JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - On coming into force of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings. Act. 1960, the Prescribed Authority issued a notice to the petitioners under Section 10 of the Act calling upon them to show cause why the statement annexed to the notice be not treated as correct. The petitioners filed objections on a variety of grounds. By the time the objections came to be heard the petitioners' family increased From seven of nine members by birth of children. Consequently they claimed that the ceiling for them should be fixed at 64 acres under Section 4 of the Act. The Prescribed Authority accented this submission but rejected other grounds of objection. Aggrieved, the petitioners went up in appeal. The appellate court, however, did not accept the petitioners' case that the ceiling area be determined on the basis that their family consisted of nine members. Relying upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of State v. District Judge, 1964 A.L.J. 558 it held that the relevant date for determining the ceiling area was the date of the enforcement of the Act and not the date when the proceedings are commenced or the orders were passed. On the date of the enforcement of the Act, the petitioners' family consisted of seven members. It is admitted by both the parties that of the two subsequently born children, one was conceived and was in embryo on the date of the enforcement of the Act, though he was born subsequently. Ultimately, the petitioners' appeal was dismissed. Aggrieved, the petitioners have come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The principal point raised at the hearing canvassed the correctness of the view of the appellate court in respect of the number of members of the family entitled to be considered for determination of the ceiling area. Ultimately, the petitioners' appeal was dismissed. Aggrieved, the petitioners have come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The principal point raised at the hearing canvassed the correctness of the view of the appellate court in respect of the number of members of the family entitled to be considered for determination of the ceiling area. For the petitioners it has been urged that in the Division Bench case State v. District Judge, 1964 A.L.J. 558 the Bench considered the effect of Sections 5, 9 and 10 of the Act and held that the cumulative effect of Sections 5, 9 and 10 of the Act was to point irresistably to the conclusion that the, relevant date for determining the ceiling area as contemplated by the framers of the Act was the date of the enforcement of the Act and not any date subsequent thereto. The petitioners accept the correctness of this view but they submit that the question whether a child utero matris is a child in case, that is, in existence, was not raised and decided in that case. The Division Bench, it is urged, assumed that a child not born was not in existence. The Division Bench concentrated the attention to the sole question whether the birth of a child subsequent to the enforcement of the Act could be taken into consideration in determining the ceiling area of a tenure-holder. 3. It seems a well established and accepted proposition of personal law that a child en ventra sa mera is to be considered as a child born and in existence on the date of its conception for the purposes of safe-guarding his interest in property. In an elaborate and comprehensive judgment in the case of Kusum Kumari v. Desarath, AIR 1921 Calcutta 487 Sir Asutosh Mookerjee reviewed the position regarding the status of a son utero matris under the Hindu, Muslim, Roman, English and other nature jurisprudences and came to the decision that a child once conceived is deemed in existence. This decision was followed by a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Mandli Prasad v. Ramcharanlal, A.I.R. 1948 Nag. This decision was followed by a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Mandli Prasad v. Ramcharanlal, A.I.R. 1948 Nag. 1 where it was held that under the Hindu law a son begotten but not born is equal in all respects to a son actually in existence except for the purpose of adoption, and that his membership of the family is considered as commencing from the date of conception. Similar views were expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in Deo Narain Singh v. Gang Prasad, A.I.R. 1915 Alld. 65 It was held that a Hindu son subsequently born alive is competent to contest an alienation made by the father when the son was in his mother's womb. The Andhra Pradesh High Court is in agreement with this view vide Kouterapu Venkata Chenchcvva v. Koutarapu Ramalingham, A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 744. In outlines of Mohammadan Law by Fyzee, 3rd Edition (1964) page 386 it is stated that every person, including a child in the womb, provided it is born alive, is entitled to inherit unless there is a specific rule of exclusion. Tyabji in his commentary in Muslim Law has given the same opinion (see Article 606) . These were all cases of succession, partition or alienation. 4. In Ram Dayal v. Bhim Sen, 1965 A.L.J. 1142 a division Bench of this Court held that according to all civilised systems of jurisprudence a child in embryo at the death of the holder of a proprietary interest, if born alive after his death, is deemed to be living at his death. This principle was held applicable to succession under the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939. Thus this general rule is recognised by the personal law of Hindus, Muslims and others. It has been held applicable to agricultural as well as non-agricultural properties. 5. The Supreme Court, in the case of Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh v. Mallappa Chanbasappa, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 510 held that a member of a family who was in the womb of his mother at the time of alienation, circumscribed the power of the manager to make alienation An alienation after his conception, would be voidable at his instance. 5. The Supreme Court, in the case of Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh v. Mallappa Chanbasappa, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 510 held that a member of a family who was in the womb of his mother at the time of alienation, circumscribed the power of the manager to make alienation An alienation after his conception, would be voidable at his instance. The Supreme Court accepted the position that a son conceived or in his mother's womb is equal in the matters of inheritance, partition, survivership and the right to impeach an alienation made by his father, but they refused to apply this principle in the case of adoption, because in their opinion, there was an essential distinction between an alienation, partition and inheritance on the one hand and adoption on the other; his right to set aside an alienation hinges on his secular right to secure his share in the property belonging to the family, as he has right by birth in the joint family property and transactions effected by the father in excess of his power when he was in the embryo, are voidable at his instance; but an adoption, secures mainly spiritual benefit to the father, and, the power to adopt is conferred on him to achieve that object. The doctrine evolved wholly for a secular purpose would be inappropriate to a case of adoption, which enables the discharge of a religious duty. In view of this declaration of law the position is that the general principle would apply in secular matters pertaining to property. 6. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider this general doctrine in T.S. Srinivasan v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, 1966 Vol. 60 I.T.R. p. 36. The Court held that this doctrine was not one of universal application and it applied mainly for the purpose of determining rights to property and safeguarding such rights of the son. The Supreme Court said that this doctrine did not fit in with the scheme of the Income Tax Act and it was not intended to be incorporated in it. Their Lordships held that it was difficult to reconcile this doctrine with the scheme of the Act. They also observed that non-recognition of this doctrine for the purpose of Income Tax Act did not affect adversely any rights of the subsequent born son. 7. Their Lordships held that it was difficult to reconcile this doctrine with the scheme of the Act. They also observed that non-recognition of this doctrine for the purpose of Income Tax Act did not affect adversely any rights of the subsequent born son. 7. It thus appears that this doctrine will 1,e applicable to matters secular and relating to property, in order to safe guard the interest of the child. If a statute affects the properties of a family and the interest of the after born child needs protection, the doctrine would normally be applicable unless it is irreconciliable with the scheme of the Act. 8. The U.P. Imposition of ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, seeks to take away from a tenure-holder land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him. The excess area is declared surplus land. The surplus land stands transferred to and vests in the State free from all encumbrances. The Tenure holders right, title or interest in such surplus land stands extinguished (vide Sections 5 and 14). Under Section 4 (2) (a) the ceiling area of a tenure-holder shall be forty acres of fair quality land. Clause (b) of Section 4 (2) provides that where the tenure-holder has, or consists of a family having more than five members, the ceiling area of such tenure-holder shall be the area mentioned in clause (a) together with eight acres of fair quality land for every additional member of the family, subject to a maximum of twenty-four such acres. Under the proviso, if at any time the family comes to consist of not more than five members, all land held by the tenure-holder in excess of the ceiling area under clause (a) shall become liable to be treated as surplus land. Thus the number of members of the family of a tenure-holder makes a vital difference to the extent of the land which is permitted to be retained by the family. The number of the members of the family is to be determined with reference to the date of the enforcement of the Act, namely, 2nd January, 1961, in view of the Division Bench case of this Court in State v. District Judge, 1964 A.L.J. 558. The number of the members of the family is to be determined with reference to the date of the enforcement of the Act, namely, 2nd January, 1961, in view of the Division Bench case of this Court in State v. District Judge, 1964 A.L.J. 558. If a tenure-holder has five members in his family, he is entitled to 40 acres of fair quality land, but if he has six members in his family, the family gets an additional eight acres of land. 9. It is apparent that this Act deals with secular rights of family members of a tenure-holder in respect of agricultural properties. The Act, in effect and in substance, seeks partition of the land belonging to a tenure-holders' family between the tenure-holder and the State. The ceiling area remains with the tenure-holder, the surplus land going to the State. The subject-matter of the Act attracts the general doctrine mentioned above. There is no express provision to exclude it. The scheme of the Act does not show that the doctrine was intended to be made in applicable. The number of the members of a family determine the area which a tenure-holder can retain. The rights of the members of the family of a tenure-holder in respect of property are directly affected by the Act. Under these circumstances the general doctrine will, in my opinion, be attracted to this Act. A child once conceived will be deemed to be in existence. He will be deemed to be a member of the family since the date of his conception. If the child was conceived on or before the date of the enforcement of the Act, he will be entitled to be considered a member of the family even though he may have been born subsequent to the enforcement of the Act, because the law favours the position of a child in embryo. For the purposes of safe guarding property interest, a child en ventre sa mera is deemed to be born on the date of his conception. 10. In the instant case it is the accepted position that a son was conceived prior to the enforcement of the Act though he was born subsequently. He would be entitled to be considered a member of the family for determining the ceiling area. The petitioners' family consisted of seven members. 10. In the instant case it is the accepted position that a son was conceived prior to the enforcement of the Act though he was born subsequently. He would be entitled to be considered a member of the family for determining the ceiling area. The petitioners' family consisted of seven members. The eight would be deemed to exist on the date of the enforcement of the Act. In this view, the petitioners would be entitled to 64 acres of fair quality land. The appellate authority erred in dealing with the petitioners' case that as if they were entitled to only 56 acres. 11. In the result, the petition succeeds and it is allowed. The impugned order of the appellate authority is set aside. The appellate authority will decide the petitioners' appeal afresh on the basis that they are entitled to 64 acres of fair quality land. The petitioners would be entitled to their costs. Petition allowed.