JUDGMENT D.P. Uniyal, J. - This is an application in revision from an order of the learned District Judge, Farrukhabad remanding the case to the Civil Judge for disposing of the objections to the award made by Sheo Prasad opposite party. In order to appreciate the controversy it is necessary to state a few facts. Roop Lal filed an objection before the Consolidation Officer saying that as he had become Bhumidhar his name should be entered in the revenue records as owner. This application was contested by the opposite party who claimed to be Sirdar of the land in dispute. Since a question of title was raised by Roop Lal the matter was referred by the Consolidation Officer to the Civil Judge, who in his turn, sent the case to an arbitrator who made an award on 14-2-1958 and held that Roop Lal applicant was Bhumidhar of the land in dispute. The award was confirmed by the Civil Judge on 15-3-1958, and was made the rule of the court by an order dated 19-3-1958. The opposite party then filed an application for setting aside the order confirming the award on the ground that he had no notice of the date of the filing of the award. His application was allowed on 2-8-1958 and the order confirming the award was set aside. The applicant then filed a revision against the order setting aside the award, but the same was dismissed by Mithan Lal, J. on the ground that it had become in fructuous. In the course of his judgment the learned Judge observed that the Civil Judge while disposing of the objections of the opposite party should consider whether the same had been made within the period of limitation. It was during the pendency of the aforesaid revision in this Court that the Civil Judge heard the objections of the opposite party and set aside the award and remitted the case to the arbitrator making a fresh award. In appeal the District Judge reversed the order of the Civil Judge on the ground that the direction contained in the judgment of the High Court had not been complied with. He accordingly remanded the case for a finding as to whether the objections filed by the opposite party were within limitation or not. In appeal the District Judge reversed the order of the Civil Judge on the ground that the direction contained in the judgment of the High Court had not been complied with. He accordingly remanded the case for a finding as to whether the objections filed by the opposite party were within limitation or not. The Civil Judge recorded a finding that the opposite party had not filed objections within the period of limitation and that the award was not liable to be set aside. The opposite party preferred an appeal against the said order to the District Judge who allowed the appeal and reversed the judgment of the Civil Judge, holding that the limitation for filing objections would commence when the order confirming the award is set aside, and relied on the case of Jartki Rice Mills v. Duarika Prasad Asharli La1, 1964 ALJ 724. It is against the last mentioned order that the present revision has been filed. Mr. Hari Swarup, learned counsel for the applicant strenuously contended that under Section 158 of the Limitation Act the period of Limitation for filing objections against an award was 30 days from the date of the service of notice of the filing of the award. Alternatively, it was contended that the time for filing objections would commence from 2-8-1958 when the application of the opposite party to set aside the order confirming the award was allowed. The arbitration in this case was a statutory one to which Section 14 of the Arbitration Act is applicable. Section 14 of the Act provides that the arbitrator or umpire shall, at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement, or if so directed by the Court, cause the award to be filed in Court, and the Court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of the filing of the award. In the instant case it is admitted that the arbitrator had not given any notice to the parties of the date of the filing of the award. Indeed under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act the arbitrator is not required to give any such notice. Clause (7) of Rule 63 framed under Section 54 of the said Act says : - "Where the Arbitrator has made the award, he shall sign it, and give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof. Indeed under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act the arbitrator is not required to give any such notice. Clause (7) of Rule 63 framed under Section 54 of the said Act says : - "Where the Arbitrator has made the award, he shall sign it, and give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof. The record of the case shall thereafter be transmitted by him to the Civil Judge concerned after giving intimation of the date on which the parties should appear before the court of Civil Judge." The arbitrator in this case had complied with the provisions of clause (7) of Rule 63 but had not given any notice to the parties of the date of the filing of the award. Under the circumstances, it is not possible to hold that the opposite party had knowledge of the date of the filing of the award in court. In fact under the Consolidation of Holdings Act the arbitrator is not required to file the award in court. After the award has been made all that he has to do is to transmit the record of the case along with the award to the court concerned. And the only information which the arbitrator is required to send to the parties is that they should appear in court on the date fixed by him. The arbitrator may appoint a date for the appearance of parties in court which may turn out to be several months after he has transmitted the award to the court. In such circumstances it would not be possible to file objections within 30 days of the notice of the date of the filing of the award, and it would work serious injustice to the parties if the provisions of Section 158 of the Limitation Act were made applicable to such arbitration. I am of the opinion that limitation in such cases would commence from the date on which parties are required to appear before the Court. The second contention of the learned counsel that the period of limitation must be deemed to have commenced from 2-8-1958, the date when the application of the opposite party for setting aside the order confirming the award was allowed, cannot be accepted: It is not for the courts to prescribe a period of limitation other than that contained in the Limitation Act. It must be remembered that no objections to the award could have been filed by the opposite party so long as the order confirming the award stood. This obstacle was removed for the first time on 2-8-1958 when the case was remitted to the arbitrator for making a fresh award. Obviously no question of filing objections earlier could arise in a situation like this because there was no valid award against which objections could be filed. Consequently it would be futile to contend that the opposite party had a chance of filing objections to the award on 2-8-1958. I am clearly of the opinion that the appellate order passed by the District Judge is perfectly valid and legally sound. The revision application must there-fail and is dismissed with costs. Revision dismissed