JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is an application by a person from whom certain properties, alleged to have been stolen, were taken during the investigation of an offence and produced in Court, the case ending in acquittal in the manner presently to be set out. ( 2. ) THE original owner wanted the properties to be returned to him notwithstanding that the case had ended in an acquittal. The person from whom the properties were taken, who is the pawnee through the accused, urged that no offence having been proved to have been committed, the normal rule that the properties should be returned to the person from whom they are taken, should not be departed from, and they should be restored to him; he was a pawnee for value and had acted in good faith. The Magistrate directed that the properties should be restored to the original owner whose story of the theft had not been believed. In revision before the Sessions Judge, the Magistrates order was maintained whereupon the pawnee has come to this Court in revision. ( 3. ) THE facts are simple. One Laxminarayan alleged that a fellow villager, Bherusingh by name, had entered his house on the 16th of April 1964 and had stolen a number of properties among which were four ornaments that are the subject-matter of the present proceedings. He gave the First Information report on the 19th. During investigation, Bherusingh took the police to the shop of the present applicant Bhagchand, got these four ornaments recovered and gave the following story :-Laxminarayan and he were partners in a business. Wanting money for this venture, Laxminarayan brought these ornaments from his house and asked Bherusingh to pawn them for a sum of money with Bhagchand who was in this line of business. Each of the four ornaments were pawned on a different occasion but they were all in February and March 1964 well before the date of the alleged theft as given by Laxminarayan. In fact Laxminarayan himself accompanied Bherusingh at the time of the pawning though in the books of the pawnee the transactions were recorded in the name of Bheru only. Having done this, Laxminarayan thought fit to put the entire burden on Bheru and try to get back the properties without paying anything. Accordingly, he brought this case falsely. ( 4. In fact Laxminarayan himself accompanied Bherusingh at the time of the pawning though in the books of the pawnee the transactions were recorded in the name of Bheru only. Having done this, Laxminarayan thought fit to put the entire burden on Bheru and try to get back the properties without paying anything. Accordingly, he brought this case falsely. ( 4. ) LAXMINARAYAN denied this as was only to be expected ; but he had, during the police investigation, stated that he and Bheru were partners in a business. That does not become positive evidence but that does indicate how little regard Laxminarayan has for truth. Bhagchand himself gave the story about the pawning which is of course common ground, but he introduced a refinement viz. , that Laxminarayan himself had come at that time with Bheru. This detail may or may not be true but it is of no consequence either way, whether or not Laxminarayan was present at the time of the pawning or was a co- pawnor. ( 5. ) THE Magistrate acquitted Bherusingh "with the benefit of the doubt". It was not of reasonable doubt with reference to Bherus complicity in the offence of theft on the commission of which that Court was satisfied. It was on the benefit of the doubt in regard to the theft itself, in other words, the Court was not satisfied that the commission of the theft or of any other similar offence had been proved beyond reasonable doubt, Obviously, it was at least equally doubtful whether Bherusingh had committed it It has also examined the defence argument that at the time of the alleged commission of the offence, that is on or about 16th April, these properties, which Laxminarayan had listed, were not in his possession having already been pawned with Bhagchand. The magistrate having examined this, is critical about the manner in which Bhag-chands book has been maintained but is still inclined to believe that the articles had already been pawned. All the same, because they were originally the properties, of Laxminarayan, the Magistrate made an order that they should be given to him which has been maintained fey the Sessions Court in revision. ( 6. All the same, because they were originally the properties, of Laxminarayan, the Magistrate made an order that they should be given to him which has been maintained fey the Sessions Court in revision. ( 6. ) TWO points emerge out of section 517, Criminal Procedure Code; firstly, it is essential that the property before the Court, in regard to the disposal of which it is called upon to make an order, is one regarding which any offence appears to have been committed or which had been used for the commission of the offence; secondly, in deciding this, the Court is not to start on a new and independent enquiry but has to study the decision of the trial Court or the appellate Court, as the case may be, which finally disposed of the case, in other words, we have to look at the last and final judgment in the case and decide whether or not regarding the property in question, any offence had been committed or it had been used in the commission of an offence. ( 7. ) WHEN it is a case of conviction, it is a straight case; when it is a case of acquittal, some difficulties appear because it is conceivable that the Court finds that an offence has been committed and still acquits the accused before it on the ground that he or they had not committed the offence or, at any rate, it is not beyond doubt that he or they did. The test for the restoration to the original owner, of the property, under section 517, Criminal Procedure Code, is not whether the accused before the Court has been convicted under the charge, but whether any offence had been committed regarding the property. Similarly, to speak of the benefit of the doubt may be confusing. It may mean one of the two things ; first, that it is not beyond reasonable doubt that the offence has been committed at all; secondly, that there being reasonable certainty that the offence has been committed, there is reasonable doubt as to whether the accused before the Court had done it, in other words, it is possible that not he nor they but some other or others had actually done it. In which of the two forms the benefit of the doubt is given, would depend upon the wording of the judgment; it does not as a rule give rise to any difficulty. ( 8. ) IN this case, it is not urged on behalf of Bhagchand that simply because the accused has been acquitted, the properties should be restored to him. His argument is that no offence having been proved, whether committed by Bherusingh or by anybody else, in respect of the properties, the normal rule, that the goods seized during the investigation should be returned to the person from whom they are seized, should not be parted from. Laxminarayans case is that the properties undoubtedly belonged to him at one stage and now they have gone to Bhagchand through the agency of Bherusingh Therefore, the properties should be returned to the original owner, that is, he himself. The fallacy of this argument is that section 517, Criminal Procedure Code, does not direct the return of the property to the original owner in so many words. It should be restored backwards to the stage at which no offence has been proved to have been committed. If it has changed hands four times, we will examine backwards each of the stages and stop at the stage where no offence is proved. If it is at the first stage itself, the property shall be restored to the person from whom it has been taken (There is certainly a case where the person, from whom it has been taken, declines that he ever had it, in which event, even if no offence is proved, it will not be restored to him but will be forfeited. ). ( 9. ) ON behalf of Laxminarayan, cases have been cited where it is an acquittal with the benefit of doubt, the properties seized during the investigation had been given to the original owner. But to make this rule is really to state the position too widely. ). ( 9. ) ON behalf of Laxminarayan, cases have been cited where it is an acquittal with the benefit of doubt, the properties seized during the investigation had been given to the original owner. But to make this rule is really to state the position too widely. If it is an acquittal with the benefit of the doubt to the person on trial while it is found that the offence has been committed, then certainly there will be restoration to the original owner because, whether or not the persons on trial are guilty, the property has been removed by commission of an offence; but where the benefit of doubt relates to the commission of the offence itself, there will be no restoration, because there has been no offence committed and the property will have to be made over to the person from whom it had been taken. The fallacy of Laxminarayans argument lies in the failure to distinguish between the two kinds of the benefit of doubt. In the instant case, the finding of the Magistrate is not that, the offence of theft having been committed, Bheru is not guilty, but that no offence has been proved, in other words, the properties of Laxminarayan went to Bhagchand by a process which did not involve the commission of an offence. Therefore, the general principle, that the property should be restored to the person from whom it is recovered, should be followed, there being no justification for a departure on the ground of the commission of an offence. ( 10. ) THE result is that the application is allowed and the order of the magistrate directing the restoration of the property to Laxminarayan is set aside and instead it is ordered that they should be handed over to Bhagchand from whom they were taken. Application allowed.