JUDGMENT B.D. Gupta, J. - The two connected appeals before us are appeals by tenants against decrees in favour of the landlord for their ejectment. The common question which arises for consideration in these appeals is whether the notice, which in each case was a notice combining the demand for payment of arrears of rent with termination of tenancy, was in accordance with law and brought about termination of the tenancy entitling the landlord to obtain decree for ejectment. 2. The relevant part of the notice issued on behalf of the landlord in the suit which gives rise to Second Appeal No. 2607 of 1965 may be reproduced as follows: You are hereby given notice to pay the amount of rent due on you within one month of the service of this notice. If you do not propose to pay and do not pay this amount of arrears of rent within the stipulated period of one month, then you can be ejected from the premises without the permission of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Moradabad. Take notice that if you do not pay the amount within the stipulated period, then your tenancy is terminated and you are given notice of clear 30 days to vacate the premises immediately after the expiry of 30 days from the date of the receipt of this notice failing which my client shall take recourse to law and shall file a suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent and damages.... Mr. Gyan Prakash, who is the counsel for the Appellant in each of these cases has conceded that, so far as the question which has arisen for consideration in both the appeals is concerned, the notice in the suit giving rise to Second Appeal No. 3603 of 1966 is substantially to the same effect. There is no controversy that by now it is the settled view of this Court that a notice of demand of arrears of rent u/s 3 of the UP (Temporary) Control of (Rent and Eviction Act can be combined with the notice required by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. There is also no controversy that if in such a notice the landlord, besides demanding arrears of rent, also notifies to the tenant his intention to terminate his tenancy, it will be a good notice if it is otherwise in accordance with law. There is also no controversy that if in such a notice the landlord, besides demanding arrears of rent, also notifies to the tenant his intention to terminate his tenancy, it will be a good notice if it is otherwise in accordance with law. The controversy which has been raised before us arises from the circumstance that, by the notices in question, the landlord gave to the tenant the option to continue to remain in occupation as tenant if the tenant paid the arrears within the time mentioned in the notice and termination of tenancy was made dependent upon tenant's failure to comply with the demand for payment of arrears of rent. The only reported case dealing with the controversy in this form, which has been brought to our notice is the decision of Dhavan, J. in the case of Military Stores and Anr. v. Ram Lal Kohli 1965 ALJ 298. In view, however, of an unreported decision of Asthana, J. dated 10-9-1964, in Second Appeal No. 4179 of 1959 in the case of Lala Lakshman Das v. Sri Om Nandan Agrawal and Ors. where Asthana, J. took the view that such a notice was not valid, D.S. Mathur, J., whilst admitting Second Appeal No. 2607 of 1965, recorded the conflict and that Second Appeal was referred to a Division Bench. By a later order of D.S. Mathur, J. Second Appeal No. 3603 of 1966 has been connected with Second Appeal No. 2607 of 196. Having heard Mr. Gyan Prakash in support of his contention and having given out best consideration to the matter we find ourselves in full agreement with the decision of Dhavari, J. in the case of Military Stores and Anr. v. Ram Lal Kohli. Learned Counsel for the Appellant conceded his inability to cite any decision of this Court or of any other Court, except for the unreported decision of Asthana, J. in the case of Lala Lakshman Das v. Sri Om Nandan Agrawai and Ors. in support of his contention that a combined notice like the one reproduced earlier in this judgment is bad in Jaw on the ground of vagueness or uncertainty. The only decision which the learned Counsel for the Appellant referred to was the decision, of a Full Bench of this Court in Bradley v. Atkinson ILR 7 All 899. in support of his contention that a combined notice like the one reproduced earlier in this judgment is bad in Jaw on the ground of vagueness or uncertainty. The only decision which the learned Counsel for the Appellant referred to was the decision, of a Full Bench of this Court in Bradley v. Atkinson ILR 7 All 899. Observations in the judgments of the learned Judges who constituted the Full Bench in Bradley v. Atkinson ILR 7 All. 899 have been dealt with and discussed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Kikabhai Gandabhai v. Kalu Ghela and Ors. ILR 22 Bom. 241 which has been relied upon by Dhavan, J. in his decision in the case of Military Stores and Anr. v. Ram Lal Kohli. It may also be added that the Division Bench in the case of Kikabhai Garidabhai v. Kalu Ghele and Ors. ILR 22 Bom. 241 relied for its decision on earlier decisions recorded by the. Calcutta High Court as also of the decision of the majority of the Judges in Ahearn v. Bellman 4 Ex.D. 201. 3. The judgment recorded by Dhavan, J. in Military Stores and Anr. v. Ram, Lal Kohli has elaborately dealt with the matter and if we may say so with respect we find it difficult to improve upon the reasoning given by Dhavan, J. in support of his decision. 4. In the judgment recorded by Asthana, J. in the case of Lala Lakshman Das the discussion as regards the question which has arisen before us is brief. The learned Judge, after observing that the notice must clearly show an intention on the part of the landlord terminating the tenancy and that the same should be clear, Unambiguous and without any condition, held that the notice in the case before him could not be treated as valid because the landlord intended that if the Defendant paid the arrears within time, no termination of the Defendant's tenancy could take place. The learned Judge took the view that such a notice was a conditional notice and was, therefore, not valid. With all respects we are unable to agree with the view taken by brother Asthana. The learned Judge took the view that such a notice was a conditional notice and was, therefore, not valid. With all respects we are unable to agree with the view taken by brother Asthana. The requirement that a notice terminating a tenancy must not be vague but must be clear and unambiguous is for the benefit of the understanding of the receiver of the notice and not the giver of the notice. In the case of a notice by a landlord to the tenant giving him the option either to make payment of arrears of rent within a certain time and thus save his tenancy, or to incur termination of his tenancy by non-payment of arrears, there is no vagueness or ambiguity so far as the understanding of the tenant as regards the consequence of the path he may decide to adopt is concerned and it cannot be said that such a notice is conditional. The landlord may be in a state of doubt as to the course which the tenant may decide to adopt, but so far as the tenant is concerned he must be imputed knowledge of the future course of his own action and it is impossible to sustain a contention on behalf of the tenant that the notice was void or uncertain. Reference in this connection may be made to the observation of Lord Atkinson in the case, of Harihar Banerji v. Ramshashi Roy AIR 1918 PC 102 that notices to quit are to be construed not with a desire to find faults with them which would render them defective but to be construed res magis valeat quam percat. It appears to us unnecessary to elaborate on the matter because, as observed earlier, the judgment of Dhavan, J. is exhaustive and elaborate and we are in full agreement with the decision recorded by him that a notice, such as the one we are dealing with, is not invalid. In our opinion the notices in both the suits which have given rise to the Second Appeals before us complied with the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and were valid. 5. No other point has been raised or argued before us. The result is that these appeals must fail. In our opinion the notices in both the suits which have given rise to the Second Appeals before us complied with the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and were valid. 5. No other point has been raised or argued before us. The result is that these appeals must fail. Second Appeal No. 2607 of 1965 is dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs as no one has appeared on behalf of the Respondent. Second Appeal No. 3603 of 1966 is dismissed with costs.