Sudama Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh — 1967 DIGILAW 245 (ALL)

JUDGMENT V.G. Oak, C.J. - These two connected special appeals arise out of proceedings for realisation of certain taxes. Since the questions for consideration in the two appeals are largely common, it will be sufficient to refer in detail to the facts of one of the two cases. 2. Special Appeal No. 371 of 1967 arises out of writ petition No. 4512 of 1966 filed by Sudama Prasad and others. Certain dues under the Large Land Holdings Tax Act and other statutes were outstanding against Smt. Susheela Kumari and others, who are Respondents Nos. 3 to 20 in the writ petition. A proclamation for sale was issued. But the sale was postponed from time to time. On 20-4-1964 the sale was postponed to 1-5-1964. No fresh proclamation was issued either for 27-4-1964 or for 1-5-1964. Sudama Prasad and other Petitioners made the highest bid in the auction. The Petitioners' bid was approved by the Sales Officer and by the Collector. In due course the Commissioner also confirmed the sale in favour of the Petitioners or 14-4-1965. Respondents Nos. 3 to 20 filed a revision petition before the State Government. That revision petition was allowed by the State Government on 16-8-1966. The State Government set aside the Commissioner's order confirming the sale and directed that the land should be re-sold according to law. Sudama Prasad and others filed a writ petition challenging the order of the State Government, dated 16-8-1966. The writ petition was dismissed by a learned single Judge of this Court. Sudama Prasad and others have, therefore, come up in special appeal. 3. The first contention of Mr. S.N. Kacker appearing for the Appellants is that the State Government had no power to interfere with the order of the Commissioner confirming the sale. The Respondents rely upon Section 219, Land Revenue Act. Section 219, Land Revenue Act states: The State Government may call for the record of any nonjudicial proceeding not connected with settlement held by any officer, subordinate to it and may pass thereon such orders as it thinks fit. The Board may call for the record of any case of a judicial nature or connected with settlement, in which no appeal lies to the Board.... 4. According to Section 293 of Act No. I of 1951, certain provisions of the UP Land Revenue Act apply to proceedings under Chapter X of Act No. I of 1951. The Board may call for the record of any case of a judicial nature or connected with settlement, in which no appeal lies to the Board.... 4. According to Section 293 of Act No. I of 1951, certain provisions of the UP Land Revenue Act apply to proceedings under Chapter X of Act No. I of 1951. Chapter X of Act No. I of 1951 deals with land revenue. Chapter X of the Land Revenue Act is mentioned in Section 293 of Act No. 1 of 1951. Section 219, Land Revenue Act appears in Chapter X of Land Revenue Act. The result is that Section 219, Land Revenue Act is to be deemed to be a part of UP Act No. I of 1951. In this way, Section 219, Land Revenue Act has been, as it were, incorporated in UP Act No. I of 1951. 5. Mr. S.N. Kacker, advanced various reasons why the State Government could not entertain any revision u/s 219, Land Revenue Act. He pointed out that Section 219, Land Revenue Act empowers Government to call for records of non-judicial proceedings only. He urged that the present case relates to a judicial proceeding. He pointed out that in disposing of an objection the Commissioner has to adjudge rights between the owner of the land and the auction-purchaser. It was, therefore, urged that the proceeding before the Commissioner is judicial. In Radeshyam Khare and Another Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, AIR 1959 SC 107 it was explained that where an authority, which is not a Court, is empowered by a statute to decide a dispute between parties and there is nothing in the statute to the contrary, the authority is under a duty to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act. When a statutory authority has power to do an act which will affect the rights of a subject, then although there are no two authorities and the contest is between the authority and the subject the final determination of the authority will be a quasi-judicial act provided the statute requires the authority to act judicially. In Shankarlal Aggarwal and Others Vs. Shankarlal Poddar and Others, AIR 1965 SC 507 it was observed on page 511 that it would not be possible to describe an order passed deciding a lis before an authority that it is not a judicial order. In Shankarlal Aggarwal and Others Vs. Shankarlal Poddar and Others, AIR 1965 SC 507 it was observed on page 511 that it would not be possible to describe an order passed deciding a lis before an authority that it is not a judicial order. 6. Classification of judicial and non-judicial orders is to be found in paragraphs 911 and 912 of the Revenue Manual. Paragraph 911 contains a list of judicial orders. But orders relating to collection of land revenue are not mentioned in paragraph 911. Paragraph 912 states that all cases not covered by paragraph 911 are to be deemed non-judicial. According to that classification, the proceeding under discussion should be treated as a non-judicial proceeding. It may be that paragraphs 911 and 912 of the Revenue Manual do not in terms apply to the present case. But the classification made in the Revenue Mannual is on the whole sound. 7. We must remember that the Land Revenue Act was passed in the year 1901. That was long before the Constitution of India came into force. The classification made by Section 219 of the Land Revenue Act must be looked at from a practical standpoint. The broad division of cases u/s 219, Land Revenue Act is that decisions of Courts may be reviewed by the Board of Revenue, whereas non-judicial orders may be reviewed by the State Government. It is true that the Collector and Commissioner are both mentioned in the list of Revenue Courts given in Clause (8) of Section 4, Land Revenue Act. But we must recognise that the Collector and the Commissioner have also got certain administrative duties. A proceeding for collection of land revenue is essentially of administrative nature. It may be that at some stage in the proceeding the hearing before the Commissioner assumes the character of quasi-judicial nature. But that circumstance does not alter the essence of the proceeding as a whole. We are in agreement with the learned single Judge that the proceeding for realisation of land revenue from Respondents Nos. 3 to 20 was essentially a non-judicial proceeding. 8. The next contention of Mr. S.N. Kacker was that Section 219 conflicts with certain provisions of UP Act No. I of 1951. So on the language of Section 293 of Act No. I of 1951, it is impossible to give effect to Section 219, Land Revenue Act. Mr. 3 to 20 was essentially a non-judicial proceeding. 8. The next contention of Mr. S.N. Kacker was that Section 219 conflicts with certain provisions of UP Act No. I of 1951. So on the language of Section 293 of Act No. I of 1951, it is impossible to give effect to Section 219, Land Revenue Act. Mr. Kacker, referred to Section 333 of Act No. I of 1951 Section 333 of Act No. I of 1951 states: The Board may call for the record of any suit or proceeding decided by any subordinate court.... The plan of Section 333 of Act No. I of 1951 suggests that Section 333 was mainly concerned with judicial orders. The proceeding under consideration in the present case is of non-judicial nature. So, there is no conflict between Section 333 of Act No. I of 1951 and the first paragraph of Section 219, Land Revenue Act. 9. Mr. Kacker also relied upon certain provisions of ZA and LR Rules. Rule 285-1 provides for objections to be filed before the Commissioner. According to Rule 285-J, the period of limitation is 30 clays. Rule 285-K states: If no application Under Rule 285 I is made within the time allowed therefor, all claims on the ground of irregularity or mistake in publishing or conducting the, sale shall be barred. 10. Mr. Kacker contended that R. 285-K has to be treated as a part of Act No. I of 1951. For this contention, he relied upon The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751 . In that ease it was observed on page 763: ...the rules governing disciplinary proceedings cannot be treated as administrative directions, but shall have the same effect as the provisions of the statute whereunder they are made, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions thereof. That observation merely implied that a statutory rule cannot be dismissed as a mere administrative direction, but has the force of law. 11. In the first place, there is no direct conflict between Rule 285-K and Section 219, Land Revenue Act. Secondly, even if there was such a conflict, the provision of Section 219, Land Revenue Act must prevail as against Rule 285-K which is in the nature of subordinate legislation. Consequently, full effect must be given to Section 219, Land Revenue Act. In the first place, there is no direct conflict between Rule 285-K and Section 219, Land Revenue Act. Secondly, even if there was such a conflict, the provision of Section 219, Land Revenue Act must prevail as against Rule 285-K which is in the nature of subordinate legislation. Consequently, full effect must be given to Section 219, Land Revenue Act. The learned single Judge was right in holding that the State Government was competent to entertain a revision. u/s 219, Land Revenue Act. 12. The State Government gave two reasons for interfering with the Commissioner's, order. The first reason was that the Commissioner confirmed the sale without disposing of a number of objections pending before him. It was conceded for the Respondents that that assumption was erroneous. There were no such objections pending before the Commissioner at the time of confirmation of the sale. 13. Another ground given by the State Government was that sale took place on 1-5-1964 without a proclamation as prescribed by rules. It was not disputed by Mr. Kacker that there was contravention of the rules relating to conduct of sales. 14. The learned single Judge went further. He held that the sale was a nullity. This reasoning has been challenged by Mr. Kacker. In Jatindra Mohan Sarkar Vs. Mahipal Nayek and Others, AIR 1948 Cal 203 it was held that non-issue of sale proclamation is a mere material irregularity. Such an irregularity would not affect the jurisdiction of the revenue Court to hold the sale. Similarly, in Subbanna v. Satyanarayanamurti AIR 1943 Mad 739 it was held that a sale without fresh proclamation is not illegal or a nullity. Such a sale can be set aside only if substantial loss is proved. 15. On these authorities, there appears to be much force in Mr. S.N. Kacker's contention that the sale held in the year 1964 was not a nullity simply because the authorities failed to issue a fresh proclamation for 1-5-1964. 16. Although the reasons given by the learned single Judge may not be sound, the ultimate decision dismissing the writ petition can be supported on Other grounds. It was not disputed for the Appellants that there was at least an irregularity in the conduct of the sale. The State Government observed: ...the total valuation of the property given in the proclamations amounted to Rs. It was not disputed for the Appellants that there was at least an irregularity in the conduct of the sale. The State Government observed: ...the total valuation of the property given in the proclamations amounted to Rs. 41,226/- while the entire land has been sold for only Rs. 14,040. If a proclamation was issued properly the land could have got good value. These figures have not been challenged in the writ petition or in the grounds of appeal. It means that property worth more than Rs. 41,000/- was sold in auction for less than Rs. 15,000/-. The price secured in the auction held on 1-5-1964 appears to be a good deal below the market value. The irregularity in the conduct of the sale appears to have materially prejudiced the owners of the property. The State Government has set aside the auction sale and directed a fresh auction. It will be always open to the Appellants to offer fresh bids in the new auction. Since substantial justice has been done, it does not appear necessary to interfere under the extraordinary powers of the Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution. So, the decision of the learned single Judge may be allowed to stand. 17. Special Appeal No. 371 of 1967 is dismissed with costs to Respondents Nos. 1 and 3. Special Appeal No. 336 of 1967 is dismissed with costs to Respondent No. 3.