JUDGMENT M.H. Beg, J. - This writ petition is directed against the orders of the consolidation authorities in a case arising out of an objection filed by Chhidda, opposite party No. 3, under Section 10 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) Chhidda's objection, filed on July 9, 1960, was that the name of Shankar Lal, the petitioner here, should be expunged from Khata No. 413 of village Khad Mohan Nagar, Pargana Siana, in the district of Bulandshahr. Later, on June 6, 1961, Chhidda, together with two of his brothers, Ram Dass and Raghubir, opposite parties Nos. 5 and 6, filed an application stating that the brothers wanted to remain joint. That application does not say that the applicants wanted the objection of Chhidda against Shankar Lal to be dismissed. It is evident that the application and a statement alleged to have been made by Chhidda and his brothers subsequently appeared quite unconnected. Moreover, it also appeared that statements of the applicants were not recorded separately, but an order of the Consolidation Officer showing that such statements were made was recorded on the back of the application. After recording the supposed joint statement, in the manner mentioned above, the Consolidation Officer dismissed the objection of Chhidda on June 6, 1961. It is not known whether this dismissal took place in the presence of the parties or afterwards. It is also not known when Chhidda and his brothers came to know of the dismissal of Chhidda's objection against Shankar Lal. 2. All we know is that an appeal war preferred, on January 8, 1962, by Chhidda and three of his brothers, including Babu Ram who had not filed any application at all before the Consolidation Officer. This appeal, under Section 11 (1) of the Act, filed before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), was time-barred on the face of it. Such an appeal can only be preferred within 30 days of the date of the order. But, Section 53-B of the Act, which was on the statute book at the relevant time, enabled delay in filing an appeal to be condoned by applying the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to such appeals. It appears that Chhidda and his brothers had filed an affidavit together with the memorandum of appeal. 3. But, Section 53-B of the Act, which was on the statute book at the relevant time, enabled delay in filing an appeal to be condoned by applying the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to such appeals. It appears that Chhidda and his brothers had filed an affidavit together with the memorandum of appeal. 3. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dismissed the appeal of Chhidda and his brothers on March 14, 1962 on merits without going into the question whether the appeal was barred by time. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) held that Babu Ram, one of the appellants, had no right of appeal whatsoever as he had not filed any objection before the Consolidation Officer. So far as Chhidda and his brothers, Raghubir and Ram Dass, were concerned, the Settlement Officer held that the statement recorded by Consolidation Officer, purporting to have been made on behalf of Chhidda and his brothers, was rightly treated by the Consolidation Officer as a withdrawal of the objection of Chhidda against Shankar Lal altogether. The Settlement Officer also took into account that the appellants had not filed any evidence in support of any objection for nearly 3 years. The Settlement Officer did not go into the merits of the entries as there was no evidence before him on this point. The Settlement Officer treated the order passed by the Consolidation Officer as a proper order of dismissal of Chhidda's objection resulting from an admission by the appellants of the rights of Shankar Lal. This supposed admission was the only evidence in the case about the rights of the two sides. 4. Chhidda and his brothers appealed to the Deputy Director of Consolidation from the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated March 14, 1962. The learned Deputy Director came to the conclusion that the case of Chhidda and his brothers deserved to be heard on merits because the statement alleged to have been made by Chhidda and his brothers was neither properly recorded nor consistent with the application dated June 6, 1961. He, therefore, inferred that there must have been some misapprehension or mis-understanding which resulted in the order of the Consolidation Officer. He, therefore, inferred that there must have been some misapprehension or mis-understanding which resulted in the order of the Consolidation Officer. Assuming that this conclusion was correct and that the Deputy Director was justified in inferring that there must be some misapprehension giving to the order of the Consolidation Officer, the further question remained whether Chhidda and his brothers had preferred an appeal in time to the Settlement Officer. This question was not determined by the Deputy Director of Consolidation at all on the ground that the question of Limitation should have been raised before the Settlement Officer and not before him. 5. My attention has been drawn by Mr. Bhatnagar to the provisions of Section 44-A of the Act which was applicable. This lays down : "Where powers are to be exercised or duties to be performed by any authority under this Act or the rules made there under, such powers or duties may also be exercised or performed by an authority superior to it." The Deputy Director was, therefore, clearly in error in holding that the question could not be raised before him at all. After going through the order of the Settlement Officer, it appears that Settlement Officer has not considered the question of limitation at all as no body raised it before him. His attention does not appear to have been directed towards it at all. On behalf of the petitioner it is urged that he had no opportunity of meeting any affidavit filed before the Settlement Officer. In reply, the contesting opposite parties submit that there is no practise in proceedings before Consolidation authorities to serve copies of affidavits on parties. In other words, the petitioner's grievance is that the whole question remained undecided as there was no opportunity given to him to contest any application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. As already indicated, the order of the Settlement Officer also shows that he never applied his mind to the question at all. 6. In these circumstances, it is clear that the Deputy Director should have himself taken evidence and decided the question whether the delay in filing appeal before the Settlement Officer could be condoned. Section 44-A of the Act undoubtedly invests him with the power to go into this matter. 6. In these circumstances, it is clear that the Deputy Director should have himself taken evidence and decided the question whether the delay in filing appeal before the Settlement Officer could be condoned. Section 44-A of the Act undoubtedly invests him with the power to go into this matter. If Chhidda and his brothers could justify the delay in filing the appeal by showing that they had no knowledge of the order passed or were under some misapprehension or could give some other acceptable ground for condonation of delay, the Deputy Director could himself have condoned the delay by reason of Section 44-A of the Act. This question could only be decided after a proper inquiry in the course of which both sides should have had an opportunity of giving evidence. It was essential that this matter should have been decided at the outset because the validity of the order of the Settlement Officer on the first appeal depended upon the decision of this question. If there was no proper ground for condonation of delay the appeal could not have been entertained by the Settlement Officer. This would, in its turn, affect the maintainability of the second appeal before the Deputy Director. The view of the Deputy Director that he was unconcerned with the preliminary bar which arose in the court of the Settlement Officer is, in my opinion, patently erroneous. If, after considering the question of condonation of delay and deciding that the delay could be condoned, the Deputy Director had come to the conclusion that the Consolidation Officer had not proceeded properly, the Deputy Director could, in my opinion, remand the case to the Consolidation Officer for adjudication on merits. 7. An objection advanced against the order of the Deputy Director is that he had no power to remand the case on a second appeal. The contention is that the power of remand had to be conferred specifically upon the appellate authority just as it is found under Section 107 C.P.C. This argument overlooks that the powers of appellate authorities acting under the Act are not defined with the same precision or in such detail as they are under the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is that the power of remand had to be conferred specifically upon the appellate authority just as it is found under Section 107 C.P.C. This argument overlooks that the powers of appellate authorities acting under the Act are not defined with the same precision or in such detail as they are under the Code of Civil Procedure. It is, however, evident from an examination of powers of appellate courts in general that the power of remanding the case for re-hearing to the subordinate authority or court is either expressly included or inherent and implied in the power of deciding an appeal and passing appropriate order on it. It is not necessary that such a power should be always expressly conferred. Section 11(2) was also relied upon in support of the contention that the Deputy Director had no power to remand the case to the Consolidation Officer. It was contended that the Deputy Director could only pass an order which finally disposed of the dispute between the parties. This contention overlooks that Section 11(2) only gave finality to the order of the Deputy Director in the sense that it could not be ordinarily questioned further. It did not mean that the order had to be such as to finally dispose of the claims of the two sides. Obviously, such a final decision was not possible in those cases where no evidence had been taken on the wrong assumption that there was an admission so that a consent order could be passed. In such cases, the appellate authority has powers to remand the case or to take evidence itself by reason of Section 44-A of the Act. 8. The Deputy Director could remand the case to the Consolidation Officer for considering the merits only after the preliminary hurdle of delay in filing an appeal from the order of the Consolidation Officer had been surmounted. That hurdle could only by overcome by a proper inquiry either before the Settlement Officer or before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The question had not arisen in the court of the Consolidation Officer and there was no duty cast upon the Consolidation Officer, by any provision of law or by any order passed, to perform the duty which the Settlement Officer ought to have performed before hearing the appeal. The question had not arisen in the court of the Consolidation Officer and there was no duty cast upon the Consolidation Officer, by any provision of law or by any order passed, to perform the duty which the Settlement Officer ought to have performed before hearing the appeal. The Deputy Director could have performed this duty under Section 44-A of the Act, but did not do so due to a patent misconception on a question of law. There could be no remand to the Consolidation Officer before such a duty had been performed by an authority competent to do so. 9. Mr. S.S. Bhatnagar, for the petitioner, relying on Zahirul Said v. Lachhmi Narayan, A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 251 and Salendra Narayan v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 346, also contended that there was a general principle that no appeal lay against a consent order. It may be observed that there is no such limitation on the powers of the appellate courts under Section 11 of the Act, but even assuming that there could be such a limit to the right of appeal under the Act, the question whether there was or was not consent on the part of Chhidda and his brothers had not been determined by taking evidence on this matter specifically. Chhidda and his brothers denied consent. The Deputy Director had, on the evidence already before him, come to the conclusion that there was a mis-apprehension. If this was the correct conclusion, there was no consent on the part of Chhidda. I do not think that such a conclusion arrived at by the Deputy Director can be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution as it is not unfounded in evidence. There was a conflict between the contents of the application and the alleged statement embodied in order of the Consolidation Officer. The alleged statement had not been properly recorded. The consolidation authorities, though perhaps not strictly "courts", have to decide important questions of rights of parties. They have to proceed in a judicial manner which should approximate as nearly as is reasonably possible to that adopted in regular Courts. 10. The alleged statement had not been properly recorded. The consolidation authorities, though perhaps not strictly "courts", have to decide important questions of rights of parties. They have to proceed in a judicial manner which should approximate as nearly as is reasonably possible to that adopted in regular Courts. 10. It was contended for the respondents that the finding of the Joint Director dismissing the revision application of the petitioner, under Section 48 of the Act, on January 7, 1963, showed that the petitioner would suffer no injustice from the remand which would only give parties opportunity to prove their respective cases. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that unnecessary litigation itself imposes a hardship and must result in injustice. After considering this matter also. I think this is a fit case in which the order of the Deputy Director should be quashed as it fails to determine a question which had to be determined by him before he could have the jurisdiction remand the case to the Consolidation Officer. Justice cannot be completely dissociated from correctness of procedure which is meant to subserve the ends of justice and not to defeat them. A right to an inquiry and to a decision upon a matter which can have a decisive bearing on the claims of the two sides is involved here. 11. I, therefore, quash the order of the Deputy Director dated June 22, 1962 as well as of the Joint Director dated January 17, 1963 and send back the case to the Deputy Director for disposal in accordance with law. The parties will bear their own costs.