JUDGMENT S.D. Khare, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P., Lucknow, (opposite party no. 2) on February 20, 1964. 2. The undisputed facts leading to this petition might be briefly stated as follows. The dispute relates to a Khata in village Jagdishpur, district Ballia. In the basic year the land in question was recorded as the bhumidhari holding of Mathura and Sm, Manoria, widow of Deoraj. During the consolidation proceedings Bhagan, son of Mathura (deceased) raised an objection that the land in suit had been acquired by his ancestor alone and Sm. Manoria had no right of co-tenancy as the widow of Deoraj. It was further alleged that Sm. Manoria was not the wife of Deoraj. During the course of the mutation proceedings which were fought up to the Board of Revenue it was held that Sm. Manoria was the widow of Deoraj and her name was ordered to be recorded in the Khata. She had made a transfer of her interest in the bhumidhari Khata in favour of Ram Cheez and others and they had applied that their names be entered in the revenue records in place of that of Sm. Manoria. The Consolidation Officer by his order dated May 17, 1963 decided both the objections against the objectors. No mutation was ordered in favour of Ram Cheez and others on the technical ground that there was nothing on the record to show that this land purchased together with the land already with them will not exceed the maximum prescribed by Section 154 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Both the objectors, therefore, went up in appeal before the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation Ballia, who by his judgment dated August 28, 1963 decided both the matters in favour of Bhagan son of Mathura. He held that Deoraj was not a member of the family of Mathura and was, therefore, not entitled to co-tenancy in the property in dispute. The transfer in favour of Ram Cheez and others, therefore, became ineffective. He further ordered that the name of Sm. Manoria be expunged from the holding and the same shall continue to be the sole property of Bhagan and Shankar sons of Mathura. 3. The transfer in favour of Ram Cheez and others, therefore, became ineffective. He further ordered that the name of Sm. Manoria be expunged from the holding and the same shall continue to be the sole property of Bhagan and Shankar sons of Mathura. 3. Ram Cheez and others filed three revision applications against the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The Deputy Director of Consolidation did not proceed to record a finding on the question whether or not Deoraj and Mathura had belonged to the same family lie, however, arrived at the finding that Deoraj and after his death Sm. Manoria had all along been recorded as co-tenure-holders along with Mathura and had also all along remained in possession. He further arrived at the finding that both Mathura and Sm. Manoria had become co-bhumidhars of the property. He accepted an affidavit filed on behalf of Ram Cheez on the point that the property purchased by him from Sm. Manoria when added to the property already in his possession will not contravene the provisions of Section 154 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. On these findings he allowed the revision application, set aside the orders passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer and directed that the names of Ram Cheez and others be recorded over the share of Sm. Manoria in the Khata in dispute. He thus upheld the co-tenancy right of Deoraj and Sm. Manoria over the Khata in dispute on the basis of their continuous possession. 4. The history of litigation between the parties is to be found in the judgment of the Assistant Settlement Officer passed on August 28, 1963. The names of Mathura and Deoraj were entered as co-tenure-holders of the Khata from prior to 1335 Fasli. During the revision of records operations an objection had been raised by Mathura Koeri before the A.R.O. with the allegations that the name of Deoraj had been incorrectly recorded as co-tenure-holder as he did not belong to his family while the land in dispute had been acquired by the objector's ancestors alone. The A.R.O. by his order dated September 3, 1940 dismissed that objection. On the finding that both Mathura and Deoraj belonged to a common family the entries in the Khata of joint tenancy was allowed to continue. The A.R.O. by his order dated September 3, 1940 dismissed that objection. On the finding that both Mathura and Deoraj belonged to a common family the entries in the Khata of joint tenancy was allowed to continue. Nine years later, after the death of Deoraj, Bhagan son of Mathura raised an objection during the mutation proceedings started after the death of Deoraj with a two-fold allegation, that Deoraj was not entitled to co-tenancy in the land in suit and that Sm. Manoria was not the widow of Deoraj. The S.D.O. directed the name of Sm. Manoria to be mutated in place of Deoraj (deceased). The parties went up to the Board of Revenue and the objection preferred by Bhagan was disallowed and the name of Sm. Manoria was entered in the Khata in place of that of Deoraj (deceased). A declaratory suit was filed by Bhagan on May 31, 1958. However, the proceedings were stayed as the village was notified under Section 4 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The parties, therefore, re-agitated the same matter before the consolidation courts. 5. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that inasmuch as the Deputy Director did not record any clear finding on the point that Deoraj had become a co-tenant of the Khata in question, he could not have decided the revision applications against Bhagan and others holding that both Mathura and Sm. Manoria were co-bhumidhars. It was contended that Sm. Manoria could have become a co-bhumidhar with Mathura only in case her husband Deoraj was a co-tenant with Mathura. Reliance was placed on Section 33 which prohibited transfers except in favour of a co-tenant, and provided that "no person shall be deemed to be a co-tenant notwithstanding that he may share in the cultivation of the holding unless he was a co-tenant from the commencement of the tenancy or has become such by succession or has been recognised as such in writing by the landholder." 6. It is, therefore, contended that it was incumbent on Sm. Manoria to establish that her husband had been a co-tenant of the holding from the commencement of the tenancy or had become such by succession or had been subsequently recognised as such in writing by the land-holder. It was also contended that inasmuch as none of these conditions existed the plea of co-tenancy should be rejected. 7. Manoria to establish that her husband had been a co-tenant of the holding from the commencement of the tenancy or had become such by succession or had been subsequently recognised as such in writing by the land-holder. It was also contended that inasmuch as none of these conditions existed the plea of co-tenancy should be rejected. 7. Another contention raised was that Sm. Manoria could not have become a bhumidhar unless she was a co-tenant of Mathura, and for that proposition reliance is placed on the case of Data Din and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad, 1961 R.D. 318 wherein it was held that "bhumidhari rights are conferred by Section 18 (2) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act upon a person holding a sanad granted under the Acquisition of Privileges Act only if he is a "person belonging to the class mentioned in Section 3" of the Acquisition of Privileges Act. The class of persons mentioned in Section 3 are persons holding certain tenancy rights. On the date of vesting, a person must belong to that class in order to be entitled to bhumidhari rights and mere possession of the bhumidhari sanad is not enough." 8. The learned counsel for the opposite parties has not challenged this proposition of law as laid down in Data Din's case (supra). He has, however, relied on the case of Dudh Nath Kori v. Sm. Dhanrajia, 1954 A.W.R. (H.C.) 458, in support of his contention that Section 23 of Act 3 of 1926 and Section 33 of Act 27 of 1939 do not exhaustively lay down the modes in which a person could have become a co-tenant, and that the acquisition of co-tenancy rights by estoppel was not opposed to the provisions of any statute. He also relied on the case of Babaji Daso Deshpande v. Jiwaji Yeshwant Deshpande, A.I.R. 1930 Bom. 333 in support of his contention that in the circumstances of the case the long history of possession over the joint Khata would give him the right of co-tenancy in the Khata. In Babaji Daso Deshpande's case, AIR 1930 Bom 333, a person given in adoption had even after adoption been treated as a member of the joint family of his birth openly exercising the rights appurtenant to such a position for over 12 years. In Babaji Daso Deshpande's case, AIR 1930 Bom 333, a person given in adoption had even after adoption been treated as a member of the joint family of his birth openly exercising the rights appurtenant to such a position for over 12 years. He was deemed to have acquired a title to joint possession by adverse possession. 9. The main question for consideration in this writ petition is whether there is a manifest error of law in the decision arrived at by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The finding of fact recorded by him is that Deoraj and after his death Sm. Manoria were described as co-tenants of the holding in the revenue papers from before 1345 Fasli and that the possession of Sm. Manoria over the holding had continued right upto the date of the filing of objections by Bhagan and another and even thereafter. This finding, considered in the circumstances of the case, to wit, that in the year 1940 the objection Mathura filed before the A.R.O. was dismissed and the entries of co-tenancy of Deoraj and Mathura were allowed to continue, that Deoraj died some nine years after the order of the A.R.O. and it was only after the death of Deoraj that an objection was raised during the course of mutation proceedings that Sm. Manoria was not entitled to get her name mutated in his place, cannot be said to suffer from any infirmity. The objection against mutation of Sm. Manoria's name could obviously relate to the right of Sm. Manoria to succeed to Deoraj and not to the right of Deoraj to be entered as a co-tenant. The declaratory suit was filed only in the year 1958, i.e., more than 18 years after the A.R.O. had declared both Deoraj and Mathura to be the co-tenants of the holding in question, and could not, therefore, succeed against a recorded co-tenant, who had remained in joint possession of the holding for more than 18 years. 10. The status of Deoraj as a co-tenant, though it had come to the knowledge of Mathura prior to the year 1940, was not questioned till as late as 1958 A.D. Again it was questioned only by means of a declaratory suit. 10. The status of Deoraj as a co-tenant, though it had come to the knowledge of Mathura prior to the year 1940, was not questioned till as late as 1958 A.D. Again it was questioned only by means of a declaratory suit. The names of the two co-tenants remained entered in the revenue records and the co-tenants or their heirs remained in joint possession of the land for over 18 years before the declaratory suit was filed. In these circumstances Sm. Manoria could very well say that both her husband and she had acquired co-tenancy by virtue of their names being recorded in the revenue papers for a very long period and also possession. 11. It was held in the case of Dudh Nath Kori v. Sm. Dhanraja that Section 23 of Act 3 of 1926 did not exhaustively lay down the modes by which a person could become a co-tenant and the acquisition of co-tenancy rights by estoppel was not opposed to the provisions of any statute. I respectfully agree with that view. The provisions of the proviso to Section 23 of Act 3 of 1926 will not be against the acquisition of co-tenancy rights by estoppel or even by adverse possession. 12. It is, therefore, clear that the Deputy Director of Consolidation could arrive at the decision on the basis of the findings of fact recorded by him. It is true that he has nowhere in his judgment mentioned that Deoraj or Sm. Manoria had become co-tenants by adverse possession or by estoppel. However, when he accepted that right in them after arriving at the finding that they had remained in possession of the holding for more than 18 years it can be safely inferred that he wanted to rely on the principles of estoppel and adverse possession. 13. It is not a fit case for interference in writ jurisdiction. The petition is dismissed. I make no order as to costs.