Judgment :- 1. The 3rd defendant in O. S.299 of 1955 and O. S.298 of 1955 is the appellant in these second appeals. 2. The owner of the property in question in the suits had executed an usufructuary mortgage to one Kelan Kochu Kunju. Kochu Kunju hypothecated the mortgage right to the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff in O. S. No: 298 of 1955 in 1089, and subsequently to the plaintiff in O. S. No. 299 of 1955 and thereafter to the 1st defendant in O S. No. 299 of 1955 and O. S. No. 298 of 1)55 in the year 1097. The predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff in O. S. No. 298 of 1955 filed O. S. No. 512 of 1105 on the foot of the hypothecation bond and obtained a decree. The plaintiff in O. S. No. 299 of 1955 filed a suit as O. S. No. 513 of 1105 on the foot of the hypothecation bond in his favour and also obtained a decree. The 1st defendant was not a party to these decrees. The 1st defendant had filed O. S. No. 141 of 1102 on the basis of the hypothecation bond in his favour and obtained a decree. The prior hypothecatees, namely, the plaintiffs in O. S. Nos. 299 and 298 of 1955, were not parties to that decree. Thereafter the 1st defendant executed the decree and purchased the mortgage right in the property on 2 51110 and took delivery of the property on 15 81110. The decree-holders in O. S. Nos: 512 and 513 of 1105 purchased the very same right in the property on 18101119 and 14 21113 respectively in execution of their decrees. The equity of redemption in the property became vested in one Thommen Ouseph. The 3rd defendant in O. S. Nos: 298 and 299 of 1955 got an assignment of the equity of redemption benami in the name of the 2nd defendant in these cases under Ext P-5 on 23 91950 and 2nd defendant filed a suit for redemption of the mortgage as O. S. No. 120 of 1950. There was a compromise decree, Ext. P 7, by which the property was allowed to be redeemed by the plaintiff, namely, the 2nd defendant. Subsequently, the 2nd defendant transferred his nominal right in the property to the 3rd defendant. 3. There was a compromise decree, Ext. P 7, by which the property was allowed to be redeemed by the plaintiff, namely, the 2nd defendant. Subsequently, the 2nd defendant transferred his nominal right in the property to the 3rd defendant. 3. The decree-holders in O. S. Nos: 512 and 513 of 1105 did not get delivery of the property as the 1st defendant, as earlier auction-purchaser in execution of his decree got possession of the property and was in possession. So, the present suits were filed by the decree-holder-auction-purchasers in O. S. Nos: 512 and 513 of 1105 for redemption of the property or for sale and realisation of the hypothecation amounts due to them. The suits were decreed by the trial court allowing the plaintiff to recover the amounts by sale of the property. Appeals were filed against the decrees by the 3rd defendant. The appellate court confirmed the decrees of the trial court. 4. The only question which was urged before me was that the suits were barred by limitation and therefore the courts below went wrong in passing the decrees. The Courts below relied on the decision in Othuman Tnambi v. Navuru Pathummal (XXVII T. L. J. 1004) and held that the suits were not barred by limitation. In that case it was observed. "Strictly speaking, the question whether the original mortgage has become barred for enforcement against the 1st defendant is not material in this case as the purchase by the 2nd mortgagee was in express recognition of whatever rights had accrued to the 1st mortgagee. The case would perhaps have been different if in purchasing the equity of redemption the 2nd defendant had ignored altogether the 1st mortgage.". The court below held "In the present case since the purchase was made by the 1st defendant subject to the rights of the plaintiffs under the respective decrees the question as to whether the mortgage has become barred or whether the decree bad become barred would not be material." This view, I think, cannot be supported. The fact that a property has been purchased in execution of decree obtained by a subsequent mortgagee subject to a prior mortgage does not preclude the purchaser from contending that the prior mortgage is barred by limitation when it is sought to be enforced against him. The ruling of the Full Bench in Ram Sanehi Lal v. Janaki Prasad (AIR. The fact that a property has been purchased in execution of decree obtained by a subsequent mortgagee subject to a prior mortgage does not preclude the purchaser from contending that the prior mortgage is barred by limitation when it is sought to be enforced against him. The ruling of the Full Bench in Ram Sanehi Lal v. Janaki Prasad (AIR. 1931 Allahabad 466) is a clear authority for this proposition. There, it was held that if the purchaser in execution of a prior mortgagee's decree is not in possession and if he sues as plaintiff the purchaser in execution of the subsequent mortgagee's decree, he can enforce his remedy only if limitation on the prior mortgage has not yet run out, and that he cannot recover the mortgage money, if limitation has run out and that if he was the earlier purchaser in point of time, he can redeem the second mortgage and recover possession, even though the prior mortgage is barred by time. In this case, admittedly the 1st defendant was the later mortgagee and the sale in execution of his decree was the first in point of time and he obtained possession of the property also. In such a case, if the prior mortgagee's action for recovery of the mortgage money is barred by limitation he cannot sue to enforce that mortgage as against the purchaser of the equity of redemption. Therefore, the suits were clearly barred by time. I therefore set aside the decrees passed by the courts below and allow these second appeals with costs throughout. Allowed.