M. U. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THESE three connected revision applications arise out of a decree of recovery of possession of suit premises that has been passed in favour of the original plaintiff by the learned Assistant Judge Kaira at Nadiad in Regular Civil Appeal No. 62 of 1961 from the decree in Civil Suit No. 96 of 1959 of the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) Petlad. The learned Assistant Judge has ordered ejectment of the original defendants Nos. 1 to 4 from the suit premises. The decree is passed on the ground covered under clause (b) of sub-sec (1) of sec. 13 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 (Bombay Act No. LVII of 1947) which will hereafter be referred to as the Act. The learned Judge has however. rejected the Plaintiffs case that the premises which were lands were reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the erection of a new building covered under clause (i) of sub-sec (1) of sec. 13 of the Act. Ten learned Judge has also rejected the plaintiffs plea that the said defendants have unlawfully sub-let the whole or part of the premises since the coming into operation of the Act. Thus the grounds of ejectment which were pleaded by the plaintiff relying on clauses (e) and (i) were not accepted by the learned Assistant Judge. However the learned Judge has accepted the case of the plaintiff that the defendants had without the landlords consent given in writing erected a permanent structure on the lands and has thus passed a decree of ejectment on the ground covered under clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 of the Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 2 ) THUS the learned Assistant Judge has considered all the relevant evidence and on a consideration of the nature of the structure made the materials used in the making of the structure and the purpose for which it has been erected has reached a conclusion that the offending new construction was a permanent structure. It appears that the construction so made is lasting in duration having regard to the materials used and the nature of the construction so found by the learned Assistant Judge. It appears that the construction so made is lasting in duration having regard to the materials used and the nature of the construction so found by the learned Assistant Judge. This will thus satisfy the objective test which is required to be employed in finding out the nature of the structure being permanent. As observed by a Division Bench of this High Court in Khureshi Ibrahim Ahmed v. Ahmed Haji Khanmahomad (Bhagwati and Mehta JJ.) A. I. R. 1965 Gujarat 152 at page 154 (VI G. L. R. 27 at p. 32) :. . . . . the structure in order to be a permanent structure within the meaning of the section must have an element of permanence in it. It must be intended to be a lasting structure and that would depend on the nature of the structure. The permanent or temporary character of the structure would have to be determined having regard to the nature of the structure and the nature of the materials used in the making of the structure and the manner in which the structure is erected and not on the basis of how the tenant intended to make use of the structure. As a matter of fact the nature of the structure itself would reflect whether the tenant intended that it should exist and be available for use for a temporary period or for an indefinite period of time The test provided by the Legislature is thus an objective test and not a subjective one and once it is shown that the structure erected by the tenant is of such a nature as to be lasting in duration-lasting of course according to ordinary notions of mankind-the tenant cannot come forward and say that he erected it for use for only a temporary period and it is therefore a temporary structure. In my view the test which is laid down in this decision is fully satisfied in the instant case. The nature of the materials used in the making of the structure and the nature of the structure as is to be found from the commissioners report which I have referred to in extenso earlier as well as the manner in which the structure has been erected go to show that it is of a lasting nature. The nature of the materials used in the making of the structure and the nature of the structure as is to be found from the commissioners report which I have referred to in extenso earlier as well as the manner in which the structure has been erected go to show that it is of a lasting nature. It is therefore not material whether the intention of the tenant was to use it only for a temporary period co-extensive with his tenancy or not. ( 3 ) IT was urged by Mr. Karlekar that the learned Assistant Judge has in para 15 of his judgment made an observation that the intention of the defendant was to make permanent structure and has thus treated the intention as the test for determining the nature of the structure and this was employing the subjective test and offended against the ratio of the decision of this Court in Khureshi Ibrahim Ahmed v. Ahmed Haji Khanmahomad (supra ). But it must be remembered that the aforesaid was the inference which the learned Assistant Judge drew from the nature of the construction the materials used and the purpose for which the upper storey construction was made as observed by him and the observations must be read in that context. In my view there is nothing objectionable in this process of reasoning and this is not employing a subjective test. When one reads the context in which learned Judge has made this particular observation or inference then it is clear that he has not applied the test of intention. Ten learned Judge has in this connection considered the evidence of defendant No. 3 of his witness Dayabhai of the commissioner and has also considered the report of the commissioner and then looked into the nature of the construction the materials used and the purpose for which the construction is made and has observed that: From the nature of construction material used and the purposes for which upper storey was constructed it can well be said that intention of the defendant was to make permanent structure. The learned Judge has in continuation further observed that: Bath-room and latrine are also permanent structures. From the evidence on record it can well be said that the construction put in 1954 is of permanent character. The learned Judge has in continuation further observed that: Bath-room and latrine are also permanent structures. From the evidence on record it can well be said that the construction put in 1954 is of permanent character. Thus it is clear that the intention considered by the learned Judge was the intention of the defendant as to the permanency of the structure erected by him and not the defendants intention as regards the length of time for which the defendant wanted to make use of the structure. Thus Mr. Karlekar is not right in his submission that the test of intention was employed by the learned Judge in reaching his conclusion in the matter and this has led to miscarriage of justice. ( 4 ) I may say that on behalf of the original plaintiff who is the opponent No. 1 in Civil Revision Applications Nos. 830 of 1962 and 858 of 1962 and the applicant in Civil Revision Application No. 889 of 1962 Mr. S. M. Shah learned counsel has urged that intention is also one of the tests to be employed in determining the nature of the construction viz. whether it is a permanent structure or a temporary structure. In support of his submission he has relied upon an unreported decision of the Division Bench consisting of Chagla C. J. and Tendolkar J. of the Bombay High Court in Madhavdas Dharamdas Vithaldas v. B. K Patel the Municipal Commissioner of Bombay and another Civil Appeal No. 79 of 1951 (Misc. P. 188 of 1951) decided on September 27 1951 of which a certified copy has been produced at Ex. 147 wherein the learned Chief Justice has observed as under :-IN order to decide whether a structure is of a permanent character or not two factors have to be taken into consideration : one is the nature of the structure itself and the other is the intention of the party who puts up that structure. ( 5 ) IN the Bombay case the question at issue was whether some wooden cabins which were resting on the railing at some height above the floor level and which were fitted up on teak-wood brackets which were belted to the posts of the building flanking the side passage thereof were additions or alterations to a building within the meaning of sec. 342 of the Bombay Municipal Corporations Act so as to entitle the Commissioner in taking an action under sec. 351 (2) of the said Act to demolish the structure departmentally. It was contended by the appellant that the structures were easily removable without causing damage to the building and therefore they were not in the nature of permanent structures. It was in this connection that Chagla C. J. had made the aforesaid observations. In my view although it was a case of structures in the nature of fixtures the observations made therein equally apply to the instant structure. The intention of the party that sets up the structure can well be a factor to be taken into consideration. It was argued by M/s. Karlekar and Nanavati that the Gujarat judgment in Ibrahims case (supra) laid down that the intention of the tenant was not material to find out the nature of the structure as being permanent. Now in Ibranims case (supra) the structure in question was one made of bamboos and iron sheets. What appears to have been contended in the case was whether the intention of the tenant as regards the length of time for which he wanted to make use of the structure was test to decide whether the structure was permanent or not and it was in this connection that Bhagwati J. has observed that how long the tenant intended to make use of the structure was not the test. There can be no dispute as regards this proposition of law with which I am in respectful agreement. Whether or not the tenant intends to make use of the structure for the length of his tenancy is not material for the purpose. But if the tenant intends the structure to be a permanent structure in my view it will certainly be one of the considerations which can weigh with the Court in finding out the nature of the construction. Thus the contention that was raised on behalf of the defendants that the Gujarat High Court has ruled out the consideration of intention is not well-founded. The Bombay judgment clearly lays down the test of intention of the party who puts up the structure as one of the considerations and in my view that judgment does not take a different view from that taken in the Gujarat decision. The Bombay judgment clearly lays down the test of intention of the party who puts up the structure as one of the considerations and in my view that judgment does not take a different view from that taken in the Gujarat decision. ( 6 ) IT was urged that in order that a structure can be called a permanent structure the materials used in its making must be steel cement stones and such other materials so as to give it the character of a permanent nature. It was contended that the materials used in the making of the structure in question were not of lasting character and were removable. Now removability cannot per se be a test in the matter. Nor is it necessary that a particular type of material is to be used to give the structure an element of permanence or to make it of such a nature as to be of a lasting nature. The learned appellate Judge has on a consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstance and employing the objective test as aforesaid found that the offending structure is a permanent structure. Thus no case for my interference here is made out. The nature of the materials to be used depends upon the change in the mode of life the economic conditions of the persons concerned the availability of the materials at a given time and such other factors. In my view the expression permanent structure is used to denote some work which is not of a temporary nature. In Nasir-Ul-Zamn v. Azim-Ullah and others 28 All. 740 even a Kachha thatched of house was considered to be a work of a permanent character within the meaning of sec. 60 (b) of the Easements Act 1882 although the thatch of the house was renewed from time to time. Thus the materials that might be used in erecting a structure may differ with the mode of life and the circumstances of the person concerned. It would therefore not be proper to say that because in the offending structure beams of wood and such other materials aforesaid were used and not the cement or the steel frame therefore it could not be considered to be a permanent structure. It would therefore not be proper to say that because in the offending structure beams of wood and such other materials aforesaid were used and not the cement or the steel frame therefore it could not be considered to be a permanent structure. ( 7 ) IN Dwarka s/o Kaludin Ahir v. Gaurishankar Thakur s/o Sunder A. I. R. 1943 Nagpur 77 a person was granted a licence to build a residential hut and the hut built was fit for residence. Such a construction was considered to be of a permanent character within the meaning of the expression used in sec. 60 of the Easements Act 1882 It was observed that The more important factor to be considered is the intention with which the house was built. If it was built for residence it must be presumed to be of a permanent character. This case lays down that the purpose for which the construction is put up would be a material circumstance to be considered in the matter. It was further observed in the Nagpur case that : If a poor man wishes to build a permanent structure for his residence he would choose the cheapest material such as mud. Even in a place like Nagpur in its older parts are to be found houses of a considerable dimensions constructed with mud and wood. Consequently the mere fact that a structure had mud walls would not be conclusive to prove its temporary character. In the instant case it is clear that the first storey has been constructed for the residence of defendant No. 3 and his family. Thus the purpose for which the construction has been put up will also indicate the element of permanence in the matter. In Brahmananda Das v. Nagendra Chandra Sarkar A I. R. 1954 Cal. 224 construction of a surface drain upon the floor of the verandah which had practically converted a substantial part of the said open verandah into a close room was considered to be a construction of a permanent nature and as it was made without the landlords permission the act was held to be in contravention of clause (p) of sec. 108 Transfer of Property Act and sufficient to desentitle the tenant to the protection of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act 1948 (vide sec. 11 sub-sec. (1) proviso (a) of the Act ). 108 Transfer of Property Act and sufficient to desentitle the tenant to the protection of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act 1948 (vide sec. 11 sub-sec. (1) proviso (a) of the Act ). Thus it is clear from the aforesaid Bombay Allahabad Nagpur and Calcutta decisions that the character of the structure being permanent or not is a mixed question of fact and law and that the intention of the party who puts up the structure is a factor to be considered in determining the character of the structure in question. Of course the nature of the construction the nature of the materials uses the manner in which the structure is erected and the purpose thereof will also be material factors in arriving at a proper conclusion in the matter. In the Gujarat case as aforesaid the question of intention considered was the intention of the tenant to use the new structure co-extensive with his tenancy and it was observed that intention in such a case could not be the test. That is so. But the intention of the party who puts up the structure viz. whether to reside therein or to put it to another use is a material factor to be considered As observed by Chagla C. J. for the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Madhavdas Dharamdas Vithaldas v. B. K Patel the Municipal Commissioner of Bombay and another (supra) :in my opinion those structures are in the nature of fixtures. But the more important consideration with regard to these structures is as to the intention with which these structures were put up. The petitioner himself admits that those structures were put up in order to enable him to earn more rent. They are fitted with telephones; they are fitted with electricity; and a fairly good rent is realized from letting out these structures. On these facts it is difficult to contend that the intention of the owner was to put up structures for a short period or for a temporary duration and that there was no intention to have a permanent addition to the building. In my view therefore such an intention must be considered and having regard to the facts as found by the learned Assistant Judge the intention was clear viz to make an addition to the building for his residence. This will also be a material factor. In my view therefore such an intention must be considered and having regard to the facts as found by the learned Assistant Judge the intention was clear viz to make an addition to the building for his residence. This will also be a material factor. But as aforesaid apart from the intention the nature of the structure itself reflects the nature of permanency of the structure and in my view the learned appellate Judge was right in finding that the offending structure was a permanent structure. ( 8 ) IT was then contended by Mr. Nanavati that Explanation which was added to sec. 13 (1) of the Act by sec. 12 (1) (c) of the Gujarat Act LVII of 1963 would be attracted in the instant case and that as provided therein any structure or alteration made in the premises if it could be removed without serious damage to the premises would not come within the mischief of clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 of the Act the relevant part whereof reads as under :13 (1 ). Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of sec. 15 a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) that the tenant has without the landlord s consent given in writing erected on the premises any permanent structure; or. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Explanation introduced by Gujarat Act LVII of 1963 is : explanation : For the purposes of clause (b) no permanent structure shall be deemed to be erected on any premises merely by reason of the construction of a partition wall door or lattice work or the filling of kitchen stand or such other alterations made in the premises as can be removed without serious damage to the premises now as observed by the Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 661 at page 733 : an explanation appended to a section or clause gets incorporated into it and becomes an integral part of it and has no independent existence apart from it. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 661 at page 733 : an explanation appended to a section or clause gets incorporated into it and becomes an integral part of it and has no independent existence apart from it. There is in the eye of law only one enactment of which both the section and the Explanation are two inseparable parts. They move in a body if they move at all. ( 9 ) IT was contended by Mr. Karlekar who appears for original defendants Nos. 1 and 2 that the Explanation applies to pending actions. In support of his submission Mr. Karlekar has relied upon the decision of the Madras High Court in Balaji Singh v. Chakka Gangamma and another A. I. R. 1927 Mad. 85 where Devadoss J. has considered the effect of the Transfer of Property (Amending) Act 27 of 1926 and has observed that the Amending Act applied to pending actions. The relevant observations are as under :when any phrase or word or expression in an enactment is explained by the Legislature. the Act has to be applied with the authoritative explanation; for the very object of the authoritative explanation is to enable the Court to understand the Act in the light of the explanation. It cannot therefore be said that this Act does not apply to pending actions. Mr. S. M. Shah learned counsel appearing for the original plaintiff has not disputed this proposition of law. I will therefore for the present purpose assume that ten Explanation is to be treated as an integral part of sec. 13 (1) (b) of the Act. ( 10 ) THE next question that will then arise for consideration is whether the Explanation can be attracted to the present structure. Now the word premises has been defined in sec. 5 (8) of the Act as under : (8 ). 13 (1) (b) of the Act. ( 10 ) THE next question that will then arise for consideration is whether the Explanation can be attracted to the present structure. Now the word premises has been defined in sec. 5 (8) of the Act as under : (8 ). premises means- (a) any land not being used for agricultural purposes (b) any building or part of a building let separately (other than a farm building) including- (i) the garden grounds garages and outhouses if any appurtenant to such building or part of a building (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or a part of a building (iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof but does not include a room or other accommodation in a hotel or lodging houses. Thus the definition of the term premises falls into two distinct parts : (i) any land not being used for agricultural purposes; and (ii) any building or part of a building let separately and this is an inclusive definition. It is not disputed that in the instant case the premises which were let out to the defendant were open lands. Again these lands are indisputably not used for agricultural purposes. Thus the premises in question will fall under clause (a) of sec. 5 (8) of the Act and not under clause (b ). This position is not in dispute before me. Bearing in mind this material fact it will have to be considered whether the Explanation can be attracted to such premises viz. open lands. The Explanation provides that construction of a partition wall door or lattice work or the filling of kitchen-stand or such other alterations made in the premises as can be removed without serious damage to the premises shall not be considered to be 3 permanent structure. Now examining this Explanation it is clear that it has reference to minor alterations in an existing structure for more beneficial enjoyment thereof and not to major alterations to be made. It gives liberty to the tenant merely to put up a partition wall a door or lattice work or to fill in the kitchen-stand or such other alterations. These are obviously minor alterations. It gives liberty to the tenant merely to put up a partition wall a door or lattice work or to fill in the kitchen-stand or such other alterations. These are obviously minor alterations. It appears that with limited accommodation now available and with the present mode of living such minor alterations which can be removed without serious damage to the premises are permissible and cannot be considered to be erection of a permanent structure within the meaning of clause (b ). This appears to be the very object of the Explanation. By reason of the particular words preceding viz. construction of a partition wall door or lattice work or the filling of kitchen-stand the general words following viz. or such other alterations to be found in the Explanation would have a meaning attributed to them less comprehensive than they would otherwise bear. Ejusdem generis rule of construction is to be applied in construing such cases. In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan A I. R. 1955 S. C. 810 the Supreme Court has observed that before the ejusdem generis rule of construction can be applied apart from the fact that the rule mast be confined within narrow limits and general or comprehensive words should receive their fall and natural meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their intendment it is requisite that there must be a distinct genus which must comprise more than one species. Thus it is clear that where the words to be interpreted are restrictive in their intendment the rule will be attracted as in this case. In a New Zealand case Cooney v. Covell (1901) 21 N. Z. L. R 106-108 Williams J. has observed that :there is a very well known rule of construction that if a general word follows a particular and specific word of the same nature as itself it takes its meaning from that word and is presumed to be restricted to the same genus as that word. No doubt that rule is one which has to be Followed with care; but if not to follow it leads to absurd results then I am of opinion that it ought to be followed. No doubt that rule is one which has to be Followed with care; but if not to follow it leads to absurd results then I am of opinion that it ought to be followed. The rule has been enunciated by Lord Campbell in R. v. Edmundson (1859) 28 L. G. M. C. 213-215 as under :i accede said he to the principle laid down in all the cases which have been cited that where there are general words following particular and specific words the general words must be confined to things of the same kind as those specified. It is rally a question of the assumed intention of the statute. In Shaw v. Ruddin (1858) 9 Ir. C. L. R. 21a 220 the question was whether sec. 25 of the Dublin Carriages Act 1853 which enacts that it shall not be lawful for any person to use or let to hire any hackney carriage job carriage stage carriage cart or job horse at any place within the limits of this Act without having a licence for the same applied to carts used for private purposes only. It Was held that it did not. In the interpretation of this Act said Lefroy C J we have to aid us the long-established rule of construction-namely that we must look to the associate terms in connection with which we find the word carts. We find then. that in the several sections in which that word occurs it is associated with carriages and vehicles none other than those let or used for hire. In Re Stockport etc. Schools (1898) 2 Ch. 687-696 the Court of Appeal read the words or other schools in sec. 62 of the Charitable Trusts Act 1853 as applying not to all schools of whatever description but only to schools similar in character to the cathedral collegiate (or) chapter schools mentioned in the section. Lindley M. R. said : I cannot conceive why the Legislature should have taken the trouble to specify in this section such special schools as cathedral collegiate and chapter except to show the type of school which they were referring to and in my opinion other schools must be taken to mean other schools of that type. It is true that ejusdem generis rule is to be applied with caution and not to be pushed too far. It is true that ejusdem generis rule is to be applied with caution and not to be pushed too far. However in the instant case the words or such other alterations to be found in the Explanation when considered in the context of the associate words preceding thereto the rule of ejusdem generis is in my view attracted. The words are limited to the same category or genus comprehended by the particular words. Reliance was placed by Mr. Nanavati on the decisions of the Supreme Court in The Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Delhi and another v. The Union of India and others A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 1167 and in Jagdish Chandra Gupta v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd. 66 B L. R. 709. These two decisions lay down the same rule namely that it is to be decided in each particular case whether the general words which follow the particular words have a meaning attributed to them less comprehensive than they would otherwise bear. These two decisions relied upon by Mr. Nanavati go to show that the Court in considering the application of the rule of ejusdem generis must consider the context of the clause and whether a genus was disclosed. In these two cases the finding was that the genus was not disclosed and therefore the rule was not attracted. Here the general words or such other alterations to be found in the Explanation follow particular words construction of a partition wall door or lattice work or the filling of kitchen-stand. Thus the general words used in the Explanation will not include anything of a class superior to which the particular words belong. The intention of the Legislature using the general words and in particular the word such other can be gathered from the preceding particular or specific words. The specified words used do not apply to different objects of a widely different character but to something which can be called object or category namely minor alterations in an existing structure. The rule ejusdem generis or noscitur a sociis thus comes into play and the words or such other alterations must be read as ejusdem generis with previous categories and must be confined to things of the same kind as those earlier specified. This is also shown by necessary intendment. The rule ejusdem generis or noscitur a sociis thus comes into play and the words or such other alterations must be read as ejusdem generis with previous categories and must be confined to things of the same kind as those earlier specified. This is also shown by necessary intendment. It follows that only minor alterations will not be deemed to be permanent structures within the meaning of the Explanation. To the offending structure which clearly appears as has been found by the learned trial Judge to be an extensive construction the Explanation cannot be attracted. Therefore even assuming that the Explanation applies to pending actions as has been contended by Mr. Karlekar the Explanation cannot come into play. Thus apart from my view that the Explanation is not attracted to lands simpliciter falling in clause (a) of sec. 5 (8) the Explanation will have no effect in the instant case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 11 ) THUS as aforesaid the offending structure consists of a ground- floor structure in which two shops have been constructed on what was originally a Kachcha or temporary shed or godown which was used by defendants witness Dahyalal for running his lodge. This has been turned into shops for the business premises of the newly started business of defendant No. 3 Ishwarbhai as is apparent from the aforesaid invitation card. As found by the learned Assistant Judge on good and reliable evidence an upper storey has also been constructed with all modren facilities. All this construction is indisputably made without the land-lords consent. The principle evolved clearly is that in order to determine the character of the structure whether it is a permanent or a temporary one the nature of the structure the nature of the materials used in the structure the manner in which the structure is erected the purpose for which the structure is erected and the element of permanence will be the material considerations. These are considered to be the objective tests which in my view are clearly fulfilled in the instant case. The subjective consideration that was ruled out in the case of Ibrahim v. Khanmahomed (supra) as aforesaid viz whether tenant had erected the structure for his use as long as he was a tenant is not a material factor to be considered. The subjective consideration that was ruled out in the case of Ibrahim v. Khanmahomed (supra) as aforesaid viz whether tenant had erected the structure for his use as long as he was a tenant is not a material factor to be considered. This will clearly repel the argument urged on behalf of the defendants that they wanted to occupy the new structure only till they remained as the tenants and that on their leaving the premises they will remove the structure. This is not a factor to be considered as observed by the learned Judges in Ibrahims case (supra ). The contention that the materials that have been used in the construction of the offending structure are not the modern materials like cement iron etc. would not make any difference to the character of the construction. The materials used may be granite stone marble cement concrete table moulded bricks country bricks or clay or mud. There can be no absolute standards as regards the materials for judging whether the structure is permanent or temporary. I may say that it makes no difference whether the conditions of a man may be affluent or otherwise. But the fact remains that the defendants have been found to have made the extensive construction with all the modern amenities. Having regard to the objective test laid down in the Gujarat judgment and having regard to the purpose for which the structure has been made I have no matter of doubt that the offending structure is a permanent structure erected on the suit premises viz. open land. The case against the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 is thus clearly covered within the purview of clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 of the Act and the learned Assistant Judge was right in granting a decree of ejectment against the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 on that ground. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 12 ) HOWEVER I must say that Mr. S. M. Shah had emphasized the point that the expression requirement to be found in clause (i) was in a passive voice. 1 to 4 on that ground. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 12 ) HOWEVER I must say that Mr. S. M. Shah had emphasized the point that the expression requirement to be found in clause (i) was in a passive voice. It was contended that when a landlord desires to erect a new building on his land and further makes preparation for the construction that would be following up his intention and that would be a need and a requirement within the meaning of clause (i ). It is difficult to accept Mr. Shahs submisson that desire of a landlord followed by preparations in the matter would mean that the premises are required for the purpose reasonably and bona fide. In my view the word require cannot be equated with desire and it does not refer to the state of the landlords mind. It involves something more then a mere wish and at least an element of need to some extent although it may not be an absolute need or absolute requirement. A mere desire followed by preparations to act upon the desire cannot be said to be requirement much less a reasonable requirement within the meaning of clause (i ). I have examined the decision on this aspect of the case and in my view the decision given in appeal by the learned Assistant Judge is according to law and as such no case for interference is made out in this revision application as well. Application dismissed. .