Judgment :- 1. In these two cases a common question of law arises for determination relating to the interpretation of S.2(c)(xi) of the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 31 of 1958 and they arise out of connected proceedings between substanially the same parties. 2. The petitioners in the Civil Revision Petition and the appellant in the Second Appeal had executed a usufructuary mortgage in respect of their properties to one Itty Iype Joseph in the year 1123 and on the same date the mortgagors took back the properties on lease on an yearly rent of Rs. 360/-. As the rent due under the lease back was kept in arrear, the mortgagee instituted O.S. 168 of 1950 in the Munsiff's Court, Ettumanoor for recovery of such arrears of rent. This suit ended in a compromise decree passed on 21-1-1954 and the compromise provided that the mortgage money as well as the arrears of rent should be paid to the mortgagee-decree-holder within a period of one year from its date. Thereafter, in June 1954 the mortgagee-decree-holder assigned his rights under the decree, inclusive of his rights in the mortgage, in favour of a banking company who is the respondent in the above Civil Revision Petition as well as in the Second Appeal. When the respondent Bank sought to execute the compromise decree, the judgment-debtors raised the plea that they were entitled to relief under Act 31 of 1958 and that the decree was liable to be scaled down on the footing that the possession of mortgage and lease back together constituted a simple mortgage under S.11 (6) of the Act. They also contended that, in any event, S.5 (2) of the Act applied to the decree in question and that the decree-holder was hence entitled to future interest only at 5 percent. In answer to these contentions the respondent-Bank claimed that the debt in question was clearly covered by the exemption contained in S.2(c)(xi) of the Act and that therefore, it was not liable to be scaled down either under S.5 or under S.11 of the Act. 3. In answer to these contentions the respondent-Bank claimed that the debt in question was clearly covered by the exemption contained in S.2(c)(xi) of the Act and that therefore, it was not liable to be scaled down either under S.5 or under S.11 of the Act. 3. In the mean time, the debtors had also filed O. P. 43 of 1964 in the Munsiff's Court, Vaikom where the execution proceedings were pending, for scaling down the debt under S.5 and 11 of Act 31 of 1968, the contentions-raised by them in the Original Petition being substantially the same as those raised by way of objections to the execution petition 4. The execution petition as well as O. P. No. 43 of 1964 were disposed of by the Munsiff's Court by a common order dated 21-12-1964. The Munsiff upheld the contention of the respondent Bank that the debt in question fell within the scope of S.2(c)(xi) and was therefore, not liable to be scaled down under S.11 of the Act. He, however, held that the decree being one for recovery of rent the judgment-debtor was entitled to relief under S.5(2) of Act 31 of 1958 and he accordingly directed the decree-holder to put in an amended execution petition in conformity with S.5 (2) of the Act after giving credit to various payments already received and calculating interest only at 5 per cent per annum. The debtors thereupon took up the master to the District Court, Kottayam by way of two separate appeals A. S.112 of 1965 being filed against the order in O. P. 43 of 1964 and A. S.172 of 1965 against the order passed on the execution petition. The respondent-Bank filed cross-objections in both the appeals challenging the decisions of the first court in so far as it held that S.5(2) of the Act applied to the debt. 5. The learned District Judge affirmed, the view taken by the first court that the debt in question was covered by the exemption contained in S.2(c)(xi) of the Act in spite of the fact that the initial borrowing was not from a Banking Company. The appeals filed by the debtors were, therefore dismissed. 5. The learned District Judge affirmed, the view taken by the first court that the debt in question was covered by the exemption contained in S.2(c)(xi) of the Act in spite of the fact that the initial borrowing was not from a Banking Company. The appeals filed by the debtors were, therefore dismissed. On the cross-appeals filed by the creditor-Bank, the District Judge held that in view of the clear wording of S.2(c)(xi) which expressly says: "The provisions of S.5 shall not apply to such debt." the first court's view that even though the debt came within the scope of S.2(c)(xi) it was nevertheless liable to be scaled down under S.5(2) was incorrect and unsustainable. It accordingly, allowed the cross-appeals filed by the Bank The judgment-debtor in O. S.168 of 1950 has thereupon preferred the above Second Appeal to this Court challenging the aforesaid decision of the learned District Judge, and the Civil Revision Petition has been filed by the petitioners in O. P. 43 of 1964 against the order of the District Court passed on their appeal. 6. The only question that arises for determination in both the Second Appeal as well as the Civil Revision Petition is whether the lower courts were right in holding that the debt which is sought to be scaled down in O.P. 43 of 1964 falls within the scope of the exemption contained in S.2(c)(xi) of the Act. It is contended before us by the learned counsel for the appellants that in order that S.2(c)(xi) should apply, the debt must be one borrowed from a banking company and that the requirements of the said provision will not be satisfied by the mere fact that a debt initially borrowed from a private party had subsequently become payable to a Banking Company before the date of the commencement the of the Act by reason of any assignment or other devolution of the rights of the creditor. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the object of Legislature in enacting S.2(c)(xi) was to make a differentiation between debts borrowed from private auditors and those borrowed from Banking Companies and to classify the latter category of debts for preferential treatment. It is contended that such differentiation can exist only in respect of borrowings made from Banking Companies, that is, where the debt originated in a transaction with a Banking Company. 7. It is contended that such differentiation can exist only in respect of borrowings made from Banking Companies, that is, where the debt originated in a transaction with a Banking Company. 7. In our opinion, the appellant's contention has to succeed. An exemption has been provided for in regard to debts exceeding Rs. 1500/ -borrowed by an agriculturist under a single transaction and due before the commencement of the Act to a Banking Company. In enacting S.2(c)(xi) the intention of the Legislature clearly was confine the scope of the exemption to debts borrowed from Banking Companies, where, under a single transaction, an amount exceeding Rs. 1500/-was advanced to an agriculturist by a Banking Company. We are fortified in this view by the observations of a Full Bench of this Court in Catholic Bank of India Ltd v. Jacob (1967 KLT. 416 F.B.). In the case before the Full Bench the vires of S.2(c)(xi) of the Act was challenged on the ground that the provision was discriminatory and was violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. Repelling this contention, M.S. Menon C. J. has observed as follows at page 422: "The advance by a back of a sum exceeding one thousand five hundred rupees under a single transaction will normally be to a person who does not belong to the poorer sections of the State. This also will provide a rational basis for a differential treatment of such debts." To the same effect are the following observations of Raman Nayar J., at page 428: "Act 31 of 1958 was enacted to give relief to indebted agriculturists in the State of Kerala, and it is notorious that they stood in need of this relief because of their exploitation by money lenders, whereas the Jagirdars of Rajasthan stood in need of relief by reason of the resumption of their Jagis and their consequent impoverishment. Now, this exploitation of the agriculturist was effected not merely by taking advantage of his dire need for money to impose extortionate terms with regard to interest and the like, but lay also in such non-apparent abuses as the deduction of interest in advance at a higher rate than that specified in the contrast, and not giving due credit to payments made. It is on the assumption, which the Legislature could legitimately make, that such "exploration would not exist in the case of the exclusions mentioned in S.2(c) that those exclusions are based. With particular reference to a banking company, it may be assumed that the rate of interest charged by it would be reasonable that its books and accounts are truly and properly kept, and that the transaction is no different from what it purports to be. Moreover, an agriculturist who borrows money from a Banking Company especially one who borrows more than Rs. 1500/- under a single transaction, is not an ordinary agriculturist. He would be richer than an ordinary agriculturist more or less in the same position as an excluded agriculturist under S.2(a) and would not stand in need of relief to the same extent as an ordinary agriculturist. The transaction also would savour more of a commercial transaction." It would thus be seen that the classification was upheld by the Full Bench mainly on the grounds: (1) that a banking company in advancing money to a person would not ordinarily take advantage of the borrower's dire need for money and exploit such situation with a view to impose extortionate terms with regard to interest and the like: [2] that is may legitimately be assumed that the rate of interest charged, by a banking company in advancing a loan would be reasonable and that the transaction would be no different from what it purports to be; and [3] that an agriculturist who borrows money from a banking company, especially one who borrows more than Rs. 1500/-under a single transaction would de richer than an ordinary agriculturist and the transaction would savour more of a commercial borrowing. All these grounds clearly proceed on the assumption that the initial borrowing was itself from a banking company and they can be justified only on that basis. 8. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that in order that S.2(c)(xi) should apply, that debt should have been borrowed from a Banking Company and that the creditor, even at the very inception, must have been a banking company. 9. In the present case, the mortgage in question was executed in favour of a private individual and the bank came into the picture only by taking an assignment of the rights of the mortgagee under the compromise decree in O.S 168 of 1950. 9. In the present case, the mortgage in question was executed in favour of a private individual and the bank came into the picture only by taking an assignment of the rights of the mortgagee under the compromise decree in O.S 168 of 1950. The debt is, therefore, not covered by the exemption contained in S.2(c)(xi) of the Act and the contrary view taken by the courts below cannot be upheld. The Second Appeal and the Civil Revision Petition are accordingly allowed, the orders of the courts below are set aside and the cases are sent back to the first court for fresh disposal in the light of the observations contained in this judgment We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in this court. Allowed.