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1967 DIGILAW 238 (ALL)

Chakrapani v. State

1967-07-24

J.N.TAKRU

body1967
ORDER J.N. Takru, J. - This application by Chakrapani, u/s 561A Code of Criminal Procedure, prays for the quashing of the committal order, dated 20-12-1965, Sessions Trial No. 168 of 1965--State v. Chakrapani pending in the court of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mathura. The undisputed facts, which have given rise to this application, are as follows: The Applicant was the sub-post master at the Bankey Behari Post Office at Brindaban in 1963 one of his duties being to receive deposits in the Savings Bank accounts. On 17-10-1963 the Superintendent Post Offices Mathura inspected the post office and discovered that the Applicant had retained monies amounting to Rs. 1040/- in contravention of the Departmental Rules and was, accordingly guilty of temporary breach of trust of the said amount. Thereupon he lodged a report with the police which investigated the case and submitted a charge-sheet u/s 409 IPC against the Applicant and he was, in due course, committed to the court of Session to stand his trial. The Applicant was tried by the learned Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge, Mathura and was convicted and sentenced by him on 24-2-1965. The Applicant filed an appeal against his aforesaid conviction in this Court which is still pending. 2. It appears that after the aforesaid conviction the Applicant was committed to the court of session by the committal order in question in respect of criminal misappropriation of two sums of monies viz. Rs, 605/- and Rs. 450/-. The case with regard to the first sum was that it was shown as deposited in the Savings Bank account on 10-10-1962 but was shown in the Savings Bank Journal as deposited on 12-10-1962. Similarly the case with respect to the sum of Rs. 450/- was that it was deposited in the Savings Bank account on 12-10-1962 while it was shown in the Savings Bank Journal as deposited on 16-12-1962. In other words the Applicant was charged with having committing temporary criminal misappropriation of the aforesaid two sums. The alleged criminal misappropriations were in the knowledge of the authorities when the first trial in respect of the criminal misappropriation for the sum of Rs. 1040/- took place. In other words the Applicant was charged with having committing temporary criminal misappropriation of the aforesaid two sums. The alleged criminal misappropriations were in the knowledge of the authorities when the first trial in respect of the criminal misappropriation for the sum of Rs. 1040/- took place. The Applicant's case therefore, was that as the two sums in respect of which the present committal order was made, were allegedly misappropriated within one year of the earlier criminal misappropriations and were part and parcel of the same transaction, they should have been made the subject matter of a single trial and a separate trial for the alleged criminal misappropriation of Rs. 605/- and 450/- was neither legal, nor desirable with the result that the committal order in question was liable to be quashed. 3. On this application notice was issued and further proceedings in the trial court were stayed meanwhile. When the case was called out today no one appeared for the State to oppose this application. After hearing the learned Counsel for the Applicant, I am satisfied that while there is nothing illegal in holding separate trials for offences of the same kind committed in the coarse of one year and even when the offences are part and parcel of the same transaction, it is not desirable to permit separate trials to take place. But before I proceed to give my reasons for coming to that conclusion it is necessary to mention one further fact. It appears from the record of the earlier sessions trial that an application was moved on behalf of the Applicant in that trial bringing the fact of the alleged five items of criminal misappropriation to the notice of the court and praying that the prosecution might be asked to submit the charge-sheet in respect of the remaining two sums also, i.e. the sums which are the subject matter of the present trial, so that a joint trial for the cumulative sum might be held. This application was rejected by the learned trial Judge on the ground that it was misconceived. This application was rejected by the learned trial Judge on the ground that it was misconceived. I have mentioned this fact only to make it clear that both the prosecution and the learned trial Judge were aware at the time of the earlier trial that the Applicant was also allegedly responsible for committing criminal misappropriation of these two sums, only a few months before and further that all these criminal misappropriations were, so to say, part and parcel of the same transaction. 4. Now, Section 222(2) Code of Criminal Procedure empowers a Court to try a person u/s 409 IPC for a gross sum in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been committed provided that the time between the first and the last of such embezzlements does not exceed one year and likewise Section 235 Code of Criminal Procedure empowers a magistrate to hold one trial for more than one offence, if they form part of one and the same transaction. But these sections however are only enabling sections and do not make it obligatory on the court to hold one trial in respect of all the items of criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of money simply because the said criminal breaches or dishonest misappropriations have taken place in the course of a year or that they form part of one and the same transaction. There is, therefore, no illegality in the Applicant's being tried separately for the present two items of dishonest misappropriation. 5. There is, however, sufficient authority for the proposition that while such a trial is not illegal it is definitely undesirable and should not be allowed to take place. The first decision is that of Inamullah v. King Emperor 2 ALJ 673. In this case six documents were fabricated at one and the same time. The accused was charged with the fabrication of these documents but the charge was at first framed only as to three. The accused was convicted by the trial court but was acquitted by the High Court. He was subsequently charged with the fabrication of the remaining three documents. The accused was charged with the fabrication of these documents but the charge was at first framed only as to three. The accused was convicted by the trial court but was acquitted by the High Court. He was subsequently charged with the fabrication of the remaining three documents. It was held by this Court, that though the Petitioner was technically liable to be tried a second time nevertheless that fact that the fabrication of all the documents being one single transaction and having been treated at the former trial as such no second trial should take place notwithstanding that there was no legal bar. It will be noticed that there is a striking similarity between the facts of the aforesaid case and the present case. In that case both the prosecution and the court were aware of all the six documents which were said to have been fabricated by the accused but the trial in the first instance was confined to only three of them. In the present case also both the prosecution and the trial court were aware at the time of the first trial that there were two further items in respect of which the Applicant was alleged to have committed criminal misappropriation only a few months before and those misappropriations as also the latter misappropriations constituted, as it were, a single transaction u/s 235 Code of Criminal Procedure. Hence applying the ratio of the aforesaid case to this case no second trial should be allowed to take place notwithstanding that there is no legal bar. 5. The second case on this point is that of Sidh Nath Awasthi v. Emperor AIR 1929 (?) 457. It was held in this case that no doubt when a person commits breach of trust of or misappropriates different sums of money he commits so many offences, but it is not desirable that he should be tried as many times when he could have been tried for all of them at one trial. The decision of this case applies with full force to the facts of the present case. Thus for the reasons stated above I am satisfied that while the second trial of the Applicant cannot be held to be illegal, the circumstances of the present case are such as to make the holding of the second trial undesirable. I, therefore, allow this application and quash the committal order dated 12-9-1965.