JUDGEMENT : This is a second appeal filed in forma pauperis by the appellant in first Civil Appeal No. 33/62/19 of 1963 on the file of the Additional District Judge Manipur, against his Judgement and decree dated 7-1-1964 dismissing the appeal filed by her against the judgement and decree dated 13-3-1962 of the Munsiff of the valley at Imphal in Civil Suit No 64/1960 decreeing the suit against her. 2. The first respondent (R.K. Chandani Singh-plaintiff-P.W. 5) filed Civil Suit Case 64 of 1960 on 9-5-1960 for declaration of his title to and possession of the plaint schedule land, which is the southern 1/3 of an Ingkhol covered by Patta No. 90/144 I.W.T. (8-2/3 lessas in extent) and for mesne profits, alleging that the 2nd respondent (Polem Nandeswar Singh, second defendant in the suit) acquired it from his father late Polem Chaoba Singh, in or about 1950, that he was ever since in possession and enjoyment of it, that he sold it to the first respondent under Ext. A/1 (registered sale deed dated 27-5-1959), for Rs. 400, that the appellant (D.W. 3 the first defendant) was permitted to live in the house constructed by the 2nd respondent, that she refused to vacate the land and that, therefore, the first respondent (P.W. 5) is entitled to declaration of his title to the suit land and recovery of possession of the same. The appellant (1st defendant) pleaded that she herself purchased the suit land for Rs. 400 with her own money in the name of her husband late P. Chaoba Singh in 1946, that she had been in possession and enjoyment of the land, that she is the widow of late P. Chaoba Singh and that the 2nd respondent was not entitled to alienate the land, even assuming that Chaoba Singh was its owner. She denied the alleged permissive possession of the land, as set up by the first respondent (P.W. 5). 3. The Munsiff framed 10 issues and held that Late P. Chaoba Singh himself purchased the suit land, that he gave it to his son the 2nd respondent, that the appellant (D.W. 3) was in permissive possession of the suit land, that the first respondent (P.W. 5) acquired title to the suit land by purchasing it under Ext. A/1 and that, therefore, he is entitled to the reliefs prayed for. He decreed the suit with costs. 4. A/1 and that, therefore, he is entitled to the reliefs prayed for. He decreed the suit with costs. 4. The appellant carried the matter in 1st Appeal case 33/62/19 of 1963 on the file of the Additional District, Judge, Manipur. He concurred with the findings of the Munsiff that the land was purchased by late P. Chaoba Singh, that he gave it to his son the 2nd respondent, that the latter was in possession and enjoyment of it and that, therefore, the first respondent (P.W. 5), who purchased the suit land from the 2nd respondent, was entitled to the declaration of his title to the suit land and to recover possession of it. He thus negatived the plea of the appellant (the first respondent) that she herself purchased the suit land with her own money in the name of late P. Chaoba Singh. He further held that, though the Munsiff did not frame any issue whether the appellant the 1st defendant is the widow of late P. Chaoba Singh or not both the parties were quite aware of the plea of the appellant that she is the widow and that of the 1st respondent that she is not the widow of late Chaoba Singh, that the evidence on the record is sufficient for 9 decision on the point and that therefore, there was no need to frame and additional issue under O. 41, R. 25, C.P.C. He resettled the issues under O. 41, R. 24, C.P.C. and held on the evidence that the appellant was not legally married to late P. Chaoba Singh. In view of the findings arrived at by him, he dismissed the appeal with costs. 5. Being aggrieved with the judgement and decree of the Additional District Judge, the first defendant filed the present 2nd appeal in forma pauperis. 6. In this 2nd appeal the learned counsel for the appellant challenged all the findings of the Courts below. The respondents 2 and 3 (Polem Nandeswar Singh and Polem Ibohal Singh P.W. 4) (defendants 2 and 4) are the sons of one Late Polem Chaoba Singh. The respondents 4 and 5 (defendants 3 and 5) are the children of one Polem Pishak Singh, the pre-deceased son of late P. Chaoba Singh. The mother of the respondents 2 and 3 and Polem Pishak Singh predeceased Chaoba Singh. The respondents 4 and 5 (defendants 3 and 5) are the children of one Polem Pishak Singh, the pre-deceased son of late P. Chaoba Singh. The mother of the respondents 2 and 3 and Polem Pishak Singh predeceased Chaoba Singh. The appellant claims to be the legally married wife of late P. Chaoba Singh and the respondents deny the same. 7. The patta land in question belonged to Karam Gopal Singh. After his death, his daughter Keinahanbi Devi sold the northern 2/3 portion of the patta land to P.W. 1 (Chongtham Bira Singh) and the remaining southern 1/3 portion to late P. Chaoba Singh in or about 1950. 8. There are concurrent findings of fact by the Munsiff and the Additional District Judge that the suit land was purchased by Late P. Chaoba Singh with his own money, that immediately after the purchase P.W. 1 and Chaoba Singh separated their respective shares and that thereafter P. Chaoba Singh settled the suit land in favour of the 2nd respondent (P. Nandeswar Singh) but that the appellant (defendant No 3) did not purchase the suit land and that Late Chaoba Singh was not her benaminder. Their findings are based upon the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 3 and 4 (Ch. Bira Singh, R.K. Kalasana Singh and P. Ibohal Singh) and D.Ws. 1 to 3 (M. Modhu Singh, H. Kula Sarma and the appellant). They also held that the other members of the family of late Chaoba Singh viz., P.W. 4 the 3rd respondent (defendant 4) and the branch of the predeceased son Pishak agreed to the settlement of the land In favour of the 2nd respondent that the latter constructed a house on the suit land, that he was in possession and enjoyment of it, that he permitted the appellant (D.W. 3) to reside in the house and that thus and 2nd respondent was entitled to sell away the land to P.W. 5 (the first respondent). These two findings of fact were assailed by the appellants counsel in this second appeal. The judgements of the two Courts below show that the evidence adduced by both the parties in this regard was fully discussed by both the Courts and that they accepted the evidence of P.W. 1 (Ch. Bira Singh) the Co-Pattadar, P.W. 3 (R.K. Kalasana Singh) and P.W. 4 (the 3rd respondent) in preference to that of D.Ws. 1 to 8. The judgements of the two Courts below show that the evidence adduced by both the parties in this regard was fully discussed by both the Courts and that they accepted the evidence of P.W. 1 (Ch. Bira Singh) the Co-Pattadar, P.W. 3 (R.K. Kalasana Singh) and P.W. 4 (the 3rd respondent) in preference to that of D.Ws. 1 to 8. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the High Court can interfere in the second appeal if the findings of fact are based upon wrong hypothesis or wrong presumptions and relied on Banarashi Agarwall v. Sankarlal Agarwalla, AIR 1961 Assam 13. But, it was held by Supreme Court in Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanumayya, AIR 1959 SC 57 that the provisions of S. 100, C.P.C. are clear and unambiguous and that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous findings of fact, however, gross the error may seem to be. It was further held that the judge of a High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal with the findings of fact given by the first appellate Court based upon an appreciation of the relevant evidence. The practice of some judges of the High Court disposing of second appeals, as if they are first appeals, was deprecated. Vide also Paras Nath Thakur v. Smt. Mohani Dasi. AIR 1959 SC 1204 . It is true to say that in this case there is no evidence to show what other properties were allotted in the family settlement to the other members of the family of late P. Chaoba Singh. But, there is evidence, which was accepted by both the Courts, that the suit land was allotted by late P. Chaoba Singh to the second respondent. The Transfer of Property Act came into force in Manipur on 1-1-1957 and the settlement of the suit land in favour of the second respondent took place in or about 1950. That there can be an oral family arrangement without any document in writing is also clear from Tek Bahadur Bhujil v. Bebi Singh Bhujil AIR 1966 : SC 292. The Transfer of Property Act came into force in Manipur on 1-1-1957 and the settlement of the suit land in favour of the second respondent took place in or about 1950. That there can be an oral family arrangement without any document in writing is also clear from Tek Bahadur Bhujil v. Bebi Singh Bhujil AIR 1966 : SC 292. Thus, so far as the two findings of fact arrived at by the two Courts below that the suit land was purchased by late P. Chaoba Singh with his own money and that he, settled it on his second son the second respondent herein in or about 1950 are concerned, the findings are not contrary to law. There was no substantial error or defect in the procedure. So, there are no grounds for interference with these two findings of fact under Section 100 C.P.C. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the learned Additional District Judge should not have disposed of the contentions of the parties regarding the status of the appellant as the widow of late P. Chaoba Singh or otherwise, that he should have framed an issue on this point under Order 41 Rule 25 C.P.C. without disposing it of under Order 41 Rule 24 C.P.C. and that the Additional District Judge should have called for findings from the Munsiff on this point, after allowing both the parties opportunity to lead further evidence. His further contention is that, though the appellant did not specifically plead in the written statement alternatively that the appellant as the widow of late P. Chaoba Singh is entitled to a share in the suit land under the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act (Act 18 of 1937), that her right ripened into full ownership under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act (Act 30 of 1956), that the second respondent was not entitled to sell away the entire land and that the right of the first respondent, if any, is only to file a suit for partition and for recovery of the second respondents share in the suit land, the legal consequences would flow from her plea in the written statement that she is the widow of late Chaoba Singh. There is no doubt that, if the appellant was legally married to late P. Chaoba Singh, she would be entitled to ¼ share of the suit land as his widow. There is no doubt that, if the appellant was legally married to late P. Chaoba Singh, she would be entitled to ¼ share of the suit land as his widow. As can be seen from Articles 284 and 285 of Mullas Hindu Law (13th Edition) at Pages 318 and 319, the respondents 2 to 5 take defined shares in the co-parcenary property, as they are governed by the Dayabhaga Law. The first respondent as an alienee from the second respondent has to work out his rights by filing a suit for general partition Vide Thongam Thamphajo Singh v. Irom Ibotombi Singh, Second C.A. Case No. 5 of 1961 on the file of this Court and Brijlal v. Durga, 56 Ind Cas 254 : (AIR 1920 Lah 159). 10. Then, the next question for determination would be whether the appellant was legally married to late P. Chaoba Singh. However, this question has no material bearing on the facts as found by the lower Courts and as upheld in this second appeal. For, even if the appellant is the widow of late P. Chaoba Singh, in view of the findings that the land was purchased by late P Chaoba Singh and that he settled it upon the second respondent, neither the appellant nor the other members of the family would have any share in the land. The learned Additional District Judge considered this question of truth of the marriage of the appellant with late Chaoba Singh, as evidence was let in by both the parties. Under Order 41 Rule 24 C.P.C. the appellate Court is entitled to dispose of the case finally after resettling the issues, when there is sufficient evidence on record regarding the point in dispute in such a case, there is no need to frame any additional issue under Order 41 Rule 25 C.P.C. and refer the same for retrial to the trial Court. Each and every case depends upon its own facts. However the appellants counsel relied on Laskari v. Abbas Bapari, AIR 1917 Cal 196. Each and every case depends upon its own facts. However the appellants counsel relied on Laskari v. Abbas Bapari, AIR 1917 Cal 196. In that case it was held that the first appellate Judge acted wrongly in resettling the issues when he, in fact, framed an entirely new issue and that the proper course for him was to proceed under Order 41 Rule 25 C.P.C. But, there are a number of decisions which lay down that when there is sufficient evidence, the issues can be resettled under Order 41 Rule 24 C.P.C. Vide Hamid Hussain v. Bishen Sarup, AIR 1918 Lah 264 (2), Gundappa Bharmagowda Desai v. Shantappa Bhaurao Desai, AIR 1924 Bom 113, Kundan Lal v. Beni Pershad, AIR 1932 Lah 293, Dhanpal Madrasi v. Supdt. of Collieries, AIR 1934 Pat 630, M/s Kalka Prasad Ram Charan v. Harish Chandra, AIR 1957 All 25 and Rameshwar v. Tarasingh. AIR 1958 Raj 269 . Both the parties let in evidence regarding the status of the appellant. So, the learned Additional District Judge was justified in dealing with the evidence on record without framing any additional issue or remanding the case. 11. D.Ws. 1 to 3 (M. Madhu Singh, H. Kula Sarma and the appellant) are the witnesses who speak to the case of the appellant that she was married by late P. Chaoba Singh. D.W. 1 (M. Madhu Singh) deposed that D.W. 3 (the appellant) came from Nambol as the wife of P. Chaoba Singh, when the latter returned to Imphal after evacuating it in the last Japanese war, that he kept her on the Ingkhol of Khoirom Chura Singh and that they subsequently shifted to the suit land with the consent of its owner. D.W. 1 (M. Madhu Singh) admitted that he did not witness the marriage between the appellant D.W. 3 and Chaoba Singh D.W. 2 (H Kula Sarma) desposed that Gopal Singh, the owner of the suit land was the maternal uncle of D.W 2s wife, that they lived on the suit land, that after the death of Gopal Singh, his daughter was maintained by D.W. 2s wife that when Imphal was bombed by Japan, they left the suit land that thereafter late Polem Chaoba Singh brought one woman by eloping with her and that both of them lived on the suit land. D.W. 2 (H. Kula Sarma) was not able to remember the name of the woman at first. Later on he identified D.W. 3 as the selfsame woman, who eloped with deceased Chaoba Singh According to the appellant (D.W 3), she was first married to one Naorem Amu Singh She has got a daughter named Ibetombi Devi by him She was aged about 14 years at the time of her deposition in 1962. She married P. Chaoba Singh about 15/16 years prior to that year so, her case that she married late Chaoba Singh even before her daughter by her first husband was born improbabilises her case. There is Ext. B/4 certified copy of the order of the Chief Commissioner in C.C. Revenue case 59 of 1959 in which the Chief Commissioner held that the appellant is the widow of Chaoba. The learned Additional District Judge, however, went wrong in stating that it is inadmissible in evidence, on the ground that it was no1 put to P.W. 5 under S. 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. Under S. 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, the witness is to be confronted with his previous statement made in writing. But. Ext B/4 is a Judgement as between the same parties viz the appellant and the first respondent. The Chief Commissioner stated in Ext. B/4 that the first wife of Late P. Chaoba Singh died, at the appellant was living on the suit land for at least 6/7 years (from about 1953), that she was in possession of the suit land and that, therefore, she was the widow of the deceased P. Chaoba Singh according to the local customs and the precedents. He directed the mutation of her name in the records. The Chief Commissioner was only concerned with mutation. He could not go deep into the matter regarding the truth and validity or otherwise of the appellants marriage with Chaoba Singh. As can be seen from Puyam Liklai Singh v. Moiranthem Maipak Singh, AIR 1956 Manipur 18 and also Ketuki Devi v. Jayantakumar Goswami. AIR 1964 Manipur 14 the prevailing customs in Manipur were duly recorded in the time of the former Maharajah of Manipur. A committee called "Codification Committee" was appointed to report the customs prevailing in Manipur with the object of introducing a Bill in Manipur State Legislative Assembly for enactment of a Code. AIR 1964 Manipur 14 the prevailing customs in Manipur were duly recorded in the time of the former Maharajah of Manipur. A committee called "Codification Committee" was appointed to report the customs prevailing in Manipur with the object of introducing a Bill in Manipur State Legislative Assembly for enactment of a Code. There is a custom in Manipur as can be seen from Chapter III of the said "Report of Manipuri Customs", according to which the union between a man and a widow as husband and wife is considered as marriage among the Hindus in Manipur. But, for such union Loukhatpa (approval) of some form of a relation of the widow is necessary. There is an observation in AIR 1956 Manipur 18 already referred to, that it has not been laid down anywhere that unless Loukhatpa is performed a marriage would not be legal and valid. This is not the correct position of the customary law prevailing in Manipur. For, as can be seen from the same chapter III of the "Report of Manipuri Customs", though, the widow is not permitted to join any social ceremony held by her parents and relatives, unless the Loukhatpa Ceremony is performed, some sort of marriage ceremony is essential for all the various kinds of marriages which are prevailing in Manipur. According to this custom, unless some sort of marriage ceremony, like Loukhatpa is performed, the status of a widow, who lives permanently with a man as his wife, is not that of a wife but is that of a concubine or "Byabicharini". So Loukhatpa is necessary to validate the marriage. But, the evidence of D.Ws 1, 2 and 3 does not show that there was any such Loukhatpa ceremony. As such, the status of the appellant is only that of a concubine of the deceased P. Chaoba Singh. Of course, P.W. 5 the first respondent-plaintiff purposely omitted to mention the name of the husband of the appellant D.W. 3 in her description in the cause title in the plaint. The evidence already adduced does not show that late P. Chaoba Singh validly married the appellant after eloping with her. This is, however, not very necessary for the purpose of disposal of this appeal in view of the findings and the other questions of fact involved in this case. 12. The evidence already adduced does not show that late P. Chaoba Singh validly married the appellant after eloping with her. This is, however, not very necessary for the purpose of disposal of this appeal in view of the findings and the other questions of fact involved in this case. 12. Thus, there is no substance in any of the contentions of the appellants counsel and the appeal fails. It is accordingly dismissed with costs of the first respondent. The appellant shall pay the court-fee due to the Government. Appeal dismissed.