ORDER G.C. Mathur, J. - Rajendra Kumar was married to one Sarla Gupta. Suits Nos. 23 and 24 of 1963 were filed in the court of the Civil Judge, Moradabad, by Rajendra Kumar against Sarla Gupta and by Sarla Gupta against Rajendra Kumar u/s 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for dissolution ot their marriage. The suits were decreed on 8-4-1963. On 25-5-1963, Rajendra Kumar married Lila Gupta. On 7-5-1965, Rajendra Kumar died. Rajendra Kumar was the Bhumidhar of certain plots of land and disputes arose in consolidation proceedings between Lila Gupta claiming to have succeeded to the Bhumidhari as Rajendra Kumar's widow and Rajendra Kumar's brothers and brothers' sons who claimed to have succeeded to the Bhumidhari on Rajendra Kumar's death. The case set up by them was that Lila Gupta and Rajendra Kumar were not married and that, in law, no marriage could take place between them on the date it was alleged to have taken place. In other words, they disputed the factum of the marriage as well as the legality of the marriage. The legality was challenged on the ground that the marriage alleged to have taken place on 25-5-1963, was within one year of the decree of dissolution which was prohibited by Section 15 of the Act. The Consolidation Officer held that, in fact, no marriage had taken place between Rajendra Kumar and Lila Gupta and that, in law, no legal marriage could have been contracted by Rajendra Kumar or 25-5-1963. Against the orders of the Consolidation Officer, Lila Gupta went up in appeal. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) held that the marriage of Rajendra Kumar with Lila Gupta on 25-5-1963, was established by the evidence. He further held that the question whether Rajendra Kumar and Lila Gupta could legally enter into a marriage on 25-5-1963, could not be allowed to be raised as it had not been specifically pleaded. He accordingly allowed the appeals and ordered the name of Lila Gupta alone to be entered against the plots. The orders of the Settlement Officer were challenged before the Deputy Director of Consolidation in revision. The Deputy Director has also held that Rajendra Kumar and Lila Gupta were married on 25-5-1963. He disagreed with the Settlement Officer that the question whether the marriage was in violation of Section 15 and was, on that account, illegal could not be raised. The orders of the Settlement Officer were challenged before the Deputy Director of Consolidation in revision. The Deputy Director has also held that Rajendra Kumar and Lila Gupta were married on 25-5-1963. He disagreed with the Settlement Officer that the question whether the marriage was in violation of Section 15 and was, on that account, illegal could not be raised. He went into this question but held that the marriage of Rajendra Kumar and Lila Gupta, though solemnized in contravention of the provisions of Section 15, could be deemed to be neither null and void nor even voidable. He accordingly held the marriage to be a good and binding marriage and on the basis thereof, held that Lila Gupta was the widow of Rajendra Kumar entitled to succeed to his Bhumidhari rights. In this view, he dismissed all the revisions The Petitioners have challenged the orders of the Deputy Director of Consolidation and of the Settlement Officer. 2. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has rightly not challenged the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Settlement Officer and the Dy. Director of Consolidation that the marriage of Rajendra Kumar with Lila Gupta was solemnised on 25-5-1963. The only contention, which he has raised, is that the marriage was in violation of the provisions of Section 15 of the Act and was, therefore, illegal, that such a marriage could not confer the status of a widow on Lila Gupta on the death of Rajendra Kumar and that she was not entitled to succeed to the Bhumidhari rights. 3. Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act is in these words: 15. When a marriage has been dissolved by a decree of divorce and either there is no right of appeal against the decree or, if there is such a right of appeal, the time for appealing has expired without an appeal having been presented, or an appeal has been presented but has been dismissed, it shall be lawful for either party to the marriage to marry again: Provided that it shall not be lawful for the respective parties to marry again unless at the date of such marriage at least one year has elapsed from the date of the decree in the Court of the first instance. 4. According to the findings of fact, the marriage took place on 25-5-1963. The decree for dissolution of marriage was passed on 8-4-1963. 4. According to the findings of fact, the marriage took place on 25-5-1963. The decree for dissolution of marriage was passed on 8-4-1963. The marriage has, therefore, taken place within one year from the date of the decree and is clearly hit by the proviso to Section 15. This much is not disputed. The dispute is whether the marriage is legal or illegal. Section 5 of the Act lays down the conditions for a Hindu marriage and the first condition laid down is that neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage. Section 11 provides that marriages solemnised after the commencement of the Act in contravention of the conditions specified in Clauses (i) and (iv) and (v) of Section 5 shall be null and void. Reading Section 5 and Section 11 together, it appears a marriage, when one of the parties has a spouse living, is a null and void marriage. Section 12 enumerates what are voidable marriages. Section 13 makes provision for divorce. Section 15, which has already been quoted above, lays down when divorced persons may re-marry again. Section 17 provides punishment for bigamy. 5. The rival contentions may now be noticed. Shri Shanti Bhushan for the Petitioners has contended that the proviso to Section 15 is in imperative terms and prohibits remarriage within one year of the decree for dissolution and it must be construed as a mandatory provision. He further contends that a marriage solemnised in violation of this provision is an illegal marriage which cannot be recognised in law. Shri K.C. Saksenafor Lila Gupta contends that the proviso to Section 15 is merely directory and a marriage performed in violation thereof will not be illegal. According to him, only those marriages are void which are declared to be void by Section 11. Shri Shanti Bhushan has relied upon certain decisions given in respect of Section 57 of the Indian Divorce Act. Section 19 of the Indian Divorce Act provides that a marriage may be declared null and void inter alia on the ground that the former husband or wife of either party was living at the time of the marriage and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force. Section 57 permits parties, whose marriage has been dissolved by a decree, to re-marry after the period of waiting prescribed therein but "not sooner". Section 57 permits parties, whose marriage has been dissolved by a decree, to re-marry after the period of waiting prescribed therein but "not sooner". In Warter v. Warter (1890) L R 15 P D 152 the question arose whether the marriage of Mrs. Tayloes against whom a decree absolute for dissolution was passed on November 27, 1879, with Warter on February 3, 1880, within the period of waiting was legal or not. It was held that the marriage was invalid. It was observed in that case: Mrs. Tayloe was subject to the Indian law of divorce and she could only contract a valid second marriage by showing that the incapacity arising from her previous marriage had been effectually removed by the proceedings taken under that law. This could not be done, as the Indian Law, like our own, does not completely dissolve the tie of marriage until the lapse of a specified time after the decree. This is an integral part of the proceedings by which alone both the parties can be released from their incapacity to contract a fresh marriage. 6. This decision was followed by Chamier, J., in Jackson v. Jackson ILR 34 All 203 and it was held that, where the successful Petitioner in a suit for dissolution of marriage enters into a second marriage within six months of the decree for dissolution of marriage becoming absolute, the second marriage was void. These two decisions were followed by the Madras High Court in Battie v. Brown AIR 1961 Mad 847 (2). It was observed in this case: ...the former marriage is to be considered still in force at any rate to the extent of preventing a subsequent marriage during the life time of the other party to such marriage until the prohibition resulting from the survival of such other party is removed by virtue of the section. Now the prohibition is not removed by virtue of the section till the lapse of six months, or the happening of the other event therein mentioned. Consequently, I hold that not only was this marriage void on the date when it was solemnised, but also that the previous marriage was still 'in force' within the meaning of Section 19(4), so as to give me jurisdiction u/s 19 to pronounce a decree of nullity. 7. Consequently, I hold that not only was this marriage void on the date when it was solemnised, but also that the previous marriage was still 'in force' within the meaning of Section 19(4), so as to give me jurisdiction u/s 19 to pronounce a decree of nullity. 7. The Calcutta High Court, in Turner v. Turner AIR 1921 Cal 517 has following Warter v. Warter (supra), taken the same view. These cases establish that, on account of the passing of a decree for dissolution, the marriage does not come to an end for all purposes and at least for purposes of re-marriage, the marriage continues to be in force till the period of waiting is over and any re-marriage performed during the period of waiting would be void. I can see no reason why these principles should not apply to the provisions of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act which are analogous to the provisions of Section 57 of the Indian Divorce Act. The object of the provisions appear to be the same. So long as the period prescribed by Section 15 has not expired, the marriage, in spite of the decree for dissolution, shall be deemed to subsist for purposes of re-marriage by the divorced persons and any marriage by any of them during this period would be in violation of Clause (i) of Section 5 and would be void. It is true that Sections 5 and 11 do not specifically lay down that a marriage performed in contravention of the provisions of Section 15 shall be a void marriage but that is the effect of reading Sections 5, 11 and 15 together. Apart from this line of reasoning, a plain reading of the proviso to Section 15 leads to the irresistible conclusion that a marriage by divorced persons within one year of the decree of dissolution will be illegal. The proviso states emphatically that "it shall not be lawful" for the divorced persons to marry again within one year of the decree of dissolution. When the statute says that it shall not be lawful for a particular person to do a particular act and he does that act, how can it be said that the act is lawful or that the consequences which flow from a lawful act will flow from it? When the statute says that it shall not be lawful for a particular person to do a particular act and he does that act, how can it be said that the act is lawful or that the consequences which flow from a lawful act will flow from it? An act, which the statute declares to be unlawful, cannot but be held to be unlawful. The language used in the proviso leaves no room for doubt that it is mandatory. If it were held to be directory, its object would be completely frustrated and it would become a dead letter. It follows that a re-marriage by any of the divorced persons within the prohibited period would be void and illegal. 8. Shri Saksena then contended that the proviso was directed against the divorced persons marrying each other again and not against one of the divorced persons marrying a third person. I am unable to accept this contention, heading Section 15 as a whole, it is quite clear that the main provision of the section as well as the proviso prohibit the divorced persons both from marrying each other and from marrying third persons within the prohibited period. 9. It was then contended by Shri Saksena that, even if the marriage of Rajendra Kumar with Lila Gupta was null and void, the Petitioners could not challenge the same. According to him, it is only the husband or the wife who can initiate proceedings u/s 11 of the Act and no other person can raise this question. I am unable to accept this contention. It is true that Section 11 provides a mode for the husband and the wife to obtain a declaration of nullity and other persons cannot obtain a declaration u/s 11, but there is no specific bar in the Act and no bar can be inferred from the wordings of Section 11 to other persons challenging the marriage as null and void in other proceedings if their rights are affected by such marriage. I have no doubt that it was open to the Petitioners to challenge the marriage of Rajendra Kumar with Lila Gupta as null and void in the consolidation proceedings. 10. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the marriage of Rajendra Kumar with Lila Gupta on May 25, 1963, was in contravention of the proviso to Section 15 and was null and void. 10. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the marriage of Rajendra Kumar with Lila Gupta on May 25, 1963, was in contravention of the proviso to Section 15 and was null and void. The view taken by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) is manifestly erroneous in law. I am conscious of the fact that the view, which I am taking, would deprive Lila Gupta of the property of Rajendra Kumar with, whom she had undergone some sort of a marriage. I cannot do better then report what Sanderson, C.J., said in Turner v. Turner (Supra) where the marriage performed some 18 years earlier was annulled at the instance of the husband on the ground that it had taken place within the period of waiting: The circumstances of the case, as at present before us, are such as to create a great hardship upon the Respondent, who has my sincere sympathy, but that cannot induce me to disregard the plain provisions of the Act. 11. I accordingly allow these writ petitions and quash the orders of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated October 19, 1966 and the orders of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated June 7, 1966. In the circumstances of this case, parties will bear their own costs of these petitions.