JUDGMENT : Shelat J. 1. This appeal together with Civil Appeal Nos. 881 to 887 of 1964 are by special leave and arise from eviction suits filed by the appellants against the respondent-tenants. All of them are directed against the common judgment and order passed by the High Court of Maharashtra allowing revision applications filed by the respondent-tenants under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and dismissing the appellants' suits. As they involve common questions of fact and law, they were heard together and are disposed of by this judgment. As the facts in Civil Appeal No. 880 of 1964 are typical, we need set out only those facts it being unnecessary to go into the facts of the other appeals. 2. The facts leading to these appeals may briefly be noticed. By an agreement dated May 19, 1933, the Improvement Trust of the City of Bombay (the predecessor-in-title of the Municipal Corporation of Bombay) agreed to lease a plot of land situate at Matunga, Bombay and handed over possession thereof to the predecessors-in-title of the appellants. The said lessees thereupon built on the said plot a building known as 'Bhiwandiwala Building.' The building consists of a ground floor and two upper floors, the ground floor consisting of 17 shops with a projecting awning, constructed presumably as a shelter against rain and sun. By an indenture of lease dated January 29, 1936, the Municipal Corporation granted lease of the said plot together with the said building to the said lessees in perpetuity, determinable, however, on conditions as there in contained. Under clause (2) of the said lease, the lessees covenanted. 'not to use or permit to be used such portion of the land hereby demised as shall be for the time being unbulit upon for any purpose whatever other than as an open space .... and not to place or store or permit to be placed or stored upon the land for the time being unbulit upon or any part thereof any article or thing whatsoever which may interfere with the use of such an open space.' 3. Clause 13 authorised the Corporation to re-enter upon the said premises or any part thereof in the event of the lessees committing breach of the said conditions and covenants. Clause 13 authorised the Corporation to re-enter upon the said premises or any part thereof in the event of the lessees committing breach of the said conditions and covenants. In 1949, the appellants who had by then acquired the lease-hold rights in the said property filed eviction suits against the respondents on the ground that they had made encroachments in the said open space by putting up platforms for storing and exposing their wares for sale thereby committing breach of the said clause (2) and jeopardising the said least. The suits ended in a compromise dated August 28, 1950 upon the tenants agreeing and undertaking to remove the said encroachments and also undertaking not to make any encroachment and obstruction in future or keep any articles in the said open passage which would be objectionable to the Municipal Corporation and which would render the lessees open to the risk of being prosecuted or of the said lease being forfeited. It appears that notwithstanding the said compromise, the said encroachments were continued. For we find the Estate Agent of the Municipal Corporation complaining by his letter of November 15, 1952 that certain unauthorised encroachments continued to exist. These encroachments, inter alia, consisted of platforms projecting into the said open space in shops Nos. 1, 6, 7 and 8 and a milk shop. The said letter warned that "even though the said breaches may not have been committed by you but by your tenents, you are liable for the same under the terms and conditions of the leave and action will be taken against you only." 4. Between 1952 to 1957 the said Estate Agent kept on reminding the appellants that the said encroachments were not removed inspite of several requisitions by him and threatening that the Corporation would exercise its right of re-entry unless the appellants filed suits against their tenants for eviction. Consequently, On March 13, 1957 the appellants filed three suits against their tenants in the Court of Small Causes, one of them being in respect of shop No. 2, the subject-matter of Civil Appeal No. 882 of 1964. On May 8, 1958, the appellants wrote to the Estate Agent requesting for a copy of the report detailing the encroachments in suits which they proposed to file. On May 8, 1958, the appellants wrote to the Estate Agent requesting for a copy of the report detailing the encroachments in suits which they proposed to file. On this letter the Estate Agent asked one of his subordinates, witness Rajani, to report as to "the present position of the outstanding breaches." On May 17, 1958, Rajani made his report detailing encroachments in respect of shop Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 14, 15 and 17. On May 31, 1958, the appellants served notices on the respondent-tenants terminating their respective tenancies and enclosed therewith a copy of Rajani's report. In September 1958, the appellants filed seven more suits. On November 11, 1958, the appellants got photographs made of the said open space outside these shops. On November 22, 1958, Rajani made another report stating that the encroachments reported earlier by him still continued. Consequently, on January 17, 1959, the Estate Agent wrote to the appellants giving once again details of encroachments in respect of shops 3 to 15 and 17. All these reports correspondence and the said photographs were on proof thereof admitted in evidence in these suits without apparently any objection by the respondents. Besides them, the appellants examined the first appellant, the said Rajani and the photographer Tahajani. As against this evidence the defence of the respondent-tenants was (1) of denial of having made any encroachments, (2) in the alternative that the goods found by Rajani lying in the said open space were not kept for sale but were kept temporarily either while they were being shifted inside the shops or while the said shops were being cleansed and (3) that Rajani's report was made in collusion with the appellants. 5. The trial Judge did not accept the evidence of the first appellant but accepted the evidence and the report of the said Rajani that when he inspected the building on May 17, 1958 he found that each of the respondent-tenants had stored his wares and goods outside in the open space exposing them for sale and not for a temporary purpose as alleged by him. The trial Judge also relied on the photographs taken on November 11, 1958 not as evidence of encroachments subsequent to the date of the suits but as showing a continuous conduct on the part of the respondents. The trial Judge also relied on the photographs taken on November 11, 1958 not as evidence of encroachments subsequent to the date of the suits but as showing a continuous conduct on the part of the respondents. On these findings, he held that the encroachments committed by the respondents were in breach of Cl. (2) of the lease and the undertaking contained in the said consent decree and directed eviction. The Appellate Bench of the Small Cause Court' also accepted the evidence of Rajani, repelled the suggestions that his report was made in collusion with the appellants or that the goods were kept outside the shops for temporary purpose and confirmed the decree passed by the trial court. The Appellate Bench observed: (a) that the correspondence between the Municipal Corporation and the appellants established that the Corporation was objecting all along to the said encroachments in the said open space and threatening re-entry; (b) that there was nothing wrong in the appellants calling for details of these encroachments from the Corporation ; (c) that Rajani's evidence established that when he visited the property on May 17, 1958 he found the respondents having kept their goods for sale; and (d) that "considering the fact that even after the suits were filed, the appellants (tenants) were committing breaches as demonstrated by the photographs the natural presumption is that thay must have committed such breaches even prior to the date when the casue of action in the suit arose." In the revision applications filed by the respondents the High Court posed the, question: "Whether it was established on the evidence that the tenants or any for them had encroached on the open space ?" The High Court decided to interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below on the grounds : (a) that the findings of fact were contrary to the weight of the evidence and based on conjecture and guess work. (b) that they were not only unsupported by evidence but had been arrived at by ignoring the evidence oral and documentary, and (c) that the courts below had misdirected themselves in construing the covenant contained in clause (2) as meaning an isolated encroachment on May 17, 1958 and not a frequent, if not habitual, encroachment. 6. (b) that they were not only unsupported by evidence but had been arrived at by ignoring the evidence oral and documentary, and (c) that the courts below had misdirected themselves in construing the covenant contained in clause (2) as meaning an isolated encroachment on May 17, 1958 and not a frequent, if not habitual, encroachment. 6. The High Court also held that Rajani's report that the goods stored in the said open space belonged to the respondents, could not be acted upon as there was evidence that the footpath adjacent to the said open space was infested by hawkers, that therefore it was possible that the said goods might have belonged to the hawkers and further that the statement that the goods belonged to the respondents was not reliable as Rajani had not disclosed what enquiries he had made in that connection and from whom. In coming to this conclusion the High Court seems to have ignored the respondents' defence that they had kept the goods in the open space for a temporary purpose which meant that the goods belonged to them. It also ignored the testimony that when photographs were taken on November 11, 1958, the respondents had admitted that the goods lying in the said open space on that day were their goods. 7. The first question which arises is whether the High Court was competent to set aside the concurrent findings of the trial court and the Appellate Bench and the decrees based on those findings. The revision applications before the High Court were under section 115 of the Code. In view of the several decisions of this Court and the Privy Council there can no longer be any doubt or dispute as to the restricted scope of the revisional jurisdiction under section 115. The revision applications before the High Court were under section 115 of the Code. In view of the several decisions of this Court and the Privy Council there can no longer be any doubt or dispute as to the restricted scope of the revisional jurisdiction under section 115. In Venkatgiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious Endowment Board, (1949) 76 I.A. 67 the Privy Council made it clear that section 115 laid down the intention of the legislature that the order of the trial court, right or wrong, shall be final and that the section empowered the High Court to satisfy itself on three matters only: (a) that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction, (b) that the case is one in which the court ought to exercise jurisdiction and (c) that in exercising it the court had not acted illegally, i.e., in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, i.e., by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which was material in that it might have affected the ultimate decision. Similarly, in Balkrishna Udayar v. Vasudev Aiyar, (1917) 44 I.A. 261, the Privy Council laid down that section 115 applied to jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it or illegal assumption of it and that the section was not directed against conclusions of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction was not involved. In Vora Abbasbhai v. Haji Gulamnabi, (1964) 5 S.C.R. 157 , a case under the Bombay Rent, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, this Court explained the restricted jurisdiction under section 115 in terms of the Privy Council's decisions and observed that section 121 of the Act under which the trial court and the District Court in appeal had dismissed the landlord's suit did not affect the jurisdiction of the court to entertain and decide the suit as that section only conferred a certain protection to the tenant. The decision of the District Court that the tenant established or failed to establish his readiness and willingness to pay the standard rent did not affect the jurisdiction of the court and that by wrongly deciding that a tenant is or is not entitled to protection, the court did not assume to itself jurisdiction which was not vested in it. The decision of the District Court that the tenant established or failed to establish his readiness and willingness to pay the standard rent did not affect the jurisdiction of the court and that by wrongly deciding that a tenant is or is not entitled to protection, the court did not assume to itself jurisdiction which was not vested in it. Nor did the court by arriving at an erroneous conclusion on the tenant's plea of his readiness and willingness act illegally or with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction. It is clear that the expression `illegally or with material irregularity' in clause (c) of section 115 means errors relating to material defects of procedure, and not to errors of either law or fact after the formalities which the law prescribed have been complied with (C.F. Keshardeo Chamria v. Raodha Kissen, (1953) S.C.R. 136, 153). 8. In the present case, there was obviously no wrongful assumption of jurisdiction nor failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in the Small Cause Court. Section. 12(l) of the Bombay Rent Act provides protection against eviction to a tenant so long as he performs the terms and conditions of the tenancy. The finding of the trial court and the Appellate Bench that the term that the tenant shall not make any encroachment on the open space was a condition of tenancy was accepted as correct by the High Court. The decision of the trial court concurred by the Appellate Bench was that the tenants had contravened this condition and that such contravention deprived them of the statutory protection. Whether such conclusion was right or wrong and whether it was one of law or of fact, did not mean that the trial court assumed to it self jurisdiction not vested in it or refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by the Act. To say that the findings of the trial court and of the Appellate Bench were against the weight of evidence or that they were reached by ignoring important evidence would amount at best to errors in conclusions on facts. To say next that the construction of clause (2) of the lease by the trial court and the Appellate Bench was erroneous and that clause (2) required a continuous breach, assuming such contruction is warranted, would be an error of law. To say next that the construction of clause (2) of the lease by the trial court and the Appellate Bench was erroneous and that clause (2) required a continuous breach, assuming such contruction is warranted, would be an error of law. But as so often been said by this Court an error of law or of fact does not confer jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere under section 115. Such interference would set at naught the manifest legislative intention to give finality to the decision of the trial court which is subject only to an appeal before the Appellate Bench. Such errors are not errors relating to material defects of procedure contemplated by clause (c) but are errors of either law or fact. In P.D. Chougule v. M.H. Jadhav, (1966)1 S.C.R. 102 , this Court pointed out the distinction between errors in deciding questions of law which have relation to or are concerned with the question of jurisdiction and errors of law which have no such relation or connection. It also observed that though the construction of a document of title is a point of law the fact that the trial court construes` it wrongly does not confer on the High Court the power to interfere under section 115 unless the error necessarily involves a question of jurisdiction of that court. 9. The contention of Mr. Rameshwar Nath, however, was that a wrong construction of clause (2) of the lease by the trial judge resulted in a jurisdictional error. The proper construction according to him was that unless the encroachment resulted in interference with the use of the open space as a passage, there could be no breach of the said clause. He argued that the evidence was that there was no such interference. He also pointed out that the said clause (2) and the terms of the said compromise decree did not constitute conditions of tenancy, that they amounted to personal obligations and therefore the lessees' remedy was one in damages and not eviction. We are not impressed by these arguments. Clause (2) of the lease in clear language provides that the open space below the said awning was not to be used except as an open space and no goods or things were to be placed or stored therein which would interfere with its use as an open space. We are not impressed by these arguments. Clause (2) of the lease in clear language provides that the open space below the said awning was not to be used except as an open space and no goods or things were to be placed or stored therein which would interfere with its use as an open space. There was evidence accepted both by the trial court and the Appellate Bench that each of the respondent-tenant had placed his goods in the open space outside his shop exposing them for sale and not for any temporary purpose, as alleged. Neither clause (2) nor the said compromise provided that a breach of them would occur only if the use of the open space by placing or storing goods therein amounted to interference as a passage. Assuming it were so, the construction placed by the subordinate courts would at best be an error of law and not a jurisdictional error resulting either in wrong assumption of jurisdiction or failure to exercise jurisdiction vested by law. 10. The next contention that clause (2) of the lease and the said compromise did not constitute conditions of tenancy is untenable. Indeed, the High Court repelled the contention and rightly held that they were conditions of tenancy as they pertained to the use of the demised premises and forbade the use of part of such premises viz., the open space, except as open space. There is nothing in the evidence to show that the open space immediately outside each of the shops was not part of the demised premises. 11. The contention that there was no evidence of a continuous breach of clause (2) of the lease and the said terms of the compromise, assuming that the breach under clause (2) and the said terms meant a continuous one, would again be an erroneous construction and therefore an error of law, which as already stated, would not warrant interference under section 115. 12. Mr. Misra for the respondent tenant in C.A. 880 of 1964 argued that the trial court committed an error as to a jurisdictional fact as a tenant cannot be deprived of statutory protection under section 12 (1) of the Act unless it was found that he failed to perform the conditions of tenancy and further that such conditions were not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. The argument was that a condition in the lease that its breach would result in eviction was inconsistent with the provisions of the Act unless such a condition was in respect of matters enumerated in section 13. He argued that section 12 was subject to section 13, that is, that section 13 was exhaustive of the matters on proof whereof by a landlord a tenant can be evicted. If a condition in a lease does not relate to any one of those matters, its breach cannot result in deprivation of the statutory protection under section 12(1). Such a breach would be of a condition in consistent with the provisions of the Act. Section 12(1) no doubt confers the status of irremovability upon a tenant so long as he performs the conditions of the tenancy. In Vora Abbasbhai's case (supra) payment of standard rent was considered to be one such condition. If payment of such rent is considered to be a condition, the non-performance of which deprives the tenant of the status of irremovability, it is difficult to appreciate why breach of the other conditions, viz, the use of part of the demised premises in a particular manner, cannot have the same result. But the contention was that such a condition, the breach of which is claimed to take away the protection, must be consistent with the provisions of the Act. The objects of the Act are to prevent landlords from extorting excessive rents and evicting tenants by taking undue advantage of scarcity of accommodation. It is difficult to appreciate how a condition of the tenancy that part of the demised premises shall be used as an open space and forbidding its use in a manner contrary to its being an open space can be said to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Rent Act. No specific provision of the Act was shown to be inconsistent with such a condition. The contention, however, was that a condition which provides that its breach would result in a right in the landlord to evict the tenant is necessarily inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. We are not prepared to accept such a wide proposition. No specific provision of the Act was shown to be inconsistent with such a condition. The contention, however, was that a condition which provides that its breach would result in a right in the landlord to evict the tenant is necessarily inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. We are not prepared to accept such a wide proposition. The argument was that section 13 of the Act laid down certain circumstances under which alone a landlord can sue for eviction, that those circumstances are exhaustive, that a condition of tenancy, the non-performance whereof deprives the tenant of his status of irremovability must be in respect of the circumstances set out in section 13 only and that conditions other than those would be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Such a construction, in our view, is not warranted. Section 12 and 13 deal with different topics and have different objects. Whereas section 12(l) seeks to clothe a tenant with the cloak of statutory protection against eviction so long as he performs the conditions of his tenancy, section 13 provides that notwithstanding that protection, the landlord can sue for eviction provided he establishes any one of the circumstances set out in that section. For instance, notwithstanding the fact that a tenant performs the conditions of tenancy and is ready and willing to pay the standard rent and is therefore protected under section 12(1), if a landlord establishes that he requires the premises bona fide he can by virtue of section 13 sue for and obtain a decree for eviction. The two sections seek a compromise between the necessities of tenants and landlords. It is, therefore, impossible to say that it is only when circumstances set out in section 13 arise that a landlord can evict a tenant and that eviction on the ground of failure to perform the conditions of tenancy would not deprive the tenant of the protection under s, 12(l). Such a reading of the two sections would be contrary to the objects underlying the two provisions. 13. The decision in Artizans Labourers and General Dwellings Company Ltd. v. Shitaker, (1919) 2 K.B. 301, illustrates a case where a condition can be inconsistent with the Act and its non-performance therefore would not result in deprivation of the statutory protection. Such a reading of the two sections would be contrary to the objects underlying the two provisions. 13. The decision in Artizans Labourers and General Dwellings Company Ltd. v. Shitaker, (1919) 2 K.B. 301, illustrates a case where a condition can be inconsistent with the Act and its non-performance therefore would not result in deprivation of the statutory protection. It was there held that the tenant's covenant to give up the premises to the landlord at the expiration of the tenancy would not enable the landlord to obtain eviction, Mr. Misra cited certain other decisions but we do not think that they can assist as none of them lays down anything contrary to what we have said earlier. The recent decision of this Court in Hiralal Vallabhram v. Sheth Kasturbhai, Civil Appeal 685 of 1965 decided on March 31, 1967 Supreme Court (Unrep.), also does not help because it was there held that once the appellate court found that the appellant was a trespasser, it could not pass a decree of eviction against him under section 28 of the Act which envisages only suits between landlords and tenants and that that being so the decision of the appellate court was clearly in excess of its jurisdiction. 14. We must, therefore, hold following the decisions of this Court and of the Privy Council referred to earlier, that the High Court had no jurisdiction in applications under section 115 of the Code to interfere with the findings of the Small Cause Court and its Appellate Bench however erroneous it thought they were as such errors did not fall under clause (a), (b) or (c) of that section. We may observe that though the facts in these appeals are common there is one difference so far as appeal No. 880 of 1964 is concerned. The respondent-tenant there did not, while agreeing to the compromise decree, concede that he had committed any encroachment before the earlier suits were filed. This difference, however, has no significance as the encroachment relied on by the trial court and the Appellate Bench was one found on May 17, 1958 which was held to be a continuous one. 15. It was then argued that even if the High Court was not competent to interfere under section 115 it was competent to do so under the revisional jurisdiction conferred on it by section 5 of Bombay Regulation II of 1827. 15. It was then argued that even if the High Court was not competent to interfere under section 115 it was competent to do so under the revisional jurisdiction conferred on it by section 5 of Bombay Regulation II of 1827. We do not know, and both Mr. Rameshwar Nath and Mr. Misra frankly conceded that they too were not aware, whether the rules and practice of the High Court permit a single Judge to hear and dispose of applications under the said Regulation. Assuming that a single Judge can try such applications, we do not know what view the learned Judge would have taken if these revision applications had been converted into applications under the said Regulation as there are decisions of that High Court which lay down that it would exercise this power only in exceptional cases (C.F. Mahadali Govind v. Sonu Din Daylata, (1872) Bom. H.C. 249 Shiva Nathaji v. Joma Kashinath, (1883) I.L.R 7 Bom. 341 and The Bombay Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Vasudev Baburao Kamat,(1927) 29 Bom. Law 1551). The present applications were lodged and were tried and disposed of under section 115 of the Code. The judgment of the High Court clearly shows that it interferred under the jurisdiction conferred by that section. No application was ever made to convert the revision applications into applications under the said Regulation or to invite the High Court to try them or to exercise its power thereunder. We do not, therefore, know whether the High Court would have interferred under the said Regulation or not. In these circumstances though the point raised by counsel was one of law, we considered it unfair to the appellants to allow counsel to raise this point for the first time. 16. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the judgment and order passed by the High Court are set aside and the decree passed by the trial court and confirmed by the Appellate Bench are restored. The respondents will pay the costs of these appeals. One hearing fee only. Appeal Allowed.