ORDER :- This Rule is directed against an order of the Sessions Judge at Howrah whereby he set aside the order of an assistant sessions judge of the district directing a complaint to be made against the present opposite party to a magistrate, first class, for an offence under section 211 of the Indian Penal Code. On a first information alleging an offence of dacoity resulting in a charge-sheet, the five petitioners were put on trial on a charge under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code. The trial ended in an acquittal with a finding that the allegations made in the complaint were false, frivolous and malicious. The present petitioners thereupon applied to the learned assistant sessions judge concerned for an enquiry under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the object of making a complaint against the present opposite party for an offence under Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned assistant sessions judge allowed the prayer and directed that a complaint be filed as prayed for. Against this order of the learned assistant sessions judge, an appeal was taken to the sessions judge of the district and he found that the necessary findings required to be arrived at before a complaint can be directed to be made under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were wanting in the findings of the trial court and on this finding he allowed the appeal and directed that the complaint already made by the assistant sessions Judge be withdrawn. It is against this order that the petitioners moved this Court and obtained the present Rule. 2. Mr. Ray appearing in support of the rule contends that the fact that in the complaint it was not stated that it was expedient in the interest of justice that the opposite party should be prosecuted, is not a factor which would take away the legality of the complaint. Certain other arguments in this regard were also advanced. In my view the entire approach of the learned Sessions Judge to the matter before him was erroneous. The question that really arises in the matter is whether any complaint of the Court concerned is really required in the case. 3. Certain other arguments in this regard were also advanced. In my view the entire approach of the learned Sessions Judge to the matter before him was erroneous. The question that really arises in the matter is whether any complaint of the Court concerned is really required in the case. 3. Section 476 of the Criminal P.C. is attracted to offences referred to in S. 195 (1) (b) or (c) when the offences mentioned therein appear to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in Court before which the enquiry is prayed for. If as a result of the enquiry the Court concerned comes to the finding that it is expedient in the interest of justice that a complaint should be made, it is then and then only that S. 195 (1) comes into operation. That S. 195 (1) provides a bar to the taking of cognizance of an offence in the case of certain offences committed under certain specific circumstances. Clause (b) of sub-s. (1) to S. 195 provides such a bar in the case of offences including one under S. 211 of the Penal Code when such offences are alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceeding in Court. Cognizance of these offences mentioned in this clause can only be taken on the complaint in writing of the Court in which the offences are committed or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate. The position thus comes to this that in the case of an offence under S. 211 of the Penal Code, in order to attract the bar of S. 195 (1) (b) or (c) necessiting thereby an enquiry under S. 476 of the Criminal P.C., such offences must be alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceeding in Court to which the prayer for enquiry is made. If the offence is not committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any Court, the bar of S. 195 (1) (b) is not attracted and necessarily an enquiry under S. 476 of the Code is not called for. The question pertinent in this case thus boils down to this as to whether the alleged offence under S. 211 of the Penal Code was committed in or in relation to any proceeding in Court. 4. The question pertinent in this case thus boils down to this as to whether the alleged offence under S. 211 of the Penal Code was committed in or in relation to any proceeding in Court. 4. The alleged offence, according to the present petitioners, was committed as a result of a false charge laid at the police station in the first information report which culminated in a charge-sheet under S. 395 of the Penal Code against them. Obviously, there was no proceeding pending in any Court at that time. The question as to whether there is a proceeding pending in any Court while a matter is pending investigation by the police came up for decision by the Supreme Court in the case : M. L. Sethi v. S. P. Kapur, AIR 1967 SC 528 . It was held in that case that in the case of a matter pending police investigation, there is no proceeding pending in Court till the filing of the final report on the charge sheet in the case and it was further held that if there was no proceeding in any Court at all in which or in relation to which the offence under S. 211 of the Penal Code could be alleged to have been committed, S. 195 (1) (b) of the Criminal P.C. would not be attracted at all. 5. Mr. Ray appearing for the petitioners persuaded himself to accept this legal position and he himself refers to the case : Tayebulla v. Emperor, ILR 43 Cal 1152 : (AIR 1917 Cal 593), and also to the case : Haibat Khan v. Emperor, (1906) ILR 33 Cal 30, where this very point cropped up and it was held by this Court that no sanction is necessary under S. 95 (1) (b) of the Criminal P.C. to prosecute an informant under S. 211 of the Penal Code when a false charge had been made by him only to the police. 6. Section 211 of the Penal Code appears in Chapter XI of the Code which deals with false evidence and offences against public justice. All the offences mentioned in S. 195 (1) (b) of the Criminal P.C. are offences falling under this Chapter. 6. Section 211 of the Penal Code appears in Chapter XI of the Code which deals with false evidence and offences against public justice. All the offences mentioned in S. 195 (1) (b) of the Criminal P.C. are offences falling under this Chapter. The Chapter deals with a proceeding pending in Court, and from this arrangement also a conclusion is permissible that S. 195 (1) (b) of the Criminal P.C. comes into operation only when a proceeding is pending in Court and the offences concerned are committed in or in relation to that proceeding. Although arrangement in a Code is not always a sufficient guide in the matter of interpretation of the Code, a literal interpretation of S. 195 (1) (b) must lead to the inference that unless there is a proceeding pending in any Court and unless the offences concerned are committed in or in relation to that proceeding, the bar provided for in the section does not operate. 7. Considering the above, I find that the enquiry under S. 476 of the Criminal P.C. in this case was incompetent as no complaint of the trial Court was necessary for the purpose of prosecuting the opposite party for the offence under S. 211 of the Penal Code in the present case. The petitioners were free to make a complaint in Court untrammelled by any bar imposed by the Code. 8. In this view of the matter, this Rule stands discharged. Rule discharged.