ORDER S.S. Dhavan, J. - These are six applications u/s 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure, for the quashing of certain proceedings which have been initiated against the Applicants by the State of U.P. As the facts and the questions of law involved in them are almost identical, they were connected and heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment. Some of the Applicants are traders and businessmen and the others Government officials. They are all being prosecuted for various offences Under Sections 420, 465, 467, 471 and 120-B, IPC and Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The charge against the Applicants who are businessmen is that they conspired with the Applicants who were officials of the Supplies Department to obtain licences under the UP Coal Control Order, 1955, to which they were not; entitled. It is alleged by the State that these businessmen falsely alleged in their applications that they were partners of firms which owned brick kilns and they needed coal dust for the purpose of running these kilns. The case of the State is that in fact the alleged firms were defunct or did not exist at all, that these businessmen were running no brick kilns and obtained licence by deceiving the authorities. It is further alleged that they were able to achieve their dishonest object because certain officials of the State Government colluded with them and gave false reports that these persons were running brick kilns. It is further alleged that when the State Government got wind pf this fraud it ordered an inquiry through the CID which after investigation, reported that there had been a conspiracy between these businessmen and certain officials to cheat the Government. Thereupon the State Government; ordered their prosecution and a criminal case Under Sections 420/465/467/471/120-B, IPC was started against them. The charge sheet was submitted before the Judicial Officer, City, Meerut, by an official of the rank of Inspector in the CID. As the legality of the charge-sheet is one of the questions involved in all these cases, it is necessary to quote it in full. As the charge-sheet in each case is almost identical, the only variations being the names of the accused concerned, it is not necessary to quote all of them. The charge-sheet in application No. 1463 of 1961 runs thus: Col. As the charge-sheet in each case is almost identical, the only variations being the names of the accused concerned, it is not necessary to quote all of them. The charge-sheet in application No. 1463 of 1961 runs thus: Col. 7: Sir, In compliance with the orders of SP I/c CB, CID, Lucknow on letter No. A5008 XXV/CX, dated 23-12-1959 the enquiries were conducted by the CID. The enquiry revealed that accused Sri S.K. Gupta gave an application through his brother Bijaipal and filled form I as prescribed by UP Coal Control Order, 1953 for (illegible) coal for running the brick kilns in the name of M/s. Kedar Nath as its partners S/s. Kedar Nath Bijai Pal and showed the site of the kiln Aoiin Nagar Sarai in Tahsil Baghpat using their fraudulent and dishonest means, they got allotment of coal from time to time. Investigation, however, revealed that firm M/s. Kedar Nath had become defunct in the year 1951-52 and no licence was obtained for running brick (sic) Amin Nagar Sarai from the Antarim Zila Parishad, Town Area Amin Nagar Sarai and the licence from DSO Office was obtained in 1956 for such a kiln. No such brick kiln was actually operated by the accused in Amin Nagar Sarai, the site given in Form I. Sri Bijai Pal signed the application and form I for licence and coal allotment, S.K. Gupta filled the particular of the form and made entries in R.R.S. and obtained the R.Rs. from D.S.O. Office and also obtained coal of these R.Rs. and used it for their own gain, but for purposes other than the one for which it was obtained. Thus the provisions of UP Coal Control Order 1953 were contravened. The accused achieved the object with the active help and abetment of Sri V.D Tiagi, Supply Inspector and also of Sri S.S. Swami (S.K.) now a Lekhpal, who gave a wrong report of the brick kiln functioning at the site given in Form I. The accused persons mentioned in Col. The accused achieved the object with the active help and abetment of Sri V.D Tiagi, Supply Inspector and also of Sri S.S. Swami (S.K.) now a Lekhpal, who gave a wrong report of the brick kiln functioning at the site given in Form I. The accused persons mentioned in Col. 4 of this charge sheet entered into a criminal conspiracy with object of obtaining coal by dishonest and fraudulent means and in pursuance of this conspiracy they committed forgeries of documents, dishonestly used them as genuine, also contravened provisions of UP Goal Control Order 1953 to achieve this object of conspiracy they committed offence Under Sections 420/467/468/471/ 120-B IPC and u/s 7 Essential Supply Temp. Powers Act 1946 and are being sent up as such for being tried by a court of law. (Sd.)-Illegible Inspector, C.I.D., C.B., 15 Baje din/Raat ko tarikh Lucknow 12--5--1961 isvi kobheja gaya. 12.5.61. Janch Karne waley adhikari ke hastakshar. Each charge sheet is followed by a long list of prosecution witnesses. 2. The proceedings have not gone beyond the stage of the filing of the charge sheet in the court of the Magistrate. Before the court could proceed further, all the Applicants came to this Court and filed these applications u/s 561-A Code of Criminal procedure. The prayer in each is that the criminal case against the Applicants concerned be quashed. Each application is based on the following ground:--Firstly because the UP Coal Control Order of 1955 was void and ineffective and the Applicants could not be guilty of violation of a void order; secondly, the aforesaid order being void it could not confer any benefits on the Applicants and the Applicants could not have been guilty of cheating or other offences for obtaining benefits which were no benefits under the law; thirdly the charge-sheet itself was submitted by an Officer other than a Station Officer but not superior in rank to Station Officer and therefore the entire proceedings are illegal; fourthly the allegations in the charge sheet are vague and no prosecution could be based on them. (I have mentioned only those grounds which were pressed before me during the hearing of these applications and have ignored many others which were not pressed). 3. I shall first consider whether the Applicants can be charged with the various offences under the IPC if the UP Coal Control Order 1955 is void and ineffective. (I have mentioned only those grounds which were pressed before me during the hearing of these applications and have ignored many others which were not pressed). 3. I shall first consider whether the Applicants can be charged with the various offences under the IPC if the UP Coal Control Order 1955 is void and ineffective. For this purpose I shall assume that the order is void and ineffective as contended by learned Counsel for the Applicants, Mr. B.N. Sapru who argued this petition with ability. Learned counsel's argument may be summarised thus: The Applicants did not require any licence or permit under the ordinary law of the land and were entitled to carry on their trade of running brick kilns and purchasing coal dust for this purpose. The State however could impose reasonable restrictions on this right of the Applicants in the form of a licence or permit system. It passed the UP Coal Control Order of 1955 which enjoins that no person could stock, sell, store for sale or utilize coal for burning bricks except under a licence granted in accordance with the order. Thus the order required every owner of a brick kiln to obtain a licence before he could purchase and use coal for running his brick-kiln. Any contravention of this provision was made an offence punishable u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 and a person contravening it was liable to imprisonment for a term extending to three years and also liable to fine. Each of the Applicants applied for a licence. All of them deny that they made any false allegation or entered into any conspiracy with one another or with the State officials. But, Mr. Sapru argued, even assuming that the allegations made in the applications are false as alleged by the State no prima facie case of cheating u/s 420 IPC or forgery u/s 465 IPC or forgery of valuable security etc. u/s 467 IPC or dishonestly using a forged document u/s 471 IPC or criminal conspiracy u/s 120-B IPC is made out. Learned Counsel pointed out that the effect of the licencing system introduced under the UP Coal Control Order 1955 was not to confer any benefits on any member of the public but to impose restrictions on a right of trade. Learned Counsel pointed out that the effect of the licencing system introduced under the UP Coal Control Order 1955 was not to confer any benefits on any member of the public but to impose restrictions on a right of trade. The order required every person running a brick kiln to obtain a licence for purchasing and using coal for his kiln. But for this order, any person could obtain coal in the open market and use it as he wished. The licence merely removed the restriction in favour of the licence-holder. It any person made false allegations in his application for a licence, the object could only be to have the restriction removed so that he could obtain coal in the market and use it for his kiln. If there had been no restriction, the application for licence would be purpose less and any false allegation made in it meaningless. Mr. Sapru argued that making a false statement or telling a lie is not an offence under the IPC unless it amounts in law to cheating. But if a person makes a false allegation or deceives another person and thereby induces that person to confer on him a benefit which is really no benefit under the law, he has committed no offence u/s 420 IPC or any other related section. Counsel argued that the UP Goal Control Order being void and ineffective, it conferred no authority on the State Government to impose restrictions on the normal right of every citizen to run a brick kiln and purchase coal in the open market. Therefore, the licencing authority created had no power to issue any licence and if it did its licence conferred no benefit on the licencee which he did not already enjoy. Therefore any false statement made in the application for licence cannot be said to have induced the licencing authority to deliver to the Applicants any property or to do or omit to do anything which he would not have done if he had not been deceived. Nor could such act or omission be likely to cause damage or harm to the licencing authority in body, mind reputation or property. Mr. Sapru's argument is that the essence of cheating is that the accused must have obtained some benefit or the person cheated incurred loss or suffered detriment as the direct result of the cheating. Mr. Nor could such act or omission be likely to cause damage or harm to the licencing authority in body, mind reputation or property. Mr. Sapru's argument is that the essence of cheating is that the accused must have obtained some benefit or the person cheated incurred loss or suffered detriment as the direct result of the cheating. Mr. Sapru pointed out that in this case neither the Applicant had received any benefit nor the licencing authority suffered any loss or detriment because the licence was mere scrap of paper which could not confer any benefit nor cause any loss to any one. 4. The argument^ which was advanced by the learned Counsel with considerable skill and charm, appears plausible at first sight* But on closer scrutiny, it is revealed as without substance. For the purpose of this part of the case I shall assume that the UP Coal Control Order 1985 was invalid and the restrictions imposed on the purchase of coal were without authority. I shall also assume-and Mr. Sapru concedes that this assumption must also be made while considering his argument--that the charge against the Applicants that they made false allegations in their applications for the purpose of obtaining a licence is true. If both these assumptions are made, it cannot be said that there is no prima facie case under the relevant sections of the IPC against the Applicants. Section 420 IPC runs thus: Section 420: Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person decieved to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. 5. This section divides the offence of cheating into two ingredients--(1) the conduct amounting to cheating and (2) its effect. In the present case I must assume that the Applicants by making false allegations in their applications have deceived the licensing authority and their conduct amounted to cheating, (sic) first ingredient is therefore made cut by the State. The only question is whether the effect of the Applicant's fraud constitutes the second ingredient of the offence. In my opinion, it does. The only question is whether the effect of the Applicant's fraud constitutes the second ingredient of the offence. In my opinion, it does. Section 420 requires that the deception by the accused should have induced the person deceived "to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security." A valuable security is defined in Section 30 of the Act as "a document which is, or purports to be, a document whereby any legal right is created, extended, transferred, restricted, extinguished or released or whereby any person acknowledges that he lies under legal liability or has not a certain legal right". The words "valuable security" have been given a very wide meaning by this Court and the other High Courts in India. It has been held that the following documents are property as contemplated under this section: A transit pass without which no forest produce could be removed under a particular Regulation--Superintendent and Remembrancer of legal Affairs Bengal v. Daulat Ram ILR 1959 Cal. 1233--a health certificate--in Re: Packianatham 21 CrLJ 478; an import licence-Durgadas Tulsi Ram Sood v. State 1956 BLR 188; a health certificate-- In Re: J.S. Dhas and Another, AIR 1940 Mad 155 ; a certificate that a person attending the minimum number of lectures in the 1st Year Class--Q.E. v. Sashibhushan ILR 15 All. 210. Therefore if by their fraudulent conduct the Applicants obtained a licence which enabled them to purchase coal in the market, they are guilty of the offence of cheating u/s 420 IPC. 6. But Mr. Sapru's argument is that all the authorities mentioned above apply only where the licence or the permit or the certificate or the transit pass or any other document was executed by an authority competent to do so but not if the document itself is void. Learned Counsel contended that a licence which in law is no licence at all is neither property nor valuable security even u/s 30 IPC. This argument ignores the words "a document which is or purports to be (my emphasis) a document whereby any legal right is created...." Therefore a document need not actually create a legal right in order to be "valuable security" u/s 30;, it is sufficient if it purports to create such right, Mr. This argument ignores the words "a document which is or purports to be (my emphasis) a document whereby any legal right is created...." Therefore a document need not actually create a legal right in order to be "valuable security" u/s 30;, it is sufficient if it purports to create such right, Mr. Sapru at first tried to argue that the words "purports to create" only refer to a document which is valid on the face of it but not to one which was executed by a person with no authority and is therefore wholly void. I cannot agree. This question has been considered by his Court and the Patna High Court. In Emperor v. Ram Harakh Pathak ILR 1948 All. 140 the accused was convicted u/s 447 IPC for the offence of having destroyed a patta which he jointly with another person had executed in favour of third person. It was established that the patta was invalid as it was signed only by the accused and one other person whereas the land comprised in the patta belonged to a family of six persons. He contended that the document alleged to have been destroyed by him was not a valuable security as it conferred no rights. The Court rejected this plea on the ground that even though invalid the patta purported to create a right in immovable property. This Court pointed out that if the argument of the accused were accepted, "any forged document, if the forgery was attempted, or any document which was not executed or stamped according to law and on which no decree could be passed by a Civil Court, could not be called a valuable security." In Ram Narain Sahu v. Emperor AIR 1933 Pat 60 (1) the accused were convicted u/s 384 IPC for the offence of having compelled a minor boy of 15 years of age to execute a note for Rs. 400/-. It was contended on his behalf that a note executed by a minor was altogether void as a security and therefore the note in question was not a valuable security u/s 30 IPC. The High Court rejected this argument and observed...the document purports to be a document whereby a legal right is created or a person acknowledges that he lies under a legal liability. On the face of it the document executed by the executants created a legal liability.... The High Court rejected this argument and observed...the document purports to be a document whereby a legal right is created or a person acknowledges that he lies under a legal liability. On the face of it the document executed by the executants created a legal liability.... It is immaterial that it might subsequently upon certain evidence being given be held to be of no effect against the executent, if certain, is a valuable security within the meaning of Section 384 read with Section 30 IPC. 7. In my opinion a person who by cheating induces another to issue a licence in his favour cannot plead that he is not guilty of the offence of cheating because it is subsequently discovered that the official concerned had no authority to issue the licence and therefore made no "valuable security" within the meaning of S 420. The vital issue is the state of mind of the person deceiving and the person deceived at the time when the licence was issued. If at that time both considered that the obtaining of a licence was necessary and on this assumption the licencee obtained a licence by cheating the licenseing authority, the offence u/s 420 is established. The essence of cheating, as I have pointed out consists of two ingredients--(1) fraud and (2) its effect. But a person is convicted of cheating because of his own fraudulent conduct--provided it has certain effects. But the punishment is for his conduct. Therefore if a person even under an erroneous assumption commits a fraud which has the effect of inducing another to do something w lich he would not have done but for the fraud, the offence of cheating is made out and it is no defence that the accused subsequently discovered that he need not have committed the fraud. 8. If the arguments on behalf of the Applicants is accepted the result will be that persons who have indulged in wholesale cheating and obtained licences by their fraudulent conduct will escape the consequences of their crime if it is subsequently discovered that the authority to grant the licence did not exist because of a technical flaw. 9. Thus the objection against the proceedings u/s 420 IPC fails. 10. But I am of opinion that the charge-sheet makes out no prima facie case Under Sections 465, 467 and 471 IPC. 9. Thus the objection against the proceedings u/s 420 IPC fails. 10. But I am of opinion that the charge-sheet makes out no prima facie case Under Sections 465, 467 and 471 IPC. The charge sheet quoted above is very vague, but the State counsel stated that these three charges are founded on the allegations that the Applicants forged the signature on the application form. But I pointed out to him that the charge sheet itself states that the application for licence was signed by a particular person and that it does not allege that the accused forged the signature of that person. Learned Counsel however contended that if a person represents himself to be some one else and signs himself as that some one this amounts to forgery. I cannot agree, If A deceives B by pretending to be C but does not forge the signature of C his offence may be criminal fraud but it is not forgery. In this case the prosecution has not alleged that any of the accused forged the signature of another person. I am therefore of the opinion that the prosecution of the accused u/s 465, 467 and 471 IPC is misconceived and must be quashed. 11. Mr. Sapru next contended that the entire prosecution must be quashed because the charge sheet was submitted not by a Station Officer In-charge but by an official of the GID. He conceded that u/s 551 Code of Criminal Procedure an officer of a rank higher than that of the Station Officer is competent to submit a charge sheet to the Magistrate, but contended that an officer of the rank of Inspector in the GID is not such an officer. Learned Counsel relied upon the provisions of the Police Act which enumerated a hierarchy of police officials incharge of the police administration of a State. These ape the Inspector General, Deputy Inspector General, the Superintendent of Police and the Deputy Superintendent of Police. Counsel argued that the rank of an Inspector is unknown to the Police Act and therefore it must be ignored for the purpose of Section 551 Code of Criminal Procedure. I cannot agree. These ape the Inspector General, Deputy Inspector General, the Superintendent of Police and the Deputy Superintendent of Police. Counsel argued that the rank of an Inspector is unknown to the Police Act and therefore it must be ignored for the purpose of Section 551 Code of Criminal Procedure. I cannot agree. Section 551 provides that "Police Officers superior in rank to an officer incharge of a police Station may exercise the same powers...." This section does not lay down any criterion or test for determining whether a particular officer is or is not superior in rank to a Station Officer and in particular it does not provide that the only officers superior in rank to the Station Officer should be the hierarchy of officers mentioned in the Police Act. In my opinion, the question whether any officer of the Police is higher in rank than a Station Officer is one of fact and it depends largely upon the ranking conferred upon him by his employer--namely the State. If the State Government has placed him on a rank higher than the Station Officer, he has all the powers u/s 551 Code of Criminal Procedure. The very fact that one is called a Sub-Inspector and the other Inspector is prima facie proof that the latter is higher in rank than the former. 12. Moreover, the matter is concluded by authority. In Textile Traders Syndicate Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 1959 All 337 it was held by this Court that a person belonging to the GID and holding the rank of the Inspector is superior in rank to the Station Officer. This finding was based upon a Government Order which was produced before the Court during the hearing of that case--G.O. No. 5087-24 (1) 11938. 13. I shall now consider the argument that the Applicants cannot be charged with any offence under the UP Goal Control Order 1955 as that order is void and of no effect. Mr. Sapru based this argument on two admitted facts namely, firstly that the Order was not published in the Gazette of India but only in the Uttar Pradesh Gazette and secondly a copy of the order was not laid before both Houses of Parliament. 14. Mr. Sapru based this argument on two admitted facts namely, firstly that the Order was not published in the Gazette of India but only in the Uttar Pradesh Gazette and secondly a copy of the order was not laid before both Houses of Parliament. 14. Learned counsel's argument is based upon Sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 which are as follows: Sub-section (5): An order made under this section shall-- (a) in the case of an order of a general nature or affecting a class of persons, be notified in the official gazette; and (b) in the case of an order directed to a specified individual be served on such individual-- (i) by delivering or tendering it to that individual, or (ii) if it cannot be so delivered or tendered, by affixing it on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the premises in which that individual lives and a written report thereof shall be prepared and witnessed by two persons living in the neighbourhood. Sub-sections (6): Every order made under this section by the Central Government or by any officer or authority of the Central Government shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament, as soon as may be, after it is made. Mr. Sapru contended that these two sub sections prescribed conditions which must be fulfilled before an order passed u/s 3 becomes effective and if they are not, the order shall be void and of no effect. He relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Narendra Kumar and Others Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1960 SC 430 in which it was held that to make an order u/s 3 effective it is necessary that it should be notified in the gazette and laid before both the Houses of Parliament. The State counsel tried to argue that an order passed by the State Government in the exercise of its power delegated u/s 5 is not an order passed u/s 3 but one u/s 5 read with Section 3 and therefore the requirements of Sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 3 do not apply. I cannot agree. Section 5 empowers the Central Government to authorise the authorities specified in that section including the State Government to make orders u/s 3. I cannot agree. Section 5 empowers the Central Government to authorise the authorities specified in that section including the State Government to make orders u/s 3. Therefore though the delegation of authority is u/s 6, the order was passed by the delegating u/s 3. The opening words of Section 6, "the Central Government may by notified order, direct that the power to make orders u/s 3...shall be exercisable also by..." makes it clear that it is immaterial whether the Central Government or its de legating passes the order and that order will always be one u/s 3. Therefore Sub-section (5) applies to every order, irrespective whether it has been passed by the Central Government or its delegating. 15. I have now to consider the effect of failure to publication of the UP Coal Control Order in the Gazette of India. Sub-section (5) does not require that every order should be published in the Gazette of India but only that it should be notified in the "official gazette". Mr. Sapru's argument is twofold. First he contended that the word "official gazette" must in all cases means the Gazette of India; secondly (in the alternative) he argued that in the case of the orders passed by the State Government the words "official gazette" would mean both the State Gazette and the Gazette of India. I cannot agree with either of these two arguments. The words "official gazette" have not been defined in the Essential Commodities Act 1955 and therefore the definition in the General Clauses Act will apply unless there is anything to the contrary. Section 3(39) provides, " "official gazette" or "gazette" shall mean the Gazette of India or the Official Gazette of a State." The question, in which gazette, in particular, order u/s 3 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 should be published, depends upon the nature of the order and the authority which passed it. If it was passed by the Central Government, official gazette would mean the Gazette of India but if it was passed by the State Government or any officer of the State Government, they will mean the official gazette of that State. In this case it is admitted that the UP Coal Control Order of 1955 was notified in the Uttar Pradesh Gazette. This was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of Sub-section (5). 16. As regards Mr. In this case it is admitted that the UP Coal Control Order of 1955 was notified in the Uttar Pradesh Gazette. This was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of Sub-section (5). 16. As regards Mr. Sapru's alternative argument that the words "official gazette" should be construed as including both the State Gazette and the Gazette of India, I do not propose to give any definite opinion on it. But even assuming that his argument is correct I would hold that if an order is passed by the State Government and is published in the official gazette--i.e., in the gazette covering the territories where it is effective--this is substantial compliance with the provisions of Sub-section (5) and the failure to publish it in the Gazette of India would not invalidate the order. 17. I shall now consider the second argument of Mr. Sapru namely, that the UP Coal Control Order of 1955 is invalid because it was not laid before both Houses of Parliament. In Narendra Kumar and Others Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1960 SC 430 the Supreme Court held that an order passed u/s 3 of the Essential Commodities Act which is not notified in the official gazettee nor laid before the Houses of Parliament will not come within the protection of the phrase "reasonable restriction" in Clauses (5) and (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution. The Court further held that so long as the principles are not notified in accordance with Sub-section (5) of the Act and laid before both Houses of Parliament in accordance With Sub-section (6), it is void as taking away the rights conferred by Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. As I understand the effect of that decision it means that if an order is requited to be placed before both Houses of parliament and has not been, it will be ineffective until it is so placed. The impugned order in that case was passed by the Central Government whereas in the present case the order was passed by the State authorities. The question is whether the condition laid down in Sub-section (6) of Section 3 applies to orders passed by the State Government as the sub-delegate of the Central Government u/s 5. The impugned order in that case was passed by the Central Government whereas in the present case the order was passed by the State authorities. The question is whether the condition laid down in Sub-section (6) of Section 3 applies to orders passed by the State Government as the sub-delegate of the Central Government u/s 5. The words of Sub-section (6) are "every order made under this section by the Central Government or by any officer or authority of the Central Government shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament." Mr. B.N. Sapru argued that the words "Central Government" must be interpreted to include any sub-delegate of that Government. He relied on an observation of the Supreme Court in Harishankar Bagla and Another Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 465 that the Central Government is the delegate of the legislature and the State Government the sub-delegate of the Central Government. He also relied on Section 19 of the General Clauses Act which provides that it will be sufficient to lay down the law for superiors and it will apply automatically to their subordinates also. He also argued that the provision for laying orders before Parliament was made for the purpose of establishing and preserving parliamentary control over the Central Government and its agencies and officers and this purpose will be frustrated if the condition imposed by Sub-section (6) is not extended to orders passed by the State Government or authorities subordinate to it. Mr. Sapru pointed out that the powers of control conferred on the executive u/s 3 of the Ad are enormous. The breach of these orders is punishable with imprisonment and fine. They impose restrictions on the fundamental rights of citizens to carry on their trade. Therefore parliamentary supervision and control were imposed as necessary safeguards against arbitrariness. Mr. Sapru contended that if sub-section which requires that every order made u/s 3 by the Central Government shall be laid before Parliament is interpreted as not including orders passed by the State Government, the result will be that Parliamentary control will be removed from a large majority of orders passed u/s 3 of the Act. Mr. Sapru contended that if sub-section which requires that every order made u/s 3 by the Central Government shall be laid before Parliament is interpreted as not including orders passed by the State Government, the result will be that Parliamentary control will be removed from a large majority of orders passed u/s 3 of the Act. Counsel pointed out that the State Governments and officers and authorities subordinate to them pass a large number of orders every year imposing restrictions on the right of citizens to carry on their trade and the legislature could not have intended that such orders should not be subject to parliamentary supervision and control. Mr. Sapru cited passages from several text-books and commentaries on administrative law in support of his argument that delegational or sub-delegational legislation must be strictly construed and all legislative steps must be complied with. It is not necessary to discuss the observations cited by Mr. Sapru in detail as I think that the question must be decided on the interpretation of the words of sub Section (6) of Section 3. 18. I have given Mr. Sapru's argument my anxious and careful consideration. I agree that a requirement that an order must be laid before both Houses of Parliament is mandatory and no order is effective unless and until it is so laid. If the legislature has imposed such a condition it must be complied with. It is beyond doubt that this condition must be fulfilled in the case of orders passed by the Central Government. But does the sub-section extend the condition to orders passed by the State Government in the exercise of their powers delegated by the Central Government? Mr. Sapru argued that the words "Central Government" must be interpreted as automatically including any sub delegate. The flaw in this argument is that Sub-section (6) itself specifies the classes of sub-delegates whose orders shall be laid before Parliament and the orders passed by the State Government or authorities subordinate to it are not included. It says, "Every order made by the Central Government or by an officer or authority of the Central Government (my emphasis) shall be laid. Mr. Sapru argued that the words "Central Government" was intended to include any sub-delegate whatsoever. But if that were so, why were the words "or by any officer or authority of the Central Government" added? It says, "Every order made by the Central Government or by an officer or authority of the Central Government (my emphasis) shall be laid. Mr. Sapru argued that the words "Central Government" was intended to include any sub-delegate whatsoever. But if that were so, why were the words "or by any officer or authority of the Central Government" added? They indicate that; it was not the intention to include the orders of any and every sub-delegate of the Central Government whatsoever but only the orders passed by any officer or authority of the Central Government. The specific mention of "officer or authority of the Central Government" limits the scope of Sub-section (6) to orders passed by such officer or authority. Therefore orders passed by the State Governments or authorities subordinate to them are not included. It is not necessary to guess the reasons for not including them. Possibly considerations of convenience may have prevailed. There are several State Governments in India and thousands of orders may be passed every year by them or authorities subordinate to them in the exercise of powers delegated to them by the Central Government and it may have been considered impracticable that every order passed by every State Government in India should be laid before Parliament at Delhi. Whatever the reason, the language of sub-section makes it clear that orders passed by the Stale Governments or authorities subordinate to them were not intended to be included. 19. Mr. Sapru argued that any interpretation of Sub-section (6) exempting orders passed by the State Government or officers or authorities subordinate to them from parliamentary control will have the effect of classifying orders passed u/s 3 into two classes--those which are subject to parliamentary supervision and control and those which are not and the result of this classification will be that citizens effected by orders passed by the State Government or officers or authorities subordinate to them will not have the protection of parliamentary control while those affected by the orders passed by the Central Government will have such protection. He argued that there will be no reasonable basis for this classification or for holding that one set of orders should be laid before Parliament and the other should not and the sub-section will have to be condemned as discriminatory. 20. I am not much impressed by this argument. He argued that there will be no reasonable basis for this classification or for holding that one set of orders should be laid before Parliament and the other should not and the sub-section will have to be condemned as discriminatory. 20. I am not much impressed by this argument. Even if the result of this interpretation is to divide the orders into two classes, there is no discrimination against citizens or persons. Each class of order will apply equally to all citizens and persons. For these reasons I hold that the UP Coal Control Order was not required to be laid before Parliament and the omission to do so does not invalidate it. Consequently, the proceedings against the Petitioners, or any of them, for the violation of this order are legal and not ultra vires. 21. These applications are all dismissed as regards the proceedings against the Petitioners, or any of them, u/s 420 IPC. They are also dismissed as regards the charges against the Petitioners or any of them u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. They are allowed as regards the charges framed against the Petitioners or any of them, u/s 465, 467 and 471 IPC and the proceedings under these charges are quashed. 22. The record shall be returned to the Court below forthwith with a direction that the proceedings u/s 120 IPC shall be continued and disposed of according to law without the least delay. Applications partly allowed.