ORDER Satish Chandra, J. - This petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution arises out of proceedings under the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act. It prays that the orders dated 21-12-1965 and 7-1-1966 passed by the Consolidation Officer and the order dated 21-4-1966 passed by the Dy. Director of Consolidation be quashed. 2. One Nand Ram was the occupancy tenant of three holdings Nos. 157, 241 and 338. He died in or about 1952 leaving a widow Mst. Mukandi. The widow also died on or about July 1958. The Petitioners Sita Ram and Lotan Singh are the sister's son of Nand Ram. Respondent No. 3 Hukam Singh is the son-in-law of Nand Ram. Bijendra Singh, Respondent No. 4, claims to be the daughter's son of Nand Ram. On the death of Nand Ram's widow Mukandi in 1958, disputes arose as to succession. Several litigations were fought out between the parties, but during their pendency proceedings under the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act commenced. At this time, the revenue records showed that over holding No. 157, Smt. Mukandi, the widow of Nand Ram, was entered as a bhumidhar. She was entered as a sirdar over holding No. 338. Holding No. 241 (excluding plot Nos. 1041 and 1042) was entered in the name of Hukam Singh. Hukam Singh had transferred plot Nos. 1041 and 1042 in favour of Respondent Nos. 5 to 11 and as such these Respondents were entered over plot Nos. 1041 and 1042 of holding No. 241. 3. The Petitioners claim all the three holdings as the sister's sons of Nand Ram. They filed an objection in respect of all the three holdings claiming them as the sister's sons of Nand Ram. They denied that Hukum Singh had been engrafted as a cotenant of Nand Ram. Hukam Singh filed a claim for holding Nos. 157 and 338. He did not file any objection in respect of holding No. 241 because his name existed thereon. He claimed that Nand Ram had in his life time made him a cotenant and that on his death he is entitled to the holdings by survivorship. He denied that the Petitioners were the sister's sons of Nand Ram and contested their claim. Bijendra Singh, Respondent No. 4, also filed objections. He admitted that Hukam Singh was a co-tenant of Nand Ram. He denied that the Petitioners were the sister's sons of Nand Ram and contested their claim. Bijendra Singh, Respondent No. 4, also filed objections. He admitted that Hukam Singh was a co-tenant of Nand Ram. He claimed to be the daughter's son of Nand Ram and 'contended that on the death of Nand Ram's widow he will inherit the half share of Nand Ram in the holdings, the other half going to Hukam Singh. He also contested the claim of the Petitioners to be the sister's sons of Nand Ram. The Petitioners contested the claim set up by Bijendra Singh and filed a written statement to Bijendra Singh's claim. They denied that Bijendra Singh was the daughter's son of Nand Ram. 4. Several dates were fixed for hearing on some of which parties led evidence, documentary as well as oral. Ultimately 21-12-1965 was fixed for hearing. The Petitioners were not present. Respondents Hukam Singh and Bijendra Singh were present. The Consolidation Officer dismissed the objection of the Petitioners ex parte. The Consolidation Officer observed in his order that Hukam Singh has stated that Bijendra Singh be recorded as a co-tenant in the three holdings. He, therefore, ordered that the name of Bijendra Singh be recorded over the three holdings. 5. Three days later i.e. on 24-12-1965 the Petitioners filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order dated 21-12-1965. 7th January, 1966 was fixed for the disposal of this application. The Petitioners' case is that when the case was about to be called they went to fetch their counsel but by the time they returned with their counsel, the restoration applications were dismissed for default of appearance of the Petitioners. The same day the Petitioners made another application for the setting aside of the order passed on 7-1-1966. The Consolidation Officer dismissed this application summarily on the ground that the Petitioners can go up in appeal against the dismissal of their first restoration application. The Petitioners went up in appeal against the order dated 7-1-1966 and succeeded. The Settlement Officer Consolidation held that the Petitioners were present on 7-1-1966 and the court below did not exercise its discretion judiciously in dismissing the applications while the Petitioners had gone to call their counsel. It also held that the ground for the condonation of delay given in their previous restoration application dated 24-12-1965 also appears to be reasonable. The Settlement Officer Consolidation held that the Petitioners were present on 7-1-1966 and the court below did not exercise its discretion judiciously in dismissing the applications while the Petitioners had gone to call their counsel. It also held that the ground for the condonation of delay given in their previous restoration application dated 24-12-1965 also appears to be reasonable. He than observed that "it is no doubt that the Appellants had unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings before the lower court for which they are solely responsible, but to meet the ends of justice, it appears reasonable that the dispute be heard on merits of the case in accordance with law." In the result he allowed the appeals and set aside both the orders dated 21-12-1965 and 7-1-1966 subject to payment of costs. 6. This time Hukam Singh and Bijendra Singh felt aggrieved and filed revisions. The Dy. Director of Consolidation has allowed the revisions by the impugned order dated 21-4-1966. He held that the order dated 21-12-1965 was not appealable in view of Sections 200 and 201 of the UP Land Revenue Act which were applicable to the proceedings in view of Section 41 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act. As such the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) had no jurisdiction to set aside the order dated 21-12-1965. He held that a second restoration application was not maintainable and so no appeal lay against the order rejecting the second restoration application. He also observed that the present Petitioners have been negligent and had taken recourse to dilatory tactics. He consequently allowed the revisions and set aside the orders passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). 7. In the present petition it has been urged that a second petition for restoration was maintainable and that the order dismissing it was passed in the presence of the parties. It was not an ex parte order and hence it was appeasable u/s 11 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. It has also been submitted that while deciding the appeal against the order dated 7-1-1966 the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) had jurisdiction to pass such orders with respect to the setting aside of the ex parte older dated 21-12-1965 as the Consolidation Officer could. If the Consolidation Officer could set aside his earlier order dated 21-12-1965, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) could equally do so in the appeal. If the Consolidation Officer could set aside his earlier order dated 21-12-1965, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) could equally do so in the appeal. Lastly it has been urged that the Consolidation Officer had no jurisdiction to allow the objections of Hukam Singh and Bijendra Singh when the Petitioners had contested their claims, merely because the Petitioners were absent. It was in law incumbent on the Consolidation Officer to have determined their claims on the merits on the basis of the evidence which had already been brought on the record. He had no jurisdiction to allow the claims of Bijendra Singh merely because Hukam Singh had agreed to it. Moreover, the claim of Hukam Singh had also been contested and the impugned order does not show that Bijendra Singh had agreed to Hukam Singh's claim. Under the circumstances the Consolidation Officer had to determine those claims and record findings on the basis of the evidence. 8. The Respondents have raised several preliminary objections. It is urged that the Dy. Director allowed the revisions on 21-4-1966. The usual period of 90 days expired on 20-7-1966. Writ petition No. 2432 of 1966 was filed on 26-7-1966 whereas the other three writ petitions had been filed on 9-8-1966. There is no explanation whatsoever for the delay. The petitions are, therefore, liable to be dismissed on this ground. The affidavit in support of writ petition No. 2432 of 1966 was sworn on 18-7-1966 at Muzaffarnagar. In paragraph 51 of the rejoinder affidavit it is stated that there was a general strike in the High Court because of which the notice of the writ petition could not be served in the Standing Counsel's office and it was served on the Junior Standing Counsel in court at the time of the presentation of the writ petition on 26-7-1966 with the permission and exemption of the Bench entertaining the writ petition. Learned Counsel at the hearing stated that the general strike commenced on 18-7-1966. The question of delay in presenting the writ petition was primarily for the Bench entertaining and admitting the writ petition. Presumably that Bench was satisfied that the case was a fit one for being entertained inspite of a few days delay. I am not satisfied that the Petitioners are guilty of laches so that the petition should be thrown out en this ground. The other three connected writ petitions were filed on 9-8-1966. Presumably that Bench was satisfied that the case was a fit one for being entertained inspite of a few days delay. I am not satisfied that the Petitioners are guilty of laches so that the petition should be thrown out en this ground. The other three connected writ petitions were filed on 9-8-1966. There was no explanation for the delay. Learned Counsel has after the close of the hearing filed a supplementary affidavit to explain the delay. I need not take this affidavit into account because in my opinion it will not be just and proper to dismiss these three writ petitions on the ground of delay, because they were at the time of admission connected with the earlier writ petition. They raise common questions and if the earlier writ petition succeeds on the merits, it will be unfair to dismiss the other three on the ground of delay. All the four petitions are connected and in the interest of justice it is proper that they should meet a common fate. 9. The other preliminary objection is that previous notice of the writ petition was not served on the Standing Counsel as required by Chapter XXII, Rule 1, Sub-rule (4) of the Rules of Court. This matter is also primarily for the Bench entertaining the writ petition. In matters arising out of proceedings under the Consolidation of Holdings Act, it is common knowledge that the authorities under that Act which are represented by the Standing Counsel do not normally take interest in the proceedings in this Court. Service of notice on the Standing Counsel was a formality. At the hearing before me, the Standing Counsel has not appeared to oppose the petition much less raised any objection on this score. Notice of the writ petitions was served on the Standing Counsel though after their presentation. This rule does not, in my opinion, act as a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the Court in entertaining writ petitions. It was, in my opinion, substantially complied with by service of notice soon after the entertainment of the petitions. As stated in paragraph 51 of the rejoinder affidavit the notice of writ petition No. 2432 of 1966 was served on the Junior Standing Counsel at the time of its presentation. I am, therefore, not impressed by this preliminary objection. 10. It was, in my opinion, substantially complied with by service of notice soon after the entertainment of the petitions. As stated in paragraph 51 of the rejoinder affidavit the notice of writ petition No. 2432 of 1966 was served on the Junior Standing Counsel at the time of its presentation. I am, therefore, not impressed by this preliminary objection. 10. The third preliminary objection was that the Petitioners have not filed certified copies of the impugned orders. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Chapter XXII requires the petition to be accompanied by a copy of the judgment. It does not confine itself to a certified copy. The petitions were, therefore, not defective on this ground. 11. On the merits I am unable to endorse the opinion of the Dy. Director that a second restoration application was not maintainable. An application for restoration is maintainable u/s 201 of the UP Land Revenue Act against orders passed u/s 200 ex parte or by default. Section 200 applies to all kinds of case. When the first restoration application was filed, it gave rise to a case. That case was disposed of in default on 7-1-1966. An application to set aside that default order was, in my opinion, maintainable u/s 201. There is no express bar to making an application for setting aside an order, whereby an application for restoration is dismissed in default. I am unable to read any such limitation by implication. The order dismissing the first restoration application for default will not operate as res judicata. There is no allegation nor any finding that it operated as estoppel in the instant case. 12. The other finding that the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, did not act correctly in setting aside the order dated 21-12-1965 also does not appeal to me. The Consolidation officer by allowing the application for restoration could have set aside the order dated 21-12-1965. The Consolidation Officer' had jurisdiction to entertain the second application for restoration. He rejected it on the ground that he had no such jurisdiction. If he had entertained and allowed the second application and if he was further satisfied on the facts that the Petitioners had a reasonable cause for absence on 21-12-1965, he could have set aside that order also. He rejected it on the ground that he had no such jurisdiction. If he had entertained and allowed the second application and if he was further satisfied on the facts that the Petitioners had a reasonable cause for absence on 21-12-1965, he could have set aside that order also. When the matter came up in appeal, the Settlement Officer could validly pass same kinds of orders, provided he found that the Petitioners had established a reasonable cause for absence. The Settlement Officer had recorded findings in favour of the Petitioners on this point. He, therefore, was within his rights in setting aside both the orders. The Deputy Director has not upset the finding on the question of reasonable cause for absence. The findings of the Settlement Officer on this question of fact can be taken to have been accepted by him. Assuming that the Settlement Officer could not set aside the order dated 21-12-1965 the Dy. Director ought to have set it aside when it had been found that there was reasonable cause for absence and when the Respondents had not filed any objection to the first restoration application. The Settlement Officer was alive to the past conduct of the Petitioners which had prolonged the proceedings, but he thought that since they had reasonable ground for their absence on 21-12-1965 and 7-1-1966, it was in the ends of justice reasonable that the dispute be heard on the merits. That order, therefore, deserves to be upheld. 13. The Petitioners have also prayed that the order dated 21-12-1965 passed by the Consolidation Officer be quashed. In my opinion the Consolidation Officer had no jurisdiction to allow the objections of Hukam Singh and Bijendra Singh without determining them on the merits. Evidence had been adduced by both the parties. The Consolidation Officer ought to have assessed that evidence and recorded his findings on the various issues arising. The Petitioners had contested the claim of Hukam Singh as well as Bijendra Singh. In view of Section 200 of the Land Revenue Act, mere absence of the Petitioners on 21-12-1965 did not entitle the Consolidation Officer to allow those objections without determining them on the merits though exparte. The Petitioners had contested the claim of Hukam Singh as well as Bijendra Singh. In view of Section 200 of the Land Revenue Act, mere absence of the Petitioners on 21-12-1965 did not entitle the Consolidation Officer to allow those objections without determining them on the merits though exparte. Mere statement of Hukam Singh that Bijendra Singh's name may be recorded as a cotenant was not enough to decide if Hukam Singh had been made a cotenant by Nand Ram or whether Bijendra Singh was the daughter's son of Nand Ram. The Petitioners were not consenting parties to that statement. The claim of Hukam Singh and Bijendra Singh ought to have been determined. The part of the order allowing the claim of Hukam Singh and Bijendra Singh was, therefore, without jurisdiction. 14. In the result, the petitions succeed and are allowed. The impugned orders dated 21-4-1966 passed by the Dy. Director and 21-12-1965 passed by the Consolidation Officer are quashed. The Consolidation Officer shall now proceed with the case in accordance with the law. As the Petitioners have been found to have taken recourse to dilatory tactics during the career of the litigation before the Consolidation Officer, this is a fit case for directing that the parties shall bear their own costs in this Court.