JUDGMENT V.G. Oak, C.J. and B. Dayal, J. - This special appeal arises out of an election petition. Shri Siaram was elected to the U.P. Legislative Assembly from a certain constituency. Shri Nathuram has filed an election petition challenging Shri Siaram's election. The election petition is pending before a learned Judge of this Court. Shri Nathuram applied to the Court for permission to inspect election papers. The application was opposed by Shri Siaram. The learned Judge overruled the objection. The application for inspection was partly allowed on 18-7-1967. The learned Judge decided to permit inspection of some of the election papers. The present Special Appeal by Shri Siaram is directed against the order of the learned single Judge, dated 18.7-1967. At the outset we considered the question whether the Special Appeal is maintainable. We heard Mr. V.K.S. Chaudhry for the appellant and Mr. M.A. Ansari for the petitioner respondent on this preliminary question. The election petition is being tried under the provisions of the Representation of the people Act, 1951 (hereafter referred to as the Act). The Act was recently amended by Central Act No. 47 of 1966. The Amending Act has introduced important changes in the procedure relating to the trial of election petitions. Chapter IV-A of the Act deals with appeals. Section 116-A appearing in Chapter 1V-A provides for appeals to Supreme Court. Sub-sec. (1) of Section 116-A states: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court on any question (whether of law or fact) from every order made by the High Court under Section 98 or Section 99." In the present case we are not dealing with any decision under Section 98 or under Section 99 of the Act. The impugned order is an interlocutory order. The question arises whether such an interlocutory order is appealable to this Court. Section 116-A of the Act does not contain any express provision for appeals against interlocutory orders. Mr. Chaudhry, however, relies upon Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court. Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court lays down that an appeal shall lie to this Court from the judgment of one Judge of this Court. This provision follows clause (10) of Letters Patent of Allahabad High Court. Mr. Chaudhry, however, relies upon Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court. Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court lays down that an appeal shall lie to this Court from the judgment of one Judge of this Court. This provision follows clause (10) of Letters Patent of Allahabad High Court. The question for consideration is whether the present appeal is maintainable under Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court read with clause (10) of Letters Patent of Allahabad High Court. Mr. Chaudhry urged that, although the Representation of the People Act, 1951 does not contain any provision for appeals from interlocutory orders, the normal procedure for such appeals should be assumed to continue. Reliance was placed on Secretary of State v. Rama Rao, A.I.R. 1916 PC 21. It was held in that case that where an appeal was preferred to the District Court against the decision of the Forest Settlement Officer under Section 10 (2) , the District Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country, with regard to whose procedure, orders and decrees, the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply. In Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin, A.I.R. 1934 PC 81 it was held that when a right of appeal is given to one of the ordinary courts of the country, the procedure, orders and decrees of that Court will be governed by the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code. An appeal to Privy Council is therefore maintainable from the decision of the High Court under Section 75 from the order of the District Judge. In Hem Singh v. Basant Das, A.I.R. 1936 PC 93 it was held that the provision in the Gurudwaras Act that appeals from the tribunal are to be heard by A Divisions Court and not by singly Judge does not indicate that the High Court in dealing with such matters would be exercising a special jurisdiction. the provisions of the Civil Procedure code with reference to appeals to his Majesty apply to decrees of the High Court made under Section 34. Hence there was a right of appeal to the privy Council from such derees. In 'Durga Charan v. Markande Misir, A.I.R. 1939 Alld. the provisions of the Civil Procedure code with reference to appeals to his Majesty apply to decrees of the High Court made under Section 34. Hence there was a right of appeal to the privy Council from such derees. In 'Durga Charan v. Markande Misir, A.I.R. 1939 Alld. 233' it was observed on page 234 that when a question is said to be referred to an established Court without more, it imports that the ordinary incidents of the Procedure of that Court are to attach and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches. These decisions cited by Mr. Choudhry would have been of considerable assistance to the appellant, had been dealing with ordinary property rights. But we must remember that the present Special Appeal arises out of an election dispute. Cl. (b) of Article 329 of the constitution state."no election to either House of Parliment or to the House or either House of the legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate legislature" In N.P Ponnustwami v. The Returning officer Namakkal, A.I.R. 1952 SC 64, their Lordships of the Supreme court observed on page 71: "The right to vote or stand as candidate for election is not a civil right but is a creature of statute or special law and must be subject to the limitation imposed by it." Similarly in K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar, A.I.R. 1958 SC 687 it was explained on page 603 that an election contest is not as action at law or a suit in equity but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and the court possesses no common law power. It may further be pointed out that under Sect. 116-A of the Act appeal lies to the Supreme Court from the final decision of a single Judge of the High Court under Section 98 or under Section 99. it would be a curious position if interlocutory orders are appealable to the High court, while the final orders are appealable to the Supreme court. Chapter III of the Act provides for trial of election petitions. Chapter III is exhaustive as regards the trial of election petitions. it would be a curious position if interlocutory orders are appealable to the High court, while the final orders are appealable to the Supreme court. Chapter III of the Act provides for trial of election petitions. Chapter III is exhaustive as regards the trial of election petitions. Similarly, Chapter IV-a appears to be exhaustive on the subject or appeals. Sec. 86 of the Act deals with trial of an election petition, sub-sec. (6) of section 86 states: "The trial of an election petition shall, so far as is practicable consistently with the interests of justice in respect of the trial, be continued from day to day until its conclusion, unless the High Court finds the adjournment of the trial beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded." sub-section (7) of Sec . 86 states: "Every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date on which the election petition es presented to the High Court for Trial". formerly, election petitions were tried by Tribunals. Under the old Act, Sub-Sec (6) of Section 90 provided that every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months. That provision corresponds to the present Sub-Sec. (7) of Section 86 of the Act. But it appears that under the previous plan there was no provision corresponding to the present sub-section (6) and (7) of the Present Section 86 are designed to ensure quick disposal of election petitions. Formerly section 116-A stood thus: "an appeal shall lie from every order made by a Tribunal under Section 98 or Sec, 99 to the High court of the State in which the Tribunal is situated." Although the Act provided for appeals from the final decisions of Elections Tribunals, there was no provision for appeals fro9m interlocutory orders passed by Election Tribunals. It would be rather strange that, in spite of the anxiety of Parliament to ensure quick disposal of election petitions, the law now provides for appeals from interlocutory orders, whereas there was no provision for appeals from interlocutory orders passed by Election Tribunals. The present appellant has presented before us an application for staying operation of the impugned order, dated 18-7-1967. The present appellant has presented before us an application for staying operation of the impugned order, dated 18-7-1967. If we entertain and admit this appeal, we shall probably have to agree to pass a stay order as requested by the appellant. If appeals of this kind are to be entertained by the appellate Bench of this Court, the appellate Bench will have to pass stay orders from time to time. If the appellate Bench passes stay orders in such Special Appeals, it will be almost impossible for the trial Judge to conclude the trial of the election petition within six months as required by sub-sec. (7) of Section 86 of the Act. To sum up: (1) The present appeal arises out of an election petition. (2) Appeals are provided by Section 116-A of the Act. This section does not provide for appeals from interlocutory orders. Chapter IV-A dealing with appeals appears to be exhaustive on the subject of appeals. (3) If appeals of this kind are entertained by this Court, the clear intention of the Legislature indicated in sub-secs. (6) and (7) of Section 86 of the Act will be defeated. In view of all these considerations, we have come to the conclusion that no appeal lies to this Court from an interlocutory order passed by a single Judge of this Court during the course of the trial of an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The next question for consideration is whether even if some interlocutory orders are appealable, the present appeal is maintainable under Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court. Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court provides for an appeal from a judgment of one judge of this Court. The question therefore arises whether the impugned order amounts to a 'judgment' within the meaning of Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court. This question came up for consideration in several cases before this Court. In Standard Glass Beads Factory v. Shri Dhar, A.I.R. 1960 Alld. 692 it was held by a Full Bench of this Court that judgment in clause (10) of Letters Patent of Allahabad High Court includes a final judgment, a preliminary judgment and an interlocutory judgment, all of which expressions are used in the Letters Patent. The term 'judgment' does not necessarily exclude an order. 692 it was held by a Full Bench of this Court that judgment in clause (10) of Letters Patent of Allahabad High Court includes a final judgment, a preliminary judgment and an interlocutory judgment, all of which expressions are used in the Letters Patent. The term 'judgment' does not necessarily exclude an order. An order of a single Judge of the High Court dismissing an appeal against an order granting a temporary injunction is an order which finally determines the right of a party to the specific temporary relief. The order is therefore appealable. In that case the impugned order finally disposed of the appeal which was pending before the single Judge of the High Court. That is not the position in the present case. The impugned order does not dispose of the election petition before the learned single Judge. The principle of the case of Standard Glass Beads Factory does not apply to the present case. Certain interlocutory orders may amount to judgments. An interlocutory order may amount to a judgment, if the order decides substantial rights of the parties. By the impugned order the learned single Judge merely permitted Shri Nathuram to inspect certain election papers. The election papers are not property belonging to the present appellant. Election papers were in the custody of the authorities. Apparently the election papers are now in the custody of the Court. If Shri Nathuram is permitted to inspect the election papers, no substantial rights of Shri Siaram are affected. It is not correct to say that to permit inspection of election papers is as good as allowing the election petition. Since no substantial rights of the parties are affected by the impugned order, the order does not amount to a 'judgment'. Firstly, an interlocutory order passed by a single Judge of this Court trying an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 is not at all appeal. able to this Court. Secondly, the impugned order does not amount to a 'judgment' as contemplated by Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court and clause (10) of Letters Patent of Allahabad High Court. For the reasons, the present appeal is not Maintainable. We, therefore, dismiss it. Appeal dismissed