N. G. SHELAT, J. ( 1 ) * * * * ( 2 ) TWO points arise with regard to and in relation to the service of summons said to have been effected in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 8 of 1965. The first is whether the service of summons by registered post to the opponent in any such proceeding under sec. 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code was valid even if it can be taken as so effected and secondly whether the period of limitation begins to run from the date of the order or from the date of knowledge of such order under sec. 488 (6) of the Code. Now clause (6) of sec. 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that all evidence under this Chapter shall be taken in the presence of the husband or father as the case may be or when his personal attendance is dispensed with in the presence of his pleader and shall be recorded in the manner prescribed in the case of summons cases. It is not in dispute that in proceedings under sec. 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code the Court has to follow the procedure laid down in respect of summons cases. The procedure in so far as it relates to processes for appearance is contained in secs. 68 to 71 of Chapter VI-A of the Code. Sec. 68 (1) refers to the form of summons and sub-sec. thereof says that it shall be served by a police-officer or subject to such rules as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf by an officer of the Court issuing it or other public servant. Then sec. 69 provides as to how the summons has to be served. Sub-sec. (1) thereof says that the summons shall if practicable be served personally on the person summoned by delivering or tendering to him one of the duplicates of the summons. Under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 69 a receipt has to be passed by the person on whom a summons is so served on the back of the duplicate. Then comes sec. 70 which provides for service of summons when a person summoned cannot be found. Under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 69 a receipt has to be passed by the person on whom a summons is so served on the back of the duplicate. Then comes sec. 70 which provides for service of summons when a person summoned cannot be found. In those circumstances the summons may be served by leaving one of the duplicates with some adult male member of his family or in a presidency town with his servant residing with him and the person with whom the summons is so left shall sign a receipt thereof on the back of the other duplicate. Then comes sec. 71 which provides for certain procedure when service cannot be effected as provided before i. e. provided in secs. 69 and 70 of the Code. In those circumstances the serving officer shall affix one of the duplicates of the summons to some conspicuous part of the house or homestead in which the person summoned ordinarily resides and thereupon the summons shall be deemed to have been duly served. None of these methods contemplated for service of summons has been adopted in the present case and we find no provision whatever in the Criminal Procedure Code or under any rules framed in that respect that a person can be served in a manner other than what is contemplated under secs. 68 to 71 of the Code of Criminal Procedure viz. by registered post or so. In these circumstances even if any summons was sent by registered post and it had come back as refused by the opponent-husband it cannot be said that he was duly served in accordance with the provisions contained in he Criminal Procedure Code. Any such service cannot be called service in law and it has to be taken as not served for the purpose of service. ( 3 ) THE learned Magistrate as already stated above had proceeded ex parte against Laxmidas in the matter on the basis that the summons was sent to him by registered post and that it had come back duly refused by him. In other words he must have felt that he was willfully avoiding service or willfully neglecting to attend the Court as provided in subsec. (6) of sec. 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code and that way he proceeded to hear the matter ex parte against him. In other words he must have felt that he was willfully avoiding service or willfully neglecting to attend the Court as provided in subsec. (6) of sec. 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code and that way he proceeded to hear the matter ex parte against him. But the learned Sessions Judge has dealt with that part of the matter in an exhaustive manner and that again after looking into the papers of that Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 8 of 1965 and has come to the conclusion that those papers nowhere show that the notice sent by registered post was received back by the Court. He has then pointed out that there is no affidavit filed by the applicant that the notice was addressed to the proper address of the opponent and that the opponent was residing at that very place at that time though in fact a date was fixed for filing an affidavit in respect thereof. One other circumstance pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge is that the address of the opponent shown in the suit for judicial separation filed in the Court of the Civil Judge Bareily was quite different from the one shown in the Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 8 of 1965 filed by the wife in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate F. C. Gandhidham. In these circumstances his conclusion was that any such service cannot be said to be a valid service on him in respect of that proceeding and there is no reason why we should not accept that finding as correct which was arrived at on the basis of facts before the Sessions Judge. That way speaking there is no valid service of the proceeding filed by the wife.-Bai Laxmibai against her husband. . . Laxmandas for maintenance and consequently the order passed in that petition was an order which cannot be one passed against an opponent who was willfully avoiding service or willfully neglecting to attend the Court as contemplated in the proviso to sub-sec. (6) of sec. 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The evidence under this chapter has to be taken in the presence of the husband or when his personal attendance is dispensed with in the presence of his pleader and has to be recorded in the manner prescribed in the case of summons cases. (6) of sec. 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The evidence under this chapter has to be taken in the presence of the husband or when his personal attendance is dispensed with in the presence of his pleader and has to be recorded in the manner prescribed in the case of summons cases. But by reason of the proviso if the Magistrate is satisfied that the husband against whom The application for maintenance has been made is willfully avoiding service or willfully neglecting to attend the Court the Magistrate can proceed to hear and determine the case ex parte. Thus it can be called an ex parte order legitimately passed by the Court only when the Court is satisfied that he was willfully avoiding service or willfully neglecting to attend the Court. ( 4 ) AS already shown here above there is no service effected as required in law and the one said to have been effected by registered post-apart from its being invalid as not provided in the Code there is nothing to show that he refused to accept it as it had not come back with any such endorsement. Unless therefore the Court is satisfied that he was willfully avoiding service or willfully neglecting to attend the Court it cannot proceed against him ex parte under sec. 488 clause (6) of the Code. The order therefore was not an ex parte order validly passed against him. It cannot affect him in any manner. In that view of the matter the question of limitation of three months from the date of order cannot arise. ( 5 ) HOWEVER if it arises it can obviously run from the date of his knowledge of such an order and cannot be from the date of order itself in the circumstances of the case. The relevant part of the proviso says that any order so made may be set aside for good cause shown on application made within three months from the date thereof. It is the contention of Mr. Israni the learned Advocate for Laxmibai that the words in the last part of the proviso do not show that the application can be made within three months from the date of the knowledge of the order and that no Court would read something more than what the words clearly indicate. It is the contention of Mr. Israni the learned Advocate for Laxmibai that the words in the last part of the proviso do not show that the application can be made within three months from the date of the knowledge of the order and that no Court would read something more than what the words clearly indicate. According to him therefore the period of limitation would commence from the date of the order itself and since he did not file the application within that period it was liable to be rejected by the learned Magistrate. In support of that proposition he invited a reference to the case of A. S. Govindan v. Mrs. Margaret Jayammal A. I. R. 1950 Madras 153. There it has been laid down that the period of three months does not mean three months from the date of knowledge of the order. In the Judgment we do not find as to how the ex parte order was passed by the learned Magistrate. The facts reveal only that an ex parte order for maintenance was passed against the petitioner on 7th September 1948 and an application to set aside that order was filed on 4 January 1949. Then the judgment refers to the proviso to clause (6) of sec. 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code saying that an ex parte order may be set aside for good cause shown on application made within three months from the date of the order. There the contention was that the period of three months means three months from the date of the knowledge of the order. In short the word knowledge was sought to be introduced which was not there and there was no reason why section should be read with the word knowledge which was not there. It is further observed that if the intention of the Legislature was that it would be three months from the date of knowledge of the order it would have said so. It is that way that the application was rejected. We do not know whether the ex parte order was passed on the ground namely as to whether the opponent-husband was found willfully avoiding service or that he was willfully neglecting to attend the Court. It may not be a case of the type that we have in which the facts established are that no proper service was at all effected. It may not be a case of the type that we have in which the facts established are that no proper service was at all effected. That case therefore can have no application. ( 6 ) BUT we have a decision of the Supreme Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 1500 where the question arose as to whether the expression the date of the award used in proviso (b) to sec. 18 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court said that where the rights of a person are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order the making of the award must mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned. So the knowledge of the party affected by the award made by the Collector under sec. 12 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 either actual or constructive is an essential requirement for fair play and natural justice. Their Lordships then observed that it would be unreasonable to construe the words from the date of the Collectors award used in the proviso to sec. 18 in a literal or mechanical way. Those observations well serve the purpose in giving meaning to the words similarly used in the proviso to sub-sec. (6) of sec. 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code. To hold otherwise on reading it in a mechanical or literal manners would mean a denial of justice-which can never have been contemplated even by the Legislature. It has to be read in a reasonable manner as otherwise there would be no remedy available if any fraud is practised by a party in obtaining an ex parte order from the Court. The application has therefore to be taken as duly filed within three months from the date of the knowledge thereof more particularly in cases of this type where not only no valid summons was issued as required under the provisions of the Code but where the opponent was found not to have been willfully avoiding service or neglecting to attend the Court as required under sec. 488 (6) of the Code. It is therefore clear that the period of limitation will only begin to run from the date when the opponent came to know about the order passed against him by the Court for setting aside any such order passed behind his back. The learned Sessions Judge was therefore quite correct in recommending the case to set aside the order passed by learned Magistrate. Order set aside. .