JUDGMENT M.H. Beg, J. - A dispute arising between the etitioriing company and its four employees, Sohan Lal, Kapoor Chand, Chhatar Pal and Beni Ram, opposite parties 3 to 6 has come up on the third occasion before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution Act. The petitioning company seeks a writ of certiorari to quash the orders dated 7-3-1962 and 13-10-1962 passed by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, opposite party No. 1 and the Second Additional District Judge, Agra, opposite party No. 2 who heard the appeal from the order of the opposite party No. 1 and dismissed it. The opposite party No. 1, hereinafter referred to as the Authority and the appellate Court, hereinafter referred to as the Judge (Agra), interpreted an award dated 25-4-1951 given by the Regional Conciliation Board in an industrial dispute between the petitioning company and its 25 employees out of whom the four opposite parties 3 to 6 were reinstated ana awarded half the wages for the period they had remained unemployed due to the illegal discharge of the opposite parties from service on 4-1-1951 on the ground of need for retrenchment. The need was held to be genuine but four employees were held to have been discharged in violation of an agreement laying down that retrenchment, if necessary, will begin with the junior-most employees. The operative part of the order of the Regional Conciliation Board was: "I, therefore, direct their reinstatement from the date of their dismissal as to maintain continuity of service. Further, I award them half the wages that they would have earned by working for the period they remained unemployed as compensation." This award having been given on 25-4-1951 became enforceable "on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 17" as provided by Section 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was the case of the opposite parties 3 to 6 that they became entitled to full wages from 25-5-1951 under this award. 2. The petitioning company relied on two subsequent orders. The first of these was an interim order dated 17-7-1951 made upon an application under Section 14 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act. 1950, by which it was provided that the implementation of the award is stayed on condition that the petitioning company paid Rs. 2. The petitioning company relied on two subsequent orders. The first of these was an interim order dated 17-7-1951 made upon an application under Section 14 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act. 1950, by which it was provided that the implementation of the award is stayed on condition that the petitioning company paid Rs. 250 to each of the four workers provided the workers furnished sureties for the return of this amount if the appeal filed by the petitioning company was allowed. The second order upon which the petitioning company relied was the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal published on 16th June 1952, The operative part of this decision was : "We accordingly maintain the award in respect of them. The result is that this appeal by the company is also dismissed. The company must pay to the respondents in this appeal, namely Cal 169/ 51 the sum of Rs. 50 as costs." By the same order the appeal preferred by the workmen was also dismissed. The result thus was that the award given by the Regional Conciliation Board had been maintained. The contention advanced on behalf of the petitioning company was that the implementation of the award itself was postponed during the pendency of the appeal so that the workmen were entitled to half the wages only from 4-1-1951 to 25-6-1952 when they were actually reinstated. 3. It may now be mentioned that neither the petitioning company nor the workmen tried to get the order of the Appellate Tribunal clarified. The workmen opposite parties 3 to 6 felt aggrieved by payment to them of only half the wages from 25-5-1951 to 25-6-1952. The four respondents, therefore, moved the Authority at Agra on 22-8-1953 under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, and alleged that half the wages of 25-5-1951 to 25-6-1952, which were due to them under the terms of the award which, had maintained the continuity of their service, were wrongly deducted by the petitioning company. On 9-3-1954, the Authority allowed the claim of the workmen to some extent. The petitioning company then filed an appeal before the Judge, Agra which was allowed on 19-11-1954. The result was that the opposite parties 3 to 6 moved this Court by means of writ petition No. 340 of 1954. The order passed on that writ petition has not been produced. The petitioning company then filed an appeal before the Judge, Agra which was allowed on 19-11-1954. The result was that the opposite parties 3 to 6 moved this Court by means of writ petition No. 340 of 1954. The order passed on that writ petition has not been produced. The petition, however, states that this Court allowed the writ petition and remanded the case for re-hearing before the Judge, Agra. The Judge (Agra) then framed four issues, and on 22-10-1956, remitted the case for trial to the Authority. On 20-5-1957, the Authority then dismissed the application made on behalf of the four workmen on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to go into the matter at all. It evidently accepted the petitioning company's submission that the whole question could be determined only by the Labour Tribunal. This made it necessary for the four workmen the opposite parties 3 to 6 to come up to this Court for a second time, by means of a Writ Petn. No. 2254 of 1957, D/- 15-3-1960 (All) by V.D. Bhargava, J. It was held by this Court that the authority had jurisdiction to determine all questions arising out of the interpretation of the award which affected the claim to wages or the claim of admissible deductions from wages. A copy of the judgment of V.D. Bhargava, J. is Annexure E to the writ petition and it enables me to dispose of the first objection put forward against the decisions of opposite parties 1 and 2 which are assailed by the present writ petition. 4. The first ground of attack to the orders impugned was stated, perhaps only as a matter of form, by Mr. S.C. Khare, to be that the opposite parties had no jurisdiction at all to proceed in the matter under the Payment of Wages Act. This question is really concluded between the parties by the detailed decision of V.D. Bhargava, J. given on 15-3-1960. It is not possible for me to reconsider this ground. The petitioning company could have appealed against the decision of V.D. Bhargava, J. if it felt aggrieved by his decision. He overruled the objection and allowed the adjudication to proceed. The petitioner cannot, therefore, be allowed to challenge the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. It is debarred from doing that by the principles of res judicata. He overruled the objection and allowed the adjudication to proceed. The petitioner cannot, therefore, be allowed to challenge the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. It is debarred from doing that by the principles of res judicata. Apart from this, I completely concur with the view taken by V.D. Bhargava, J. in the very detailed judgment given by him. I, respectfully, adopt those reasons. 5. The next objection taken by the petitioning company was that only Sohan Lai, opposite party No. 3, could derive benefit from the judgment of V.D. Bhargava, J. dated 15-3-1960 on writ petition No. 2296 of 1957 because that was a petition by Sohan Lal only. The opening words of the judgment of V.D. Bhargava, J. show that the petition was "a joint writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed on behalf of four persons Sohan Lai, Chhatra Pal, Beni Ram and Kapoor Chand." It is true that the learned Judge permitted Chhatrapal, Beniram and Kapoor Chand to withdraw from the array of parties so that the petition was to be treated as a petition made by Sohan Lal only. This, however. does not really affect the position because the result of the writ petition was that the whole order of the Authority (The City Magistrate of Agra) passed on 20-5-1967 by which he dismissed the claim of all the four workmen was quashed. It was open for the petitioning company, as an opposite party, to obtain a direction from this Court limiting its operation to quashing of the order of the Authority in Article The order of the authority having been set aside in toto, the result was that the claim of all the four opposite parties 3 to 6 had to be deemed to be pending before the Authority. After the quashing of the order refusing to exercise its jurisdiction, the pending claims had to be tried by the Authority which has rightly proceeded to adjudicate upon the claims of all the four workmen. 6. There is another ground upon which the objection that only Sohan Lal could benefit from the order passed by V. D. Bhargava, J. is not maintainable. It is that Sohan Lal had been moving on behalf of himself and the other three workers throughout. 6. There is another ground upon which the objection that only Sohan Lal could benefit from the order passed by V. D. Bhargava, J. is not maintainable. It is that Sohan Lal had been moving on behalf of himself and the other three workers throughout. It was stated, in paragraph 1 of the counter-affidavit, that the application under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act was filed by Sohan Lal as Vice-President of Tin Factory Workers Union, Agra representing himself and opposite parties 4, 5 and 6 in respect of the wages for the same wage period "within the meaning of Section 16 of the said Act." This assertion was not denied by the petitioning company in its rejoinder affidavit. Therefore, the position appears to be that Sohan Lal was not only representing his own interest only but also represented the interests of the other three opposite parties in proceedings under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. In any case, there was no defect in the representation of the respondents 4 to 6 by Sohan Lal in proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act. This position having been admitted by the petitioning company the benefit of whatever is done by Sohan Lal in this matter cannot be restricted to Sohan Lal who has been acting as the representative of the interests of all the four workmen. 7. The last objection taken in this writ petition was that the Authority and the Judge (Agra), opposite parties 1 and 2, had committed errors apparent upon the face of the record in not interpreting the award to mean that the opposite parties 3 to 6 were only entitled to half the wages from 25-5-1951 to 25-6-1952. It was contended that it was the obvious legal result of the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal that the award was to become operative only from the date of reinstatement of the workers which took place on 26-6-1952. Reliance is placed for this contention on the order of the Regional Conciliation Board, already quoted above, that the workmen will get only half the wages "that they would have earned by working for the period they remained unemployed." It was contended that they remained unemployed until they were reinstated on 26-6-1952. Reliance is placed for this contention on the order of the Regional Conciliation Board, already quoted above, that the workmen will get only half the wages "that they would have earned by working for the period they remained unemployed." It was contended that they remained unemployed until they were reinstated on 26-6-1952. It was also contended that the effect of the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, published on 16-6-1952, was to postpone the date on which the award became effective. Reliance was placed upon Collector of Customs v. East India Commercial Co., A.I.R. 1963 SC 1124, where it was laid down: "In law, the appellate order of confirmation is quite as efficacious as an appellate order of reversal or modification." Another part of a sentence which was relied on was: "It is the order of the later authority which is the operative order after the appeal is disposed of." These observations were made in a wholly different context which has nothing to do with the interpretation of the terms of the orders of the trial Court and the appellate Court. It was also urged on behalf of the petitioning company that whatever rights the opposite parties had for wages between the award by the Regional Conciliation Board and the decision of the appeal by the Appellate Tribunal were contained in the interim stay order already & mentioned above. 8. On behalf of the four workmen, the opposite parties 3 to 6, reliance was placed on M.L. Bose and Co. v. Its Employees, A.I.R. 1961 SC 1198, where it was held: "After the award became operative the workmen were entitled to reinstatement by the appellant but the appellant obtained an order for stay from this Court unconditionally. In such a case we do not see any reason for depriving the workmen of their full wages from the date the award became operative to the date of their reinstatement." In this case the Supreme Court had made it quite clear at the time of the final order passed by it that the stay order could not modify the award and could not affect the rights of the parties under it. In this case, it was also pointed out: "This Court has repeatedly held that when the dismissal of a workman is found to be illegal it is no answer to the workman's claim for reinstatement that in the meanwhile the employer has engaged another workman. However much the Court may sympathise with the difficulties arising from such a position, the workman is entitled to-claim a reinstatement which is a formal rule in the case of wrongful and illegal dismissal. Therefore, we are not prepared to accede to the argument that a fair order of compensation would be justified in this case." In other words, the quantum of compensation could not be altered without a modification of the award. 9. It is a general rule that the order confirmed unless modified specifically by the appellate Court in its effects, will operate as it stood on the date when it was passed. It is true that the appellate authority, by adopting and confirming that order, gives a judgment into which the order of the authority appealed against may have merged. This doctrine of merger cannot, however, help a party whose right to the amount of wages as compensation and its period are fixed under the order originally passed which is confirmed by the appellate authority on a later date. The date of confirmation of the original award cannot affect the rights of the party on the date of the award or postpone accrual, of rights under it automatically. Such a postponement would amount to a modification of the award. If the appellate authority adopts the award without modifying it due to any equities which may require to be taken into consideration owing to events happening between the award and the order of the Appellate Authority, the rights will be governed by the original award as it stood. The subsequent date of confirmation could not mechanically alter those rights. 10. Coming to the award of the Regional Conciliation Board I find that half wages were awarded for the period for which the workmen had remained unemployed. The award did not deal with any future events, such as the filing of an appeal by an aggrieved party and the delay in the enforcement of the award resulting from it. 10. Coming to the award of the Regional Conciliation Board I find that half wages were awarded for the period for which the workmen had remained unemployed. The award did not deal with any future events, such as the filing of an appeal by an aggrieved party and the delay in the enforcement of the award resulting from it. It was quite a reasonable interpretation of the words used by the Regional Conciliation Board to confine the period for which the compensation was awarded to the workmen to that which the Conciliation Board had actually considered. The rights during the further period during which the workmen remained unemployed because the petitioning company chose to go up in appeal and obtained an interim stay order could only be dealt with by the Appellate Tribunal. They could not be or at least do not appear to be at all within the contemplation of the Conciliation Board. Therefore, I do not find any error apparent on the face of the record in the interpretation of the award adopted by the opposite parties. 11. It has also to be remembered that this is a case in which the award, which becomes incorporated into the terms of the contract between the employer and the employee, was being interpreted by authorities which had complete jurisdiction to do so. It was held in Modern Mills Ltd. v. Mangalvedhekar, A.I.R. 1950 Bom 342, that an interpretation of the award, being a matter within the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Payment of Wages Act, a writ of certiorari will not issue to quash the order of the Authority. A similar view was taken in A.R. Sarin v. B.C. Patil, A.I.R. 1951 Bom 423. If a matter relating to the interpretation of the terms of the contract or an award lies within the jurisdiction of the opposite parties 1 and 2, as it does in the present case, such jurisdiction includes the power to err. It is only when the error becomes apparent on the face of the record, or in other words is not a matter of controversy upon which two opposing views are reasonably possible, that the jurisdiction of this Court to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution may be attracted. I see no such error in the interpretation adopted by the Opposite Parties 1 and 2. I, therefore, dismiss this writ petition with costs.