JUDGMENT M. Madhavan Nair, J. 1. This appeal is by the plaintiffs whose suit for damages for malicious prosecution succeeded in the Court of first instance but failed in the lower appellate Court. 2. The plaintiffs were prosecuted by the defendant under S.447, 426, 341 and 323 I. P. C. on the averment that at 10 a.m. on 29.5.1959 the 1st plaintiff was found making a foot-path through his land and when he protested, the plaintiffs attacked him 1st plaintiff assaulting him and plaintiffs 2 and 3 catching hold of his waist. The parties are close relations, plaintiffs 2 and 3 being daughters of the defendants maternal aunt and the 1st plaintiff being 2nd plaintiff's son. Plaintiffs 2 and 3 and the defendant are almost of the same age (near 60). The judgment in the criminal case is proved in the case as Ext. A-1. It reads thus: "P.Ws.2 and 3... have deposed that they have actually seen the incident. They were working in their fields adjoining 'Arugunilam' (the scene of occurrence) at the time of occurrence. No doubt P.Ws.2 and 3 are independent witnesses and nothing substantial have been brought out against him by the defence. The accused...denied the offence and cited two witnesses in support of their version.... D.W.2....has stated that his buffaloes were given for ploughing the adjoining land belonging to Ittiyal Unnirnaya Amma on the day of the alleged occurrence and....that he was in the field.. watching the buffaloes and that the incident took place in the field on 29.5.1959. D.W.1 has stated that though he could not say whether the incident actually took place or not and that if any such incident had taken place he would have heard about it...... On a dispassionate consideration of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defence, I find that there is not much difference with regard to the quality and quantity of the evidence. Two witnesses have deposed in favour of the prosecution and two have deposed against it. There is not much difference in the status of the witnesses also. In the result therefore, I find that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused. Accordingly I give the benefit of doubt to the accused, hold them not guilty of the offences under S.447, 426, 341 and 323 IPC and I acquit them under S.245(1) Crl. P.C." 3. In the result therefore, I find that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused. Accordingly I give the benefit of doubt to the accused, hold them not guilty of the offences under S.447, 426, 341 and 323 IPC and I acquit them under S.245(1) Crl. P.C." 3. It is well settled that in an action on malicious prosecution the plaintiff has to prove (1) that the prosecution was without reasonable and probable cause, (ii) that the prosecution was actuated by malice in the sense of an improper motive other than vindication of justice (iii) that it ended in his favour, and (iv) that he has suffered damages by way of mental agony, expenses of defence and / or loss of reputation. (See Braja Sunder Deb v. Bandal Das, AIR 1944 PC 1 and Mohamad Amin v. Jogendra Kumar Banerjee - ( AIR 1947 PC 108 ) 4. The Courts below have found malice because of litigations between the plaintiffs and the defendant regarding partition of their tarwad. But that by itself will not make out malice in law which is not grudge or ill will but an improper purpose in launching the prosecution. The judgment in the criminal case (quoted above) shows that the two independent witnesses for prosecution have spoken of the incident and have not been discredited in cross examination. One defence witness also spoke of the incident and all that the other defence witness had stated was that he "could not say whether the incident actually took place or not." Anyhow on account of the defendant's pretension of ignorance of his relationship with the plaintiffs and the long standing civil litigation between them, the Magistrate had chosen to give the benefit of doubt to the plaintiffs and to acquit the plaintiffs. Obviously, it was a very narrow escape that the plaintiffs had in the criminal case. The acquittal based on benefit of doubt cannot be said to be an unstained termination of the prosecution in the accused's favour. On the other hand, it is a strong evidence, if not rebutted against want of reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution. Evidence on record does not establish either malice or want of reasonable or probable cause for the prosecution. 5. In the circumstances, the dismissal by the lower appellate court of the suit for compensation for malicious prosecution is well justified. Evidence on record does not establish either malice or want of reasonable or probable cause for the prosecution. 5. In the circumstances, the dismissal by the lower appellate court of the suit for compensation for malicious prosecution is well justified. The Second Appeal fails and is dismissed hereby.