T. V. R. Tatachari ( 1 ) THIS Lettres Patent Appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff, Tek Chand Chitkaria, against the judgment of S. K. Kapur, J. , dated 5th June, 1967, in Regular Second Appeal No, 264 of 1967, dismissing the said Second Appeal and thereby confirming the judgments of the courts below, whereby the plaint in the suit filed by the appellant herein was rejected under Order VII, Rule II, Clause (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 2 ) THE aforesaid suit (Case No. 13/22) was filed on 22nd March, 1961 by the appellant herein in the court of the Subordinate Judge, 1st Class, Kandaghat, alleging inter alia- (1) that the estate known as "lauriston" once belonged to Mrs. A. W. C Bowder, who sold the same to Capt. Malik Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana by a registered sale deed, dated 27th October, 1913, that the mutation in favour of the purchaser was attested on the 4th January. 1921, and that the land thus transferred to the said purchaser was of an extent of 17 big has and I biswa, and it comprised Khasra Nos. 142. 159, 161, 164, 163, 1/1 and 144; (2) that the property formerly known as "newton Villa" lying tow- ards the west of "lauriston" and contiguous thereto belonged to Mr. W J S. Britts, that this property had, however, been destroyed by fire, and only the site and the land belonging thereto remained, that the said vacant site and the land were also purchased by Capt. Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana; (3) that after the purchase of the land and the site pertaining to Newton Villa, by Capt Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, the said land and site formed only an appurtenance of Lauriston which was the main residential house of Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, Newton Villa having lost its entity; (4) that Capt Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana had also purchased the house known as Garden View lying towards south east of Lauriston, and that the said Garden View was, however, separated from Lauriston by a well demarcated path between the two properties; (5) that after the partition of the country, all the aforesaid property became evacuee property and was taken over by the 1st respondent herein (1st defendant), the Union of India, (6) that in 1954. the Regional Settlement Commissioner, Jullundur, on behalf of the Union of India, issued a pamphlet calling for sealed tenders for the purchase of the evacuee properties mantioned therein, that subsequently the appellant (plaintiff submitted his tender for "lauriston" on 11th September, 1954, in the following terms:- " Serial No 137. Lower Kaithu, Evacuee No. 239/1 known as Lauriston. All lands appurtenant to it (7) that the tender made by the appellant (plaintiff) was accepted by respondent No. 1 on 8th October, 1954 without any demur; condition or change, that thereafter the full consideration (tender money) was paid by the appellant (plaintiff)to the respondent No. 1 (defendant No. 1) and respondent No. 1 issued an ownership certificate in favour of the appellant (plaintiff), and that the appellant (plaintiff) thus became the owner of the lands in Khasra Nos. 141 (part), l41/2. 142, 144, 160,163, 159, 161, 162, 164, 599/163 and 158, which Khasra numbers made up what was known as "lauriston Estate" after the purchase made by Capt. Umar Havat Khan Tiwana; (8) that the appellant (plaintiff) was put in possession of a major portion of the lands and properties that were bought by him, except a cattle-shed and the compound attached, thereto and forming part of Khasra Nos. 160, 161, 162 and 163: (9) that the appellant (plaintiff) made representations regarding the non-delivery of the Khasra Nos. 160,161, 162 and 163, but the same were rejected by the Regional Settlement Commissioner on 21st January, 1958, and that the appellant (plaintiff) pursued his remedy by way of appeal, revision and review, but without avail; (10) that in spite of the fact that the lands in Khasra Nos. 160 to 163 became the absolute property of the appellant (plaintiff), respondent No. 1 sold on 11th June, 1959, the said lands (cattle-shed and lands attached thereto) to respondent No. 2 (defendant No. 2), Jaswant Ram, that the said sale was confirmed by Respondent No. 1 on 24th April. 1960, and that the cattle-shed was put in the possession of respondent No. 3 (defendant No. 3), Mast Ram Gowala. by respondent No. 2, and respondent No. 3 was paying a monthly rent of Rs. 17. 00 per month for the same ; (11) that on the acceptance of the tender of the appellant (plaintiff) by respondent No. 1 (defendant No. 1 ). by respondent No. 2, and respondent No. 3 was paying a monthly rent of Rs. 17. 00 per month for the same ; (11) that on the acceptance of the tender of the appellant (plaintiff) by respondent No. 1 (defendant No. 1 ). the appellant (plaintiff) hand become the full owner of the entire property for which ha submitted his tender, that since the cattle-shed and the lands attached thereto, comprised in Khasra Nos. 160, 161, 162 and 16, had become an appurtenance to Lauriston Estate, the appellant (plaintiff), by virtue of the acceptance of his tender, had become the owner of the said cattle-shed and lands also, and that therefore, he was entitled to be put in possession of the said Khasra Numbers together with the cattle-shed and lands comprised therein; (12) that the appellant (plaintiff) was not bound by the illegal and void sale made by the respondent No. 1 in favour of respondent No. 2; that he was entitled to recover compensation for the use and occupation of the cattle-shed and the lands, that the compensation calculated at Rs. 17. 00 per month worked out at Rs. 612. 00 for a period of three years, but that he voluntarily relinquished his claim to a sum of Rs. 112. 00 and sought recovery of Rs. 500. 00 only on that account ; and (13) that be, therefore, filed the suit for recovery of possession of Khasra Numbers 160, 161, 162 and 163 together with the cattle-shed thereon (and the lands forming compound. etc. of the cattle-shed) and for recovery of Rs. 500. 00 as compensation. Respondent Nos. 1 to (defendants Nos. 1 to 3) filed separate written statements. But it is unncessary to set out in detail the aljega. tions in the various written statements for the purpose of this appeal. etc. of the cattle-shed) and for recovery of Rs. 500. 00 as compensation. Respondent Nos. 1 to (defendants Nos. 1 to 3) filed separate written statements. But it is unncessary to set out in detail the aljega. tions in the various written statements for the purpose of this appeal. The main pleas of the respondents (defendants) in the said written statements were (1) that the Jurisdiction of the civil court was barred under section 36 of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (44 of of 1954) and section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (31 of 1950), as the property in suit formed part of the compensation pool ; (2) that the suit was incompetent and not maintainable as there has been no transfer of the property to the appellant (plaintiff) as yet by a regular sale deed ; (3) that the suit was not properly valued for purposes of court fee and Jurisdiction; (4) that a valid notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not served upon respondent No. 1 (defendant No 1) ; (5) that the plaint was not properly signed and verified ; (6) that since a writ petition filed by the appellant (plaintiff) against the respondent for the same relief was dismissed by the Punjab High Court, the decision in the writ petition operated asrse judicata and barred the present suit ; (7) that the suit was barred by limitation ; and (8) that the cattlesed, compound attached thereto and the vacant land underneath the building of Newton villa comprised in Khasra Nos. 160, 161, 162 and 16 never formed a part of or were appurtenant to Lauriston, and that the same were never offered to the appellant (plaintiff) for sale and were not sold to him, and as such the appellant (plaintiff) was neither entitled to seek recovery of possession or claim damages, and hence the suit was liable to be dismissed. The appellant (plaintiff) filed a replication in which he pleased, inter alia that his title was complete on the acceptance of his tender, and in any ease, after the purchase money was fully paid, partly in cash and partly by adjustment of duly verified claims. ( 3 ) ON the aforesaid pleadings, the learned Subordinate Judge framed the following issues :- 1. Whether the suit is properly valued for purposes of court fee and Jurisdiction ? 2. ( 3 ) ON the aforesaid pleadings, the learned Subordinate Judge framed the following issues :- 1. Whether the suit is properly valued for purposes of court fee and Jurisdiction ? 2. Whether the plaintiff has served on defendant No. 1 a valid notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, before in institution of this suit ? 3. Whether the decision in the writ petition operates as resjudicata and disentitled the plaintiff to file the present suit ? 4. Whether the suit is within time ? 5 Whether the plaint is not properly verified ? if so, to what effect ? 6. Whether the sale certificate has been issued in favour of the plaintiff if not what effect ? 7. Whether the cattle-shed and the land comprised in Khastct Nos. 161 and 163 formed a part of Lauriston and the sale of Lauriston by defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff included the sale thereof as well ? 8. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover any compensation from the defendant No. 3 for the use of the cattle shed ? If so for how much period and at what rate ? 9. In case issue No. 8 is decided in favour of the plaintiff and the defendant No. 2 has made the payments of the rents either to the defendant No. 2 or to defendant No. 1, is the plaintiff entitled to recover the same amount from the defendants Nos, 1 and 2 ? 10. Relief. 9. In case issue No. 8 is decided in favour of the plaintiff and the defendant No. 2 has made the payments of the rents either to the defendant No. 2 or to defendant No. 1, is the plaintiff entitled to recover the same amount from the defendants Nos, 1 and 2 ? 10. Relief. ( 4 ) THE learned Subordinate Judge, by his Judgment, dated 30th November, 1961, held on issue No. 1 that the suit as framed was properly valued for purposes of court fee and jurisdiction, on issue No, 2 that a valid notice under section 80, C. P. C. was served on respondent No. 1, on issue No. 3 that the decision of the writ petition did not operate as res judicata, and in fact, no arguments were advanced by the respondents on the said issue, on issue No. 4 that the suit was within time, on issue No. 5 that the plaint was properly verified, and on issue No. 6 that the sale certificate was not issued in favour of the appellant (plaintiff), that, therefore the title in the property did not pass to the appellant (plaintiff), and the property still formed a part of the compensation pool, and that consequently the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred under section 36 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (No. 44 of 1954) and section 46 of the Administration Evacuee Property Act (No. 31 of 1950 ). In view of his finding on issue No. 6, the learned Subordinate Judge held that issues Nos. 7 to 9 did not merit consideration at that state, and rejected the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 Clause (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 5 ) AGAINST that judgment, the appellant (plaintiff) preferred an appeal ( Civil Appeal file No. 1/13 on 4th January, 1962, Judgment, dated 17th September, 1962, to the Court of the District Judge Ambala. The learned District Judge by his order confirmed the findings of the trial court on all the issues, and dismissed the appeal On issue No. 6, the learned District Jadge, while agreeing with the trial court, took the view that the transfer of the property would be complete only when the deed of transfer is executed. Dealing with a contention on behalf the purchaser that he had acquired an interest in the property under Ex. Dealing with a contention on behalf the purchaser that he had acquired an interest in the property under Ex. P/3, a letter sent by the Respondent No. 1 (defendant No. 1) to the appellant (plaintiff), he also held that the said letter (Exhibit P/3), was incapable of passing any interest in the immovable property to the appellant (plaintiff) as the same was not a registered document. He, therefore, held that the appellant (plaintiff) could not pray for 3 decree for possession of the suit property, He accordingly dismissed the appeal. ( 6 ) AGAINST that Judgment, the appellant (plaintiff) filed Regular Second Appeal No. 264 of 1967 in this Court. The Second Appeal was heard by S. K. Kapur, J. Before the learned Judge, it was contended on behalf of the appellant (plaintiff) that the title to the property passed to the appellant (plaintiff) as soon as his tender was accepted and the entire consideration was paid, and the passing of the title was not in abeyance till the execution or registration of the deed of conveyance, and that since a major portion of the property was put in his possession, but the possession of the cattle-shed and the compound and land attached thereto was not delivered, the appellant (plaintiff) was entitled to sue in a civil court for possession of the said cattle-shed, compound and land, etc. attached thereto, and also for compensation for use and occupation of the said property. attached thereto, and also for compensation for use and occupation of the said property. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the respondents (defendants) that in the case of sale by tender in respect of evacuee property which formed part of the common pool, the transfer takes place only after the execution of the deed of conveyance in the form specified in Appendix XXIV or XX V as the case may be, as provided in sub-rule (8) of Rule 91 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehalibitation) Rules, 1955, that since the deed of conveyance was not executed in respect of the suit property in the present case, the title did not pass to the-appellant (plaintiff), and the suit property remained as a part of the common pool, and that, therefore, the suit in respect of the suit property which thus remained as a part of the common pool was barred under section 36 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (No 44 of 1954) and section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. On behalf of the appellant (plaintiff) reliance was placed upon the decision in Bishan Paul v. Mothu Ram in support of the proposition that the intention behind the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, was that title shall pass when the full value was realised, and the certificate of sale or the deed of conveyance, when executed and registered, shall relate back to the date when the sale became absolute. On the other hand, reliance was placed on behalf of the respondents upon a Full Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Gulzari Lal v Dewan Chand. in support of the proposition that till the sale certificate is granted under theaforesaid Rules, the property still belongs to the Government in law. The learned Judge pointed out that in Bishan Paul s case, the transferee was an auction purchaser governed by Rule 90 of the aforesaid Rules, that sub-rule (15) of Rule 90 provides that when the purchase price has been realised in full from the auction- purchaser, the Managing Officer shall issue to him a sale certificate in the form specified in Appendix XXII or XXIII, as the case may be. and that, as pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bishan Paul s case, the sale certificate may fix a date from which the transferee becomes the owner of the property. The learned Judge then pointed out that the present case, however, is governed by Rule 91 of the said Rules, sub-rule (8) where of provides that when any property is purchased under this Rule and the full purchase price has been paid or adjusted against the compensation claims, if any, a deed of transfer shall be executed in the form specified in Appendix XXIV or XXV, as the case may be, that the present case was admittedly governed by Appendix XXIV, and that in the said Appendix XXIV, no provision was made for declaring a transferee as an owner from a past date, that combined with the said fact was the fact that the language of Appendix XXIV suggests that the property, til] the date of the conveyance deed, continues to be owned and possessed by the Government, and that in that view it must be held that the property in the present case did not stand transferred to the appellant (plaintiff) by the mere issue of the letter (Ex. P/3) by respondent. No. 1 to the appellant (plaintiff), and it was not disputed that in that situation the decision of the two courts below as to the maintainability of the suit would be correct. In the result, the learned Judge dismissed the Second Appeal. It is against that judgment that the present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred. ( 7 ) AS stated above, 311 the three lower courts reacted the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, Clause (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the appellant (plaintiff) herein. The material issue framed in the suit was issue No. 6 which was framed as follows ; - "6. Whether the sale certificate had been issued in favour of the plaintiff ? If not, what effect ?" It was under this issue that all the three courts considered the question as to whether the civil court had no furisdiction to entertain the suit. It may be pointed out here that the purchase "sale certificate" was used, perhaps, by mistake in the said issue. If not, what effect ?" It was under this issue that all the three courts considered the question as to whether the civil court had no furisdiction to entertain the suit. It may be pointed out here that the purchase "sale certificate" was used, perhaps, by mistake in the said issue. Admittedly, the sale in the present case was by inviting tenders, and in such a case Rule 91 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, governs the same, and sub-rule (8) of Rule 31 contemplates the execution of a deed of transfer and not the issue of a sale certificate. The learned Subordinate Judge also used the same phrase "sale certificate", perhaps by mistake. The learned Subordiante Judge, following the decisions in M/s. Bombay Salt and Chemical Industries v. L. J. Jhonson and Manohar Lal v. Rent Control and. Eviction Officer Bareilly, took the view that the title to the property does not pass to the purchaser unless the sale certificate ( mis take for deed of transfer) is executed, that the sale certificate (mistake for deed of transfer) in respect of the property sold in the present case having not yet been issued by the respondent No. 1 (defendant No. 1) in favour of the appellant (plaintiff), the property still formed a part of the compensation pool, and that consequently the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred under section 36 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (No. 44 of 1954), and Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (No. 31 of 1950 ). On appeal, the learned District Judge took the same view that the transfer of the property would be complete only when the deed of transfer is executed. Dealing with a contention on behalf of the purchaser that he had acquired an interest in the property under Ex. P/3, a letter sent by respondent No. 1 to the appellant (plaintiff), he also held that the said letter (Ex. P/3) was incapable of passing any interest in the immovable property to the appellant (plaintiff) as the same was not a registered document. P/3, a letter sent by respondent No. 1 to the appellant (plaintiff), he also held that the said letter (Ex. P/3) was incapable of passing any interest in the immovable property to the appellant (plaintiff) as the same was not a registered document. On second appeal, S. K. Kapur, J. , after pointing out that the decision of the Supreme Court in Bishan Pal v. Motu Ram, dealt with a case under Rule 90 of the aforesaid Rules, and that the Supreme Court laid emphasis on the fact that the sale certificate (Appendix XXII or XXIII) may fix a date from which the transferee become? the owner of the property, observed that the present case is governed by Rule 91 of the said Rules, that under sub-rule (8) of Rule 91, a deed of transfer has to be executed in the form specified in Appendix XXIV, that in the said Appendix XXIV. no provision was made for declaring a transferee as an owner thereof from a past date, that combined with the said fact was the fact that the language of Appendix XXIV suggests that the property, till the date of the deed of transfer, continues to be owned and possessed by the Government, and that in that view, it must be held that the property in the present case did not stand transfred to the appellant ( plaintiff), and that, therefore, the decision of the courts below as to the maintainability of the suit was correct. ( 8 ) SHRI Ramji Dass, the learned counsel for the appellant, contended firstly that the learned single Judge was in error in thinking that in Appendix XXIV no provision was made for declaring a transferee as an owner from a past date, and that the language of Appendix XXIV suggests that the property till the date of the deed of transfer continues to be owned and possessed by the Government, that Appendix XXIV, as amended in 1951, does contain such a provision, that, therefore, the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Bishan Pal s case would apply to a case governed by Rule 91 also, that, therefore, it must be held that when the full price was paid or adjusted, the title to the property passed to the appellant (plaintiff) even without the execution of a deed of transfer, as the said execution of a deed of transfer is only a ministerial act as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Bishan Pal s case. The learned counsel is correct in stating that Appendix XXIV was amended in 1951, and the words "this Indenture shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from. . . . . " were added in the form of the deed of transfer which has to be executed under sub rule (8) of Rule 91 in the case of free-hold properties which are sold otherwise than by public auction, There is, therefore, considerable force in the submission of the learned counsel that if the learned Judge had noticed the said amendment, he might have applied to Rule 91 the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Bishan Pal s case regarding Rule 90, and might have come to the conclusion that the title passed to the appellant (plaintiff) on the payment of the full price even before the deed of transfer is actually executed. We shall, therefore, consider in detail the respective contentions of the parties regarding the question as to the passing of title to the appellant and the maintainability of the suit in a civil court. We shall, therefore, consider in detail the respective contentions of the parties regarding the question as to the passing of title to the appellant and the maintainability of the suit in a civil court. ( 9 ) AS already stated, the contention of the respondents was and is that in the ease of a sale of property in the compensation pool by inviting tenders, the title to the property does not pass to the purchaser either on the final acceptance of the tender or on the transfer of the said acceptance by the Settlement Commissioner or when the full purchase price has been paid by the purchaser or adjusted against any comoensation payable to him in respect of any verified claim held by him, but would pass only after the execution of a deed of transfer in the form specified in Appendix XXIV or XXV, as the case may be, as provided in sub-rule (8) of Rule 91 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, that in the present case no such deed of transfer has been executed, and consequently the title to the property did not pass to the appellant but continued to remain in the government, and the property continued to be part of the compensation pool, and that the present suit, in the civil court, in respect of such property in the compensation pool, is barred by the provisions in section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (No. 31 of 1950) and Section S6 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (No. 44 of 1954) on the other band, the contention of the appellant (plaintiff) was and is that the title to the property passed to him on the payment or adjustment of the full purchase price even though the deed of transfer has not been executed in his favour, that the execution of the deed of transfer is only a ministerial act which can be done by the Government at any time subsequently, that the property, therefore, did rot continue to be part of the compensation pool, and that, in any event, the provisions in section 36 and 46 of the aforesaid Acts did not bar the filing of the prevent suit by him in the civil court. ( 10 ) IT has to be noted that the first part of the above contention of the appellant (plaintiff) is based on his assertion that the full price of the property (tender money) was paid by him. In paragraph 4 of his plaint, he stated that his tender was accepted by the respondent No 1 on 18th October, 1954, and thereafter the full consideration (tender money) was paid by him to respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 1 issued an ownership certificate in his favour. In the written statement, filed on behall of the respondent No. 1 (defendant No. 1), it was merely stated in paragraph 4 thereof that "para No. 4 in the plaint is denied being incorrect except to the extent that tender of the plaintiff was accepted only for the E. P. No. 239/4. Lower Kaithu, mentioned at serial No. 13/ of the auction notice and none else, and an intimation was duly sent to him to this effect. The rest of the property was never offered to him for sale nor was ever the subject of negotiation. The plaintiff was duly supplied with the copy of the plan of the evacuee property sold to him. " ( 11 ) THERE was thus no specfic denial of the averment in paragraph 4 of the plaint as to the payment of full price. That is why, perhaps, no issue was framed on this fact of payment of the price. ( 12 ) IN the witten statement filed by respondent No. 2 (defendant No. 2) it was stated in paragraph 9 there of that the suit was incompetent, that there was no transfer of the property to the appellant (plaintiff) as yet by a regular sale deed, and hence the suit was not maintainable. In his replication to the written statement of respondent No. 2 (defendant No. 2), the appellant (plaintiff) stated in paragraph 7 that the objection of the respondent was wrong that the title of the appellant (plaintiff) was complete immediately on his tender having been accepted, and more so after the purchase money was fully paid, partly in cash and partly by adjustment of duly verified claims. In Ex. In Ex. P/3, a communication, dated 26tb/28th April, 1955, by the Regional Settlement Commissioner, Jullundur, to the appellant (plaintiff), it was stated - "it has been decided to transfer provisionally with effect from the 1st March, 1955, the ownership of the marginally noted property for which your tender was accepted. The sale will be confirmed when your application for compensation and those of other displaced claimants associated with you have been finally scrutinised and the balance of the amount, if any, due from you paid to this office. "it has to be noted that this communication was as long back as 1951. No further communication appears to have been sent to the appellant (plaintiff) as to whether any balance amount was due from the appellant (plaintiff) towards the purchase price. The silence on the part of the respondent No. 1 for such a long time and the absence of a specific denial of the averment in the plaint, clearly show that no balance was due from the appellant (plaintiff ). The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has not been able to place any material before us even at this stage of the appeal to show that any balance is still due from the appellant (plaintiff ). We have, therefore, to proceed, and the arguments before us proceeded on the basis that the full price was paid or adjusted. ( 13 ) FOR a proper appreciation of the respective contentions of the parties, it is necessary to refer at this stage to the relevant provisions of the Acts and the Rules mentioned above. Section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Cornpensation and Rehabilitation) Act (No. 44 of 1954) empowers the Central Government, to acquire evacuee property for rehabilitation of displaced persons. As admitted in paragraph 1 of the written statement filed on behalf of the respondent No. 1, the property in suit was acquired by the Government under ths atoresaid section 12 of Act No. 44 of 1954. Section 14 (1) of the Act provides for the constitution of a compensation pool which shall consist of, inter-alia all evacuee property acquired under section 12 of the Act, and section 14 (2) provides that the compensation pool shall vest in the Central Government free from all encumberances and shall be utilised in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. As stated in paragraph 1 of the written statement of respondent No. 1, the property in suit formed part of the compensation pool. Section 20 of the Act provides that subject to any Rules that may be made under the Act, the Managing Officer or Managing Corporation may transfer any property out of the Compensation pool, inter alia. by sale of such property to a displaced person or to any other person by public auction or otherwise. Section 40 of the Act provides that the Central Government may make Rules to carry out the purposes of the Act. ( 14 ) IN exercise of the powers conferred by section 40 of the Act, the Central Government promulgated the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, on 21st May, 1955. Chapter XIV of the said Rales has prescrbed the procedure for sale of property in the compensation pool. Rule 87 prescribes the mode of sale of the property in the compensation pool It provides that any property forming part of the compensation pool may be sold - (I) by public auction; or (ii) by inviting tenders; or (iii) in such other manner as the Chief Settlement Commissioner may, by general or special order, direct. Rule 90 prescribes the procedure for sale of property by public auction, and Rule 91prescribes the procedure for sale of property by tender. In the present, case, the property in suit, was sold by tender, and therefore, the procedure to be followed was as prescribed in Rule 91. Rule 91, amended, run? as follows : - "91. Rule 90 prescribes the procedure for sale of property by public auction, and Rule 91prescribes the procedure for sale of property by tender. In the present, case, the property in suit, was sold by tender, and therefore, the procedure to be followed was as prescribed in Rule 91. Rule 91, amended, run? as follows : - "91. Procedure for sale of property by tender (1) where any property is to be sold by inviting tenders, the Settlement Commissioner, the Managing Officer or any other officer authorised by the Settlement Commissioner for the purpose shall invite sealed tenders for the property and the invitation for tenders shall specify- (i) the amount to be deposited by the tenders as earnest money; Provided that such earnest money shall not be more than 20 per cent of the amount tendered ; (ii) a brief description of the property to be sold, its location and boundaries where possible, and any other particulars which may be material ; (iii) the period within which tenders are to be received ; (iv) the date, time and place fixed for the opening of tenders ; (v) the terms and conditions of tender as set forth in the provisions herein alter appearing ; and (vi) any other relevant information (2) the tenders shall be opened by the settlement commissioner, the Managing Officer or any authorise officer on the date and at the time and place fixed for the opening of tenders in the presence of all those tenders who may wish to be present. (3) The Settlement Commissioner shall not be bound to accept the highest or any other tender and shall not be bound to disclose his reasons therefore. Every tenderer shall be bound by his offer and shall, if he resiles from such offer, be liable to forfeit his deposit of earnest money. The decision of the Settlement Commissioner with regard to the forfeiture of the earnest money shall be final. (4) When a tender has been accepted by the Settlement Commissioner or an officer empowered by him in this behalf, the tenderer shall produce before the managing officer or other officer appointed by the Settlement Commissioner for the purpose within 15 days of the intimation to him of the acceptance of the tender, a challan evidencing a deposite into the treasury of the balance of the purchase money. (5) The balance of the tender amount may be adjusted against the compensation due to the purchaser in the same manner as the balance of purchase money may be adjusted when a sale takes place by public auction under rule 90. (6) The final acceptance of a tender shall be subject to approval of the Settlement Commissioner or an officer appointed by him for the purpose, (7) The provisions of sub-rules 12, 13 and 14 of Rule 90 shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to the sale of a property by tenders under this rule, as they apply in relation to the sale of a property by public auction under that rule. (8) Where any property is purchased by any person under this rule and the full purchase price has been paid by him or adjusted against the compensation as provided in sub-rule (5), a deed of transfer shall be executed in the form specified in Appendix XXIV or XXV, as the case may be. If the tender has associated with himself any displaced person having a verified claim wh"se net compensation is to be adjusted in whole or in part against the purchase price, the deed of transfer shall be made out jointly in the name of all such persons and shall specify the extent of interest of each in the property. Provided that if every such displaced person who has associated himself with the tenderer sends an intimation in writing to the Regional Settlement Commissioner that the deed of transfer may be made out in the name of the tenderer, the deed of transfer may be made out in the name of the tenderer. " ( 15 ) THE Rule which we reproduced above shows that, where the sale of property is by tender, tenders are to be called for by the Settlement Commissioner or the Managing Officer or any other officer authorised by the Settlement Commissioner specifying, inter alia, the amount to be deposited by the tenderer as earnest money. The tenders are to be opened by the Settlement Commissioner or the Managing Officer or any authorised officer on a date and at a time and place fixed for the opening of the tender. The Settlement Commissioner is not bound to accept the highest or any other tenderer to disclose his reasons therefore. The tenders are to be opened by the Settlement Commissioner or the Managing Officer or any authorised officer on a date and at a time and place fixed for the opening of the tender. The Settlement Commissioner is not bound to accept the highest or any other tenderer to disclose his reasons therefore. When a lender is accepted by the Settlement Commissioner or an officer empowered by him in this behalf, the tenderer, within 15 days of the intimation to him of the acceptance of the tender, has to produce a challan evidencing a deposit into the treasury of the balance of the purchase money, i. e after deducting the earnest money, or the said balance of the purchase money may be adjusted against the compensation payable to the tenderer in respect of any verified claim held by him, in the same manner as the balance of purchase money may be adjusted when a sale takes place by public auction under Rule 90. The final acceptance of a tender is subject to the approval of the Settlement Commissioner or an officer appointed by him tor the purpose. The provisions of sub-rules (12), (13) and (14) of Rule 90 are applicable, so far as may be, to the sale of a property by tender under Rule 91. As provided in the sub-rule (131 of Rule 90, if the Regional Settlement Commissioner, on scrutiny of the compensation application of the tenderer finds that a further sum is due to make up the purchase price, he has to call upon the tenderer to deposit the said balance in cash within 15 days of the receipt of such intimation As provided in sub-rule (14) of Rule 90, if the tenderer does not deposit the balance of the purchase money within the prescribed period, or does not furnish the prescribed partculars in his compensation application, or if the net compensation payable to him is found to be loss than the balance of the purchase money and the tenderer does not make up the deficiency, the intitial deposit, i. e. the earnest money paid by him under sub-rule (1) of Rule 91, is liable to forfeiture and he will not have any claim to the property. When the full purchase price has been paid by the tenderer or adjusted against the compensation payable to him, a deed of transfer has to be executed in the form specified in Appendix XXIV or XX v as the case may be. Appedix XXIV is the form of the deed of conveyance to be executed in the case of freehold properties which are sold otherwise than by public auctions. Appendix XXV is the form of deed of conveyance of buildings constructed on lease-hold sites sold otherwise than bypublic auction. Admittedly, the property in suit in the present case is free bold property, and the form applicable is that in appendix XXIV. It is necessary to reproduce the Appendix XXIV. "this indenture made. . . . . . . . . day of. . . . . . . . . . . . One Thousand Nine Hundred and. . . . . . . . . . . . between the President of India hereinafter called "the vendor" (which expression shall unless repugnant to the context or meaning thereof include his successors and assignees) of the one part and. . . . . . . . . . . . S/o. . . . . . . . . . . called "the purchaser" (which expression shall unless repugnant to the context or meaning thereof be deemed to include his heirs, executors and administrators) of the other part. Whereas the vender is seized and possessed of the land, hereditaments and premises were particularly desciibed in Schedule I, here- under written. And whereas the vendor has agreed with the purchaser for the absolute sale to him of the said land, hereditaments and premises intended to be hereby granted at or for the price of Rs. . . . . . . . . . . . . paid to the vendor by the purchaser (. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . in cash and. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . paid to the vendor by the purchaser (. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . in cash and. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .) by adjustment against the compensation payable under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, to the purchaser and his associates whose names are given in Schedule II hereunder written on or before the execution of these presents the receipt wbeieof the vendor doth hereby admit and acknowledge, and from the same doth hereby release the purchaser and whereas the said associates have agreed to the property being granted, released, conveyed and assured unto the purchaser, the vendor doth in pursuance of rule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . of the rules framed under the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, hereby grant, release, convey and assure unto the purchaser all that price or parcel of land, hereditaments and premises known as. . . . . . . . . . . . more particularly described in Schedule I hereunder written together with all buildings. . . . of the rules framed under the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, hereby grant, release, convey and assure unto the purchaser all that price or parcel of land, hereditaments and premises known as. . . . . . . . . . . . more particularly described in Schedule I hereunder written together with all buildings. commons, fences, hedges, ditches, ways, waters, watercourses, liberties, privileges, casements, and appurtenance whatsoever to the said piece or parcel of land belonging or in any way appertaining or usually held or enjoyed therewith or reputed to belong to be appurtenant thereto and all the estate, right, title, interest, claim demand whatsoever of the vendor into and up-in the said premises every part thereof excepting and reserving to the vendor all mines and minerals of whatever nature lie to, in or under the said premise together with full liberty at all times for the vendor, his agents and workmen to enter upon all or any part of the said premises to search for, make merchantable and carry away the said mines and minerals under or upon the said premises or any adjoining lands of the vendor and to let down the surface of all or any part of the said premises and any buildings standing thereon or hereafter to be created thereon, making fair compensation to the purchaser lor damage done there by to have and to hold the said land, hereditaments and premises her by granted, released, conveyed and assured, or expressed so to be, unto and to the use of the purchaser subject nevertheless to the payment of such land revenue, cesses and taxes as are or may be assessed or imposed on the said premises and the vendor doth hereby convenant with the purchaser that he has not done anything or suffered anything to be done whereby the said premises are in any way encumbered or affected and that the purchaser shall and may at all times hereafter peaceably and quitly possess and enjoy the said land, hereditaments and premises and receive the rents and profits thereof without any lawful eviction, interruption, claim or demand whatsoever, from or by the vendor or any person or persons lawfully or equitably claiming from, under, or in trust for him. And further that he the vendor and all persons having or lawfully or equitably claiming any estate or interest in the said land hereditaments and premises, or any of them, or any part thereof, from under or in trust for him the vendor shall and will from time to time, and at all times hereafter, at the request and cost of the purchaser do or execute, or cause to be done and executed, all such acts, deeds and things whatsoever, for further and more perfectly assuring the said land, hereditaments and premises, and every part thereof, unto and to the use of the purchaser, in manner aforesaid as shall or may be reasonably required. The property the compensation of which has been adjusted against the value of this property was mortgaged with Shri. . . . . . . . . S/o. . . . . . . . . in West Pakistan and/or Shri. . . . . . . . the purchaser, had obtained a debt of Rs. . . . . . . . . . from Shri. . . . . . . . . s/o. . . . . . . in West Pakistan. The said mortgagee/creditor has obtained a decree for Rs. . . . . . . . . from the Tribunal constituted under the Displaced Persons (Debt Adjustment) Act, 1951, the intimation of which has been received by the Chief Settlement Commissioner from the Tribunal concerned: The mortgagee/creditor would, therefore, have a lien over this property to the extent of mortgage charge/debt of Rs. . . . . . . . . according to the provisions of the above act until the mortgage charge/debt is satisfied or is redeemed by the mortgagor/debtor. This indenture shall be deemed to have come into force from. . . . . . . . In witness whereof the vendor has caused. . . . . . . . on bis behalf to set his land hereunto the day and year first above written. " ( 16 ) AS already stated, the words "this indenture shall be deemed to have come into force from. . . . . . . . . " were inserted by anamendment of the Rules in 1961. Similar words were also inserted in Appendix XXV, with which, however, we are not concerned in the present case. " ( 16 ) AS already stated, the words "this indenture shall be deemed to have come into force from. . . . . . . . . " were inserted by anamendment of the Rules in 1961. Similar words were also inserted in Appendix XXV, with which, however, we are not concerned in the present case. ( 17 ) IN Bishan Pal v. Mothu Ram certain peoperty in the compensation pool was sold by auction under Rule 99 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955. A person, who was already a tenant in respect of the property, even prior to the auction sale, was directed to pay the amounts of rent to the auction purchaser. The tenant made certain payments to the auction purchaser. Subsequently, the auction purchaser filed an application before the Rent Controller for eviction of the tenant on the ground, intir alia, of failure of the tenant to pay the rent. The Rent Controller held that the total amount paid by the tenant fell short of the amount of rent payable to the purchaser, and, therefore, ordered the evictionof the tenant. The contention of the tenant was that the title to the property did not pass to the auction purchaser on 0ctober,3rd 1956 which was the date on which the auction sale was confirmed in favour of the purchaser, and his tenancy did not, therefore, commence from that date, but that the title passed to the auction purchaser on December. 1955, which was the date on which the sale certificate under Rule 90 was issued to the auction purchaser, and that his tenancy commenced from that date, The arguments on behalf of the tenant was that if the passing of title to the auction purchaser was taken to be the date on which the sale was confirmed, the commencement of the tenancy was from that date, and in that case, the amount paid by the tenant would be less than the amount due to the auction purchaser, but, on the other hand if the passing of the title was taken to be the date on which the sale certificate was graned to the auction purchaser, the amount of rent deposited by the tenant was in excess of the amount due from him. Thus, the main question lor consideration in that case was as to whether the title to the property passed to the auction purchaser on the date of the confirmation of the auction sale or on the date on which the sale certificate was issued to the auction purchaser. On an interpretation of the provisions in Rules 90 and 92, the Supreme Court held that the title to the property passes to the auction purchaser on the date of the confirmation of the sale, and was not in abeyance till the issue of the certificate of sale, that the issue of the sale certificate was only a ministerial act, and that the certificate, when issued, relates back to the date when the sale became absolute. The Head Note (a) in the Report brings out succinctly the decision of the Supreme Court : "rules 90 and 92 show that there are several distinct stages in the auction sale of property in the compensation pool. These are:- (1) The fall of the hammer and the declaration of the highest bid; (2) the approval of the highest bid by the Settlement Commissioner or officer appointed by him ; (3) payment of the full price after this approval ; (4) grant of certificate ; and (5) registration of the certificate. 8. According to clause (14) of the Rule 20, the auctionpurchaser has no claim to the property in the full price is not paid. there is no provision like section 65, Civil Procedure Code, in the Rules and the question as to when title passes in the property must be considered on general principles. The intention behind the rules seems to be that title shall pass when the full price is realised and this is now clear form the new iron) of certificate requiring a mention that the purchaser has been declared the purchaser with effect from a specified date. ( 18 ) PROPERTY in possession of a tenant was auctioned and the respondent whose bid was highest had paid the full price before the 'ale in his favour was confirmed. I he sale certificate though issued latter mentioned the date of confirmation of the sale. The tenant was asked to atom to the purchaser from the date of confirmation of sale and thus possession was also delivered on that day. I he sale certificate though issued latter mentioned the date of confirmation of the sale. The tenant was asked to atom to the purchaser from the date of confirmation of sale and thus possession was also delivered on that day. Held, that the title to the propnty paused to the respondent on the date of confirmation of sale and was not in abeyance till the issue of the certificate and that the certificate when issued related back to *he date when sale became absolute. " ( 19 ) IT has to be noted that though the provisions in Rule 90 do not refer to any confirmation of the sale, but only to an approval of the bid by the Settlement Commissioner the Supreme Court used the words "confirmation of sale". The facts of that case, as stated in the decision, show that the word "confirmation" was used in the certificate of sale that was issued, and also in the letter (Ex. R/17) written by the District Kent and Managing Officer to the tenant requiring him to pay the rent to the auction purchaser. Apparently, the reference to the confirmation of sale was a reference to the approval of his bid by the Settlement Commissioner. Thus, the Supreme Court interprated the provisions in Rule 90 and held that the intention behind the Rules appears to be that title shall pass when the full price is realised In that particular case, the purchaser paid the full price before the sale in his favour was confirmed i. e. approved by the Settlement Commissioner, though normally, according to the provisions of the Rule 90, the payment of the price is to be made alter the approval of the hid by the Settlement Commissioner. That is why, although the Supreme Court stated that the intention of the Rules appears to be that title shall pass when the full price is realised, observed at a later stage in the same paragraph 16, that in that case the purchaser obtained title on the date of the confirmation of the sale. Thus, the ratio of this decision is that the title to the property passes to the auction purahaser on the confirmation of the sale or on the payment of the full price, whichever is later, and not on the date of the issue of the certificate of sale, which is only a ministerial act. Thus, the ratio of this decision is that the title to the property passes to the auction purahaser on the confirmation of the sale or on the payment of the full price, whichever is later, and not on the date of the issue of the certificate of sale, which is only a ministerial act. The Supreme Court arrived at this conclusion relying on the following circumstances :- (1) According to clause (14) of Rule 90 the auction purchaser has no claim to the property it the full puce is not paid; (2) there is no provision like section 65 of the Civil Procedure Code in the Rules; and (3) the new form of the certificate requires a mention that the purchaser has been declared the purchaser with effect from a specified date. "it has to be noted that the main provisions in Rule 91 bear a close similarity to the main provisions in Rule 90. As in Rule 90, there are several distinct stages in the sale of property in the compensation pool by tender under Rule 91. They are:- (1) the invitation of Unders specifying the earnest money to be paid; (2) the opening of the tenders and the acceptance of the highest or any other tender; (3) the approval by the Settlement Commissioner or an officer appointed by him of the said acceptance of a tender; (4) payment of the belance of the full purchase price i. e. after deducting the earnest money, in cash or by adjustment of compensation payable to the tenderer; and (5) execution of deed of transfer. ( 20 ) BY sub rule (7) of Rule 91, sub-rule (14) of Rule 90 is made applicable to sales by tender under Rule 91, and as pointed out by the Supreme Court, according to sub-rule (14) of Rule 90, the tenderer has no claim to the property if the full purchase price is not paid either in cash or by adjustment of compensation payable to him. There is no provision like section 65otthe Civil Procedure Code in Rule 91. The new form of the deed of transfer (Appendix XXIV) requires that the indenture shall be deemed to have come into force from a specified date. There is no provision like section 65otthe Civil Procedure Code in Rule 91. The new form of the deed of transfer (Appendix XXIV) requires that the indenture shall be deemed to have come into force from a specified date. Therefore, there is considerable force in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision in dealing with the provisions of Rule 90, applies to the pro visions in Rule 91. If the said reasoning of the Supreme Court applies, and is adopted, it has to be held that in the case of a sale by tender under Rule 91. the title passes when the full price is realised, and if that view that the intention behind the Rule 91 is that title shall pass when the full price is realised, is correct, the execution of the deed of transfer under sub-rule (7) of Rule 91, after the realisation of the full price, has to be retarded as only a ministerial act, just as it has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that the issue of a sale certificate under sub-rule (141 of Rule 90 is only a ministerial act. But, we have to consider here two objections to the above interpretation of Rule 91 put forward by the learnedcounsel for the respondents, Shri A C Mehta, and Shri Prithvi Raj. The first objection was that the reasoning in the decision of the Supreme Court in Bishan Pal's case cannot be adopted or applied in the interpretation of Rule 91, as the words were inserted in Appendix XXIV in 1961, and the same cannot be given a retrospective effect, as the amendment was not expressly stated to be retrospecrive in its oparation. The notification by which the aforesaid words were added in Appendix XXIV and Appendix XXV, no doubt, does not state that the said change in the Appendices shall have retrospective effect. But, the question is not whether the change in the form had retrospective effect or not. The question is as to when title passes in the case of a sale of property in the compensation pool by tender under Rule 91 of the aforesaid Rules. The provisions in Rule 90 and in Rule 91 bear a close similarity and are in parimateria. The question is as to when title passes in the case of a sale of property in the compensation pool by tender under Rule 91 of the aforesaid Rules. The provisions in Rule 90 and in Rule 91 bear a close similarity and are in parimateria. On a consideration of the provisions in Rule 90, the Supreme Court interpreted Rule 90 and held that the intention behind the Rules seems to be that title shall pass when the full price is realised, and then observed that "this is now clear from the new form of the certificate. " A reading of paragraph? 12 and 16 of the judgment of the Supreme Court shows that their Lordships merely referred to the circumstances of the new lorm of certificate containing words which require a mention that the purchaser ' has been-declared the purchaser of the said proper- ty with effect from. . . . . . . . . day of. . . . . . . . . 19. . . ", as only a circumstance supporting lbfrir view as regards the intention behind the Rules. In fact, in that particular case, as pointed out in paragraph l2 of the judgment, the form of certificate used in that case was "not the new form though the form actually used mentions all the three dates :- (I) the date of auction ; (ii) the date of the approval of the bid ; and (iii) the date of certificate. "thus, apart from the circumstances of the existence of the words in the form of certificate requiring a mention that a purchaser has been declared the purchaser with effect from a specified date, the Supreme Court interpreted the provisions of Rule 90, and held that the intention behind the Rule appears to be that title shall pass when the full price is realized As already stated, the provisions in Rule 91 also aie similar though not indentical and, therefore, there is no reason to suppose that the intention bebind Rule 91, before the amendment in 1961, was different from the intention behind the Rule 90. Therefore, it is a plausible view to take that apart from the words inserted in Appendix XXIV and Appendix XXV in 1961, the intention behind Rule 91 was that title passes when the full sale price is realised by payment or adjustment of compensation, just as the title was held by the Supreme Court to pass en the realisation of the full price in a sale by auction under Rale 90. In this view, the insertion of the words "this indenture shall be deemed to have come into force from. . . . . . . . . " in Appendix XXIV and XXV in 1961, can be regarded to have been made only to make clear what was already the intention behind Rule 91. However in our opnion it is not necessary to express our final opinion on this aspect for the purpose of the disposal of this appeal, in the view we are taking infra on the question of bar of jurisdiction of the civil court under section 36 of the Displaced Persons (Compersation and Rehabilitation) Act (No. 41 of 1954) and section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (No. 31 of 1960 ). ( 21 ) THE' second objection put to; ward by the learned counsel for the respondents was that for the passing of title in a sale by tender under Rule 91,there should not only be the execution of a deed of transfer, but that the deed should also be registered by vntue of the provisions in section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 17 (1) of the Indian Registration Act, and that the exemption from registration contained in section 90 (1) (d) of the Indian Registration Act does not apply to the deed of transfer that has to be executed in the present case. As regards section 90 (1) (d) of the Indian Registration Act, the learned counsel argued that the property in the present case comprises both building and land and not merely land, and, therefore, the deed of transfer which has to be executed under Rule 91 (8) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitat on) Rules, 1955. is not a document of assignment by Government of land or of any interest in land within the meaning of section 90 (1) (d) of the Indian Registration Act, and is not, therefore, exempt from registration. is not a document of assignment by Government of land or of any interest in land within the meaning of section 90 (1) (d) of the Indian Registration Act, and is not, therefore, exempt from registration. The learned counsel also pointed out that merely because the deed of transfer was to be executed by the Government in respect of a building and land in the present case, the same cannot be regarded as exempt from the necessity of registration by virtue of the provisions in sections 17 (2) (vii) and 90 (1) (d) of the Indian Registration Act. The decision in Amir Chand v. Secretary of State was relied upon in support of the proposition that the word land' used in section W (l) (d) of the Registration Act cannot be taken as including a building. The property involved in the said decision was only a building. In the pregent case, the property is comprised of building as well as certain lands appurtenant to it. The reasoning adopted in the aforesaid decision of Beckett, J. does not therefore, appear to apply to the present case. However the force of the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents, namely that title in respect of immovable property can pass by sale, only by a registered deed of transfer in view of the provisions in section 54 of the Transfer of Properly Act and section 17 (1) of the Indian Registration Act, still remains, and it is a moot question as to whether in view of the said requirement of a registered document of transfer of title, it can be said that in a sale by tender under Rule 91 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, It-55, title would pass on the realisation of the full price even before the execution of a registered deed of transfer, and whether the execution of the deed of transfer and its registration can be regarded as mere ministrialacts. It has to be noted that while Rule 90 (15) provide? that a certified copy of the sale certificate shall be sent to the Registering Officer, there is no such provision in Rule 91. Thus, there is considerable force in this objection out forward by the learned counsel for the respondents. It has to be noted that while Rule 90 (15) provide? that a certified copy of the sale certificate shall be sent to the Registering Officer, there is no such provision in Rule 91. Thus, there is considerable force in this objection out forward by the learned counsel for the respondents. However, it is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to express our final opinion on this question also in the view we are going to take regarding the bar of the Jurisdiction of a civil court under section 36 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, and section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Propery Act, 1950. ( 22 ) WE shall now consider the question as to whether the suit in the present case was not maintainable in the civil court by virtue of the provisions in section 46 of thedministration of Evacuee Property Act (31 of the 1950) and section 36 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 As already stated, the suit was filed by the appellant (plaintiff) for possession of a certain cattle-shed and lands attached thereto on the ground that it formed part of the "lauriston Estate" which was sold to him by the respondent No. 1, that the possession of a major portion of the property was delivered to him but not the wattle-shed and the lands attached thereto, and that, therefore, he has filed the present suit for recovery of possession of the said cattle-shed and the lands attached thereto. The contention of the respondents was, as already stated, that the salewas not completed by the execution of a deed of transfer as comtemplated by Rule 91 of the Displaced Persons (Compsnsation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955 that the property, therefore, continued to be a part of the compensation pool, and that the suit being one in respect of the property in the compensation pool. it is barred by the provisions in the section mentioned above. For a proper appreciation of the said contentions of the parties, a reference has to be made to the said section 36 and 46. ( 23 ) HOW, we shall consider the provisions of section 36 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1951. Section 36 of the said Act runs as under - "36. For a proper appreciation of the said contentions of the parties, a reference has to be made to the said section 36 and 46. ( 23 ) HOW, we shall consider the provisions of section 36 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1951. Section 36 of the said Act runs as under - "36. Bar of jurisdiction :-Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no civil court shall have the jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which the Central Government or any officer or authority appointed under this Act is empowered by or under this Act to determine, and no in-junction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act". ( 24 ) A reading of the section shows clearly that it is only a suit in respect of a matter which the Central Government or any officer or authority appointed under the Act is empowered by or under the Act to determine. As already stated, the suit in the present case is for the recovery of possession of a certain property on the allegation that it was part of a certain property which was sold to the appellant (plaintiff ). The question for consideration is, therefore, as to whether the subject matter of the suit and the relief claimed in the suit are matters which the Central Government or any officer or authority appointed under the Act is empowered by or under this Act to determine. The contention on behalf of the Respondent 1s that the sale was not completed as yet and the title to the property did not pass to the appellant (plaintiff) and that, therefore, the property continued to be part of the compensation pool. Assuming that the title to the property did not pass to the appellant (plaintiff), and the property continued to be a part of the compensation pool, can it be said that the suit for the recovery of a portion of that property which we may assume to be part of the compensation pool, is a suit in respect of a matter which the Central Government or an officer appointed under the Act is empowered by or under the Act to determine? The appellant (plaintiff) asserts in his plaint that the property for the possession of which he filed the suit was part of the property sold to him while the respondents maintain that it was not a part of that property sold to the appellant. The question forms the subjectmatter of issues Nos. 7 to 9, which were rightly not gone into by the lower Courts in the view taken by them regarding the question * * * the matter in respect of which the suit was filed We have, therefore, to see whether there is any provision in the Act which empowers the Central Government or any officer appointed under the Act to determine this matter. In othei words the position resolves itself into this. Is there any provision in the Act which empowers the Central Government or any officer appointed under the Act to determine the dispute as to whether a part of the compensation pool was sold or not to a person who claims that it was so sold to him An examination of the provisions of the Act shows that there is no such provision in the Act, nor is the learned counsel for the respondents able to point out any such provision. The preamble to the Act shows that it is an Act to provide for the payment of compensation and Rehabilitaion grants to displaced persons and for matters connected therewith. Chapter I, consisting of sections I and 2, is a preliminary Chaptar. Chapter 11, consisting of sections 3 to 11, deals with payment of compensation and Rehabilitation grants to displaced persons These two chapters have no bearing on the present question with which we are concerned. Chapter III contains sections 12 to 21. Section 12 empowers the Central Government to acquire evacuee property tor rehabilitation of displaced persons. Section 13 provides for the payment of compensation for evacuce property acquired under the Act. Section 34 provides for the- constitution of a compensation pool for the purpose of payment of compensation and rehabilitation giants to displaced persons. It enumerates the properties which will form the compensation pool. One of them is evacuee property acquired under section 12, and under section 14 (2), the compensation pool property vests in the Central Government Section 15 provides for exemption of property in the compensation pool from processes of courts. It enumerates the properties which will form the compensation pool. One of them is evacuee property acquired under section 12, and under section 14 (2), the compensation pool property vests in the Central Government Section 15 provides for exemption of property in the compensation pool from processes of courts. It states that no property which forms part of the compensation pool and which is vested in the Central Government under the provisions of the Act shall be liable to be proceeded against for any claim, in any manner whatsoever, in execution of any decree or order or by any other process of any court or other authority, It may be noted that this section only exempts the property in the compensation pool from any liability to be proceeded against in execution of any decree or order or by any other process of any court or other authority. It is not a provision which empowers the Contral Government. ent or any authority appointed under the Act to determine whether a certain property of the compensation pool was fold or not to a person who claims that it was so sold to him. That obviously is a matter governed by general law, and is to be considered and decided by the ordinary civil courts and not by the Central Government or any officer or authority appointed under the Act. Section 16 provides for the management of the compensation pool by the Central Government, either by itself or by appointing Managing Officers or by constituting Managing Corporation rations for the purpose of management. Section 17 defines the functions and the duties of Managing officers and Managing Corporations. Section 17 (2) provides that "a Managing Officers or Managing Corporation may take such measures as he or it considers necessary or expedient for the purpose of securing, administering, preserving, managing or disposing of any property in the compensation pool entrusted to him cr it and generally for the purpose of satisfac. torily discharging any of the duties imposed on him or it by or under this Act. and may, for any such purpose as aforesaid, do all acts and incur all expenses necessary or incidental thereto. torily discharging any of the duties imposed on him or it by or under this Act. and may, for any such purpose as aforesaid, do all acts and incur all expenses necessary or incidental thereto. " Even this provision decs not confer any power on the Central Government or on a Managing Officer or or a Manrging Corporation to deteimine the question as to whether a certain property of the compensation pool was sold or not. to a person who claims that it was so sold to him. Section 18 deals with the dissolution of Managing Corporations. Section 19 confers powers upon Managing Officers andManaging Corporations to vary or cancel leases or allotment of any property acquired under the Act. Section 20 confers the power to transfer property out of the compensation pool upon Managing Officers and Managing Corporations either by sale or by lease or by allotment or by transfer of shares in the case of a share of an evacuee in a company. Section 21 provides for the recovery of sums due to the Custodian in respect of any evacuee property acquired under the Act in the seme manner as an arrear of land revenue. Thus, none of the previsions in this Chapter III confers any power on any of the officeis to determine any dispute like the one in the present suit. ( 25 ) CHAPTER IV, consisting of sections 22 to 27, deals with appeal, revision and powers of officers under the Act. Section 22 provides for appeal to the Settlement Commissioner. Section 23 provides for appeal to the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Section 24 confers a power of revision upon the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Section 25 provides for review and amendment of orders. Section 26 ve;ts certain powers like those of a civil court upon officers appointed under the Act for the purpose of making any enquiry or hearing any appeal under the Act, in respect of certain specified matters, which do not include a matter like the ore involved in the present suit. Section 27 declares that every order made undei the Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court by way of an appeal or revision or in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. Section 27 declares that every order made undei the Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court by way of an appeal or revision or in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. Thus, the provisions in this Chapter also do not empower any officer to determine a dispute like the one involved in the present suit. ( 26 ) CHAPTER V, which consists of sections 28 to 40, contains miscellaneous provisions. Section 28 deals with power to transfer cases. Section 29 provides special protection from ejectment to certain classes of persons. Section 30 deals with exemption from arrest. Section 31 provides for the constitution of an Advisory Board. Section 32 empowers the Central Government to give directions to any State Government as to the carrying into execution in the State of any of the provisions in the Act. Ssction 33 confers residuary powers upon the Central Government to call for the record of any proceeding under the Act and to pass such order as the circumstances of the case require and is not inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in the Act or in the Rules. Section 34 deals with delegation of powers. Section 35 deals with imposition of penalty. Section 36, as already stated, deals with bar of Jurisdiction of civil courts in matters of a certain nature. Section 37 declares the officers appointed under the Act to be public servants within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code. Section 38 provides for protection of action taken in good faith under the Act. Section 39 validates certain actions taken before the commencement of the Act. Lastly, section 40 empowers the Central Government to make rules be carry out the purposes of the Act. ( 27 ) THE above resume of the provisions of the Act shows that there is no provision in the Act which confers a power upon any of the officers appointed or authorised undar the Act or on the Central Government to determine a dispute like The one in the present suit. ( 27 ) THE above resume of the provisions of the Act shows that there is no provision in the Act which confers a power upon any of the officers appointed or authorised undar the Act or on the Central Government to determine a dispute like The one in the present suit. We are not shown by the learned counsel for the respondents any rule which confers such a power as is mentioned above It is only when such a power to determine a matter is conferred under the Act or the Rules on the Central Government or on any officer appointed under the Act, that section 36 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain a suit or proceeding in respect of such matter, ( 28 ) IT follows that the suit out of which this appeal has arisen is thus not barred by the provisions in section 36 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. ( 29 ) SECTION 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act runs as under: - "save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no civil or revenue court shall have jurisdiction- (a) to entertain or adjudicate upon any question whether any property or any right to or interest in any property is or is not evacuee property; or (b ). . . . . . (deleted ). . . . . . . . . (c) to question the legality of any action taken by the Custodian-General or the Custodian under this Act ; or (d) in respect of any matter which the Custodian-General or the Custodian is empowered by or under this Act to determine. "the property in question was, no doubt, originally an evacuee property. But, as admitted by respondent No. 1 in paragraph I of the written statement, the said property was acquired by the Central Government under section 12 of theDisplaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 19)4, and formed part of the compensation pool. "the property in question was, no doubt, originally an evacuee property. But, as admitted by respondent No. 1 in paragraph I of the written statement, the said property was acquired by the Central Government under section 12 of theDisplaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 19)4, and formed part of the compensation pool. Section 2 (f) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act defines evacuee property as meaning-- "any property of an evacuee (whether held by him as owner or as a trustee or as a beneficiary or as a tenant or in any other capacity), and includes any property which has been obtained by any person from any evacuee alter the 14th day of August, 1947, by any mode of transfer which is not effective by reason of the provisions contained in section 40: but does net include- (i ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ; (ii ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "the said definition clearly shows that evacuee property is the property of an evacuee. When evacuee property is acquired by the Central Government under section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, it obviously ceases to be evacuee property within the meaning of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, and becomes the property,of the Central Government, and by virtue of the provision in section 14 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, the property thus acquired by the Central Government under section 12 becomes a part of the compensation pool. I he property which has become part of the compensation pool can no longer be regarded as evacuee proparty within the meaning of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. Further, section 46 bars the jurisdiction of civil courts only in the matters referred to in clauses (a), (e) and (d) of the said section. None of the clauses applies to the suit filed by the appellant (plaintiff, in the present case ) It follows that the suit is not barred by the provisions in section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. None of the clauses applies to the suit filed by the appellant (plaintiff, in the present case ) It follows that the suit is not barred by the provisions in section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. ( 30 ) THUS, the suit filed by the appellant (plaintiff) was clearly maintainable in the civil court, and the court below erred in rejecting the plaint under order 7 rule II clause (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial court and the lower appellate courts assumed that when once it is held that the title did not pass to the appellant (plaintiff) and the property continued to be a part of the compensation pool, sections 36 and 46 of the aforesaid Acts barred the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit. That their assumption was not correct is clear from the conclusion we reached above. It appears that before the learned Single Judge in the second appeal, it was not disputed that in the view taken by the learned single Judge that the property did not stand transferred to the appellant (plaintiff), the decision of the two courts below as to the maintainability of the suit would be correct. However, as it is a pure question of jurisdiction, such a concession on the part of the counsel cannot bind a party, and can be reconsidered by the appellate court. ( 31 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents next contended that the allegation of the appellant (plaintiff; in his plaint that the cattleshed and the lands attached thereto, the possession of which was sought to be obtained in the suit, formed an appurtenance to "lauristion, was not true, and sought to go into the question as to whether it was really an appurtenance as alleged by the appellant. (plaintiff ). This aspect formed the subject matter of issue No. 7 framed. in the suit. As already stated above, the lower courts did not decide the issues 7 to 9 in the view taken by them regarding the maintainability of the suit in the civil court, Now that we have come to the conclusion that the suit was maintainable in the civil court these issues will have to be gone into by the trial court. As already stated above, the lower courts did not decide the issues 7 to 9 in the view taken by them regarding the maintainability of the suit in the civil court, Now that we have come to the conclusion that the suit was maintainable in the civil court these issues will have to be gone into by the trial court. The question sought to be argued by the learned counsel does not, therefore, arise for determination by us in this Letters Patent Appeal. ( 32 ) LASTLY, the learned counsel for the respondents urged a contention that the older of the trial court rejecting the plaint under Older 7 Rule 11 Clause (d)of the Code of Civil Procedure can be supported on the ground that the plaint did not disclose a cause of action, and, therefore, the plaint was liable to be rejected on that ground under Order 7 Rule II Clause (a ). We are unable to appreciate this contintion. The plain tiff alleged in his plaint that the property in suit formed a part of the property sold to him by respondent No 1. that possession of a major portion of the propercy was delivered to him, but the suit property was not delivered to him, and that, therefore, he may be granted a decree for possession of the suit property and certain other reliefs. It is wellsettled that to find out as to whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not, the court has to look only into the allegations in the plaint, assume them to be true for the time being, and see whether the said allegations in the plaint disclose a cause of action or not. A perusal of the allegations in the plaint in the present case clearly shows that they do disclose the cause of action, and the contention of the learned counsel has to be rejected as untenable. ( 33 ) FOR the above reasons, we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the appellant (plaintiff), and that the judgments of the second appellate court and the lower courts rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule I I Clause (d) of the Civil Procedure Code were wrong. ( 33 ) FOR the above reasons, we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the appellant (plaintiff), and that the judgments of the second appellate court and the lower courts rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule I I Clause (d) of the Civil Procedure Code were wrong. We, therefore, allow the Letters Patent Appeal set aside the judgments and the decrees of the lower courts, and remand the case to the trial court which will restore the suit to its file, and dispose of the same after deciding only issues Nos. 7 to 10 in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout till the stage of this Letters Patent Appeal. A certificate for refund of the court-fees paid by the appellant (plaintiff) in the Letters Patent Appeal, second appeal and the appeal to the District Court, may be issued to the appellant (plaintiff) under section 13 of the Court fees Act.