole property by its order, dated 20th August 1964. Ext. D-13 is a true copy of this order. 7. The above narration gives a brief picture of the fight that was going on between the petitioner and her husband on the one hand and the respondent on the other hand regarding the property mentioned in Ext. P-1, which the petitioner sent to the Chief Secretary to the Government. It also shows the type of person that the respondent is. An order of temporary injunction issued by the Civil Court restraining him from interfering with the petitioner possession of the property and plucking of coconuts therefrom served no purpose. He ignored the order and continued to pluck the nuts. As the events subsequent to the sending of Ext. It also shows the type of person that the respondent is. An order of temporary injunction issued by the Civil Court restraining him from interfering with the petitioner possession of the property and plucking of coconuts therefrom served no purpose. He ignored the order and continued to pluck the nuts. As the events subsequent to the sending of Ext. P-1 show, even the prosecutions instituted against him by the police did not succeed or deter him from his criminal activities. The question whether the sending of Ext. P-1 to the Chief Secretary to the Government, which is per se defamatory, falls within the 8th or the 9th exception to section 499 of the Indian Penal Code has to be considered in the above background. 8. Section 499 I.P.C. and exceptions 8 and 9 thereto read as follows: Whoever by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person. ****** ****** Eighth Exception Accusation preferred in good faith to authorised persons: It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-matter or accusation. ****** Ninth Exception Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other's interests: It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good. (The explanations to the section and the illustrations thereto are omitted as they are not relevant to the point under consideration.) For the 8th exception to be attracted, the petitioner has to establish that (1) the accusation was made in good faith, and (2) it was made to a person who has lawful authority over the respondent with respect to the subject matter of the accusation. The 9th exception is attracted only if it is established that (1) the imputation on the character of the respondent was made in good faith, and (2) it was made for the protection of the interest of the petitioner or of any other person or for public good. Good faith is a common fact; and section 52 of the Indian Penal Code lays down in a negative form, when an act or belief cannot be in good faith. It reads as follows: 'Good Faith' Nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith which is done or believed without due care and attention.� It has, therefore, to be considered whether the petitioner acted in good faith in sending Ext. P-1 to the Chief Secretary to the Government. 9. The prosecution examined the husband of the petitioner as P.W. 2; and he has deposed that the statements contained in Ext. P-1 are true, that Ext. P-1 was prepared, by him, and that it was sent to the Chief Secretary by the petitioner at his instance on the bona fide belief that the Government would take necessary action against the respondent. The petitioner, when examined under section 342 Criminal Procedure Code, stated that Ext. P-1 was prepared by her husband, that she honestly believed its contents to be true, and that she sent the same to the Chief Secretary for proper action being taken against the respondent. The trial court has not considered the question of good faith; but the lower appellate court, after a detailed and careful consideration of the matter, has held that the petitioner acted in good faith in sending Ext. P-1 to the Chief Secretary. The correctness of this finding was not seriously disputed before me. On the facts and circumstances of the case, which have been adverted to above, there can be no doubt that the petitioner act was in good faith. 10. The next point for consideration for the application of the 8th exception is whether the accusation was made to a person who has lawful authority over the respondent in respect of the subject matter of the accusation. The respondent is an employee in the Government Secretariat and the Chief Secretary to whom Ext. P-1 was sent was the person who has the lawful authority over the respondent. The respondent is an employee in the Government Secretariat and the Chief Secretary to whom Ext. P-1 was sent was the person who has the lawful authority over the respondent. The only contention of the respondent, which both the courts below have accepted is that the Chief Secretary has no authority over the respondent in respect of the subject matter of accusation. They held that the reliefs claimed in Ext. P-1 are in respect of certain immoveable property and that the Chief Secretary is not competent to give any such relief. This is a totally wrong approach of the question. What has to be considered is, what is the subject matter of the accusation and whether the person to whom the accusation is made has any lawful authority over the matter. The subject matter of the accusation as is obvious from Ext. P-1 is a series of criminal and wanton acts alleged to have been committed by the respondent. As I have already stated, these are matters which the Chief Secretary can take cognisance of and in respect of which he can take disciplinary action against the respondent. The illustration to 8th exception to section 499 I.P.C. makes the matter very clear. This illustration reads as follows: "If A in good faith accuses Z before a Magistrate; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a servant, to Z master if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a child, to father A is within this exception."� The accusation made against the respondent in this case falls within the second instance mentioned in the illustration, namely, an accusation made in good faith against a servant to his master. In all the instances mentioned in this illustration, all what the person to whom the accusation is made can do is to enquire into the accusation, if deemed necessary, and punish the person against whom the accusation has been made, if the same was found to be true. This is exactly the nature of the accusation made in Ext. P-1 and the manner in which the Chief Secretary can deal with the said accusation. I therefore hold that the accusation made by the petitioner against the respondent by sending Ext. This is exactly the nature of the accusation made in Ext. P-1 and the manner in which the Chief Secretary can deal with the said accusation. I therefore hold that the accusation made by the petitioner against the respondent by sending Ext. P-1 to the Chief Secretary falls within the 8th exception; and it does not, therefore, amount to defamation as defined in section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. 11. Both the lower courts have relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kanwal Lal v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 1317, for holding that the 8th exception does not apply to the case. The appellant in that case, who was a police officer and a neighbour of the respondent, sent an application to the Panchayat alleging that the respondent was a woman of loose character having illicit connection with goondas, that her paramours were coming to her frequently at nights and that her immoral activities reflected badly on the locality in which the appellant lived. The imputations made on the character of the respondent were grossly defamatory. However, the appellant pleaded that the accusation made by him fell within the 8th exception to section 499 I.P.C. Rejecting this plea, the Supreme Court said: In order to establish a defence under this exception the accused would have to prove that the person to whom the complaint was made had lawful authority over the person complained against, in respect of the subject-matter of the accusation. If the District Panchayat Officer or the Panchayat had such lawful authority, the last paragraph of the offending communication would have justified such a plea. But there is no basis at all for this argument in view of the clear provisions of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952 under which statute alone Panchayats have jurisdiction.� I fail to see how this decision would help the respondent. It was a case of accusation made by a person without good faith to another person who had no manner of authority over the person against whom the accusation was made, or with respect to the subject-matter of the accusation. It was a case of accusation made by a person without good faith to another person who had no manner of authority over the person against whom the accusation was made, or with respect to the subject-matter of the accusation. On the other hand, the passage which I have extracted above from the Supreme Court decision indicates that, if the person to whom the accusation was made, has authority over the person against whom it was made, in respect of the subject matter of the accusation, exception 8 will apply. This is also obvious from a reading of this exception and the illustration appended thereto. 12. I shall also deal with the question whether the 9th exception applies to the case. Having held that the imputation was made in good faith, the only point that remains for consideration is whether the imputation was made for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good. The petitioner case is that the imputation was made for the protection of the interest of herself and her two daughters, to whom the property in question belonged. Dealing with this exception, the Supreme Court in Kanwal Lal v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 1317 said that this exception merely reproduces the principle laid down by Lord Campbell, C. J. in Harrison v. Bush, (1885) 5 E and B 344 at 348 to the following effect: "A communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contains criminatory matter which, without this privilege, would be slanderous and actionable."� And the Court held that it is sufficient for the application of exception 9, if the communication is made to a person for the protection of one own interest in which the other also has an interest. Applying the above principle it appears to me that the petitioner act in sending Ext. P-1 to the Chief Secretary falls within the 9th exception as well. However, in view of my finding that the case falls within the 8th exception, it is unnecessary for me to express any definite opinion on the question of the applicability of the 9th exception to the case. 13. P-1 to the Chief Secretary falls within the 9th exception as well. However, in view of my finding that the case falls within the 8th exception, it is unnecessary for me to express any definite opinion on the question of the applicability of the 9th exception to the case. 13. I cannot help observing that the conduct of the respondent in instituting this complaint has been highly reprehensible. Ext. P-1, which is the subject-matter of the complaint, was sent to the Chief Secretary on 21st October 1963; and the respondent knew about it immediately after it was received in the Secretariat. Ext. P-1 was disposed of on 31st October 1963 by letter Ext. P-8. But the respondent thought of taking action against the petitioner for the first time only on 14th September 1964, by sending the registered notice, Ext. P-5 and the complaint was instituted on 21st October 1964. There is no explanation for this inordinate delay. The provocation for this action is obvious from the evidence in the case. Two complaints instituted against the petitioner husband with respect to the property concerned in this case, one by the respondent himself and the other by his brother-in-law, were dismissed by the Court as per orders of discharge Ext. D-16, dated 14th May 1964 and D-17, dated 24th June 1964. Two of the prosecutions instituted by the police against the respondent on the basis of the complaints made by the petitioner husband as per final reports Exts. D-2 and D-3, both dated 5th May 1964, were pending trial against the respondent. On 20th August 1964, the Subordinate Court appointed a Receiver for the entire property, overruling the respondent objection. It is under these circumstances that the respondent thought of Ext. P-1 and instituted this complaint. There can be no doubt that it was instituted without any bona fides and as a desperate measure to vex and harass the petitioner who appears to be a chronic heart patient. 14. In the result, I allow this petition, acquit the petitioner of the offence charged against her and set aside the conviction and sentence passed against her. The fine imposed on the petitioner, if recovered, is directed to be refunded to her.