ORDER M.H. Beg, J. - These are two writ petitions by Hanuman Rai directed against identical orders passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 18-10-1962, u/s 48 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by which he dismissed the Petitioner's revision applications against the orders of the Settlement Officer, Opposite Party No. 2, passed on 11-9-1961. The Settlement Officer had dismissed two separate appeals, Under Rule 34(3) of the Consolidation of Holdings Rules, from the order of the Consolidation Officer dated 6-9-1960. The Petitioner has thus been unsuccessful before each of the three consolidation authorities. The Consolidation Officer held that the opposite parties had been in possession over plots Nos. 522 and 626 since 1348 Fasli and that the remaining plots Nos. 521, 523, 524, 525 and 526 had been recorded as sub-tenancy of Behari and others in 1349 Fasli. It is true that the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer did not give any clear findings as to when the possession of the opposite parties in the two cases, which have come up before this Court, started. The Deputy Director of Consolidation in his orders disposing of both the cases in revision, however, stated that it could not be denied that the possession of opposite party in each case had started in 1359 Fasli as trespasser so that the period of limitation for the ejectment of the trespasser, which was originally two years before the date of vesting, expired on 30-6-1954. In view of this finding, the Deputy Director held that the opposite parties automatically became sirdars by reason of the operation of the provisions of Section 210 of the UP ZA and LR Act. 2. Mr. V.K.S. Chaudhry, appearing for the Petitioner in each of the two writ petitions, has urged that, upon the finding given by the Deputy Director, the provisions of Section 210 of the ZA and LR Act could not confer any rights upon the opposite parties inasmuch as the consolidation proceedings commenced, according to the Petitioner, in 1954. Actually the consolidation proceedings commenced in March 1955 as is evident from, paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit showing that the notification u/s 4 of the Act with regard to this village was issued in March 1958. The learned Counsel for the Respondents, Mr. Actually the consolidation proceedings commenced in March 1955 as is evident from, paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit showing that the notification u/s 4 of the Act with regard to this village was issued in March 1958. The learned Counsel for the Respondents, Mr. Faujdar Rai, states that, as a result of the information given to him formally by the consolidation authorities, the date of notification u/s 4 of the Act should be 31-3-1955 and prays that he may be allowed to file the reply given on the inquiry form submitted by his client to the consolidation authorities. The actual date of the month of March 1955 on which notification u/s 4 of the Act was issued is not important in this case. Therefore, there is no need to admit any additional evidence on the matter. The question which arises in this case, whether the notification was issued in 1954 or early in 1955, is : Does the period of limitation prescribed by Section 210 of the ZA and LR Act continue to run during the pendency of the consolidation proceedings? 3. It is admitted by both sides that no suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act was filed at any time by the Petitioner who seems to have relied on objections u/s 12 of the Act, which were decided against him by the consolidation authorities, to save limitation from running. It has been contended by Mr. Chaudhry that the filing of objections u/s 12 of the Act operates as a substitute for the filing of a suit u/s 209 of the ZA and LR Act so as to arrest the running of the period of limitation prescribed u/s 210 of the UP ZA and LR Act. This question was considered by my learned brother G. C. Mathur, J in Ahsan Ali v. Deputy Director 1965 ALJ 1161 where it was held that neither the notification u/s 4 of the Act nor the publication of the statement u/s 11 of the Act prevents a person from filing a suit u/s 209 of the ZA and LR Act and his failure to file the suit within the period of limitation resulted in extinction of his rights in the plot in dispute. It was pointed out there that this view was in accord with the view taken by a Division Bench, in Special Appeal No. 384 of 1959, dismissing an appeal from the judgment and order of Srivastava, J in Chinno v. State of UP Writ Petition No. 2258 of 1957 decided on 4-5-1959. Reliance was placed in Ahsan Ali's (1) case upon a passage from Chinnoo's case (supra) where it was held that a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act would be outside the purview of Section 49 of the Act which runs as follows: Bar to Civil Court Jurisdiction : No person shall institute any suit or other proceeding in any civil court with respect to any matter arising out of consolidation proceedings or with respect to any other matter in regard to which a suit or application should be filed under the provisions of this Act. 4. In Ahsan Ali's case (supra), it was also pointed out that Dwivedi, J. had, in Dwarka v. Deputy Director of Consolidation Writ No. 632 of 1959 decided on 16-8-1960, followed the Division Bench decision in Noor Mohd.'s case (Sp. A. No. 384 of 1959). The view taken by the Division Bench had, therefore, to prevail over the view taken by D.S. Mathur, J. in Mangal Singh v. Regional Dy. Director of Consolidation 1960 AWR 503 and Asthana, J. in Mahabir Gadaria v. Dy. Director of Consolidation 1965 AWR 248 : UPRC 91. 5. Another Division Bench decision, in Garala Dhwaj v. Bhadeshwar 1966 AWR 153 : UPRC 64 was also brought to my notice. It was held here, by Desai, C.J. and Manchanda, J., that it is not enough that a party commenced some proceeding concerning his right on a date before the expiry of the period of limitation to prevent the period prescribed by Section 210 of the ZA and LR Act from running. It was the particular kind of suit prescribed by Section 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act which had to be instituted in order to prevent extinguishment of title by an application of the principle contained in Section 38 of the Indian Limitation Act which was held to be embodied in Section 210 of the ZA and LR Act. It was the particular kind of suit prescribed by Section 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act which had to be instituted in order to prevent extinguishment of title by an application of the principle contained in Section 38 of the Indian Limitation Act which was held to be embodied in Section 210 of the ZA and LR Act. It was also brought to my notice that K.B. Asthana, J. deciding writ petition No. 2952 of 1962 on 24-2-1967, had followed the view taken in Ahsan Ali v. Deputy Director (supra) and Garala Dhwaj v. Bhadeshwar (supra) in preference to his earlier view. 6. Mr. Chaudhry, however, contended that there is a conflict between the ratio decidendi of the two Division Benches mentioned above on one side and what was decided by Jagdish Sahai and Broome, JJ., in Ram Lal v. Assistant Collector 1966 AWR 140 : UPRC 59 (2) on the other side. He, therefore, submitted that this was a fit case for reference to a Full Bench. I am unable to accept this submission. It is quite true that it was held in Ram Lal v. Assistant Collector Sadabad (supra): "The bar created by Section 49 is an absolute one and no matter could be-adjudicated upon before any other authority or court which could be decided in proceedings under the Act." But, an examination of the facts of that case reveals that what had been decided in a proceeding under the UP Act 13 of 1949 reduced the share of a party before the Court to one third whereas the authorities acting under the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act had held that share to be one half. In other words there was direct conflict between the effects of the two decisions given in proceedings under the two different Acts on the same right. A matter in regard to which a suit or application could be filed under the provisions of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act could only be one which is mentioned in the Act or Rules framed thereunder. The question of the extent of the share of a tenureholder in a holding is certainly one of the matters mentioned in the Act. It was, therefore, quite reasonable to conclude that an adjudication upon the extent of a share in a holding was barred by the provisions of Section 49 of the Act. The question of the extent of the share of a tenureholder in a holding is certainly one of the matters mentioned in the Act. It was, therefore, quite reasonable to conclude that an adjudication upon the extent of a share in a holding was barred by the provisions of Section 49 of the Act. It would, however, be stretching the ambit of Section 49 of the Act too much to hold that every matter for which some manner of obtaining relief, however remote, could be discovered under the provisions of the Act, must be held to be struck by the bar contained in Section 49 of the Act. Moreover, even if Section 49 of the Act could be so interpreted as to bar a suit u/s 209 of ZA and LR Act, such a bar would not ipso facto abrogate or suspend the operation of Section 210 of the ZA and LR Act so as to prevent the period of limitation from running. It could, at the most, remove the only means of preventing the period of limitation from running in such cases. 7. The argument that there is some proceeding under the provisions of the Act which saves the period of limitation prescribed by Section 210 of the UP ZA and LR Act from running out is based upon a completely unfounded assumption. I can see no proceeding of any kind whatsoever provided by or under this Act which could save the period prescribed by Section 210 of the UPZA and LR Act from running. It was open to the legislature to provide that a proceeding for the assertion of a right or title, taken under the provisions of the Act, will be equivalent to a proceeding u/s 209 of the ZA and LR Act so as to prevent the limitation from running u/s 210 of the ZA and LR Act. In the absence of any such provision, the law of limitation contained in Section 210 will have to be enforced by the consolidation authorities themselves if, by the operation of that law, some right had accrued to a party even in the course of the consolidation proceedings. In the absence of any such provision, the law of limitation contained in Section 210 will have to be enforced by the consolidation authorities themselves if, by the operation of that law, some right had accrued to a party even in the course of the consolidation proceedings. For example, a party may not have matured its rights by adverse possession for the prescribed period when proceedings u/s 12 of the Act are taken, but, it may have matured its rights by the time proceedings under Sections 20 and 21 of the Act are taken. In such a case, the trespasser will obtain a new right under the law which he could enforce under the provisions of the Act, but the person against whom the right had accrued has no direct means of relief for him provided at all under the Act. The only way of saving the accrual of rights to a trespasser is a suit under S, 209 of the Act and not any suit or proceeding under the Act. This question was certainly not before the Division Bench relied upon by Mr. Chaudhry. It was before the other two Division Benches relied upon by Mr. Faujdar Rai on behalf of the Respondents. 8. It has been conceded by Mr. Chaudhry that no proceeding under the Act can be described as a "suit" in the technical sense of a proceeding commenced by the filing of a plaint. He, very rightly, contended that the word "suit" as used in Section 49 of the Act must be so interpreted as to mean only some proceeding which is taken before the consolidation authorities. I may mention that I have myself indicated the wide connotation of the term "suit" in Kusum Lata v. Kamta Prasad AIR 1965 Allahabad 280 at 282. Mr. Chaudhry contended that a proceeding under the Consolidation of Holdings Act could be equated with suits for possession and drew my attention to the effect of a declaration u/s 4 of the Act and to the nature of the disputes which could be tried u/s 12 of the Act as it originally stood. I, however, do not find any provision in the Act which could save accrual of rights by the lapse of time prescribed by Section 210 of the ZA and LR Act during the pendency of the consolidation proceedings. I, however, do not find any provision in the Act which could save accrual of rights by the lapse of time prescribed by Section 210 of the ZA and LR Act during the pendency of the consolidation proceedings. If the legislature intended such an effect it could easily provide that one of the effects of a notification u/s 4 of the Act was that the law of limitation will cease to run in favour of trespassers in properties subjected to consolidation operations. In the absence of any express provision to this effect, I am not able to see how specific rights conferred by lapse of time upon persons in possession of land, whether rightly or wrongly, could be taken away by implication by any proceeding under the Act. In my opinion, such a right could not be taken away without a specific provision in the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act itself or somewhere else having that effect. As I have already mentioned such a right, even though of a trespasser, resulting from possession, will have to be given effect to by the consolidation authorities under the law as it stands even if the right matures during the consolidation proceedings. I, therefore, respectfully concur with the views taken by the two Division Benches, already mentioned above and with the view taken of by learned brother G.G. Mathur, J. in Ahsan Ali's case (supra). Hence, I find no justification whatsoever for referring this case for decision by a Full Bench. 9. Lastly, it was contended for the Petitioner that the order of the consolidation authorities should be quashed if tie Petitioner's right is found not to have matured at the time' when the orders on objections u/s 12 of the Act were passed. Even if the rights had matured during the pendency of the writ petition, subsequent accrual of rights in favour of opposite parties would furnish a good ground for dismissing these writ petitions. It is a well-established principle that this Court will not exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution in a manner resulting in the passing of futile orders which cannot affect rights which a party has obviously acquired. I cannot, therefore, accept such a contention. 10. In the result, I dismiss these writ petitions with costs.